

Eumenes of Cardia

A GREEK AMONG
MACEDONIANS



EDWARD M. ANSON

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Eumenes of Cardia

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By

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In Memoriam
Lucy Dorothy Meyer Anson



Contents

Preface VIII

Abbreviations XI

Chronology XIV

Maps

Greece and the Aegean Area XVII

The Ancient Near East XVIII

Introduction 1

1 The Sources 4

2 From Cardia to Babylon 41

3 From Babylon to Cappadocia 58

4 From Cappadocia to Triparadeisus 88

Appendix: Low or High Chronology? 128

5 “The Fickleness of Fortune” 132

6 The Reckoning with Antigonus 163

Appendix: The Chronology from Nora to Eumenes’ Death 206

7 Greeks and Macedonians 213

8 “A Greek among Macedonians” 241

Bibliography 263

Index 286

Preface

I feel I've known Eumenes for most of my life. When I first encountered the Cardian in the Fall of 1968, he was a figure who had received little attention from modern biographers. The only book length work then was August Vezin's *Eumenes von Karia Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, published in 1907. Since then Eumenes has received quite a bit more attention, with two biographies, one in English (Anson: 1975; 2004B) and another in German (Schäfer: 2002), having appeared. Indeed, given that I am here introducing a second, revised, corrected, and updated version of my original Brill biography, shows clearly that Eumenes along with the Hellenistic Era itself has undergone a considerable surge of interest. This new edition reflects ten years of very profitable research on the Hellenistic Age. As you will note in the bibliography, there are references to more than 80 works cited in this new edition produced since the appearance of the first edition. While the discovery of datable papyri from Nabataea and additional cuneiform tablets from Babylonia have added much to our information concerning the period, they have also given cause for further controversy, especially concerning the chronology of the early Hellenistic Age. Much of the new scholarship has concentrated on the others who made up Alexander's empire, those non Greek and Macedonian elements. As will be noted in the text, the army that was present in Babylon when Alexander died was primarily Asian in its composition. Moreover, with respect to the Successors, the Diadochs, themselves, the old view that there were those whose rapacity was grand, but also those whose ambitions were more circumspect has been seriously challenged, with the current prevailing assessment suggesting that all were similar in their desire to control as much of Alexander's old empire as they possibly could. The argument over the governmental traditions of Macedonia and their effect on the Age created by Alexander's conquests has not abated. My current view and the one expressed in this new edition is that apart from the tradition of monarchy and Argead rule, there were virtually no true political traditions. With respect to the Cardian commander himself, my general assessment has remained in the main unchanged, but it has been placed in a clearer context that suggests that his problems were neither unique nor insurmountable. That he failed to survive the first decade of the Hellenistic Age remains the result of his divided command coupled with a clever, opportunistic, and highly skilled opponent. One aspect of this career, or, perhaps, more accurately his death, however, was not emphasized enough previously. His death along with that of Alexander's mother at roughly the same time marked the effective end of the Argead monarchy. While Eumenes, as will

be shown, may have been a very disingenuous supporter of Alexander's official heirs, the "Kings," finding this "loyalty" to be very politically useful in his final campaign, his death closely followed by that of Olympias, changed the dynamic of conflict for the rest of the Hellenistic Age. Those who survived this Second War of the Successors moved increasingly towards kingship in their own right. While the actual proclamations do not begin until 306, this second war saw the death of the elder member of this dual monarchy, Alexander's brother Arrhidaeus or Philip III, and the imprisonment of Alexander's son Alexander IV. For all intents and purposes the dual monarchy was now openly a farce. Eumenes' career, rather paradoxically, also witnessed the last great instance of a Macedonian army unit exercising its authority. Unfortunately for Eumenes, that last action resulted in this death, but also saw the end of the central importance of Alexander's old Macedonian forces in the conflict. The Cardian's career, in fact, parallels the rise and fall of the political power of the Macedonian troops as a major player in the political strife. Beginning with the chaos that followed Alexander's death, these Macedonians meeting in assembly had an independent and powerful, yet fleeting, impact on the early years of this new age. Beginning shortly after the Conqueror's death these troops meeting in assembly created a king, condemned prominent leaders, and became an active player in the course of events. With Eumenes' defeat and death, these assemblies declined in their frequency and in their independence, becoming, as they had been during the reign of Alexander himself, *ad hoc* affairs, assemblages summoned for the primary purpose of stirring troops to action (Errington 1978: 77–133; Anson 1985: 303–16; 1991: 230–47; 2008B: 135–49; 2013A: 21–5, 26–42).

There are many who have aided in the production of this new edition, but I would especially like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the staff of our University's Ottenheimer Library, and in particular those in the interlibrary loan and acquisitions departments, not just for their help in securing materials for this work, but for their efforts over our long association. Without these individuals my research would have been greatly handicapped. From my first visit to the Library back, well, a long time ago, they have been more than helpful. Our library is not a major research library, but I have never believed myself berft of the materials that I needed to do my work. In particular, I wish to thank Mr. John Hill, Director of Public Services; Ms. Maureen James, Collections Development; Ms. Emily Ray, Mr. Mark Pellegrini, Mr. John Warrick, Acquisitions; and Ms. Kayle Cossey, Ms. Marissa Spencer, Interlibrary Loan.

Along these same lines, there is another group connected to the University that I would also like specially to thank. The University History Institute is a town-and-gown collaboration founded in 1988. The Institute is made up of

subscribers who pay an annual fee or obtain life memberships to hear a series of talks presented by members of the History Department and invited guests in a convivial setting. The money raised from the subscriptions is donated to the Library, which then matches these funds, for the purchase of research materials for the History faculty. As one of those who over the years has benefitted significantly, I do wish to thank them specially. The original impetus for this organization came from two of my colleagues, Professors Carl H. Moneyhon and the late T. Harri Baker.

As with my other works, I would be remiss not to thank my wife Jeanne for again reading and commenting on various drafts of the current work.

Abbreviations

Primary Sources

Ael.	Aelian, <i>Varia Historia</i> (VH)
Aes.	Aeschylus, <i>Seven against Thebes</i>
Aeschin.	Aeschines, 1 (<i>Against Timarchus</i>); 2 (<i>On the Embassy</i>); 3 (<i>Against Ctesiphon</i>)
AION	Annali dell'Istituto universitario orientali di Napoli
Andoc.	Andocides, 3 (<i>On the Peace</i>)
Apollod. Bibl	Apollodorus Library
App.	Appian, <i>Syrian Wars</i> (Syr.); <i>Mithridatic Wars</i> (Mith)
Arist.	Aristotle, <i>Rhetoric</i> (Rhet.)
Aristid.	Aristides, <i>Orations</i> (Or.)
Arr.	Arrian, <i>Anabasis Alexandri</i> (Anab.); <i>Indica</i> (Ind.); <i>Successors</i> (Succ. 1a)
Astronomical Diaries. 2011	<i>Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia. Vol. V. Lunar and Planetary Texts.</i> Hunder, H. (ed.). Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vienna.
Athen.	Athenaeus, <i>The Banqueteers</i>
BCHP	<i>Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period.</i> http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/bchp-ptolemy_iii/bchp_ptolemy_iii_01.html
BM	British Museum
BNJ	Brill's New Jacoby. Worthington, I. (ed.). Brill Online, 2014. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/
Curt.	Curtius, <i>The History of Alexander the Great of Macedon</i>
Dem.	Demosthenes, 1 (<i>Olynthiac</i> 1); 2 (<i>Olynthiac</i> 2); 3 (<i>Olynthiac</i> 3); 4 (<i>Philippic</i> 1); 6 (<i>Philippic</i> 2); [Dem.] 7 (<i>On the Halonnesus</i>); 8 (<i>On the Chersonese</i>); 9 (<i>Philippic</i> 3); [Dem.] 10 (<i>Philippic</i> 4); 11 (<i>Reply to Philip</i>); 15 (<i>On the Liberty of the Rhodians</i>); [Dem.] 17 (<i>On the Accession of Alexander</i>); 18 (<i>On the Crown</i>); 19 (<i>On the False Embassy</i>); 21 (<i>Against Meidias</i>); 23 (<i>Against Aristocrates</i>); 24 (<i>Against Timocrates</i>); 42 (<i>Against Phaenippus</i>); 45 (<i>Against Stephanus</i> 1); 48 (<i>Against Olympiodorus</i>); 57 (<i>Against Eubulides</i>); [Dem.] 12 (<i>Philip</i>); [Dem.] 17 (<i>On the Accession of Alexander</i>)
Dexippus	Arr. Succ. 1b

Dimitsas	Dimitsas, M.G. (Ed.). 1980. <i>Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum et Latinarum Macedoniae</i> , an enlarged reissue in two volumes with preface, introduction, bibliography and a guide to the contents by A.N. Oikonomides. 1896 Greek edition, enlarged and reissued, Chicago: Ares Publishers.
Din.	Dinarchus, 1 (Against Demosthenes)
Diod.	Diodorus, <i>Library of History</i>
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers</i>
Eur.	Euripides, <i>Phoenissae</i> (Phoen.); <i>Iphigenia at Aulis</i> (IA)
Euseb.	Eusebius [Porphyry], <i>Chronica</i> (Chron.)
FGrH	Jacoby, F. 1962. <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> . E.J. Brill. Leiden.
GHI	Tod, M.N. 1948. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> . Vol. 2. From 403 to 323 BC. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
Hdts.	Herodotus, <i>Histories</i>
HE	Heidelberg Epitome. Wheatley, P. 2013. "The Heidelberg Epitome: A Neglected Diadoch Source." In <i>After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi</i> (323–281 BC). V. Alonso-Troncoso and E.M. Anson (eds.). Oxbow Books and The David Brown Book Company. Oxford and Oakville: 17–29.
Hes.	Hesiod, <i>Shield of Heracles</i> (Sh.); <i>Theogony</i> (Th.); <i>Works and Days</i> (WD)
Hom.	Homer, <i>Iliad</i> (Il.); <i>Odyssey</i> (Od.)
Hyp.	Hyperides, 4 (In Defense of Euxenippus); 5 (Against Demosthenes); 6 (Funeral Oration)
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
Isae.	Isaeus, 6 (Philoctemon); 12 (Euphiletus)
Isoc.	Isocrates, 1 (To Demonicus); 5 (To Philip); 8 (On the Peace); 12 (Panathenaicus); 15 (Antidosis); 19 (Aegineticus)
Joseph.	Josephus, <i>Against Apion</i> (Ap.)
Just.	Justin, <i>Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus</i>
LM	<i>Liber de Morte</i>
Liv.	Livy, <i>From the Founding of the City</i>
Lys.	Lysias, 6 (Against Andocides)
Memnon	Memnon of Heracleia, <i>History of Heracleia Pontica</i> (FGrH 434 F-5. 7)
Nep.	Nepos, <i>Life of Eumenes</i> (Eum.); <i>Life of Phocion</i> (Phoc.)
OCD	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> . 2012. Fourth edition. Hornblower, S., and Spawforth, A. (eds.). Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Paus.	Pausanias, Description of Greece
[Philip]	To the Council and People of Athens (= [Dem]. 12)
Pl.	Plato, Laws (Leg.); Republic (Rep.); Apology (Apol.); Cratylus (Crat.); Protagoras (Prot.); Thaetetus (Thaet.)
Plut.	Plutarch, Comparison of Pericles and Marcellus (Comp. Pel. et Marc.); Comparison of Sertorius and Eumenes (Comp. Ser. et Eum.); Plutarch, Life of Agesilaus (Ages.); Life of Alcibiades (Alc.); Life of Alexander (Alex.), Life of Antony (Ant.); Life of Camillus (Cam.); Life of Cimon (Cim.); Life of Demetrius (Demetr.); Life of Dion (Dion); Life of Eumenes (Eum.); Life of Lucullus (Luc.); Life of Lysander (Lys.); Life of Marcellus (Marc.); Life of Nicias (Nic.); Moralia (Mor.); Life of Pericles (Per.); Life of Phocion (Phoc.); Life of Pyrrhus (Pyrrh.); Life of Sertorius (Ser.); Life of Solon (Sol.); Life of Themistocles (Them.); Life of Theseus (Thes.); Life of Tiberius Gracchus (Ti. Gracch.)
Polyaen.	Polyaenus, Stratagems
Polyb.	Polybius, Histories
PSI	Papiri greci e latini. (Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto)
Quin.	Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria (Inst.)
Rhodes and Osborne	Rhodes, P.J., and Osborne, R. 2007. Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC. Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York.
Schol.	Demosthenes: Scholia Graeca ex codicibus aucta et emendata. Arno Press. New York. 1983
Str.	Strabo, Geography
Suda	Antipater, Basileia, Craterus, Leonnatus, Deinarchus, Demetrius, Ophellas
Syll. ³	Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum, 4 vols. Hildesheim. New York and Olms. 1982 (1915–24)
Syncellus	Georgius Syncellus, Ecloga Chronographica. Mosshammer, A.A. (ed.). Teubner. Leipzig. 1984
Tac.	Tacitus, Agricola (Agr.); Germania (Ger.)
Thuc.	Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
Trog.	Trogus, Prologues (Prol.)
Val. Max	Valerius Maximus, Memorable Words and Deeds
Vatican Palimpsest	Arr. Succ. 24–25
Xen.	Xenophon, Anabasis (Anab.); Cynegeticus (Cyn.); Cyropaedia (Cyr.); Hellenica (Hell.); Memorabilia (Mem.)


Chronology

361	Birth of Eumenes
342	Eumenes joins the Macedonian court
323	
June 11	Death of Alexander the Great
Summer	Philip III and Alexander IV proclaimed kings; revolt of the Greeks in the upper satrapies
September/October	Eumenes and Leonnatus arrive in Hellespontine Phrygia
Fall	Start of the Lamian War; Thibron attacks Cyrene
323/22	
Winter	Eumenes returns to Babylon; Battle of Abydus; crossing of Leonnatus to Europe
322	
March/April	Crossing of Leonnatus to Europe; death of Leonnatus
Late Spring	Craterus crosses to Europe
June	Battle of Amorgos
July	Perdiccas and Eumenes arrive in Cappadocia; defeat Ariarathes in two battles
Late July/August	Battle of Crannon; Antipater arranges affairs in Peloponnesus and Athens
Late Summer/Fall	Eumenes organizes Cappadocia; Perdiccas moves to Cilicia; Neoptolemus moves to Armenia; annexation of Cyrene by Ptolemy
322/21	
Late Fall/Winter	Eumenes sent to Armenia; Perdiccas winters in Cilicia; return of Antipater and Craterus to Macedonia
321	
Spring	Perdiccas campaigns in Pisidia; calls for Antigonus to answer charges; arrival of Nicaea and Cleopatra with marriage proposals; marriage of Perdiccas and Nicaea; marriage of Ptolemy and Eurydice; invasion of Aetolia by Antipater and Craterus
Summer	Cynnane arrives in Asia and is murdered; marriage of Adeia (Eurydice) and Philip III; Perdiccas determines to seize the monarchy; Alexander the Great's body begins its journey west

321/20 Late Fall/Winter	Antigonus flees to Macedonia; end of Aetolian campaign; diversion of Alexander's body to Egypt
320 Spring	First Diadoch War begins. Perdiccas marches to Egypt; Eumenes to the Hellespont; desertion of Cleitus and the fleet to Antipater; crossing of Antipater and Craterus to Asia; Antigonus attempts to intercept Eumenes, then to Cyprus
May/June	Eumenes defeats Neoptolemus; later Neoptolemus and Craterus; deaths of Neoptolemus and Craterus
July	Death of Perdiccas; condemnation of Perdiccas by royal army; Pithon and Arrhidaeus new regents for the kings
Late August/ Early September Fall/Winter	Triparadeisus; Antipater regent Alcetas defeats Asander; Eumenes winters in Celaenae; failed negotiations among the surviving Perdiccan leaders
319 Winter	Antipater crosses back to Europe with the kings
Spring	Eumenes defeated by Antigonus and enters Nora
July	Antigonus defeats Alcetas; death of Alcetas
Late Summer	Death of Antipater; Polyperchon new regent, Cassander, Chiliarch
Fall	Nicanor made garrison commander in Munychia
319/18 Winter	Flight of Cassander to Antigonus; Polyperchon's "Freedom of the Greeks" decree
318 Late Winter	Arrhidaeus' attack on Cyzicus; Eumenes released from Nora and allies with Antigonus
Early Spring	Antigonus takes Ephesus and Cleitus flees

Spring	Nicanor seizes Piraeus; Ptolemy occupies Phoenicia and Syria; Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, arrives in Athens, followed later by Polyperchon
May	Death of Phocion; Cassander arrives in Piraeus
Summer	Antigonus captures all of Lydia; Eumenes allies with Polyperchon; Polyperchon invades Peloponnesus, besieges Megalopolis; Eumenes moves into Cilicia, joined by argyraspids; Menander occupies Cappadocia; Eumenes creates "Alexander Tent"
Fall	Polyperchon returns to Macedonia, orders Cleitus to the Hellespont
Fall/Winter	Eumenes moves into Phoenicia
317	
Summer	Sea battles in the Hellespont; defeat of Cleitus
July	Demetrius of Phalerum in charge of Athens
Late Summer	Death of Nicanor; Cassander's first invasion of Macedonia
September	Eumenes leaves Phoenicia for the East
Fall	Eurydice claims the regency; Olympias returns to Macedonia
Fall/Winter	Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice murdered; Eumenes in Babylonia; revolt of citadel commander in Babylon; Eumenes moves into winter quarters in the "Carian villages"; Antigonus winters in Mesopotamia
316	
Spring	Eumenes joins with the forces of the satraps of the upper provinces
Late May	Eumenes arrives in Susa
Late Spring/Summer	Cassander successfully invades Macedonia; siege of Pydna begins; deposition and exile of Aeacides
July	Eumenes and Antigonus battle on Coprates
August	Antigonus retreats into Media
Late October/ Early November	Battle of Paraetacene
December	Battle of Gabene
315	
January	Death of Eumenes





Introduction

Eumenes was a remarkable figure even by the standards of this very remarkable age. He was a royal secretary turned successful general and a Cardian Greek in a period dominated by native-born Macedonian aristocrats. The surviving sources for the early years following the death of Alexander the Great track his career more closely than that of any of Alexander's other Successors. Both Plutarch and Nepos prepared biographies of his career, while ignoring more prominent and ultimately more successful contemporaries. Moreover, in general, the sources treat him very favorably. In most respects, he is presented as a brilliant military leader, contending with and often defeating those who had held major commands under Alexander. He is cited as one of the last loyalists to the Macedonian Argead monarchy, a model of fidelity to the family of Alexander (Diod. 18. 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 2–4; 19. 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14, 12. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 5, 13. 3), and with his death, in the words of Cornelius Nepos (*Eum.* 13. 3), the last hope of the Argead dynasty was lost. The picture painted by the sources is, indeed, a most sympathetic one. While successful in battle, Eumenes' brilliance, however, was doomed to failure before the all-consuming prejudice of his Macedonian officers and soldiers (Diod. 18. 60. 1–3, 62. 7; 19. 13. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1, 1. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2–3). It is a most compelling story, but a fictional one nonetheless, owing its origin to the work of the historian Hieronymus, a Cardian like Eumenes himself, and likely also a relative (Anson 1975, 1980: 55–9; 2014: 539–58; Schäfer: 2002: 172).¹ His history, as will be shown in Chapter 1, became the basis for the surviving narrative of Eumenes' career.

While, as noted, Eumenes was proclaimed the great champion of the royal family in our sources, the Cardian is often found working against their best interests. As with his contemporaries, Eumenes' first concern was his own self-interest, not any loftier ideals (cf. Plut. *Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 2. 1–5). During the First War of the Successors, he supported the regent Perdiccas, Eumenes' mentor's attempt to set aside the kings and replace them with himself. It is only after the defeat and death of this individual in this war that Eumenes found it useful to proclaim his loyalty to the royal house as a way of gaining the alliance

1 Plutarch (*Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 2. 2–3), however, while accepting his military brilliance and handicaps (*Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 1. 2–3, 2. 1), does strongly suggest that Eumenes was not as altruistic as he appears in our other sources. In fact, it appears clear that Eumenes was not Plutarch's favorite subject. Of all the *Parallel Lives* only in his pairing of Sertorius and Eumenes is the Roman presented first. As Brian Bosworth states, Plutarch was more attracted to Sertorius than to Eumenes (1992A: 56–7).

of a later regent and the loyalty of Alexander's former veterans still serving in Asia.

Moreover, as this study will conclude, Eumenes was not ultimately the victim of ethnic prejudice, but, such bias that did exist, was based rather on class and not national origin, and while this bias hindered his career, it did not doom it. Even though Eumenes was prominent in the Macedonian court and a close ally and companion of first Philip II and later of his son Alexander III (the Great), unlike the majority of those who dominated both the court and especially the army, he did not come from one of the aristocratic families of Macedonia. He was a Greek from Cardia. Even with respect to class, the Cardian's downfall had more to do with circumstance and competing ambitions than with prejudice of any kind (Anson 1980: 55–9; 2014B: 539–57). As will be shown, on many occasions Eumenes used his birth to assuage the concerns of many of his very aristocratic Macedonian colleagues. In truth, the new age ushered in by Alexander's conquests was one of opportunity for Greeks and Macedonians alike. While a sense of Macedonian nationalism was introduced by Philip (Anson 2008A: 2013A: 62–71), it counted for little outside of Macedonia proper, and even there was more muted than would be typical in the city-states of southern Greece. The prominence of Macedonians in the ranks of Alexander's Successors was due to the military nature of this new age. These individuals had been Macedonia's traditional military commanders from earliest times down to Alexander's death. Yet, even here, while armies might for the first decade after the death of the Conqueror have a core of Macedonian veterans (Roisman 2012), beginning in the last years of his life and increasingly in the armies of his Successors, Greek mercenaries and Asiatic troops came to dominate numerically the forces of these contenders for Alexander's legacy (Olbrycht 2013: 159–79; Anson 2013A: 174–176; 2014A: 3–4, 19–20, 36–7, 191–2; 2014B: 548–9). Outside of Macedonia, the term "Macedonian" even came very quickly to represent a fighting style or a political status (Diod. 19. 14. 5, 27. 6, 29. 3), not a true ethnicity. Moreover, in Asia and Africa the old Greek/barbarian dichotomy dominated, unifying those whose origins were Greece or Macedonia against Asians and Egyptians. Even though native peoples might serve in the army and in local administrative positions throughout these kingdoms in Asia and Egypt, in the court and in the new urban foundations, native Greeks and those assimilated to Greek culture dominated. Greek-speakers became a privileged class in a world that far transcended the Greek city-state (Goudriaan 1988: 14, 119). Historically Greek ethnicity was never so much tied to blood as to culture (Anson 2009C). "The title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood" (Isoc. 4.50).

Thanks to the exploits of Philip and Alexander, the Macedonians long seen as at best semi-Greeks by their neighbors in the city-states rapidly came to be viewed as brother Greeks by those whose Hellenism was long established. Five years before Alexander the Great's death, a non-royal Macedonian named Cliton won a competition in that most national of Hellenic festivals, the Olympic Games (Moretti 1957: 127 [#463]). By the second century at the latest the Macedonians came to be regarded as fully Greek by their Greek neighbors (Polyb. 5. 104. 1, 105. 5; 7. 9. 3, 5, 7; 9. 37. 7; 38. 3. 8; cf. Livy 31. 29. 15; Str. 10. 2. 23). The evidence of the Olympic Games also shows that in 296 BC, a winner is noted as being from Alexandria in Egypt (Moretti 1957: 133 [#512]).

In the final analysis, Eumenes was one of many contenders for power in the chaos that followed the Conqueror's death, who, while suffering from certain limitations, was more successful than most, but in the final analysis joined the ranks of those contenders who did not survive the first decade of conflict. His importance in this period is more the result of his prominence in the sources, than in his accomplishments. However, given that our sources follow his career so closely, it is through an examination of his career that so much of the nature of the early development of the Hellenistic Age is discovered.

The Sources

As noted in the Introduction, the surviving sources are remarkably consistent in their presentation of Eumenes' career. This is true despite the fact that none of these is contemporary and all therefore rely on earlier works. Our current known sources include the *Library* of Diodorus of Sicily, the most complete and detailed surviving historical narrative of the events from Alexander's death to the actions preceding the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC, written in the second half of the first century BC (Green 2006: 4–6); biographies written by Cornelius Nepos and Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch) in the first century BC, and early second century AD, respectively; a severely abridged version of the *Philippic History* by the Augustan historian, Pompeius Trogus, epitomated, perhaps, in the early third century AD, by an otherwise unknown Marcus Junianus Justinus (Justin); a collection of military anecdotes by the second-century AD rhetorician, Polyaeus; and the briefest remains also from the second century of *A History of the Successors*, in ten books, covering the years from 323 to 319, by Flavius Arrianus (Arrian).¹ With the exception of Arrian's history, which due to the nature of its survival contains only a bare outline of events, the consistency of our sources with respect to Eumenes is present not only in their overall presentations, but even in the details of his career, and in their assessment of his actions and those of his allies and opponents. In 320, it is Eumenes' skill which led to his victory in two separate battles over two of Alexander's former commanders (Diod. 18. 29. 4, 30–32. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4–5, 7. 5–8.1; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 1–3; Just. 13. 8. 3–9), but his successes were undermined by the defeat and assassination of his patron, the regent Perdiccas, in Egypt (Diod. 18. 36. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2–4; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 29; Just. 13. 8. 10). In 319,

1 Photius, a ninth-century author, whose work is variously called *Bibliotheca* or *Myrobiblion*, records 279 summaries of various works including that of Arrian's *Successors* (noted in the text as *Succ.* 1a). Three fragments of the original are the so-called “Vatican Palimpsest” (listed here according to the Teubner text as Arr. *Succ.* 24–25) which contains two brief extracts from Arrian's Book 7; a papyrus fragment, PSI 12.1284, and the *Gothenburg Palimpsest* (see Dreyer 2007: 251–5, for a new edition and translation), which contains excerpts from Book 10. Photius also summarized the work of Dexippus (ca. 210–273), *History of the Events after Alexander the Great's Death*, which in turn was heavily based on Arrian's *Events After Alexander*. Photius' summary of Dexippus only includes events derived from Arrian's Book 1 of the *Successors*, and references to Dexippus' summarized work will be designated as *Succ.* 1b.

due to the treasonous actions of a subordinate, Eumenes suffered defeat at the hands of Antigonus Monophthalmus (Diod. 18. 40. 5–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3; cf. Just. 14. 2. 2), and only Eumenes' well-executed retreat saved him from capture (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3–10. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 2–3; Diod. 18. 41. 1; cf. Just. 14. 2. 2). Finally, having fought for almost a decade to uphold the birthright of Alexander's son, Eumenes was mercilessly surrendered to his arch foe, Antigonus, by his own troops, who were more concerned for their possessions than for their "own commander and victory" (Diod. 19. 43. 7–9; Plut. *Eum.* 17–18. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 1–2; Just. 14. 3. 4–4. 17; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13). During Eumenes' last battle, that in Gabene, Antigonus had secured possession of Eumenes' camp along with the families and possessions of his troops. To receive these back from their captor his core infantry unit surrendered Eumenes.

The sources consistently present almost all of Eumenes' enemies as "rapacious and faithless."² There is not only uniformity in our sources depiction of Eumenes enemies, but it is also found in their depiction of his erstwhile allies as well. His great patron after Alexander's death, Perdiccas, is described as "bloodthirsty" and "grasping" (Diod. 18. 33. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 20, 28; Nepos *Eum.* 2. 3; Just. 13. 8. 2; cf. *Suda* s. v. *Perdiccas*). The treatment of Antigonus, his most consistent opponent, is especially telling. While that commander possessed certain of the traits that are criticized in Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 41. 4–5, 47. 3, 50. 1–4, 52. 4; 19. 44. 1–3, 56. 2, 57. 2; 20. 82. 3, 75. 3, 106. 3–4), he is not portrayed hostilely. Indeed, Antigonus is praised as energetic, intelligent, daring, and as a skillful general (Diod. 18. 23. 3–4, 72. 5, 73. 1; 19. 30. 1; Plut. *Ser.* 1. 5; Polyæn. 3. 6. 1–20; Just. 14. 3. 2). These are not qualities assigned to Perdiccas.³ In fact, it is most often Eumenes' erstwhile allies who come in for the greatest criticism. Alcetas and Neoptolemus are "jealous and traitorous" (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3, 5. 3–4, 8. 8; Just. 13. 8. 3); Teutamus and Antigenes, "arrogant, ambitious and envious" (Diod. 18. 60. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4, 16. 1–2, 17. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 1; Polyæn. 4. 8. 2); Peucestas, "contentious and cowardly" (Diod. 19. 15. 1, 17. 5, 23. 1, 38. 1–2, 42. 2, 4, 43. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5, 16. 9; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 1).⁴

² Diod. 18. 7. 4, 41. 4–5, 47. 3, 50. 5, 58. 4; 19. 19. 4, 90. 3–4; Plut. *Ser.* 1. 7; *Eum.* 3. 5; Just. 13. 8. 3; 14. 3. 11; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 2; 13. 1–3.

³ Polyænus (4. 10. 1–2), in his collection of "stratagems," describes only two incidents involving the long military career of Perdiccas and both of these exhibit his deceitfulness. By contrast, Antigonus is associated with 21 (4. 6. 1–21), with 5 covering the brief military career of Eumenes (4. 8. 1–5).

⁴ The charge of cowardice is interesting since Peucestas had secured his standing with Alexander through his bravery (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 10. 1–2, 11. 7, 28. 4; Plut. *Alex.* 63. 7–8; Curt. 9. 5. 14–15). However, his actions at Gabene in 315 would suggest insubordination at the least, if not outright cowardice (Diod. 19. 42. 4, 43. 2, 5; Anson 2013B: 104; contra Bosworth 2002: 154).

Polyperchon, “lethargic and witless” (Diod. 18. 75. 2; 19. 36. 6; cf. 20. 28. 1–2), and Olympias, “cruel and savage” (Diod. 19. 11. 4–9; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 3). Both Eudamus and Phaedimus remained loyal to Eumenes only to safeguard their financial investment in him (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12; Diod. 19. 24. 2–3). The soldiers making up the best fighting unit in Eumenes’ army are “treacherous,” “impious and bestial” (Diod. 19. 43. 8, 48. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1–4, 19. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 2–3, 10. 2; Just. 14. 2. 7–11, 3. 11, 13).

Eumenes’ successes are most often recorded as the direct result of his abilities.⁵ The one great exception is that at the battle of Paraetacene where the partial victory is attributed to the valor of the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 30. 5), Alexander’s former infantry guards (Anson 1988B: 131–3). The extent of this praise for Eumenes varies, however, from source to source. It is most consistently presented by Diodorus and Plutarch. The fragments of Arrian are too brief and break off before Eumenes’ great confrontation with Antigonus, and, consequently, present little evidence of Arrian’s original evaluation of Eumenes, if there even was one, and Justin’s *Epitome* presents a fuller, yet still scanty, description of Eumenes activities, but does call him “crafty” (14. 1. 11), but also responsible for his final defeat (14. 3. 4). In our main sources, most often the Cardian’s defeats and setbacks are the consequence of others’ betrayal, incompetence, or prejudice. His defeat at the hands of Antigonus in 319 at Orcynia was the result of the treacherous conduct of the Cardian’s cavalry commander (Diod. 18. 40. 5–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3).⁶ After two victories in Asia Minor in 320, Eumenes position was undermined by the assassination of his mentor Perdiccas.

Prejudice is repeatedly emphasized in Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos, as the chief cause for Eumenes’ ultimate defeat and death (Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3–4; 62. 7; 19. 13. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1, 8. 1, 18. 1, 20. 2, 9; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2–3, 7. 1–2). However, neither Justin nor Polyaeus mention this handicap, nor do either ever refer to Eumenes as a Cardian. While the fragments of Arrian’s *Successors* do not directly refer to any prejudice regarding Eumenes, Eumenes is called the “Cardian” (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 2, 5, 21). In Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos, he is routinely depicted as a foreigner whose achievements are resented by the Macedonians (Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3; 62. 7; 19. 13. 1; Plut. *Ser.* 1. 5; *Eum.* 3. 1; 8. 1; *Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 1. 1–3, 9; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2–3, 7. 1). So favorable generally is the description of Eumenes across the spectrum of our surviving sources that it

5 Diod. 18. 29. 4–5, 32. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1, 20. 8–9; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3, 10. 1, 13. 1; Just. 13. 8. 4–9; 14. 1. 1–5, 9–12, 2. 12; *Göthenburg Palimpsest* 73v–73r; *HE* 3. 1.

6 Justin (14. 2. 2) merely states that in this battle Eumenes was defeated, and Nepos ignores the battle completely.

has been postulated that they may have used a now lost source whose initial purpose was to eulogize the Cardian, and this work was only later broadened into a general history (Hornblower 1981: 162–3). Robert Hadley (2001: 3–33) has suggested that the encomiastic qualities of much of the portrait of Eumenes in the surviving sources derive from an entirely different source than does the general historical narrative, even though Hadley believes that both are from a common author. In short, the eulogy remained a separate work, even though the material was broadened into a general history of the period.

This concentration on Eumenes is transferred after the Cardian's death to first Antigonos Monophthalmus and subsequently to the latter's son Demetrius. As with Eumenes, the narrative particularly in Diodorus is dominated by these Diadochs' activities. In particular, Diodorus in his book 19, of the 85 chapters treating Greece and the East, 66 concentrate on Eumenes, Antigonos, and Demetrius. Additionally, Polyaeus associates 21 stratagems with Antigonos, and 12 with his son Demetrius, and Plutarch presents, besides his *Life of Eumenes*, the life of only one other Diadoch, that of Demetrius. By contrast, for Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus, whose careers lasted years after the deaths of the father and son, Polyaeus lists but one stratagem for Ptolemy (4. 19. 1), six for Seleucus (4. 9. 1–6), and three very short stratagems for Lysimachus (4. 12. 1–3); Eumenes whose military career was brief has five (4. 8. 1–5). Now, this could simply be the result of a lack of military cleverness on the part of the Ptolemy and Seleucus, but that is simply not the case, especially with respect to Seleucus, who came closest of any of Alexander's Successors in recreating the Conqueror's empire under his authority. Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus commanded armies that defeated those of Antigonos and Demetrius. Ptolemy in league with Seleucus defeated Demetrius at Gaza in 312 (Diod. 19. 82–85; Plut. *Demetr.* 5. 1–3; Just. 15. 1. 6), and Seleucus thwarted Antigonos' invasion of Babylonia in 310–308 (*BCHP* 3, Rev. 14–41; cf. Polyaeus. 4.9.1), and along with Lysimachus defeated him in the Battle of Ipsus in 301 (Plut. *Demetr.* 29–30; *Pyrrh.* 4. 4; Diod. 21. 1. 2, 4b; App. *Syr.* 55). Ptolemy was victorious over Perdiccas in two battles in Egypt (Diod. 18. 33. 2–36. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 28; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1–4; Polyaeus. 4. 19; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1), and repulsed a subsequent invasion by Antigonos (Diod. 20. 73–6; Plut. *Demetr.* 19. 1–5; Paus. 1. 6. 6).

There are also indications that a very detailed source was available to our surviving sources. While this is not as obvious in all our surviving sources, Arrian did compose ten books on a period of less than four years, and Diodorus' work becomes very detailed for the period from Alexander's death to 301. Even though Plutarch is more interested in anecdotal information, as expressed in the introduction to his *Life of Alexander* (1. 2–3), where the biographer states: “a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character

than battles where thousands fall... I devote myself to the signs of the soul in men... leaving to others the description of their great contests,"⁷ in his *Lives* of both *Eumenes* and *Demetrius*, there are battle descriptions which are quite detailed. Eumenes' battles with Craterus in 320 (*Eum.* 6–7) and against Antigonus at Gabene (*Eum.* 16), and Antigonus and Demetrius' unsuccessful invasion of Egypt (Plut. *Demetr.* 19. 1–5) are uncharacteristically full, as is the depiction of Demetrius' battle with Ptolemy at Salamis in Cyprus (*Demetr.* 16). The latter corresponds in many respects, especially regarding the competing strategies, to the description of the sea battle found in Diodorus (20. 49. 1–52. 3), and both report that the direct result of Demetrius' victory was the proclamation of Antigonus and his son as kings (Diod. 20. 53. 2; Plut. *Demetr.* 18. 1).

Diodorus in his Books 18–20 is especially detailed, with careful attention given to battle and siege descriptions,⁸ and the delineation of the respective forces are often most precise.⁹ An example of this precision is seen in his description of the battle plans at Paraetacene. Diodorus not only lists the total forces on each side, but also describes the placement of particular units in the line of battle, specifically referencing not only the unit's identity but also its strength (19. 27–29).¹⁰ The battle itself is described in three chapters (19. 30–32). While this is the most clearly described of all the battles concerning affairs in Greece and the East found in these books, it is indicative of the detailed source material that was available for our surviving sources on these events. For comparison, in these same books where Diodorus is treating affairs

7 This separation of "Lives" from history is also apparent in Nepos' biographies (*Pel.* 1. 1; *Eum.* 1. 1).

8 Diod. 18. 13. 3, 25. 6, 29. 6, 30–32, 33. 3, 6, 34, 35. 1, 41. 6, 44, 45. 2, 70. 2, 4–7, 71. 3, 72; 19. 13. 6, 17. 4, 18. 4, 19. 4, 21. 1, 25. 2, 27–29, 36. 1, 37. 2, 38–39. 4, 40. 1–2, 42–43. 5, 49. 1, 58, 64. 6, 77. 5, 82–83, 84. 1–5, 93. 3, 5; 20. 22. 3, 22. 6, 23. 4, 45. 5–6, 47. 2, 7, 48, 49. 4, 50–52, 81–89, 91–99, 102. 2, 103, 107. 2, 108. 4, 7, 109. 1, 112. 3.

9 Diod. 18. 4. 1, 4, 7, 7. 2, 3, 5, 9. 1, 5, 10. 2, 11. 3, 12. 1, 2, 14. 2, 5, 15. 2, 8, 16. 2, 4, 5, 17. 2, 5, 18. 5, 19. 2, 20. 2, 21. 1, 4, 24. 1, 2, 29. 6, 30. 4, 5, 36. 1, 3, 4, 37. 2, 38. 1, 3, 40. 2, 7, 8, 41. 3, 44. 4, 45. 1, 5, 50. 3, 51. 1, 52. 1, 7, 53. 7, 58. 1, 59. 1, 3, 61. 5, 68. 1, 3, 70. 1, 72. 3, 4, 8, 73. 1, 4; 19. 11. 8, 13. 3, 14. 5–8, 16. 1, 2, 3, 17. 6, 18. 4, 7, 20. 3, 27. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 28. 1, 2, 3, 4, 29. 2, 3, 4, 5, 31. 5, 39. 2, 3, 4, 40. 1, 3, 4, 42. 4, 43. 1, 46. 5, 47. 1, 50. 7, 54. 4, 55. 5, 58. 2, 5, 59. 2, 60. 1, 62. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 63. 2, 67. 2, 68. 1, 3, 6, 69. 1, 3, 74. 1, 4, 75. 7, 75. 8, 77. 2, 3, 4, 80. 4, 82. 1, 2, 3, 4, 83. 1, 85. 3, 90. 1, 92. 1, 94. 1, 95. 5, 96. 4, 100. 2, 4, 7; 20. 19. 1, 20. 3, 22. 4, 25. 1, 28. 3, 47. 1, 3, 49. 2, 50. 1, 2, 6, 53. 1, 75. 2, 74. 5, 76. 2, 82. 3, 84. 2, 86. 1, 88. 4, 6, 8, 9, 91. 7, 93. 2, 3, 4, 5, 95. 1, 97. 5, 98. 1, 2, 5, 99. 2, 103. 6, 107. 2, 4, 110. 4, 111. 3, 112. 1, 4, 113. 3, 4.

10 Diodorus' listing of the total number of the respective forces, however, does not match the totals of the individual units, perhaps, proving that, while his source may have been meticulous, Diodorus was likely less so.

in Sicily and the West, such details are not found and it is most often postulated that Diodorus has switched sources for this material. Much of Diodorus' material on Agathocles, the Syracusan tyrant, is thought to derive from either Duris of Samos, or Timaeus of Tauromenium, or both (Kebric 1977: 72–8; Walbank 1985; Landucci Gattinoni 1997:148; Baron 2013: 215).¹¹ For example, in these sections most detail is missing. In his description of the Battle on the Himera River in 311 (Diod. 19. 65. 1–6, 104; 20. 6, 8. 2–7, 10. 5–13. 1, 20. 18, 29. 2–11), the best described of all these conflicts respecting the Greek West, where Agathocles, the Sicilian tyrant, was beaten and fled in disarray back to Syracuse, Diodorus gives the total for the Carthaginian forces, but no breakdown of individual units, and Agathocles forces are never enumerated other than to remark that over 7000 of his troops died in the conflict (19. 106. 2–5, 108–10), representing the “greater part” of his infantry (20. 4. 2). Additionally, these sections dealing with the West present myths (20. 14. 6–7, 41. 3–6), monsters (20. 42. 2), oracles and omens (19. 2. 3–4; 20. 11. 3–4), examples of divine punishment (20. 101. 3), love affairs (19. 3. 1; 20. 33. 5–6), disguises (19. 5. 2–3), torture instruments (19. 108. 1; 20. 71. 3–4), human sacrifice (20. 14. 5–6, 65. 1), and strange customs (20. 58. 4; 21. 16. 4). Such curiosities are absent from those sections of Diodorus dealing with Greece and the East.¹²

The sources, and in particular Diodorus, regarding this period in Greece and Asia, and especially with respect to Eumenes, do suggest a common origin for much of their material, and indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the surviving works regarding the early Hellenistic Age can be traced back to just such a common source, Hieronymus of Cardia, the companion and fellow-countryman of Eumenes (*FGrH* 154. T-1; F-8, F-9, F-15).¹³ Indeed, the basic question today is not whether Hieronymus was the major source, that is most often assumed, but how much additional material from other sources may have

11 The use of Timaeus might be considered unlikely given that Diodorus apparently dismissed that historian's account of Agathocles because “[Timaeus] deserted the honest standard of historical candor to gratify his personal animosity and contentiousness” (21. 17.3=*Const. Exc.* 2. 255), indicating either that he disapproved of the history, making it unlikely that he would have used it, or that in this particular, fragmented, part of his history he is following a different source and may have incorporated that source's opinion into his narrative (Polyb. 12. 15. 6–12).

12 If his history of the West is taken from Timaeus and/or Duris, he may even have toned down the emotional aspects (19. 8. 4–5).

13 For example, see, Fontana 1960: 151–237; Hornblower 1981: 2–3, 18–75; Merker 1988: 90; Sacks 1990: 21, 40, 41, cf. 99, 158; Bosworth 2002: 169; the most extreme position was maintained by Reuss (1876), who declared that all the surviving sources for this period used Hieronymus directly.

been added (Landucci Gattinoni 2013: 30–42), whether or not primary sources were used at all, or did our survivals use intermediary sources (most recently, Rathmann 2014: 49–113), and how much originality has been employed by our surviving sources. Most follow Felix Jacoby's (1913: 8. col.1556) moderate addition theory: Hieronymus was the primary source, but not the only one. This state of affairs would appear peculiar given that none of Hieronymus' fragments can be brought into direct relation to any of the surviving works, and that only eighteen fragments of his work have survived (Jacoby 1963: 2B, no. 154).¹⁴

So meager are the fragments and *testimonia* that neither the number of Hieronymus' works, nor the exact content, nor the number of books, nor even the exact title(s) is known. According to the *Suda*, Hieronymus wrote "Concerning the deeds after Alexander" (*FGrH* 154 T-1). Diodorus (18. 42. 1=*FGrH* 154 T-3) and Josephus (*Ap.* 1. 213–14) refer to a work titled *Concerning the Diadochi* (Successors),¹⁵ while Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 1. 5. 4=*FGrH* 154 F-6) cites a history entitled, *Concerning the Epigoni* (Offspring). Through a form of scholarly syncretism many arrive at a title for a single work, *History of the Diadochi and the Epigoni* (e.g. Jacoby 1913: 1547). This syncretism is suggested by Diodorus 1. 3. 3, "for while some have closed their accounts with the deeds of Philip, others with those of Alexander, and some with the Diadochi or the Epigoni..."¹⁶ The suggestion is not without foundation, for a perusal of the fragments demonstrates that Hieronymus wrote a work or works covering both periods. But these titles could easily represent two distinct works, and there is nothing to decide conclusively between the two positions (Müller 1973: 7–12).¹⁷ It is also possible, although once again without any clear evidence, that Hieronymus' work included an introduction concerning the early history of Macedonia up to and including the death of Alexander and the division of his empire (Jacoby 1913: 1547; 1923–58 [1963]: Vol. 2B suppl., 544; cf. Hornblower 1981: 238).

14 There are in addition one doubtful fragment and twelve *testimonia*. These fragments are all citations from later authors; no papyri fragments, etc., have been found of the original work. The collected fragments and *testimonia* have been collected by Felix Jacoby in his *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Geschichte*.

15 A recently published papyrus fragment (*POxy.* 4808. Col. 2) states that Hieronymus wrote about the "Diadochi." This unattributed prose work treats in summary a number of Hellenistic historians: Onesicritus, Chares, Clitarchus, Hieronymus, Polybius.

16 This passage with no justification is included by Jacoby among the *testimonia* on Hieronymus (*FGrH* 154 T-10).

17 Hornblower (1981: 79) suggests that what was in conception a single work may have been produced in installments.

Other conclusions based on the surviving fragments and *testimonia* are equally speculative. It has been suggested that Hieronymus' writings were quite detailed and extensive, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that they were so long and dull that no one could read them to completion (Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 4. 30=*FGrH* 154 T-12). Dionysius, however, was not very happy with the style of Thucydides either (*de Thuc.*), and was, indeed, most concerned with style. Another factor that might have made Hieronymus' work rather dry was that he apparently eschewed speeches (*POxy* 4808. Col 2), which dominate much of the historiography of ancient Greece. These rhetorical exercises were to demonstrate the ability of the historian as well as reflect the situation. In short, while the information, I believe, is mostly accurate, the presentation itself may be highly fictional, its content presented by either what the historian believes the individual may have said, or what the historian believes should have been said (see below).

The date Hieronymus began writing is, likewise, open to conjecture, although his continued political activity at least to 293 (Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3–7=*FGrH* 154 T-8) would most probably have delayed at least final composition until rather late in his life. If his historical writing was but a single work, he certainly had not completed it by 272, since one of his fragments makes reference to the death of Pyrrhus in that year (Paus. 1. 13. 7=*FGrH* 154 F-15). This is the last known event recorded by Hieronymus, and may indicate the terminal point of his writing.¹⁸ A case can certainly be made that Pyrrhus represents the last of those generally regarded as the *Epigoni*, and, consequently, his death makes a fitting terminus.

Our information concerning Hieronymus' life is again limited.¹⁹ He served Eumenes of Cardia likely from at least the campaign against Ariarathes in 322 (cf. App. *Mith.* 8=*FGrH* 154 F-3) until the former's death in 315 (Diod. 18. 42. 1=*FGrH* 154 T-3; Diod. 18. 50. 4=*FGrH* 154 T-4; Diod. 19. 44. 3=*FGrH* 154 T-5). He was Eumenes' "friend and fellow citizen" (Diod. 18. 50. 4), and may have been his kinsman as well (Hornblower 1981: 8; Billows 1990: 390).²⁰ After Eumenes'

18 Pseudo-Lucian (*Macr.* 13=*FGrH* 154 F-4) could be taken as evidence that Hieronymus was writing as late as 266, but the text suggests that the author has confused two different individuals (see Hornblower 1981: 244). He is reputed to have lived "over 90 years" (*POxy.* 4808. Col. 2).

19 The *Suda* contained a life of Hieronymus, but unfortunately only a title remains (*FGrH* 154 T-1).

20 Both Hornblower and Billows suggest that Hieronymus was Eumenes' nephew. The argument for a familial relationship is based on Arrian, *Indica*, 18. 7, where it is learned that Eumenes' father was named Hieronymus, often grandsons were named for their grandfathers. While it is possible that Eumenes and Hieronymus, the historian, were related, it

execution, Hieronymus entered the service of Antigonus Monophthalmus (Diod. 19. 44. 3=*FGrH* 154 T-5; Diod. 19. 100. 1-3=*FGrH* 154 T-6).²¹ Henceforth, Hieronymus was a loyal adherent of the Antigonid family, serving in succession Antigonus, Demetrius, Antigonus' son, and Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius' son and Monophthalmus' grandson.²² The nature of his service varied. He was employed as an envoy by both Eumenes and the elder Antigonus (Diod. 18. 42. 1=*FGrH* 154 T-3; Diod. 18. 50. 4=*FGrH* 154 T-4), and placed in charge of the collection of bitumen from the Dead Sea by the latter (Diod. 19. 100. 1=*FGrH* 154 T-6). It is assumed by Jacoby and others that Hieronymus did not serve any of his superiors in a military capacity (Jacoby 1913: 1541; Brown 1947: 690; Hornblower 1981: 10).²³ As evidence, the absence of any references to Hieronymus in connection to specific military operations is cited. But, the fact is there are few references to Hieronymus in any capacity, and there are passages which suggest that he had an active, albeit unspectacular, military career. Pseudo-Lucian refers to Hieronymus as Antigonus' "fellow-soldier" ([Luc.] *Macr.* 11=*FGrH* 154 T-7, F-8), perhaps, even indicating that he participated in Antigonus Monophthalmus's last battle at Ipsus,²⁴ and in a separate passage, citing Agatharchides, states that Hieronymus participated in the warfare of his age and survived many wounds ([Luc.] *Macr.* 22=*FGrH* 154 T-2). Diodorus

must remain a supposition. As noted, Diodorus (18. 50. 4) describes Hieronymus only as "friend and fellow-citizen." Nowhere in our sources is Hieronymus called either nephew or son. Hieronymus' readiness to join Antigonus after Eumenes' execution (Diod. 19. 44. 3=*FGrH* 154 T-5; Diod. 19. 100. 1-3=*FGrH* 154 T-6) would tell against his being a relative, but certainly not invalidate it. Antigonus Monophthalmus had a number of nephews who were both on occasion trustworthy and on others treacherous. Scholars have attempted to get around what appears a callous act on the part of Hieronymus of joining the murderer of his "friend and fellow citizen," by stating that Antigonus was reluctant to kill Eumenes and after the murder gave him a fine funeral (e.g. Jacoby 1913: 1541). Whatever the relationship between the two Cardians, it was not so strong as to preclude the historian serving loyally his previous mentor's killer.

21 Antigonus had earlier unsuccessfully tried to recruit Hieronymus (Diod. 18. 50. 4=*FGrH* 154 T-4).

22 Diod. 19. 100. 1=*FGrH* 154 T-6; Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3-7=*FGrH* 154 T-8; Paus. 1. 9. 8=*FGrH* 154 T-11; Paus. 1. 13. 9=*FGrH* 154 F-15; Theon *Vit. Arat.* 147=*FGrH* 154 T-9.

23 Hornblower (1981: 10; cf. Gabbert 1997: 14) sees him as having only very limited military roles, and primarily as a "civil servant."

24 The passage is ambiguous either implying that Hieronymus had been involved in the conflict or that he was in addition to being an historian he was also a fellow-soldier in the more general sense of being present but not necessarily active. Since both Antigonus and his son Demetrius were present in this battle, it is likely that our Cardian historian was also present.

(19. 44. 3=*FGrH* 154 T-5) confirms that he was wounded at the battle of Gabene. Moreover, Hieronymus was appointed by Demetrius as guardian and garrison commander of Thebes (*FGrH* 154 T-8=Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3–7). Such military experience, even if limited, would make Hieronymus not only an eyewitness, but in many ways an expert eyewitness, fully capable of assessing and describing the personalities and events of his time.

His contemporary knowledge would have made him then ideally suited to write such a history. It is with this in mind that the inability to bring any of his fragments into direct, uncontested, relation with the surviving works is so frustrating. Indeed, none of the extant fragments is a direct quotation. Moreover, despite this paucity of fragments and *testimonia*, there are indications that Hieronymus was a careful and scholarly historian. Clearly, Hieronymus' history, or histories, was not just the memoirs of an old man. He took pains to acquire precise information. This is shown by his use of Pyrrhus' *Commentaries* for that part of his history dealing with that commander (*FGrH* 154 F-12 Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21. 12). Plutarch further relates that Hieronymus cited more reasonable figures for the casualties in the battle of Heracleia than did Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 17. 7=*FGrH* 154 F-11), and more plausible dimensions for a trench than appeared in Phylarchus (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27. 8=*FGrH* 154 F-14). As mentioned earlier, Hieronymus is also reported to have dispensed with the inclusion of speeches in his history (*POxy* 4808), which might suggest a more sober and factual tone. While these comments are all suggestive of a competent historian, they are hardly proof. Despite this obvious conclusion, John Bury in 1909 (177) proclaimed that Hieronymus was the equal of Thucydides and Polybius. More importantly, nothing in the extant accounts unequivocally points to Hieronymus as a source, let alone the major source, for these surviving histories, biographies, and *exempla*, depicting the individuals and events of the early Hellenistic Age. These subtle indications of competence, and his participation in the actual history, personal knowledge of many of the actors, and access to materials, make Hieronymus the ideal historian for this period. In short, the general near unanimity of belief on the part of historians that the Cardian was the ultimate source for most of our surviving historians, biographers, etc., could then be no more than wishful thinking. I personally believe that he is the ultimate source for much of this material, but this is not a conclusion written in stone. The rest of this chapter will attempt to show that it is not written in sand either.

The argument for the use of Hieronymus by our surviving sources is based on considerations other than the ability to prove any particular passage is from Hieronymus. In part, it rests on a comparison of Hieronymus and what we know of his work with that of contemporary alternatives. While it might be

argued that the true source for the surviving material has been lost altogether, it is an unlikely possibility. It is doubtful that such a major author and work would remain unknown; the *Suda* and other anthologies would almost certainly have made reference to such an alternative. Excluding the argument from silence, there are only a very few contemporary alternatives: Euphantus of Olynthus (*BNJ* 74), Demochares (*BNJ* 75) and Diyllus, both of Athens (*BNJ* 73), Marsyas of Philippi (*FGrH* 136), Nymphis of Heracleia (*BNJ* 432), and Duris of Samos (*BNJ* 76). As with Hieronymus, all of these authors survive only in fragments. When compared with these alternatives, certain aspects of the surviving sources fit more closely with what is known of Hieronymus' career and work, than with any of these alternatives.

The extant histories and biographies follow most closely the careers of Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius, the three commanders whom Hieronymus served in turn. Diodorus, the major surviving narrative source for this period, when describing events in Greece and Asia, concentrates almost exclusively on the careers of these three (Brown 1947: 693). Plutarch wrote lives of Eumenes and Demetrius; Cornelius Nepos composed a biography of Eumenes in his lives of *Great Generals of Foreign Nations*. In particular, none of the alternatives to Hieronymus can be personally associated with Eumenes.

Euphantus was, however, connected with the Antigonid house as tutor to Antigonus Gonatas (*BNJ* 74 T-1=D.L. 2. 110),²⁵ and he is reported to have written a "history of his times" in ten books, as well as a number of tragedies (*BNJ* 74 T-1=D.L. 2. 110; cf. *BNJ* 74 F-2=D.L. 2. 141). No title other than *Histories* (*BNJ* 74 F-1=Athen. 6. 251D) for the historical work is known. His *testimonia* and fragments are so meager that any evaluation of this work is severely limited. However, since he wrote of Ptolemy III in the fourth of his ten books, his work was likely not that extensive for the early Hellenistic period.²⁶ For example, it could not have been more than of marginal value to Arrian in his *History of the Successors*, which also in ten books managed only to cover the years from Alexander's death to Antipater's return to Macedonia early in 319.

In the case of Demochares and Diyllus, these authors evidently focused on their native Athens, and both had strong democratic leanings (*BNJ* 75 T-2=[Plut.] *Mor.* 851D-F). Demochares, in fact, was the nephew of Demosthenes (*BNJ* 75 T-1=[Plut.] *Mor.* 847C-D) and clearly idealized his uncle (*BNJ* 75 T-1=[Plut.]

25 While the passage simply states that he taught "Antigonus the King," the general consensus is that Gonatas is meant (Tarn 1913: 25 and n. 40; Hornblower, 1981: 252–3; Williams 2014), and not Doson.

26 The text has been emended to read *πρώτου* instead of *τρίτου* (Mallet 1845: 96; Williams 2014: Com. F-1a). However, see Olson (2008: 154n. 241).

Mor. 847C).²⁷ He wrote a history of Athens “not so much in the style of a historian but of an orator” (*BNJ* 75 T-15=Cic. *Brut.* 286). As emphasized recently (Pownall 2014: Com. F-1), ancient Greek historians often dramatized their material. The most frequent manifestation of this tendency was the inclusion of speeches, most often created by the historian to fit the occasion, into the historical narrative, but in its more exaggerated form this dramatization included exaggeration, theatrical reversals of fortune, descriptions of the fantastic, bizarre, and the sensational. Much of the history written during the years after Xenophon and up to Polybius apparently “aimed at stirring the readers’ emotions” (Walbank 1960: 216). Polybius described this type of history as emulating the productions of the “tragic poets,” becoming more concerned with making events more vivid and evoking an emotional response, while true historians were to be concerned with “truth” (Polyb. 2. 56. 10–12; cf. 2. 16. 13–15; 3. 47. 6–48. 12, 58. 9; 7. 7. 1–8; 12. 24. 5–6). Despite attempts to produce some general theory of this pattern, it would appear that it was likely tied simply to a less vigorous evaluation of sources and greater elaboration of the available material. This trend has in the past been referred to as “tragic history” (Ullman 1942: 25–53; Fornara 1983: 123–5), and used to designate a new Hellenistic genre of history, but now the term is generally avoided by most recent commentators (Walbank 1960: 216–34; Pownall 2014: Com. F-1; Gattinoni Landucci 1997: 51–5). However, as Simon Hornblower states, even though there was no distinct school of tragic history and its attributes have been in some sense a part of Greek history from the genre’s very beginning, “it is helpful to have a term which suggests a direct assault on the emotions” (Hornblower 1996: 45). The tendency to involve, in this case, readers in the emotions of the situation can be found in the modern evening news where no disaster can be reported without some newsperson querying some unfortunate victim about their feelings at this particular moment. Ancient historians apparently did not believe they were constrained to write only what they could prove, but speculation, dramatization, and opinion were often presented as fact. Both Herodotus and Thucydides accepted legend as evidence and included speeches in their histories. Today, as more and more publishers insist that historical works be accessible to a general public, certain aspects of this ancient practice have begun to creep into modern accounts as well. Historians have long been guilty of making arguments from silence, associating facts which may have no obvious connection, in what one historian has called “attempts to pile one hypothesis on another in a desperate effort to gain certainty, often in cases where no certainty is possible” (McNeal 1970,

27 For Demochares life and career, and anti-Macedonian views, see Marasco 1984.

306).²⁸ If modern historians can also be guilty of applying present concerns and beliefs to the past, and filling in gaps in the source evidence, it should not be surprising that ancient historians would fall into similar practices with even less restraint, especially since the rules of evidence were not as pronounced as they are professed to be currently. In addition to the obvious dramatizations and editing for moral purposes,²⁹ hearsay, innuendo, and rumor were often given the same, if not more, weight than documentary evidence. As Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander* (1. 2) proclaims, character (ἦθος) is more often displayed by the little things.

Diyllus, likely writing in the period between the 290s and the 230s (Jacoby 1962: 2C. 112), composed a history, perhaps, covering the years from 357 to the death of Philip IV in 297, in 26 books (*BNJ* 73 T-1, T-2). There is, however, debate over the number of books, and which Philip (unspecified in the text) of Macedonia is meant (Cooper 2014: *BNJ* 73 T-2, Com.).³⁰ Unfortunately, only three fragments of his work are known and two of these concern Athens (F-2; F-3); one treats Cassander without Athenian reference (F-1). If the work did indeed conclude with the death of Cassander's son, this would be further evidence of an Athenian perspective. As noted by W.S. Ferguson (1997: 131–5), the death of Cassander followed shortly by that of his son Philip immediately affected two places, Athens and Syria. It is also claimed, based on one *testimonium*, that Diyllus' history exhibited "tragic" qualities (Cooper 2014: Com. T-6). Pliny in his *Natural History* (1. 7 = *BNJ* 73 T-6) suggests that Diyllus presented "wondrous figures of people." However, in the same passage it is also noted that such "figures" may also have been taken by Pliny from Xenophon. The passage itself does not survive without lacunae, making it difficult to truly assess its meaning.

It is also clear that Diodorus at least was familiar with this work for of the six *testimonia*, three are from Diodorus (16. 14. 5, 76. 6; 21. 5), and, despite the lack of any real evidence, Diyllus is often proposed as one of Diodorus' sources for

28 Alexander Meeus has recently commented on the more routine errors committed by modern historians of ancient history (2013 84–98).

29 With respect to the latter, see Pownall 2004, although her position appears to me to be a bit extreme.

30 Hammond (1988) assumes that the Philip is Philip II, but see Cooper (2014: Com. T-1). Complicating the entire question is Fragment 1(Athen. 4. 41. 155A) which states that Diyllus in his "ninth book" discusses Cassander's return to Macedonia in the summer of 316. Diodorus 21. 5 (*BNJ* 73 T-1) states that Diyllus' history was divided into parts. How many is not specified, but it is assumed that there would be two, each containing 13 chapters, with one devoted to events down to 340, and a second continuing the history to 297/6 (Cooper 2014: Com. T-3).

Books 16 and 17 (Hammond 1937: 79–91; 1983: 49–51, 79). About all that can be concluded based on the *testimonia* and fragments with any assurance is that Diyllus did not participate in the events he describes ([Plut.]. *Mor.* 345 E–F=BNJ 73 T-4), and given what little is known of his history, it is unlikely he would have concentrated on the careers Eumenes of Cardia, Antigonus Monophthalmus, or Demetrius.

Marsyas of Philippi is the most enigmatic of the possible primary sources for the period of the Diadochi. He is often described as the younger to separate him from Marsyas of Pella, often termed the elder, who was the brother of Antigonus Monophthalmus (Heckel 2006: 156). The elder among other works wrote a history of Macedonia in ten books beginning with the first king and ending with Alexander the Great's march into Syria (*Suda* sv. *Marsyas (Pella)*=FGrH 135 T-1). While the younger also wrote a history of Macedonia much less is known about this work, although it apparently dealt with the period of the Diadochi, and may have begun with the expedition of Alexander, given a reference to the Gordian Knot in his first book (FGrH 136 F-8).³¹ There is also a third Marsyas listed in the *Suda*, Marsyas of Tabae, who wrote an *Archaeologia* in twelve books, a *Mythical History* in seven books, and other works concerning his native city of Tabae. It has been suggested that Marsyas the younger and Marsyas of Tabae were the same individual (Müller 1846: 40–4; but see Heckel 1980: 450–1). The main argument for this identification is that there are no fragments clearly identified with the Tabenian, but then most of the fragments do not specify a particular Marsyas. Those that are identified as from Marsyas of Philippi might suggest that the history concentrated on the origin of place names and mythology (FGrH 136 F-4–7, 9). Despite the lack of much information on this historian, it is unlikely that he was a source for the material of the early Hellenistic Age. There are no references that suggest the younger Marsyas wrote an account of the political and military history of the Successors.

Nymphis of Heracleia wrote both a history of his home city, *Concerning Heracleia*, and also a work titled, *Concerning Alexander and the Diadochi and Epigoni* in 24 books, ending with the accession of Ptolemy III (*Suda* s.v. *Nymphis*=BNJ 432 T-1). From what little is known of the author, he was likely born around 310 (Billows 2014: BNJ 432, Biblio.), and engaged prominently in the affairs of his city (BNJ 432 T-3, T-4). Unfortunately, his more general history is lost except for one fragment, and even this one, while generally recognized as from this work, may not be (Billows 2014: BNJ 432 F-18, Com.). In any

31 The reference, however, may simply be a digression (Jacoby 1963: 2D, n. 483; Heckel 1980: 449).

case, the fragment is not very informative stating, “Nymphis says that in the land of the Troglodytes one finds vipers of irresistibly large size, as compared to other vipers; for they are found up to fifteen cubits. And the shells of the tortoises are so large, that they can hold up to six Attic *medimnoi* (bushels) each” (*BNJ* 432 F-18 = *Ael. NA* 17.3). While too little is known about this general work to make any kind of conclusion concerning its use by subsequent histories, on the basis of what is known of his Heracleian history, many believe him to have been a competent historian (Burstein 1976: 1, 2–3, 94; Billows 1990: 339). This conclusion is based primarily on an assessment of the later Heracleian historian Memnon, whose reputation in turn is based on large fragments of his work that survive from a Photian epitome (Billows 2014: *BNJ* 432, *Biog.*). It is now commonly accepted that Memnon’s sections 8 through 17 are based on Nymphis (Billows 2014: *BNJ* 432, *Biog.*). Of the actual 20 fragments of Nymphis,³² however, 10 treat mythical topics. In short, there is no real evidence concerning Nymphis’ history other than that as an adult he was not a contemporary of the events concerning the first generation of Alexander’s Successors and both of his histories likely reflected a Heracleian bias (Billows 2014: *BNJ* 432, *Biog.*).

A more serious candidate for the source of at least part of the surviving material is Duris of Samos, who, in addition to many other works, wrote a *Makedonika* (*BNJ* 76 F-4 = *Athen.* 4. 167C-D; cf. F-3, 4, 6, 9, 11), beginning with the death of King Amyntas of Macedonia in 370/69 and continuing at least to 281 and the death of Lysimachus (*BNJ* 76 F-55 = *Plin. NH* 8. 143).³³ Duris, however, was often criticized in antiquity for his lack of accuracy.³⁴ Although using him extensively (Sweet 1951: 177–81; Kebric 1977: 55–60), Plutarch in particular is often critical of Duris’ information (*BNJ* 76 F-38 = *Plut. Dem.* 19; *BNJ* 76 F-39 = *Plut. Dem.* 23. 4; *BNJ* 76 F-53 = *Plut. Eum.* 1. 1–3). The biographer’s most telling criticism is found in his *Life of Pericles*, chapter 28 (*BNJ* 76 T-8, F-67), where he states, “it is not possible for Duris even where he has no private or personal interest to keep his narration near the truth.” Duris, indeed, has often been associated with the methodology associated with the term “tragic history” (*Plut. Per.* 28. 1), and, in fact, has been seen by some scholars as the originator of the so-called genre (Jacoby 1963: 2C, 117–118, von Fritz

32 Two of these Jacoby believed were doubtful (*FGrH* 432 F-18 [*BNJ* 432 F-19], F-19 [*BNJ* 432 F-17]).

33 The work is called the *Hellenica* by Diodorus (*BNJ* 76 T-5 = *Diod.* 15. 60. 6), or simply *Histories* (*BNJ* 76 F-1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15), with the consensus being that all three titles are referring to the same work.

34 Cicero however regarded him as “a diligent historian” (*Cic. Att.* 6. 1. 18 = *BNJ* 76 T-6).

1958: 85–145; Fornara 1983: 124). Indeed, Duris himself criticized both Ephorus and Theopompus for neglecting the emotional treatment of their topics (*BNJ* 76 F-1=Phot. *Bibl.* 176. 121a 41). A more tempered view of Duris is today more in vogue. Robert Kebric and Franca Gattinoni Landucci (1997: 51–5, 85) both regard Duris' style as dramatic and sensational, but still factual history. On a couple of occasions, Duris actually eschews the marvelous for the mundane. Duris rejects the claim that Alexander met the Amazons (*BNJ* 76 F-46=Plut. *Alex.* 46) and Ctesias' fantastic account of the death of Sardanapalus (*BNJ* 76 F-42=Athen. 12. 529A). Frances Pownall presents Duris' methodology as, "By associating *mimesis* (more accurately translated as 'exact representation' rather than 'imitation') with charm (literally 'pleasure', i.e., the conveying of pleasure through the narrative), Duris hoped not only to render the events of his narrative more vivid, but also to draw the reader into a fuller understanding of them by evoking an emotional response" (2014: *BNJ* 76 F-1, com.; cf. Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 51–5). Certainly an emphasis on the "emotional" and "vivid" is responsible for the relative plethora of fragments of Duris' works that have been preserved by writers of symposia, biographies, and lexicons. More than one fourth of Duris' ninety-six surviving fragments including 15 of the 36 from his *Makedonika*, collected by Felix Jacoby and Frances Pownall, derive from Athenaeus' *The Banqueters*; eleven from Plutarch, and seven from Diogenes Laertius. Most of Duris' fragments provide anecdotes of a fantastic or marvellous nature. There are tales of extravagant kings who sell their kingdoms because of their enormous debts (*BNJ* 76 F-4=Athen. 4. 167C-D), the love of a dolphin for a boy (*BNJ* 76 F-7=Athen. 13. 606C-D), half human-half beast creatures of India (*BNJ* 76 F-48=Plin. *NH* 7. 30), fabulous drinking cups (*BNJ* 76 F-37b=Athen. 4. 155D), extravagantly attired dancing generals (*BNJ* 76 F-12=Athen. 4. 155C), miraculous childbirths (*BNJ* 76 T-12a=Plin. *NH* 1. 7), and rags-to-riches metamorphoses. These latter accounts of transformations are especially telling with respect to Duris' reliability. Socrates was not the son of a slave, as claimed by Duris (*BNJ* 76 F-78=D.L. 2. 19), but the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, of the Antiochid tribe and the deme Alopece (Pl. *Lach.* 180D-181A, 187D-E; *Euthphr.* 297E, 298B; *Grg.* 495D); Eumenes of Cardia was not the son of a wagoner (*BNJ* 76 F-53=Plut. *Eum.* 1.1), but of a Cardian nobleman. Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 3) states that "he was of the highest birth," which coincides with Plutarch's (*Eum.* 1. 3) statement that Eumenes' father had a tie of guest-friendship with King Philip II. Such statements, along with other outrageous claims Duris makes in the second book of his "histories," that the Third Sacred War was caused by the Phocians abducting Theano, a married Theban woman (*BNJ* 76 F-2=Athen. 13. 560B), make Duris a dubious source for the bulk of the Diodoran material on Greece and the East in Books

18–20. Duris also apparently included much mythical material in his histories as well.³⁵ As noted, his history of Sicily, however, is thought by many to be the basis for much of Diodorus' material on Sicily during this same period. The sort of sensational material associated with Duris in his fragments also appears throughout these sections of Diodorus.

While the search for the ultimate sources of most of the surviving histories and biographies for the early Hellenistic Age leads to but tentative conclusions, in the case of Diodorus, the evidence that Hieronymus was his primary source for events in Greece and in the East immediately following Alexander's death down at least to 301 is convincing. The question, however, remains and probably will never be answered definitively, whether Hieronymus' history was used directly or through some intermediary source, as most recently claimed by Michael Rathmann (2014: 49–113). Diodorus wrote a universal history in forty books (Diod. 1. 4. 6–7) from mythical times (Diod. 1. 4. 5) down to 59 BC (Diod. 1. 4. 7). While only part of his work survives, as noted earlier, his books eighteen through twenty are the fullest account of the period from Alexander's death to the battle of Ipsus in 301. Moreover, he along with the Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos is the earliest of our surviving sources. Pliny the Elder twice refers to Nepos as a contemporary of Augustus (*NH* 9. 137, 10. 60), and Diodorus is thought to have completed his work around the 30s BC (Rubincam 1998: 229; Meister 2014).

While Diodorus' introduction to his work emphasizes his qualifications and abilities, these have been called into serious question by most modern commentators (Hornblower 1981; Stylianou: 1998). Diodorus proclaims that despite the general superiority of universal history over all other varieties (Diod. 1. 3. 8), no such work existed which was both universal and extended beyond "the Macedonian period" due to the inherent difficulty in writing such a work (Diod. 1. 3. 3). Indeed, Diodorus declares that he himself took thirty years to complete his history (Diod. 1. 4. 1). He further states that he had traveled widely in Europe and Asia gathering information (Diod. 1. 4. 1), and had used an abundance of literary sources (Diod. 1. 4. 2–4), and expended energy comparing different sources (Diod. 2. 32. 1). The question then becomes was Diodorus just knowledgeable of what made a good historian; in other words, was he only able to talk the talk, but not walk the walk. His proclamation of diligence has received mixed reviews from modern commentators. A.D. Nock

35 *BNJ* 76 F-2, 6, 9, 11, and 15, derive from his *Makedonika*; F-17, 21, and 86, from his other histories; F-41b, 47, 58, 79, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, are without stated origin, and since Duris also wrote *Homeric Problems* (*BNJ* 76 F-30) and *On Tragedy* (*BNJ* 76 F-28), these other references to mythical events and personages may derive from these other works.

(1959: 5) calls Diodorus' preface "the proem style of a small man with pretensions." However, Peter Green (2006: 35) declares that Diodorus was "an average secondary historian," many of whose inconsistencies probably resulted from alternative rough drafts "that he did not live to revise." The most favorable views are expressed by Billows (1991: 343–4), who believes that Diodorus was widely read and capable of synthesizing this material, and by Kenneth Sacks (1990: 5–7, 90; 1994: 231), who argues that the *Bibliothēke* possesses a degree of "intellectual unity." Jonas Palm (1955; cf. Hornblower 1981: 263–79) has shown conclusively that Diodorus' style and language are basically his own, and Robert Drews (1960: 15–24; cf. Hammond 1937: 79) has pointed out that a common moralistic theme pervades Diodorus' work. This moralizing was, however, apparently part and parcel of fourth-century history (Pownall 2004: 1, 3–4, 125–6, 141, 175), and, consequently, as it has been claimed, even though endorsed by Diodorus, nonetheless borrowed from his sources (Stylianou 1991; 1998: 5–7). Sacks (1990: 24–35, 42–54; 1994: 213–32) has further suggested that the *Bibliothēke* reflects Diodorus' own "philosophy of history," which includes the role of "*tyche*," or fate, and the previously noted "moral utility." This philosophy of history is, however, rather banal. Diodorus (1. 2. 2) pompously states that history, "constitutes the guardian of the high achievements of illustrious men and the witness which testifies to the evil deeds of the wicked." By praising good and censuring evil Diodorus hoped to influence posterity (10. 12. 1–3; 11. 3. 1, 38. 6, 46. 1; 14. 1. 1–3; 15. 1. 1, 88. 1; 23. 15; 31. 15. 1; 37. 4. 1). Moreover, for Diodorus, evil-doers suffered divine punishment for their actions. This retribution was handed down not in a next world, but in this one. Fate, invariably brought such individuals to task.³⁶ *Pleonexia*, greed; *asebeia*, impiety; and hubris, in particular, resulted on destruction.³⁷ On the other hand, *euergesia*, generosity; *epieikeia*, fairness; and *esebeia*, piety, are qualities consistently

36 For extensive citation of Diodorus' references to the intervention of fate in human affairs, see Palm (1955: 162), Drews (1960: 29, 52), and Sacks (1990: 36–41). Sacks, in particular, sees these references as being almost entirely of Diodorus' creation; the great exception being the discussion of fortune and Eumenes, which Sacks attributes in the main to Hieronymus (1990: 40).

37 *Pleonexia*: Diod. 3. 14. 4, 47. 1, 3, 8; 14. 2. 1; 21. 1. 4a; 23. 19. 1; 25. 2. 1; 33. 18. 2; 33. 23–24; 34/35. 14. 1; 37. 30. 1–3; 38/39. 6; *asebeia*: Diod. 1. 59. 2–4; 4. 50. 2, 68. 2; 6. 6. 2, 7. 3; 7. 5. 11, 7. 7; 9. 89. 5; 15. 24. 3, 48. 1–4, 49. 3–6; 16. 38. 5; 19. 48. 4; 20. 65. 2; 22. 11. 2; 25. 5. 1–2; 27. 12; 28. 3. 1, 7. 1; 29. 15. 1; 31. 18a. 35, 45; 34/35. 9, 28. 2; hubris: Diod. 5. 11. 4, 50. 5; 9. 18. 1, 23. 1; 10. 16. 2, 22. 1; 11. 48. 6, 53. 2–3, 67–68, 70. 3–4, 86. 4; 13. 33. 2–3, 53. 1–3; 14. 2. 1, 37. 7, 46. 4, 52. 2, 53. 1; 15. 1. 4, 61. 2; 17. 5. 3, 49. 2; 19. 89. 3, 110. 3–4; 20. 65. 2, 70, 101. 1–4; 21. 16. 4–5; 22. 1. 2–3, 2. 3; 25. 5. 3; 28. 4. 1, 14; 29. 14, 25; 33. 4. 4, 12; 34/35. 3. 1, 28. 2.

applied to those whom Diodorus approves.³⁸ As Nicholas Hammond noted back in 1937 (79), these “monotonous and ridiculous refrain[s]” likely owe their origin to Diodorus himself, even though the general theme is hardly original. Sacks (1990: 5, 19), however, while seeing Diodorus as the main source for the moralizing found in his work, still believes that most of the narrative is taken wholesale from Diodorus’ respective sources; it is only the “nonnarrative” material, he believes, that derives from Diodorus.

These indications of some independence on the part of Diodorus merely demonstrate that he was capable of editing his sources and adding his take on the material. Even if he were merely abbreviating the source, the selection of material would reflect his particular interests (Brunt 1980: 487). The evidence is overwhelming that his editorial abilities did not, however, extend to synthesis of different materials or to the development of more than the most rudimentary theses. It is also clear that while Diodorus was capable of presenting his own limited viewpoints, he most often accepted those of his sources. A comparison of his views on Athens and Athenian democracy in Book Sixteen with that of Book Eighteen is a case in point. In Book Sixteen, the Athenians take up the cause of Hellas (54. 2), and those among the Greeks who joined Philip are termed traitors (54. 2, 4).³⁹ In Book Eighteen, the Lamian War is described with far less sympathy for “the cause of Hellas.” The Athenians went to war to retain their possession of the island of Samos (18. 8. 7), from which they had expelled the Samians; the Athenian leaders are called demagogues (Diod. 18. 10. 1), and the victorious Antipater is praised for his leniency in dealing with the defeated Athenians, even though he ended their democracy (Diod. 18. 18. 4). Clearly, Diodorus is here following two very different sources.

Book Sixteen in many ways is a conflicted book. While the Athenians are praised for supporting Greek freedom, the man who was responsible for its virtual end receives lavish commendation. Philip is described as having achieved great success because of his valor and through his reverence for the gods (16. 1. 4, 3. 1, 4. 6, 8. 1, 35. 2, 38. 2, 60. 4–5, 64. 3).⁴⁰ At the conclusion of Book Sixteen, Diodorus presents a virtual encomium to the dead king (16. 95. 1–4). Philip’s

38 Diod. 3. 47. 1; 7. 12. 7; 8. 15. 1–4; 11. 26. 1, 4, 67. 2; 15. 39. 2–3, 57. 1, 88. 1–4; 16. 1. 4, 3. 1, 4. 6, 8. 1, 35. 2, 38. 1–2, 60. 4–5, 64. 2–3, 86. 6, 91. 2, 4; 17. 24. 2, 66. 6, 69. 4, 9. 73. 1, 76. 1, 91. 7; 19. 48. 4; 30. 23. 1–2; 31. 11. 1–3, 26. 2.

39 Diodorus (57. 1) does criticize the Athenians for accepting money raised by the Phocians from the sacred treasury at Delphi.

40 Ancient piety, however, had different components from most modern definitions. For example, Polybius (5. 10. 6–8) praised Alexander’s piety when he destroyed people but did not harm temples and other religious structures.

destruction of the Greek city of Olynthus is not reproached (Diod. 16. 53. 3), even though such actions by others are censured elsewhere (e. g. 12. 55. 8; 20. 72. 4–5). Nowhere is Philip charged with impiety even though he displayed himself enthroned among the twelve Olympians (Diod. 16. 92. 5).⁴¹ Philip is even proclaimed a Greek benefactor, conquering Thrace for the benefit of Greece (Diod. 16. 71. 2). While reproaching Philip for “corrupting character” through his “bribes” (16. 54. 4), soon after “bribes” are called “gifts” (Diod. 16. 55. 2), and, indeed, at the end of Book Sixteen, Philip’s claim that “cleverness” and “friendliness” accomplished more than warfare is treated favorably (95. 2–3, cf. 16. 53. 3). It is commonly assumed that the unevenness of Book Sixteen is due to Diodorus’ attempt to conflate at least two sources unsuccessfully (Hammond 1937: 77–91; Drews 1960: 126; Cooper 2014: Com. T-1).

Within Books Nineteen and Twenty there is also a clear dichotomy in tone and emphasis between the description of events in Greece and the East and in Sicily and the West.⁴² While the narrative describing activities in the East presents a sober account of unfolding events, those dealing with the West record oracles (19. 2–3), divine signs (19. 103. 5; 20. 29. 3, 30. 2, 65. 2, 70. 3), prophetic events (19. 2. 8–9, 3. 2; 20. 11. 3–5, 13. 2–3, 101. 2–3), love affairs (19. 3. 1; 20. 33. 5), impersonations (19. 5. 2–3), what might be termed the exotic (19. 108. 1; 20. 14. 6, 42. 2, 58. 4, 71. 3), and myth (20. 41. 3–6). In particular, those sections dealing with matters east of the Adriatic do not touch on impiety or the supernatural as progenitors of events. Moreover, while the writing style and language of Diodorus, as Palm has shown, are uniform, in Book Eighteen there does occur the word “*idiopragein*,” which is found only in this Book, and only in the sections treating Greece and the East (7. 4, 9. 2, 39. 7, 42. 2, 50. 1, 52. 8, 62. 7, 64. 6). Palm concludes, “dass das Wort aus der Quelle übernommen ist” (Palm 1955: 109, 193). This term is normally used to describe the various intrigues of the *Diadochi*, but in Diodorus 18. 9. 2, it is applied to the activities of Leosthenes, the Athenian commander in the Lamian War. Given that nowhere else does Diodorus use the term, it is further evidence that affairs in the Greek world are based on the same source as those in the East.

Further evidence of Diodorus’ basic methodology is found in a comparison of the fragments of Diodorus’ Books 28–32 with his major source for these books, Polybius (Sacks 1990: 121; Hornblower 1981: 29 and n. 41). Although the

41 This particular “enthronement,” described in Diodorus 16. 92. 5, likely to those who witnessed it was no more than a declaration that Philip was dear to the gods, and the king through whom the gods were working their will (Anson 2013A: 89), not a declaration of divinity. It was, however, still a singular event, about which Diodorus offers no opinion.

42 Events in Sicily and Italy are not presented in Book 18.

respective sections of these two authors mostly survive only in a fragmentary form, most of the corresponding material in both comes from a tenth century anthology, compiled for Constantine VII (Porphyrogenitus), whose fidelity to the originals is thought to be quite good (Walton 1968: 11: viii–ix; Sacks 1981: 1–20; 1990: 47, 144). The reliance of Diodorus on Polybius is confirmed by the large number of passages which can be brought into direct relation.⁴³ A comparison of these passages suggests strongly that Diodorus accomplished his purposes by copying and close paraphrasing; his abridgements most often involve the exclusion of sections of Polybius, not just a synopsis of them,⁴⁴ and where Diodorus does summarize he is apt to distort or misrepresent the original. For example, Polybius (22. 9. 13) states that a gift of a fleet of ships was rejected; Diodorus (29. 17) has the Achaeans accepting the ships, and while Polybius praises Aemilius Paullus for his humility, restraint, and simplicity, Diodorus repeats the passage almost exactly, but adds a comment on the greed of “present-day Romans” (Polyb. 31. 22=Diod. 31. 26). Sacks (1990: 19), arguing that Diodorus is responsible for the majority of the nonnarrative material, often defends Diodorus’ independence by demonstrating his incompetence. “No one would want to claim credit for the proem to [Book] xii. In introducing a book that covers the *Pentecontaetia* [the roughly 50-year period between the end of the Great Persian War and the start of the Peloponnesian War] the author [Diodorus] includes among the most illustrious men of that extraordinary half-century Aristotle, Isocrates, and their students.” P.J. Stylianou in his review of Sacks’ *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (1991) does not see this Proem to Book Twelve as evidence for Diodorus’ originality, but rather as “the sad remnants of an Ephoran preface.” Stylianou concludes his review stating, “study of D[iodorus] over an extended period of time leads me to endorse the ‘traditional’ view of D[iodorus]. The peculiarities of the *Bibliothèque* are best explained as the result of the fitful methods of a careless epitomizer with a moralizing bent, who produced, working in considerable haste, a historical compilation.” Even Sacks (1990: 91) damns Diodorus with faint praise, attributing

43 Polyb. 1. 84. 10=Diod. 25. 5. 1; Polyb. 1. 84. 56=Diod. 25. 4. 2; Polyb. 1. 86. 7=Diod. 25. 5. 2; Polyb. 1. 88. 5=Diod. 25. 5. 3; Polyb. 27. 6=Diod. 31. 1; Polyb. 27. 12=Diod. 30. 3; Polyb. 28. 21=Diod. 30. 17; Polyb. 28. 18=Diod. 30. 18. 1; Polyb. 29. 21. 7–8=Diod. 31. 10. 2; Polyb. 29. 22=Diod. 31. 12; Polyb. 30. 4=Diod. 30. 5; Polyb. 31. 22–30=Diod. 31. 26–27; Polyb. 31. 31=Diod. 31. 36; Polyb. 32. 7–9=Diod. 29. 17; Polyb. 36. 15=Diod. 32. 19.

44 Polyb. 27. 6=Diod. 31. 1; Polyb. 27. 12=Diod. 30. 3; Polyb. 28. 21=Diod. 30. 17; Polyb. 28. 18=Diod. 30. 18. 1; Polyb. 29. 21. 7–8=Diod. 31. 10. 2; Polyb. 29. 22=Diod. 31. 12; Polyb. 30. 4=Diod. 30. 5; Polyb. 31. 22–30=Diod. 31. 26–27; Polyb. 31. 31=Diod. 31. 36; Polyb. 32. 7–9=Diod. 29. 17; Polyb. 32. 15. 13–14=Diod. 31. 35; Polyb. 36. 15=Diod. 32. 19.

errors in the narrative to Diodorus' "laziness." Indeed, Sacks (1990: 19, 41, 158), as previously mentioned, supports the traditional view that the main narrative for Diodorus' history is taken from the various historians usually proposed as his main sources, i.e. Ephorus for Books 11–15, Hieronymus for the material on Greece and the Near East in Books 18–20. The evidence suggests that Diodorus was much constrained by his sources. He might embellish an incident, but he apparently did not intentionally alter his source's overall focus. While proclaiming him a slavish copier of his sources is, perhaps, too strong an indictment, in general, Stylianou's portrayal (1998: 15, 49, 137–9) of Diodorus is not too far off the mark.

One place where Diodorus' limitations are most apparent is in the area of chronology. Although it is to his credit that he attempted to organize his material chronologically, the system in concept was seriously flawed. Years in Diodorus' narrative are indicated simultaneously by Athenian archon years, Roman consulships, and Olympiads. None of these had the same beginning or ending dates for the year, so when Diodorus states that a year began when "Democleides was archon, and in Rome the consuls were Gaius Junius and Quintus Aemilius, This was the 116th celebration of the Olympic Games, ..." (Diod. 19. 17. 1), he is in actuality claiming to start the year in July of 316 (Democleides' date), or on the Ides of March of 316 (but in reality 317 according to the *Fasti*) (March started the Roman year prior to 153 BC), or around the time of the summer solstice, the start of the Olympic Games in 316. Frequently in his own narrative seasonal references refute his placement of events. Diodorus often equated events occurring spring-winter to an archon year. While Diodorus shows a predilection for seasonal errors of this nature, on occasion, he does begin his archon year in the fall or winter. He begins his narration of the events of 479/8 with the Persian fleet still "in winter quarters" (11. 27. 1). Diodorus also has difficulty in determining time intervals in his abridgement. Most often he solves this problem by using phrases such as "after this," "after some time," "after a little time," and "at the same time" (Anson 1986: 208–17). Exact time references then are in all likelihood copied directly from his sources.

On occasion even his troika of chronological referents are absent (452/1, 327/6, 321/0, 320/19). Recently Brian Sheridan (2014: 115–33) has examined these omissions, concluding that these are not the result of laziness or incompetence, but rather represent lacunae in the text. While his argument is certainly plausible, Sheridan admits that these omissions may simply be mistakes on Diodorus' part (*ibid.* 123). A comparison of the Byzantine summary of Book 18 and Diodorus text does not show any obvious omissions, but then these summaries and the actual text are not always in agreement (as noted by Sheridan, 124n. 33), and, of course, these lacunae may have appeared in the

text long before the composition of the summaries, or may have been present in Diodorus' original, but unrevised text.⁴⁵

The greatest problem in evaluating Diodorus' methodology is that most of the postulated sources for the various parts of his *Bibliothēke* have not survived except in fragments. However, as with Polybius, certain fragments can be compared. Another such case is Diodorus, Book Three, sections 12–48, which can be compared with a section of Photius' epitome of Agatharchides where the similarities are quite remarkable.⁴⁶ While the prose style is clearly Diodorus' own, the facts and the opinions are from Agatharchides. Diodorus even includes his source's references to previous material (3. 41. 1), even though these earlier references are found nowhere in Diodorus. In Book Nineteen (3. 3, 10. 3), Diodorus, likewise, makes a reference to material in his "previous book." Nowhere is this referenced material found in Diodorus' Book Eighteen, or anywhere else in his work.⁴⁷

One of the interesting sidebars to the discussion of Diodorus as an historian has to do with these cross-references. Did he copy with so little invention that these references to previous material were copied verbatim from his sources? Are these all his and occasionally he has forgotten that he has edited these out (so Sacks 1990: 89 and n. 20)? A mix? Catherine Rubincam does show, however, that of the 95 cross references she discovered in the *Bibliothēke*, 70 were fulfilled (1998: 77). Diodorus 3. 41. 1, however, would appear to be clearly a case of repeating the cross-reference of his source, Agatharchides (Phot. *cod.* 250, 84). Here Agatharchides states that "the regions that extend as far as the country of the Tauri and Ptolemais have been described," while Diodorus states, "starting from these areas, the coastal voyage from Ptolemais as far as the promontories of the Tauri we have spoken of before, when we were reporting on the elephant

45 It has been suggested that such gaps and conflicts are the result of Diodorus never completing a final revision of his work (Green 2006: 30 and n. 145).

46 The parallel passages are collected and juxtaposed by K. Müller (1965 [1855]: 1: 123–93; cf. Burstein 1989: 37–8; 2014: F-19; Hornblower 1981: 27–8. Agatharchides is also postulated as a possible intermediary source for the early Hellenistic period (Bottin 1928: 1307–27; Simpson 1959: 370; Rathmann 2014: 49–113). However, see Merker (1988: 90–3, especially 93) for a refutation of this possibility. Agatharchides' *On the Affairs of Asia*, devoted only two books to the Diadochi (Burstein: 2014: Biography).

47 As Rubincam (1998) suggests such omissions may be the result of subsequent editing. It is also possible that it is missing due to a *lacuna* in the text (as Sheridan 2014: 123–8). It is clear from the chapter summaries produced in the Byzantine period of Diodorus' work that there are lacunae in the various chapters. While Book 18 is shorter than Books 19 and 20, the chapter summaries of chapter 18, do not indicate, when compared to the text itself, any significant lacunae from the manuscripts available in the Byzantine period til today.

hunting of Ptolemy.” Rubincam (1998: 72) points out that in this passage the language of Agatharchides has been changed, and, therefore, she concludes that this cross reference was not “mistakenly” copied. I assume this means that Diodorus had earlier included the previous notice, but that it had been eliminated later. Sacks (1990: 84–85) argues that an earlier reference in Diodorus (3. 18. 4) to Ptolemy vitiates the passage. The reference taken from Agatharchides by Diodorus mentions a previous account of Ptolemy’s Red Sea voyage; the passage Sacks claims as fulfilling Diodorus’ reference is only a brief reference to Ptolemy’s exploration of the lands bordering the Red Sea. The extent of the paraphrasing of Agatharchides is impressive. Agatharchides (*FGrH* 86 T-3=Photius *Bib.* 250.450B) comments that he has been unable to use “royal records preserved in Alexandria, because of disturbances in Egypt”; Diodorus includes the reference almost verbatim (3. 38. 1). Of course, Diodorus may also have used these records and, therefore, retained the passage. It is more likely that he is here again quoting his source. Even though Diodorus may not copy a reference “without thought,” or “updating,” or “changing the perspective,” or with “frequent confusion,” this hardly defines a conscientious historian’s use of his sources. That he, if even infrequently, included references from his sources would suggest that his dependence on these authors was near complete. And yet, he clearly rephrased his sources, added his own comments, and edited his sources, not just in truncating their narratives, but also in editing out most of their speeches in those authors given to rhetorical flourishes.

Another interesting feature of the sections of Books 18–20 which deal with Greece and the East is this almost total lack of speeches. Indeed, Diodorus begins his Book 20 with an interesting discussion of speeches. He first criticizes their frequency in other historians (20. 1. 1–4), but then concludes that some speeches are necessary to adorn the work with variety (20. 2. 1–2). This may very well be one of those inclusions that comes from Diodorus himself. While it is true that the Sicilian narrative includes very few speeches in his entire text, they are not, however, absent. He includes rather lengthy ones in his Books 13–14 (13. 20–27, 29–32, 52. 3–8, 98. 1; 14. 65–69). Additionally, he includes the summaries of many speeches (eg. 13. 12. 1–2, 15. 1–3, 18. 3–4, 87–8, 91–5; 14. 40. 4–5). In Books 18–20, however, only one full speech is given (19. 97. 1–5), and that short and followed by, “when words such as these had been spoken,” perhaps, suggesting that they were actually heard by Diodorus’ source; some snippets from others (18. 60. 6), and brief summaries of speech content and results (18. 36. 6, 62. 5; 19. 9. 1–4, 61. 1–3; 20. 4. 6–7, 7. 2–3, 34. 3–5).

Hieronimus also apparently dispensed with these rhetorical exercises (*POxy* 4808), and it is possible that Hieronimus in a now lost introduction to his work explained his views. Diodorus may have inserted his statement

concerning his use of such speeches as an afterthought to condone his practice in light of his source's more unfavorable views, or simply copied the views of Hieronymus. If Timaeus was, indeed, a major source for Diodorus' western history, then he must have edited out a great many of this source's speeches (Pearson 1986: 350–68). With the previous evidence, there is the suggestion at least that Diodorus was not as slavish as some have assumed in his use of sources, but again this evidence still suggests that Diodorus deviated little from his source's narrative.

It is clear that despite the attempts to rehabilitate Diodorus, he remains little more than a cipher for the material of his sources. The general unevenness of his work shows that, while the language may be most often his own and on occasion the moral emphasis also, the facts and the opinions of his sources are preserved. Nor is it likely that Diodorus has routinely added details from other sources to enhance his material (as Drews 1960: 92, 98, 102–9; 1962: 385–91; Seibert 1969: 64–83; Landucci Gattinoni 1987: 37–42; 2008: 138, 149–50; Bosworth 2002: 26).⁴⁸ This is not to say that Diodorus never interpolated information from other historians, only that this was not done as a regular procedure, nor, perhaps, even as a conscious one. If this were the case, Books Nineteen and Twenty would not contain such divergent emphases with respect to Sicily and the East. But it is certain that on occasion Diodorus has interspersed sections from other sources to highlight particular elements of interest to him, but not deemed significant or interesting to his main source. For example, in Book Nineteen, section 98, Diodorus repeats almost exactly a description of the Dead Sea he included in his Book Two (48. 6–9). The source is likely Hieronymus indicating that he has used this author out of context in the earlier book.⁴⁹ The evidence makes it apparent that Diodorus follows one source for a given subject, and only changes sources when he wished to turn to different topics. Despite all the criticism, as it has been recently noted (Green 2006: 2), it is thanks to Diodorus that we have a fairly full narrative of the events that occurred after Alexander's death down to the approach of the Battle of

48 Hadley's (2001: 32) hypothesis of an unknown encomiastic source for much of the material favorable to Eumenes is possible, but unlikely. While certainly, these passages found principally in Diodorus are rhetorical in nature and taken collectively do amount to a eulogy, but it is more likely that these passages collected by Hadley are the result of both Hieronymus' bias in favor of Eumenes in his narrative history and Diodorus' own embellishments. If these passages praising Eumenes were collected in a single location, similar to the eulogy for the Macedonian monarch Philip II found in the conclusion of Diodorus' Book Sixteen (95. 1–4), then it would be more likely that Diodorus might have used a separate source.

49 This might, indeed, be an indication that Diodorus did edit his work.

Ipsus, and given the banal nature of what apparently was the author's "theory" of history, we should be doubly thankful that he was not a clever craftsman, but an abbreviator of his sources. Moreover, while Bosworth (2003: 194–5) is overly optimistic in regarding ancient secondary sources' desire to present the factual tradition without invention,⁵⁰ what then appears clear with respect to Diodorus' technique would suggest that this historian was even less likely to engage in factual creativity than potentially other historians.⁵¹ As noted by Simon Hornblower (1996: 6), "Diodorus had his own views but stopped short of altering the narrative to fit them." As a result, it may be possible, even though Diodorus does not identify his source or sources for Books Eighteen through Twenty, given his methodology, to distinguish that source's general traits.

In Books Eighteen through Twenty the main line of Diodorus' narrative, excluding the events in the West, follows the careers of three men: Eumenes, Antigonus and Demetrius. Although this is not as dramatic in Book Eighteen as in the other two, still twenty-seven of the seventy-five chapters concentrate on events in the lives of Eumenes and Antigonus. Of the remaining forty-eight, eleven concern the Lamian War, in which neither Eumenes, nor Antigonus, were directly involved (Diod. 18. 8–13, 14. 4–15, 16. 4–18. 9). Book Nineteen, on the other hand, of its eighty-five sections dealing with Greece and the East, sixty-six concentrate on the activities of Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius. Hieronymus is described as an historian who wrote about "those things he followed closely" (*POxy* 4808). In addition, the sections devoted to mainland Greek affairs exhibit a definite pro-Macedonian bias, a quality that Diodorus has obviously taken from his source. Eumenes and Hieronymus both came from the city of Cardia, which had long been hostile to Athenian interests

50 I do agree with Bosworth that in general ancient historians with no particular axe to grind attempt to adhere to the facts. Unfortunately, this definition of facts does not fit the definition set by present day historians. The speeches, the dramatization of events, and so on, all suggest a more inventive display, at the least, of these facts. Moreover, the evaluation of evidence adheres to different standards. Hearsay and myth are readily accepted. It has been claimed that Duris' history of the Diadochs appeared before Hieronymus' and that the latter wrote his to correct the errors of the former (Jacoby 1963: 2B: 544). While there is no way to know, it would appear that Hieronymus wrote first and that Duris based his work on the former's, with embellishments. If that is the case, then Bosworth's conclusions need some modification. The truth likely lies somewhere between Bosworth and Pownall (2004: 1–4); the latter proclaiming that fourth century history attempted "to make moral exempla of more importance than the accurate reporting of events..." (*ibid.* 1).

51 In the words of Peter Green (2006: 30; cf. Brown 1947: 692), "[Diodorus'] supposed 'slavish dependence on his sources,' however exaggerated, can now be seen as an unexpected advantage..."

(cf. Dem. 23. 169), and for most of their careers they had been closely allied with the rulers of Macedonia. Indicative of the attitude of Diodorus' source is the assessment of the Athenian politician Demades. While hardly mentioning him in his narrative in Book 18, Diodorus does describe him as serving Athens well in her relations with Macedonia (18. 48. 1). In an earlier book, however, Diodorus reports the rumor that Demades accepted a bribe of five talents from Demosthenes' supporters to defend the various Athenian orators, including Demosthenes, who after the capture and destruction of Thebes by Alexander, were threatened with death by the future Conqueror (17. 15. 3). Phocion had earlier called upon these threatened individuals in the interests of Athens to accept their fate (Diod. 17. 15. 2). Plutarch (*Phoc.* 1. 1), not only does not suggest that Demades served Athens well, but rather concludes that he conducted affairs so as to please Antipater and the Macedonians, and proposed many measures which were at variance with the dignity and character of Athens. Plutarch's account is in general vehemently hostile to Demades. Whereas Phocion is frugal and above bribery, Plutarch sees Demades as just the opposite (*Phoc.* 30. 4). In his *Life of Phocion*, Plutarch credits Phocion after the Lamian War with getting Antipater to exempt many from exile, and also with speaking against the imposition of a garrison (27. 6–7, 29. 4). All of this information is absent from Diodorus' admittedly abbreviated account. In fact, Diodorus (18. 66. 6) states that Phocion was one of those "who had deprived Athens of its independence." While Plutarch's account of Phocion's life is exceedingly favorable, in contrast to Diodorus' narrative which can be described best as disinterested. Indeed, this attitude is apparent with regard to Athens in general. In Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*, Phocion is not out for his own personal gain (18. 1–4, 7–8, 19. 1–4, 21. 3–5, 30. 1–5), but always for Athens' good (10. 7, 16. 1–4, 23. 1–6). Plutarch is at pains to document Phocion's patriotism. Where he has acceded to Macedonian interests he has done so out of necessity (9. 8–10, 16. 1–4, 21. 1, 23. 1); on other occasions, he opposed Macedonian interests (12–14, 16. 3). In Plutarch's opinion, Phocion's ultimate fate recalled that of Socrates and "the sin and misfortune of Athens were alike in both cases" (38. 5). Certainly, Diodorus nowhere describes Phocion in such glowing terms. While he does regard Phocion's condemnation as a travesty of justice (18. 67. 4, 6), Diodorus' account of Phocion's trial and death is factual in its presentation.⁵² Plutarch's wide use of sources and ability to blend these into a cohesive narrative make any attempt

52 Lawrence Tritle 1988: 147–8) detects an emotional element in Diodorus' account of Phocion's death, but apart from his condemnation of the unfairness of the situation and his attribution of these events to a "change in fortune," there is little of the dramatic presentation found in Plutarch (34–7).

to discover particular origins for particular passages let alone entire *Lives* virtually impossible. His favorable comments with respect to Phocion may derive from his sources or represent his own evaluation of the evidence. Diodorus, and hence his source, clearly reflects a pro-Macedonian position.

The numerous favorable comments in Diodorus⁵³ respecting Ptolemy, a consistent Eumenid enemy, have led a number of scholars to propose that a different source sympathetic to the Egyptian Diadoch is present in this source (Seibert 1969: 64–83; Landucci Gattinoni 1987: 37–42; 2008: 138, 149–50; Bosworth 2002: 26; cf. Rathmann 2014: 85–7). Neither Nepos, nor Plutarch, nor Polyaeus (4. 19) in his only “strategem” regarding Ptolemy, offer any especial praise of the Egyptian dynast, but Justin does praise Ptolemy’s industry, moderation, and kindness (13. 6. 18–19). These qualities, however, are all set forth to demonstrate that commander’s shrewdness in his preparation for the coming struggle with Perdiccas (13. 8. 1). By contrast, Perdiccas’ arrogance is listed as the major cause for that commander’s failure in Egypt (13. 8. 2). Mary Frances Williams suggests that these favorable Diodochan comments about Ptolemy may come from Euphantus (Williams 2014: *BNJ* 74, Biog.);⁵⁴ others believe Duris (e. g. Landucci Gattinoni 1987: 37–42; 2008: 138, 149–50). Despite these remarks, however, Ptolemy is hardly the focus of either Diodorus’ narrative or that of our other sources, nor is the praise unremitting. Diodorus (18. 73. 2) reproaches the Egyptian satrap for his invasion of Syria in 318. But, most importantly, he is mentioned summarily except in connection with other Diadochs, and these sections in their narratives primarily follow others, not Ptolemy. Even with respect to the regent Perdiccas’ invasion of Egypt, our sources concentrate on the activities of Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 29. 1–2, 33. 1–36. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 28);⁵⁵ the later attempted invasion by Antigonus Monophthalmus and his son Demetrius also follows the activities of the invaders (Diod. 20. 73–76), and the Battle of Gaza between the forces of the Egyptian dynast and his ally Seleucus against the aforementioned Demetrius is told primarily from the latter’s perspective (Diod. 19. 81–85).⁵⁶

53 Diod. 18. 14. 1, 28. 6, 33. 3, 34. 2–4, 36. 1, 39. 5, 86. 3; 19. 55. 5, 56. 1, 86. 2, 6; 20. 27. 3.

54 With respect of Williams’ claim of Euphantus as a possible source for these comments, of the three Euphantan fragments that in some fashion treat Ptolemy, two deal only with a member of the Ptolemaic court’s fascination with the Odyssey (*FGrH* 74 F-1a, 1b), and the third (*FGrH* 74 F-4=Porph. *Abst.* 4. 10), listed by Jacoby as doubtful, concerns an Egyptian hymn.

55 Justin’s account (13. 8. 2–10) is extremely truncated and in a section that is full of errors.

56 A similar situation presents itself in Diodorus’ description of the Battle of Salamis between the fleets of Demetrius and Ptolemy and especially its aftermath where the narrative follows more closely the activities of the former (Diod. 20. 49. 1–53. 1).

It has also been claimed that a source favorable to Seleucus can be detected in our sources (Primo 2009: 181–90; Landucci Gattinoni 2013: 30–6). Once again, the basis for the claim is that on occasion nice things are said with respect to this particular Diadoch. Seleucus is described as capable (Diod. 18. 73. 3–4; 19. 62. 6), but this is hardly fulsome praise. He obviously was capable as were the Diadochs in general. Waldemar Heckel (2002: 86–7) has observed that the failure of any of the Successors to unify Alexander’s former empire was a testimony to their collective ability. As with Ptolemy, the narration does not center on Seleucus and most of his activities only come to the fore in relation to his interactions with Eumenes, Antigonos, or Demetrius. Indeed, after the death of Eumenes, Diodorus follows the careers of this father and son more closely than that of any of the other Diadochs. These comments with respect to both Ptolemy and Seleucus may represent many things, including additional favorable sources, or Diodorus’ own conclusions (Green 2006: 7, 38, 241), but the likelihood is that they represent an honest single source, whose comments, perhaps, have been amplified by Diodorus. Diodorus had visited Egypt (1. 44. 1; cf. 1. 10. 6–7, 22. 2, 61. 4), and may have been impressed by the official accounts. Diodorus is most certainly responsible for the statement in Book Nineteen (1. 7) describing his homeland Sicily as, “the greatest and most beautiful of all the islands.” While the favorable comments with respect to Ptolemy and Seleucus probably reflect Diodorus’ source, the vocabulary appears to be Diodorus’ own. Diodorus in these books repeatedly criticizes many of Alexander’s Successors for insatiable greed.⁵⁷ Ptolemy, however, is not so criticized and is consistently described as generous and pious.⁵⁸ It is possible that what may have been mild praise in Hieronymus, became more extravagant praise in Diodorus.⁵⁹

While it is not possible to declare that these statements regarding either Ptolemy or Seleucus are not from another source, or from Diodorus himself, there are alternative explanations. Ptolemy was never directly in conflict with Eumenes. While he was regularly allied with Eumenes’ enemies (Diod. 18. 25. 4, 6, 29. 1, 33. 1–36. 4, 49. 3, 54. 1–55. 3), and on one occasion did unsuccessfully encourage Eumenes’ forces to desert him (Diod. 18. 62. 1–2), he never physically engaged Eumenes in battle. His encounters with Demetrius, the

57 Diod. 18. 23. 3, 33. 3, 41. 4–5, 47. 5, 50. 2, 54. 4, 62. 3, 6–7; 19. 55. 4; 20. 106. 2, 4.

58 Diod. 18. 14. 1, 28. 4–6, 33. 3, 34. 2–4, 36. 1, 39. 5, 86. 3; 19. 55. 5, 56. 1, 86. 2, 6.

59 H.D. Westlake (1969: 315 n. 8, 325 n. 50) believed that such was the case with those passages in Diodorus (18. 42. 1–2, 53. 1–5, 59. 4–6) that were especially flattering of Eumenes. Polybius’ surviving work has only three allusions to divine punishment for impiety (Polyb. 1. 84. 10; 31. 9. 4; 32. 15. 14), but Diodorus’ derivative account is replete with them (28. 3. 1, 7. 1; 29. 15. 1; 31. 35. 45; 32. 18).

third of Hieronymus' patrons, had been conducted by both parties with almost chivalrous behavior (Diod. 19 85. 3; Plut. *Demetr.* 5–6; 17. 1, 38. 1; Just. 15. 1. 6–8; 2. 6–8). Hieronymus may have over time developed a favorable opinion of this adversary. It is clear that Hieronymus wrote at least the final draft of his history late in his life, i.e. during his service under Antigonus Gonatas. Hieronymus was especially biased with respect to this the last of his patrons (Paus. 1. 9. 8=*FGrH* 154 T-11, F-9; 1. 13. 7–9=*FGrH* 154 F-15). This Antigonus differed from most of his predecessors, contemporaries, and immediate ancestors, in his more circumscribed ambitions (Tarn 1913: 203–5; Jacoby 1913: 1543–6; Brown 1947: 694–5; Lund 1997: 66–7). This monarch wished not only to present himself as the originator of a new ruling dynasty in Macedonia, the Antigonid, but also to be seen as a “philosopher king,” characterized by his humanity and his desire to serve his people, not his personal ambition (Landucci Gattinoni 2013B). Whether genuine or propaganda, such characterization would stand in sharp contrast to the career of Demetrius, Antigonus' father, in particular, and was likely meant to do so. Demetrius previously had been king of Macedonia for six years (Anson 2014A: 178–81), but lost his position to a great degree because he lacked those qualities his son wished to be seen as emulating. Even though Ptolemy in more recent scholarly work has been shown to be as ambitious as his rivals (Gruen 1985: 253–71; Billows 1990: 156–60, 351–2),⁶⁰ he and his dynasty do come to center their rule in Egypt, and this may later have come to be seen as a deliberate rejection of the overweening ambition of many of the other Successors, when, in fact, it may simply have been the result of circumstances. However, in one regard Ptolemy does appear to have more limited goals than Antigonus Monophthalmus or Demetrius Poliorcetes, his interest centered in the Aegean. Such admittedly large limits still would stand in stark contrast to those pursuing broader goals. These more relatively circumspect objectives, along with Ptolemy's claimed “generosity” and “kindness,” when contrasted with the behavior of his opponents may have put all his actions in a more favorable light. The second-century BC, historian, Polybius (5. 34. 9) in his assessment of the first three Ptolemaic kings suggests that those possessions held outside of Egypt were to be “a fence of client states” to protect Egypt.⁶¹ This Polybian assessment may have had a long pedigree. While its accuracy is highly questionable, it should be noted that, when Ptolemy I was

60 For the more traditional view, see Ellis 1994: ix, and for a more nuanced view in which Ptolemy is a cautious opportunist, not willing to stake everything on one roll of the dice, see Hauben 2014: 235–61; Meeus 2014: 263–306.

61 Ptolemy III did engage in an abortive invasion of Mesopotamia and a siege of Babylon in 246/5 (*BCHP* 11 [*BM* 34428]).

in a “position to assume the guardianship of the kings,” Alexander’s heirs, and become the regent for the empire, he declined the honor (Diod. 18. 36. 6). Such actions may have been interpreted later as the product of limited goals, rather than as the astute political calculation that this dual monarchy was ephemeral. Likewise, with Antigonus Gonatas, whose ambitions certainly extended beyond Macedonia into southern Greece, but these ambitions would appear to be in line with those of Philip II. Greece was to be the “fence” to protect the Macedonian homeland. Hieronymus, completing his history during the early years of this Antigonid (Paus. 1. 9. 8=*FGrH* 154 T-11, F-9; 1. 13. 7–9=*FGrH* 154 F-15), would have accepted the wisdom and success of his patron; he did not live to see the later reign and its failures (Gabbert 1997: 54–8).

While Diodorus’ major source for the careers of Eumenes, Antigonus Monophthalmus, and Demetrius, can be postulated with probable accuracy as Hieronymus, such confidence does not attach itself to such determinations for the other surviving works describing the early Hellenistic Age. These sources’ methodologies and conditions of survival are quite different from those of Diodorus. Neither Nepos nor Plutarch relied on a main source. While once both were thought to have drawn their material from earlier Alexandrine biographies (Powell 1939: 229–40; Sweet 1951: 177), it is now generally recognized that both relied on numerous primary sources (Ziegler 1964; Theander 1951; Stadter 1965; Tritle 1988: 7; Titchener 2003: 90). Certainly Plutarch himself asserts that he selects his material from a great number of sources (Plut. *Nic.* 1; *Alex.* 1; *Dem.* 2), and the evidence certainly bears this out. Despite the use of multiple sources, Nepos and Plutarch’s respective *Lives* of Eumenes accord well with Diodorus’ history.⁶² As shown earlier, the characterizations of Eumenes, his enemies, and erstwhile allies are remarkably similar.⁶³ Moreover, various parts of the narrative also correspond closely. The descriptions of the personal combat between Neoptolemus and Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 7–12 and Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2=Diod. 18. 31; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3=Diod. 18. 32. 3), Eumenes’ inhumane device for exercising horses while besieged in Nora (Plut. *Eum.* 11. 4–8 and Nepos *Eum.* 5.4–6=Diod. 18. 42. 3–4), the respective accounts of the Alexander

62 It should be noted that Plutarch was familiar with Nepos’ biographies (Plut. *Marc.* 30. 4; *Comp. Pel. et Marc.* 1. 5; *Luc.* 43. 4; *Ti. Gracch.* 21. 2). It has been claimed that Plutarch used Nepos *Life of Eumenes* as one of his sources (Jones 1971: 106).

63 Nepos gives no characterizations of Alcetas, Neoptolemus, or Peucestas, while Plutarch’s depictions of these individuals do correspond well with those of Diodorus; Plutarch in his *Life of Eumenes* gives no characterization of Olympias, Alexander’s mother, but his comments in his *Life of Alexander* (9. 5, 10. 7, 77.8) do agree with those in both Diodorus and Nepos

Tent (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4–8=Diod. 18. 60. 4–61. 3; cf. 19. 15. 3–5; Nepos 7. 2–3=Diod. 19. 15. 3–5),⁶⁴ are all remarkably similar in the three accounts. But the three sources each include material not found in one or in both of the others.⁶⁵

While most of these respective omissions can be explained as the result of different criteria for material selection or abbreviation, there is present in Plutarch's second chapter a tradition hostile to the Cardian. Eumenes hoards and conceals his wealth (4–6), shows himself capable of pettiness (2, 8) and obsequious behavior (9–10). In addition to omissions, there are a few conflicts. Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 2–4) and Nepos (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7) have Eumenes escaping from his entrapment in Nora through trickery by altering an oath of allegiance to Antigonus. Nepos gives no details, but says Eumenes escaped from Nora by “pretending to surrender.” Diodorus (18. 57. 3–4, 58. 1; 19. 44. 2) states that Eumenes formed an alliance with Antigonus and was released.⁶⁶ Clearly, Plutarch, and to a lesser degree Nepos, are using sources not utilized by Diodorus and hostile to Eumenes.

When the different methodologies and objectives are taken into account, the three narratives still bear a remarkable similarity.⁶⁷ Moreover, while an

64 While the actual descriptions of the Tent are in the main the same in Nepos, Diodorus and Plutarch, Nepos places its institution in Susiane, Plutarch in Cilicia, and Diodorus has it originating in Cilicia, but renewed in Susiane.

65 Material present in Nepos, but not found in Diodorus: Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2. 4–5, 3. 5–6, 4. 4. 11. 1–2. Present in Diodorus, but absent in Plutarch: Diod. 18. 22–23, 26–28, 44–49, 51–52, 54–56, 62–75; 19. 11–14, 16, 17. 5–7, 18. 1, 19–21, 23. 2–4, 25. 2–36. 6, 44. 1; present in Plutarch, but absent in Diodorus: *Eum.* 1–2, 3. 4–11, 6. 7–10, 8. 5–12, 9. 4–12, 11. 1–3, 12. 2–7, 15. 1–3, 16. 1–6, 18. 7–9, 19. 1. Many of the passages found in Plutarch but not in Diodorus are also present in Nepos' biography of Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 2=Nepos *Eum.* 1. 4–6; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4–11=Nepos *Eum.* 2. 4–5 [Nepos mentions an attempt on Eumenes' life which does not appear in Plutarch]; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2–7=Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 7–9=Nepos *Eum.* 11. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 7–19. 1=Nepos *Eum.* 11. 3–5, 12. 3–4. None of the material on Eumenes' early life prior to Alexander's death is found in Diodorus. There are also many passages approximately equivalent but distorted through abbreviation. For example, Plutarch simply notes that Eumenes was defeated in Cappadocia through treachery (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3); Diodorus gives the details (18. 40. 5–8). Peucestas' great feast in Persis is sparingly made reference to by Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5), and again it is necessary to turn to Diodorus for a full description (19. 22–23. 1).

66 For a full review of this conflict, see Anson 1977; 251–6; 2014: 85–7.

67 In another case where Plutarch and Diodorus can be compared with respect to an individual's career, that of Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Monophthalmus, the similarities are far less prevalent. This is especially true with respect to Demetrius' occupation of Athens. In Plutarch (*Demetr.* 8) Antigonus decides “to free” the city to win the goodwill of the Greeks and for his and his son's greater glory. Diodorus (20. 45. 1–2) describes the

argument from silence is hardly the best evidence, it appears clear that Plutarch did not use Diodorus' history. While there are references to Hieronymus' history (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 17. 7, 21. 7, 27. 8; cf *Demetr.* 39. 5), and Plutarch is not averse to name dropping, there are no references to Diodorus anywhere in the corpus of Plutarch's writings. There is, also, an important distinction between Plutarch and Diodorus' evaluations of Eumenes. While Plutarch praises Eumenes as loyal, clever, skilful (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 4. 1, 5. 8, 9. 4, 11. 14, 2. 11, 15. 13, 16. 1; 20. 2–4), and laments the effects of Macedonian prejudice (Plut. *Ser.* 1. 5; *Eum.* 3. 1, 8. 1, 18. 1, 20. 2, 9) in virtually the same terms used by Diodorus,⁶⁸ the latter emphasizes Eumenes' lack of ambition (18. 60. 1, 62. 7, 63. 4). Plutarch (*Eum.* 21. 2–5; cf. *Eum.* 2. 1), however, criticizes Eumenes for his great personal aspirations. The likely explanation for this conflict lies in Plutarch's ability to see through Hieronymus' rhetoric to a basic truth about Eumenes, that the Cardian, like all the Diadochs, was highly ambitious; Diodorus simply parroted Hieronymus.

With regard to the remaining sources, attempts to demonstrate the origin of their material are even less successful. Book Four of Polyaeus' *Stratagems of War* includes anecdotes relating to various individuals connected with Macedonian history, ranging from Argaeus to Perseus, but most being associated with Philip II, Alexander III, the *Diadochi*, and the *Epigoni*. Of these "strategems" twenty-one are collected regarding Antigonos, five, for Eumenes, and twelve, for Demetrius. While many of these anecdotes concerning these three recount almost exactly events found in Diodorus,⁶⁹ and others do so but in greater detail (Polyaen. 4. 6. 9 [Diod. 18. 63. 6]; Polyaen. 4. 7. 8 [Diod. 20. 103. 1]), many exhibit significant differences.⁷⁰ There are also a large number of incidents not found in Diodorus.⁷¹ Of the stratagems associated with Eumenes three are virtually identical to the events described in Diodorus. Despite an apparently limited period of research and writing, Polyaeus still

operation in purely political and strategic terms. Plutarch's description is tinged throughout with dramatic qualities, all of which are absent from Diodorus' admittedly abbreviated narrative (Plut. *Demetr.* 8–14).

68 Diod. 18. 29. 2, 42. 2, 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 4, 60. 1, 3–4, 62. 3, 7, 63. 4; 19. 13. 1–2, 24. 5, 27. 2, 26. 9, 44. 2, 4; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 1–3, 2. 3, 3. 1, 6. 5, 13. 3.

69 Polyaen. 4. 6. 8=Diod. 18. 72. 3–8; Polyaen. 4. 6. 13=Diod. 19. 42–43; Polyaen. 4. 6. 14=Diod. 19. 46. 1–4; Polyaen. 4. 6. 15=Diod. 19. 48. 3; Polyaen. 4. 8. 2=Diod. 18. 60–61. 3; Polyaen. 4. 8. 3=Diod. 19. 23; Polyaen. 4. 8. 4=Diod. 19. 38.

70 Polyaen. 4. 6. 4 (Diod. 18. 39. 3–4); Polyaen. 4. 6. 7 (Diod. 18. 44. 2–3); Polyaen. 4. 6. 10 (Diod. 19. 32. 2); Polyaen. 4. 6. 11 (Diod. 19. 37); Polyaen. 4. 6. 16 (Diod. 19. 82. 3); Polyaen. 4. 7. 3 (Diod. 20. 102. 2); Polyaen. 4. 7. 5 (Diod. 20. 45. 2–3); Polyaen. 4. 7. 7 (Diod. 20. 49. 1–50. 6).

71 Polyaen. 4. 6. 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20; 7. 4 (Diodorus exists only in fragments for Demetrius' career after Ipsus), 8. 1, 5.

may have used actual histories, and not simply consulted previously published collections of military ruses (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: 1: xi–xvi). In any case, while arguments may be made for individual passages being extracted from Hieronymus, it is impossible to decide whether Polyaeus derived them directly, or through an intermediary source.

For the two remaining major surviving sources relevant to the career of Eumenes, both survive only as epitomes, the briefest fragments, and fragments of epitomes. Arrian of Nicomedia's *The Events after Alexander*, commonly titled in modern literature as *The Successors*, covered the years from Alexander's death down to 320/319 in ten books (*FGrH* 156 F-1=Phot. *Bibl.* 92. 69. a1=Arr. *Succ.* 1a). As previously indicated, unfortunately now only a few pages of fragments and epitome remain. The most extensive of these is found in the ninth century Byzantine compendium, the *Bibliotheca*, by Photius.⁷² Despite the obvious limitations on arriving at any conclusions regarding Arrian's sources, there are indications that he was in the main following Hieronymus. In the first place, Arrian in his work on Alexander, the *Anabasis*, lists his major sources and further explains his reasons for their selection. Here he demonstrates a preference for knowledgeable eyewitnesses (Arr. *Anab.* 1. pref.). Such a predilection would naturally attract him to Hieronymus. Secondly, Arrian's surviving fragments and Photius' epitome show a striking resemblance to Diodorus' account of this same period. Certainly the use of a chronological system based on campaigning years is consistent with Diodorus' attempted practices in Book 18, especially when it is taken into consideration how often despite his archon year, consular year, Olympic year, dating, he slips into arranging events in campaigning years. Omitting sections not found in both Diodorus and in the remains of Arrian's *Successors*, only at two points are there differences in the sequence of events. Photius' *Epitome* places an account of Leonnatus' death (*Succ.* 1a. 9) before Lysimachus' operations in Thrace (*Succ.* 1a. 10), while Diodorus reverses the order (Lysimachus, 18. 14. 2–4; Leonnatus, 18. 14. 5–15. 3). The second discrepancy has Photius placing Perdikkas' moves

72 Photius' epitome of Arrian will be noted in the text as *Succ.*, chapter number, plus the letter a; i.e. Arr. *Succ.* 1a). Photius also summarized the work of Dexippus (ca. 210–273), *History of the Events after Alexander the Great's Death*, which in turn was heavily based on Arrian's *Events After Alexander*. Photius' summary of Dexippus only includes events derived from Arrian's Book 1 of the *Successors*, and references to Dexippus' summarized work will be designated as *Succ.* 1b to distinguish it from Photius' summary of Arrian's original. Additionally, there are three fragments of the original *Events After Alexander*: the so-called "Vatican Palimpsest," which contains two brief extracts from Arrian's Book 7; a papyrus fragment, *PSI* 12.1284, and the *Gothenburg Palimpsest* (see Dreyer 2007: 251–5, for a new edition and translation).

against Antigonus (*Succ.* 1a. 20) before Perdiccas' marriage to Nicaea (*Succ.* 1a. 21); Diodorus again exchanges the order of the two events (18. 23. 1–3). Neither of these is as contradictory as they might first appear. Lysimachus' operations in Thrace were an on-going matter from his arrival well past the time of Leonnatus' death; the same is likely the case with respect to Perdiccas and Antipater. With respect to the latter, the conspiratorial conversations began well before they broke out into the open at the arrival of Nicaea (Diod. 18. 23. 1–3; see Chapter 3). The differences in these two instances then are likely due simply to the selective abridging of the extensive material by the respective authors. In the final analysis, little can be determined with respect to sources for the surviving material from Arrian's history, other than to say that there was extensive, detailed, information available at the time of Arrian's writing. Additionally, Arrian was not an historian who either limited himself to one source or found it difficult to blend different sources into one connected narrative.⁷³ In his *Anabasis*, while claiming in the main to follow Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and Aristobulus, he has included material "not wholly untrustworthy" from other sources (Arr. *Anab.* 1. pref.). Moreover, Brian Bosworth (1980 1: 1–34) has suggested that Arrian was far more artful than his preface might indicate.

In the case of Justin's *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Historiae Philippicae*, any determination of the ultimate source or sources of Pompeius Trogus' history is even more difficult than for that of Arrian's *Successors*. So little is known either concerning Trogus' original history, this despite his inclusion in the so-called canon of Latin historians (Syme 1992: 11; Yardley and Develin 1994: 3), nor is much known about Trogus' epitomator. Trogus wrote his history in the first century BC, and Justin, whose exact dates are debated, with dates suggested anywhere from the second to the fourth century AD.⁷⁴ In addition to Justin's *Epitome*, brief undated "Prologues" (summaries) of Trogus' history also survive. While the history centered on the age ushered in by Philip and Alexander, it, through its digressions on various topics associated with the peoples of the lands that made up the Hellenistic world, apparently took on certain aspects of a universal history, and Justin refers to it as such: "encompassing the annals of every period, king, nation and people" (Preface 2). Justin's work, while most often termed an epitome, is not a simple condensation or abbreviation of Trogus' history. Justin excerpted that material he found "pleasurable" and

73 Philip Stadter (1980: 148–9) postulates that Arrian may have been using in addition to Hieronymus another eyewitness, Ptolemy, son of Lagus. Stadter believes that Ptolemy's history ended in 320, not in 323.

74 Ronald Syme (1988: 358–71; 1992: 11–20) holds for the fourth century; Yardley and Heckel (1997: 10–13) support the second century dating.

excised that which did not serve a moral purpose (Preface 4). He refers to his work as “a brief anthology to refresh the memory of those who had studied Greek history” (Preface 4). As a result Justin’s work is far more truncated than that of Diodorus and less given to detail. However, judging from the “Prologues,” Trogus devoted sizable sections of books 13 and 14 to Eumenes’ campaigns. If Trogus had in any way indicated his sources, neither Justin nor the author(s) of the “Prologues” retain those references. Trogus did not follow a single author, but apparently synthesized the material from many sources (Just. Praef. 2). Their identification, therefore, becomes next to impossible. Nor is it possible to draw many conclusions about the original based on Justin’s abridgement. While Justin apparently did not add new material to Trogus’ history, his “brief anthology” (Praef. 4) has radically abbreviated the original, and on occasion he has not even reproduced these parts with great accuracy (Seel 1955: 34; Pendergast 1961: 20; Yardley and Develin 1994: 70). Justin confuses Perdiccas’ campaign against Ariarathes in Cappadocia with a later one in Pisidia (13. 6. 1–3; cf. Diod. 18. 22); he inaccurately reports the death of Polyperchon in 320 (13. 8. 6), later referring to him as alive and well (14. 5. 1). Justin has here confused Polyperchon with Craterus (Diod. 18. 30. 5–6). He reports that Philip Arrhidaeus, the king, was placed in charge of the transportation of Alexander’s body from Babylon (13. 4. 6), when in fact another individual named Arrhidaeus actually performed the deed (Diod. 18. 26. 1). Thessalonike is called the daughter of King Philip Arrhidaeus (14. 6. 13); she is actually the daughter of Philip, the son of Amyntas (Diod. 18. 35. 5), Philip Arrhidaeus’ father. Perdiccas’ troops in Egypt are reported to be deserting to Antipater (13. 8. 2), who was not physically present. It is very clear that these discrepancies are due to the epitomator and not to Trogus. Justin’s narrative incorrectly centers the Lamian War on Heracleia (13. 5. 8), yet the “Prologue” for Book Thirteen clearly places the theater of operations before the walls of Lamia. Given the paucity of information, little can be concluded with respect to Trogus’ sources.

From the analysis of the surviving sources, it appears likely that Hieronymus was the ultimate origin for much of the material regarding the years following Alexander’s death, and for most of the narrative concerning Eumenes. The prominence of Eumenes in our surviving sources is doubtless the best argument that can be made for Hieronymus’ use. Eumenes did not create a kingdom or a dynasty, and while a competent commander, defeating two generals in 320 who had led significant elements of the great Alexander’s army, he lost crucial battles to Antigonos in 319, and, again, in early 315. His career after Alexander’s death spanned less than eight years, and ended in defeat and death. Yet, Diodorus centers these years of his Asian narrative on Eumenes, and both Plutarch and Nepos composed biographies of the Cardian. Given

Diodorus' methodology, that author obviously was abbreviating a source who centered his history from 323 to 315 on Eumenes. That so much information regarding Eumenes was available to these biographers, and that much of it mirrored that found in Diodorus, suggests that the ultimate source of their information was the same as that for Diodorus, Hieronymus. It is unlikely that any contemporary historian without a personal interest and firsthand knowledge would have centered these on Eumenes. Moreover, it is with respect to Eumenes that the surviving sources demonstrate the most uniformity. While the evidence for Hieronymus as the primary source of the information for the period of the Successors is circumstantial, it does appear compelling. This would make Hieronymus responsible, not only for the description of events, but also for the focus of the narrative, the selection of materials, and the characterizations of the principal individuals. Given the likelihood that Diodorus has abbreviated Hieronymus' work with little addition, it can be concluded that Hieronymus provided a detailed and a factually accurate work, but one with definite biases, especially with regard to his fellow-countryman Eumenes. In many respects that section of his history would have exhibited qualities of an *apologia*.⁷⁵

75 Robert Hadley (2001: 3–33) has collected those passages in the surviving sources that suggest just such a purpose.

From Cardia to Babylon

Eumenes, the son of Hieronymus (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 7), was born in 361 BC, in Cardia in the Thracian Chersonese.¹ Beyond this, little is known of his life prior to the death of Alexander the Great. Our major source for this later period, Hieronymus, was not writing biography, but a history of post-Alexandrine events,² and this is reflected in our sources, where little of Eumenes' activities before 323 is mentioned. The information that does survive is found principally in Plutarch's *Life of Eumenes*. Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 4–6) only notes that Eumenes became secretary to both Alexander and his father Philip, and late in Alexander's reign he commanded one of the two corps of the elite Macedonian Companion Cavalry.

Plutarch presents two accounts of the origin of Eumenes' association with the Macedonian court, one which comes from Duris of Samos and relates that Eumenes was the son of a poor carter whose athletic prowess so impressed the Macedonian king that he was immediately taken into Philip's entourage (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 1–2). There was even a tradition that Eumenes was the son of an impoverished funeral-musician (Ael. *VH* 12. 43). Ptolemy, also, is described as having risen from the ranks of the infantry (Just. 13. 4. 10); Antigonus, born of a farmer (Ael. *VH* 12. 43), and Lysimachus, the son of a Thessalian (*FGrH* 260 F-3.8).³ Certainly in the case of Ptolemy the evidence is clear that he came from the

1 Eumenes died in January 315 (see Chapter 6), having served the Macedonian royal house since he was 19; he served Alexander for 13 years (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1); Philip for seven (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). He died in his 45th year (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 1).

2 See chapter 1.

3 Certain modern historians have combined a number of sources to urge that the description of Lysimachus as a Thessalian is correct, even though both Pausanias (1. 9. 5) and Justin (15. 3. 1) describe him as Macedonian by birth, and Plutarch implies the same (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 6) (see Lund 1992: 2). Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-81=Athen. 6. 259F-261A) in a general account of the depravity of Philip II's "friends" states that a certain Agathocles who commanded troops under Philip was formerly a Thessalian slave. Lysimachus' father's and one of his son's names were Agathocles (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 3; Plut. *Demetr.* 31. 4, 46. 9). However, neither Theopompus, nor any other author, makes a connection between the former Thessalian slave and Agathocles, the father of Lysimachus. Further, Lysimachus in his struggle against Pyrrhus described the latter as a "foreigner, whose ancestors had always been subject to Macedonia" (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12. 6). On the correctness of identifying Lysimachus' ancestors as noble Macedonians, see I.L. Merker 1979: 31–5.

upper echelons of Macedonian society (Curt. 9. 8. 22; Paus. 1. 6. 2; Heckel 2006: 235 [#6]). These rags-to-riches metamorphoses were a motif popular in the Hellenistic Age. Plutarch, however, to his credit, rejects Duris' fanciful anecdote regarding Eumenes for the more reasonable report that the connection was the result of a tie of guest-friendship (*xenia kai philia*)⁴ between Eumenes' father, Hieronymus, a prominent Cardian, and Philip (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 4).⁵

Other information concerning Eumenes' background must come from an analysis of the history of his home city, Cardia, in the fourth century. The friendship between Philip and Eumenes' father probably indicates that the latter was one who early came to see the Macedonian king as the ascendant force in the north. Such attachments to the Macedonian monarch were predicated on Cardian fear of Athenian power in the region. While Cardia's early history was closely linked to Athens, since the Peloponnesian War it had been an independent state. Cardia, established originally in the seventh century, jointly by Miletus and Clazomenae (Str. 7. 51), was refounded in 560 by Miltiades and the Athenians (Hdts. 6. 34–36), with the addition of many Thracian settlers (Hdts. 6. 36, cf. 41). In 493, the city became tributary to the Persians (Hdts. 9. 115; cf. Hdts. 6. 41), but fell back under Athenian domination in 466 (Plut. *Cim.* 14. 1). Cardia gained its complete independence with the collapse of the Athenian Empire at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 2; 3. 2. 8–10; Andoc. 3. 15), and, even though the Chersonese was granted to the Athenians in the King's Peace of 371 (Dem. 9. 16), this was done in name only. Cardia maintained her independence against Athenian encroachment primarily by establishing alliances with various Thracian dynasts, perhaps, even coming under the control of Cotys, the king of the Odrysian Thracians, in 365 (Tzvetkova 2007: 660). But in 353, Cotys' son Cersobleptes formed an alliance with the Athenians, ceding the Chersonese to them, however, without Cardia (Dem. 9. 16; Diod. 16. 34. 4; see Ryder 1965: 128), which remained his ally either under his patronage (Archibald 1998: 233), or under his direct control (Tzvetkova 2007: 665–7). Athenian cleruchs were dispatched to the region, resulting in border disputes between the Cardians and the Athenian settlers (Diod. 16. 34. 4; Dem. 23. 181–2, cf. 168, 175; cf. 8. 6; [Dem.] 7. 41–4). The Athenian alliance with Cersobleptes brought a rapid response from Philip.

4 Hieronymus may also have been a *proxenos*, the visible representative of a foreign power, who retained local citizenship and domicile. The individual retained not only his citizenship, but in spite of his recognized agency retained primary loyalty to his home state (see Perlman 1958: 185–91; Walbank 2008: 132–9).

5 Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 2–3) states that Eumenes “was of the highest birth” in his native Cardia.

Philip's Thracian campaign of 352 had established him as a force in eastern Thrace primarily at the expense of Cersobleptes,⁶ and had led to the alliance between himself and Cardia.⁷ Cardian fear of and hostility towards Athens had forged this relationship with the Thracians. Now, dreading that their Thracian protector would no longer be willing or able to safeguard their interests, they allied themselves with Philip (Dem. 9. 35; 12. 11; 19. 174; Badian 1983: 67). It may have been during the 352 campaign that Eumenes' father established his friendship with Philip. In the Peace of Philocrates in 346, Cardia was recognized as an ally of the Macedonian king, and this allied status apparently continued through the reign of Alexander the Great (Dem. 5. 25; 19. 158, 174; [Dem.] 12. 11).

In 342, the then nineteen-year old Eumenes (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 1) passed into Philip's service, as the monarch's personal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5), either shortly before, or during the latter's Thracian campaign of that year.⁸ While the exact circumstances of this attachment are unknown, there are certain indications. Probably by 342, Cardia was in the hands of a tyrant and Eumenes' father deceased, with Eumenes himself no longer welcome in the city of his birth. Eumenes and the Roman Sertorius are both described by Plutarch in his comparison of these two "parallel" lives (*Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 1. 2) as strangers, aliens, and exiles ("ξένους καὶ ἀλλοδαποὺς καὶ φυγάδας"), in their adoptive homelands. Since Sertorius was not a voluntary exile from Rome, it is likely that Eumenes held a similar status. The exact date for the establishment of the tyranny is unknown. But in 322, despite Eumenes' prominence at the Macedonian court, Hecataeus, an old foe of the former's family ("hereditary distrust"), is found ruling Cardia as "tyrant" (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6–7; cf. Diod. 18. 14. 4). Exile would be very plausible, if Hecataeus, a family enemy, were already in power two decades earlier. Given that Eumenes' father was a prominent Cardian and the guest-friend of Philip himself, the most probable explanation for Eumenes' exile and the tyranny is that his father Hieronymus had died and Philip had associated himself with another prominent Cardian. As an exile, Eumenes would have availed himself of his father's friendship with the Macedonian king and sought refuge at the Macedonian court. Indicative

6 On this campaign, see J.R. Ellis 1976: 80, 87.

7 Diod. 16. 34. 4; Dem. 23. 181; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 264–6; Hammond 1994: 50; Worthington 2008: 60.

8 Philip's Thracian campaign began in May or early June of 342 (Cawkwell 1978: 187; Archibald 1998: 234). Philip later sent troops to defend Cardia from Athenian action in the spring of 341 (Dem. 8. 58; 10. 60). On Philip's Thracian campaign: Dem. 5. 25; 8. 2–3, 7–9, 58; 7. 43; 9. 16; [Philip] 12. 3.

of the change in Eumenes' circumstances is that, even though his father had been a guest-friend of Philip's and, therefore, if found in straitened conditions would have come to court as an adviser or member of the court, Eumenes was employed as a personal secretary, a position not highly regarded by aristocratic Macedonians (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1.6). While the date for the creation of the tyranny can only be guessed, it must have come into being sometime after 346, but before 338. In Philip's and Demosthenes' letters prior to 346 there are references to the Cardian people in a decision-making capacity (Dem. 7. 41, 43–44; 10. 18; 19. 174; 23. 175, 183; [Dem.] 12. 11), and Demosthenes, while discussing various provisions of the Peace of Philocrates, refers to the "Cardians," not to Hecataeus, as Philip's allies (Dem. 19. 174). These indications suggest that Hecataeus had not come to power prior to the Peace of Philocrates. The *terminus post quem* derives from a provision of the Peace of Corinth,⁹ which stated that the governments in place in the respective Greek states at the time of the peace were to be retained ([Dem.]¹⁰ 17. 7, 10; cf. Ryder 1965: 625). Alexander himself cited this provision in later reestablishing the tyranny in Messene ([Dem.] 17. 7, cf. 17. 4).¹¹ While this particular provision of the Peace was not always observed, it is likely that the author of *On the Treaty with Alexander* ([Dem.] 17) would have alluded to such a transgression committed by Philip or later by Alexander in his listing of the latter's violations of the Peace of Corinth ([Dem.] 17. 7–8, 10). It is, therefore, likely that the tyranny was established shortly before the establishment of this Peace and alliance, and at a time before Eumenes' addition to Philip's court.¹² Even though Eumenes' influence had grown during the latter part of Philip's

9 After Philip's victory at Chaeronea in 338, he created both a League of the Greeks, except the Spartans, and a common peace among the League members (*GHI*: 177, ll. 12–15).

10 While in the Demosthenic corpus, it was likely written by Hyperides (Bosworth 1988: 190).

11 Later Alexander would overthrow tyrannies and oligarchies in Asia and replace them with democracies. The reasons for both actions had nothing to do with political philosophy, but with political expedience. The democracies in Greece were typically hostile to Macedonian influence and tyrannies and oligarchies often owed their successful acquisition of power to that same influence, but in Asia tyrannies and oligarchies had been established in the Greek cities by the Persians, with democrats supporting Alexander as a path to freedom from their Persian overlords. See Anson 2013A: 130–1.

12 Hornblower (1981: 8–9) suggests that Hecataeus seized power "in the period of uncertainty following the assassination of Philip." As shown, this is unlikely. A certain Hecataeus was dispatched by Alexander soon after Philip's death to secure the assassination of the Macedonian nobleman Attalus (Diod. 17. 2. 5–6, 5. 2). While Helmut Berve (1973: 2:148 [#292]) dismisses the possibility that this is the later tyrant, Waldemar Heckel (2006: 131 [#2]) believes that it is. There is no real evidence one way or the other. The name

reign and throughout that of Alexander's, he was obviously unable to remove Hecataeus from power.

In the late 340s, with increasing Persian interest and Athenian presence in the area, and with discontent appearing in the ranks of Philip's Hellenistic allies (Ellis 1976: 168–79), Philip would not have been displeased if a Macedonian puppet seized control of Cardia. Typical polis government was always a dangerous proposition in a dependent ally, and given Philip's future plans, he required control of the entire Chersonese along with as much of the opposite Asiatic coast as possible.¹³ By 346, Philip was already treating Cardia as under his personal control, granting all of the land north of Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7. 39; cf. 7. 44; Dem. 8. 64). Hecataeus apparently was also a very dependable Macedonian ally. He was a close associate of Antipater (Diod. 18. 14. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6–8), and likely also the same Hecataeus employed by Alexander to eliminate a possible rival at the start of the Conqueror's reign (Heckel 2006: 131 [#2]). So, despite Eumenes' prominence, a personal enemy was able to maintain control of his home city. There are those historians who believe that Alexander wished to maintain such rivalries within and outside his court as a way of maintaining control (Heckel 2002: 82–4; Weber: 2009: 83).

Over time there emerged a Macedonian secretariat, with the Cardian as the chief or royal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 2; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 6). Whether it was Philip, Eumenes, or both who initiated the creation of the royal secretariat is unknown. While N.G. L Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1988: 18) states that Eumenes came to Macedonia as "a junior secretary," this premise is based on his belief that King Alexander I had established the Macedonian royal chancellery (Hammond 1988: 131; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 18). Given that the Athenian state only created a state archive some time between 409 and 405 (Boegehold 1972: 23–30), it would appear unlikely that the less bureaucratic, less imperial, Macedonia, would have established a royal secretariat so early, despite the region's slightly more than a decade as a Persian dependency (Anson 1996: 501–4). Even though the later creation of a formal secretariat and

Hecataeus, however, is not unknown among native Macedonians (see Berve 1973: 2:149 [#293], Heckel 1992, 292; 2006: 131 [#1]; Hatzopoulos 1996: 2:105 [#91, line 3]).

13 Given the dominance of the Persian fleet in the Aegean, Philip needed to control as much of the coasts on both sides of the Hellespont as possible, if he wished to cross to Asia successfully. Contemporary warships were not able to stand off a coast in blockade; they would remain on land or in harbor until enemy action was observed, then they would attempt to intercept their adversaries. Obviously, for a blockade to be successful the blockading fleet had to control the land close to the point of embarkation or landing (in general, see Anson 1989: 45–9).

archive were likely borrowed from the Persian court (Kienast 1973: 7–37), the necessity of a chancellery only arose with the growing power and influence of Philip II. Not a great deal is known of the infrastructure of the Macedonian state either before or during Philip's reign, but there does not appear to have been much governmental structure present. Indeed, the evidence suggests that there was little Macedonian bureaucracy in any period of Macedonian history. While at one time it was believed that Macedonia had an elaborate organization in place in the cities of the realm (Holleaux 1939: 1:270), Miltiades Hatzopoulos (1996: 1:29–9, 101–3, 381–93, 411, 426–29; cf. Gauthier 1993: 211–2) has shown that Macedonian cities were governed by local officials with a great deal of local autonomy. There was, however, no doubt that the king held the final and overall authority whenever he chose to exercise it.

As Philip's power grew, so did Eumenes' importance. From his position in Philip's court, he served as a conduit for correspondence between Philip and foreign states. During the reign of Philip's son Alexander, Eumenes was the head of an imperial chancellery which operated as the nerve center for the growing domains under the control of that Macedonian monarch. Since there was hardly any governmental bureaucracy, a king's personal secretary was, consequently, secretary for the entire realm. He was privy to all written communications and probably possessed the right to screen all incoming correspondence. Certainly, after Alexander's conquests in Asia, much of the day-to-day running of this vast empire was directly in Eumenes' hands. Many noble-born Macedonians learned the necessity of obtaining his favor, even though they thought such a bureaucratic position personally beneath them. Eumenes' position in the Macedonian court lacked the prestige of a military command (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5). One of Alexander's battalion commanders would later ridicule Eumenes for following the king with writing tablet and pen (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6; *Comp. Ser. et Eum.* 1. 6).

While, perhaps, lacking the prestige of a military command, the chief secretary possessed a great deal of inherent power. As contemporaries emphasize, in Macedonia the king was the kingdom. Isocrates (5. 107–108) notes that Macedonia was subject to the rule of “one man,” and the contemporary Demosthenes (1. 4) comments that Philip was the sole director of his policy, “uniting the roles of general, ruler, and treasurer,” and “was responsible to nobody: the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything” (Dem. 18. 235). Indeed, as G.T. Griffith has stated, “there was simply no government apart from the king” (1978: 77–133). The king on his own authority determined what taxes and services were owed (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 5; 7. 10. 4; Plut. *Demetr.* 42. 3–4; *Mor.* 178A–179C), controlled foreign policy and formed alliances with foreign states (Anson 2013A: 20), transferred populations from

one place to another (Ellis 1969: 9–12),¹⁴ and declared war and made peace (Anson 2013A: 20–1). He even served as the chief religious official (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 155–6; Anson 1985A: 304–7; 2013A: 20–1; Borza 1990: 238). A king's regent also appears to have had such broad authority. As heir and regent for his father, Alexander in 340 crushed a rebellion by the Thracian Maedians, expelled them from their city, and refounded it as Alexandropolis and settled it with a "mixed population" (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 1). Alexander's regent in Macedonia, while he was gone conquering the Persian Empire, Antipater, was entrusted with the affairs of Macedonia and Greece (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3).

While the evidence for autocracy would appear to be overwhelming (see Anson 2013A: 19–25), many argue that it was compromised by the power of a Macedonian national assembly to elect kings and judge cases of treason. First put forth by Friedrich Granier (1931: 18–19, 25–31), the position has in recent years been supported with modifications by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 161–2), Mooren (1983: 205–40), and Hatzopoulos 1996: 2: 261–322). While the argument over the existence and competence of such an assembly persists, it would appear that such bodies were ad hoc affairs summoned for the purposes of rallying support, testing the waters, or distributing responsibility with respect to controversial actions.¹⁵ In Macedonia, the king

14 Apparently kings made these movements without consulting the populations concerned. While Justin (8. 5. 8–13) records the general dissatisfaction of those forced to move from their homes and the "tombs of their ancestors," he also notes that no protest formal or otherwise was forthcoming from the people. In fact, Justin emphasizes that the desolation of the population was expressed by "silent dejection" only for fear that any outward sign of displeasure might risk reprisal. Similar sentiments were expressed with respect to the movement of the population from the "chief cities" to Emathia and their replacement by Thracians and "barbarians" during the later reign of Philip V (Polyb. 23. 10. 4–7). Philip II also created communities in Thrace, in western Lyncestis and Pelagonia, and in Bisaltia (Hammond and Griffith 1972: 143, 173, 199–200, 204; 1979: 652–7; West 1973: 131 n. 37, 134). He also on occasion added to the population of existing cities. Frequently he did this with recently conquered cities (Dem. 18. 182). When Philip captured the city of Crenides in 356 (Diod. 16. 8. 6), which he renamed after himself as Philippi, he added to its existing population (See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 358). He also dramatically increased the population of his capital Pella (Str. 7. frg. 20). Justin (8. 6. 1) relates that Philip even supplemented the population of some cities with prisoners of war.

15 For the position that no such assembly existed, see Goukowsky 1975: 263–77; Errington 1978: 77–133; Anson 1985: 303–16; 1991: 230–47; 2008B: 135–49; 2013A: 21–5, 26–42. A good example of what often led to such assemblies after Alexander's death is found in the settlement of the monarchy on Alexander's brother and son (see Chapter 3). Here, the absence of a unified leadership among Alexander's Successors brought to the fore the intervention of the army. Also, Perdikkas the regent for the newly selected "kings," brought before the

was a charismatic leader subject to constant review by his subjects (Adams 1986: 43–52). Informality marked this relationship between the monarch and his subjects. It was part of Macedonian custom for the people to address the king in person and express their opinions openly, but in the final analysis, the monarch was sovereign.

This informality was due in part to the noted virtual lack of a bureaucracy. The king ruled through his *hetairoi*, his mostly aristocratic companions. They were the government, acting as the king's ambassadors, military commanders, governors, religious representatives, and personal advisers. The more junior members of this class made up the elite Macedonian cavalry; the more senior their officers and the infantry commanders. These *hetairoi* were, apart from the king, the basic political institution of the Macedonian state (Stagakis 1962: 53–67; 1970: 86–102). Their relationship with the king was regarded by them as personal, not institutional. The *hetairoi* were formally tied to the monarch by religious and social bonds; they sacrificed to the gods, hunted, and drank with, and fought beside the king. While there are a number of difficulties with the oft-repeated statement that the Macedonian kingship was Homeric,¹⁶ there are clear parallels. The Myrmidons were the "*hetairoi*" of Achilles (Hom. *Il.* 16. 168–70, 269), and the Trojan Aeneas had his own "*hetairoi*" (*Il.* 13. 489–92). The hero and his *hetairoi*, like their Macedonian counterparts, fought and shared their leisure activities, and the interaction of the Macedonian king and his companions could be as fractious as that of the Greek champions in the epic. It was not unusual for Macedonian kings to lose their lives at the hands of their own disgruntled *hetairoi*.¹⁷ It was during the reign of Philip II that this relationship was expanded to include the Macedonian infantry (Anson 2009A: 88–98). While the rank-and-file infantry did not typically eat, drink, hunt, etc.

Macedonians Alexander's orders for a number of exorbitant projects hoping to get them to reject these so that he would not later be blamed for not fulfilling the wishes of the becoming legendary king (Diod. 18. 4. 2–3).

16 For the many differences in the literary Homeric kingship and real Macedonian one, see Carlier 2000: 259–68.

17 Many Macedonian monarchs lost their lives in palace intrigues involving *hetairoi*. Archelaus (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 11–12), although it is also possible that his death was due to an accident (Diod. 14. 37. 6), Amyntas II (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b 4), Orestes, the son of Archelaus, is also reported to have been killed by his guardian (Diod. 14. 37. 6), but Eusebius does not list Orestes in his listing of "the Kings of the Macedonians"; Pausanias (Diod. 14. 89. 2), Alexander II (Diod. 15. 71. 1; *FGH* 135/6 F 11=Athen. 14. 629d), and Philip II were all killed in palace conspiracies (Anson 2013A: 74–81). Alexander I may have lost his life through assassination, although it is equally likely that it was in battle (Curt. 6. 11. 26; see Borza 1990: 133).

with the king, the expansion of the concept was designed to cement these soldiers personally to their monarch. Macedonian kings were most often the first in battle and the last to leave the field. Additionally, Macedonian tradition granted all Macedonians the right to petition the king and to speak freely before him. Calling these infantrymen companions, officially the *pezhetairoi* to distinguish them from the aristocratic *hetairoi*, was certainly in line with the basic informality of the Macedonian court (Adams 1986: 45–8), and it also was a way of establishing a bond between the king and the common soldier (Anson 2009A: 88–98).¹⁸ One of the complaints aired by the aristocrats during especially the latter stages of Alexander's campaign was that this traditional relationship was becoming less personal and more subservient (Anson 2013A: 163, 166–71).

While the vast majority of the *hetairoi* were native Macedonians from prominent aristocratic families, some were not, but rather foreigners attracted to Macedonia by the direct invitation of the king (*FGrH* 115 F-224). Eumenes was an *hetairos* of both Philip and Alexander.¹⁹ Of the 84 individuals identified as members of Alexander the Great's *hetairoi*, nine were Greeks (Stagakis 1962: 79–87). Foreign *hetairoi*, like their Macedonian counterparts, would be given large tracts of land by the king (*FGrH* 115 F-225B; Plut. *Alex.* 15. 3–6; cf. Athen. 6. 261A). Land and booty were the means by which a monarch cemented his relationship with his subordinates (Samuel 1988: 1276; cf., Billows 1995: 137; Borza 1990: 215). This was certainly part of the traditional *hetairos* relationship. Philip II granted all of the land north of Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7. 39; cf. 7. 44; Dem. 8. 64). Nearchus, Alexander's fleet commander from Crete, and Laomedon, the Mytilenian, are listed as Macedonians from Amphipolis (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4). By using similar methods with his infantrymen, personal standing with the king as *pezhetairoi* and the granting of land, Philip formed a bond that created a loyal following both to the king himself but also to the institution of monarchy. Their status as both foot-companions and land-holders depended on the king (Anson 2008A: 17–30).

¹⁸ For the full extent of Philip II's reforms, see Anson 2008A: 17–30.

¹⁹ Our sources often refer to the *hetairos* relationship using such terms as *philos*, *philia*, *amicus*, and *amicitia*. However, it is fairly certain when the *hetairos* relationship is meant or simply the colloquial meaning of friend and friendship. Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 6) states that Eumenes had a "friendship" (*amicitia*) with Philip, a "friendship" which was continued with Alexander. The continuance implies an institutional aspect that transcends simple friendship. Moreover, Eumenes was clearly one of Alexander's *hetairoi* (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 4–6; Diod. 17. 107. 6; 20. 109. 7; in general see Stagakis 1970: 98 n. 40).

Eumenes' influence at court went well beyond his relationship with the king. He also established close ties with Alexander's mother Olympias, who later called him "the most faithful of her friends" (Diod. 18. 58. 2). Even though the evidence for this association comes from the period after Alexander's death, where the information on Eumenes is more plentiful, still the origins of this friendship are to be found during Philip's reign (Diod. 18. 58. 2–3; Nepos. *Eum.* 6. 1–2). After 334 and the start of Alexander's expedition to the east, Olympias and Eumenes were separated by considerable distance, and the friendship, then, could only have arisen by correspondence. While this is not impossible, it is unlikely. It is also possible, though again doubtful, that the closeness developed in the less than two-year period between Philip's assassination in 336 and the departure of Alexander's expedition for Asia in 334, Olympias having been in self-imposed exile for the year prior to Philip's death (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 11). Macedonian royal women, at least beginning with Eurydice, Philip's mother, often played influential roles at court (Carney 1993: 313 15, 322–3; 2000; 2006). Olympias, like Eumenes, was an émigré to Macedonia, having come from Epirus. In 337, she had left Macedonia due to a family rift occasioned by Philip's marriage to a noble Macedonian girl.²⁰ Royal polygamy was customary and Philip had several other wives primarily to cement alliances with Macedonia's neighbors,²¹ so this new marriage occasioned no divorce from Olympias, or change in Alexander's status (Ellis 1976: 212–13). Olympias was queen or dominant wife only in the sense that she was the mother of Philip's recognized heir (Carney 1987: 42–3; 2006: 25). Her status had come initially from the importance of the Epirote alliance, but then Philip's other wives cemented important political alliances as well. While the Larisan Philinna had given Philip a son prior to the birth of Alexander (Ellis 1976: 61), this son, Arrhidaeus, was unfit for rule, either because of genetic malformation or through deliberate injury inflicted by Olympias (Diod. 18. 2. 2.; Plut. *Alex.* 77. 8; *Mor.* 337D; Just. 13. 2. 11; 14. 5. 2; App. *Syr.* 52). Olympias' position in Macedonia was dictated in the final analysis by her son's position and her son's concern for her.

The new marriage, however, did have serious political overtones. The bride, Cleopatra, was the niece of Attalus, a prominent member of the Macedonian nobility (Diod. 16. 93. 7, 9; 17. 2. 3; Plut. *Alex.* 9. 7). She was not a foreign bride cementing some alliance with a foreign state. At the marriage feast, a drunken Attalus prayed "...that from Philip and Cleopatra there might be born a

20 On the date of this marriage see Hatzopoulos 1982: 61–2.

21 Philip was also married to Phila from the upper Macedonian canton of Elimiotis, Audata from Illyria, Philinna and Nicesipolis from Thessaly, and Meda from the Getae, a people on Macedonia's northern border (Athen. 13. 557B–E).

legitimate successor to the kingdom" (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 7–8; Athen. 13. 557D). The inference is either that Philip was not Alexander's father, or that, since Alexander's mother was from Epirus, Alexander was not truly Macedonian. Olympias was rumored to have been guilty of infidelity (Plut. *Alex.* 2. 5–7). If the comment referred to Olympias' ethnicity, it would be a peculiar remark, since Philip's mother Eurydice was likely an Illyrian.²² Brian Bosworth (1988: 21; cf. 1971: 93–105) suggests that the comment referred both to Olympias' Epirote origins and her alleged infidelity. In any case, this remark led to an altercation between Alexander and his father with Alexander and Olympias subsequently leaving Macedonia for Illyria and Epirus respectively (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 10–11); Alexander's voluntary exile was brief, but Olympias did not return during Philip's lifetime (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 14). Once back in Macedonia she moved quickly against her enemies, murdering Philip's new wife Cleopatra and her infant daughter (Paus. 8. 7. 5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 10. 8). Olympias would correspondingly have rewarded her friends. Her later reference to Eumenes as "the most faithful of my friends," (Diod. 18. 58. 2) probably reflects her response to Eumenes' loyalty during this period of difficulty. Alexander, also, eliminated those who might threaten his position. In particular, he had Attalus murdered (Diod. 17. 2. 4–6, 5. 1–2; Curt. 7. 1. 2). It is doubtful that Eumenes would have enjoyed Alexander's confidence, if he had not proven his loyalty to Alexander during this entire episode. Eumenes would certainly have supported the more cosmopolitan Alexander, as opposed to a traditional Macedonian noble. But, his support was likely muted; his position at the Macedonian court was entirely dependent on Philip's continued trust.

Eumenes was quite capable of playing a double game. During the so-called Pixodarus affair which brought about a subsequent rupture between father and son, with many of Alexander's friends being sent into exile by Philip, Eumenes remained at court apparently retaining the loyalty of the king (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). This incident, as that regarding the marriage to Cleopatra, presented another situation demonstrating Alexander's distrust of his father and a delicate situation for those at court. Here, Philip had attempted to arrange a marriage between his son Arrhidaeus and the daughter of the Carian dynast Pixodarus (Plut. *Alex.* 10. 1). Pixodarus was a member of the traditional ruling dynasty of Caria and officially the satrap of Caria from 339 until

22 While her ethnicity is contested (see Carney 2000: 41–2), the little bit of evidence that does survive concerning her origin calls her an Illyrian (Plut. *Mor.* 13B; *Suda* s.v. *Karanos*; Lib. *Vit. Dem.* 9), but she is also described as from the Upper Macedonian district of Lyncestis and descended from the Bacchiads of Corinth (Str. 7. 7. 8). The best argument for the Illyrian heritage is still Ellis 1976: 42, and especially note 98.

his death in 335/4 (Bosworth 1980: 152–3; Heckel 2007: 223). Since the marriage was but a familial manifestation of a political alliance, this would have secured a strong ally for Philip's planned invasion of Asia. However, Alexander was convinced by "his friends and mother," that Philip "by means of a brilliant marriage . . . was trying to settle the kingdom upon Arrhidaeus," and contacted the Carian satrap directly offering to marry the lady himself (Plut. *Alex.* 10, 1–3). While there is much dispute about the affair, it appears clear that it was a real event and shows how deeply distrustful of his father Alexander had become (see Anson 2013A: 77–9). That Alexander could believe that Arrhidaeus would be considered for the throne is a sign of paranoia. Arrhidaeus, as previously indicated, had from early childhood suffered from some mental deficiency. While there has been some attempt to rehabilitate Arrhidaeus (Greenwalt 1984: 69–77), throughout his life he is found being led, never leading. Philip's response to the incident is what one would expect of a good, but exasperated, father. Alexander is not exiled, but his friends are (Plut. *Alex.* 10. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 5–6). Moreover, Philip proclaims that Alexander is his heir by stating that a marriage to the satrap's daughter is not worthy of Alexander's station (Plut. *Alex.* 10. 3). Once again Eumenes emerged from a delicate situation with both the trust of the father and the son, since he is not reported as being sent into exile by the former, and, after Philip's death, he remained as royal secretary and *hetairois* to the latter. This ability to straddle both sides of a dispute also appears in the civil strife that arose in Babylon after Alexander's death. Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 1) reports that Eumenes was of one opinion, but served as a "friend" to both sides (see Chapter 3). His acceptance of Alexander as Philip's heir on the latter's death, while not indicated by our sources, would have been immediate.

Though Eumenes was careful in his relationship with the monarch and cultivated many powerful friends at court, he also incurred the enmity of others. This was inevitable. The rivalries of the various persons at court made it impossible to be a friend to all, even given Eumenes' abilities to straddle important controversies. It was during Philip's reign that Eumenes aroused the hostility of Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 8),²³ one of Philip's generals and later Alexander's Macedonian regent (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3; Diod. 17. 17. 5, 118. 1; 18. 12. 1; Curt. 4. 1. 39; Just. 11. 7. 1). While the cause of this enmity is unstated, it may have arisen directly from Eumenes' ties to Olympias. It is obvious from later evidence that Antipater and Olympias were hostile to one another (Plut. *Alex.* 68. 3, 77. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 5). However, it is also possible that the rift developed over

23 In this passage, Eumenes states that Antipater "had long hated him." As noted earlier with respect to Eumenes' friendship with Olympias, it is doubtful that such passions could have been kindled during Eumenes' time in Asia with Alexander.

Antipater's support for Hecataeus in Cardia. Antipater had campaigned often in Thrace and may have in some way been responsible for Hecataeus coming to power (Ellis 1976: 103, 110). Hecataeus later served as an emissary for Antipater (Diod. 18. 14. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6–8).

On Philip's death, Eumenes passed smoothly into Alexander's service (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). The ease of the transition came both from Alexander's need to maintain Philip's chancellery without interruption, and undoubtedly from Alexander's recognition of Eumenes' loyalty to himself and his mother. This loyalty, a theme so prominent in the sources,²⁴ was, as earlier indicated, based entirely on self-interest. Apart from the monarch, Eumenes at this point in time was without a power base. He did not possess hereditary lands and the family powers which went with such possession (cf. Lacey 1968: 25–32, 47–8, 53–68). While Eumenes probably received land in Lower Macedonia from Philip, he did not represent an hereditary Macedonian aristocratic family. Native-born Macedonian nobles were *hetairoi* because of their inherited position and power; Greeks became powerful in Macedonia because of their being made *hetairoi* of the king.

Eumenes remained in Alexander's service for thirteen years; his position terminated only on the latter's death in 323 (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). During most of Alexander's reign Eumenes' responsibilities were, as they had been with Philip, those of royal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4), but as Alexander's expedition moved ever deeper into the Persian Empire, the complexity and sophistication of the chancellery grew. Certainly after the deaths of first Darius and then the usurper Bessus, when Alexander as the "King of Asia"²⁵ began to implement Persian practices into his court, it is likely that the chancellery became increasingly Persian in its sophistication. Eumenes was now clearly in charge of a large and growing department. It was probably at this time that the custom of recording the daily activities of Alexander was introduced. The chronicles of the Persian kings had been kept from perhaps as early as the reign of the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus the Great (*Esther* 2. 23, 6. 1, 10. 2; *Ezra* 4. 15; cf. Hdts. 8. 85, 90). This daily diary, or *Ephemerides*, was edited and

24 Diod. 18. 53. 7, 58. 4, 60. 3; 19. 42. 5, 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 3. 14, 12. 3, 13. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 6. 3, 13. 3.

25 It has been made clear by Nicholas Hammond (1986: 73–85) and E.A. Fredricksmeyer (2000: 136–66) that Alexander did not wish to become the "Great King," the king of Persia, but, if not before, at least after his victory at Issus, he wished to be regarded as "King of Asia" (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 14. 9; Plut. *Alex.* 34. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 14. 4), indicating both that his kingship was not to be that of the Persians and that his ambition already extended beyond the limits of the Persian Empire and into India.

published after both Alexander's and Eumenes' deaths probably by an otherwise unknown Diodotus.²⁶ While the *Ephemerides* do not survive, parts of the published version were used by the surviving Alexander historians primarily in their accounts of the king's last days (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 25. 1–26. 3 = *FGrH* 117 F-3a; Plut. *Alex.* 76 = *FGrH* 117 F-3b; Ael. *VH* 3. 23 = *FGrH* 117 F-2a).

Eumenes' influence with Alexander went well beyond that of his position as head of the royal secretariat. At Susa in 324, Eumenes with 80 other *hetairoi* was married in a joint ceremony along with Alexander to a noble Persian woman (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 4–8; Diod. 17. 107. 6; Curt. 10. 3. 11–12; Just. 12. 10. 10; Plut. *Mor.* 329 E–F). Moreover, his prominence at court can easily be seen in his rivalries. Eumenes and Hephaestion were constantly in collision. Their disagreements were not based on differences in policy, but rather reflect personal antagonisms with their recorded quarrels stemming from trivial causes. Two specific controversies are mentioned in the sources. The first concerns Hephaestion's assignment to another of quarters already taken up for Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 2. 1–2; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 13. 1, 14. 9). The second was an argument about a gift (Plut. *Eum.* 2. 8). While Eumenes was not above acting like his Macedonian aristocratic colleagues in their petty bickering, he was always careful not to permit these animosities to threaten his relationship with Alexander. Hephaestion after all was Alexander's closest companion, his proclaimed "second-self" (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 12. 7; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 47. 10). Arrian (*Anab.* 7. 13. 1) relates that Eumenes was willing to patch up his disagreements with Hephaestion, even though the latter was reluctant to do the same. Hephaestion was clearly a difficult individual with whom to deal, and Eumenes' problems with him were certainly not unique. Craterus, likewise, often found himself at odds with Hephaestion (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 9–12). When Hephaestion died, Eumenes to counteract any possible hostile reaction from Alexander on account of the earlier problems, lavished praise and honor on the dead Hephaestion. He even freely contributed to the construction of the latter's tomb (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 14. 8–9; Plut. *Eum.* 2. 9–10).

There is little evidence that these struggles among the leaders were based on policy. They appear to be almost entirely personal in nature. Even though Hephaestion and Craterus took opposite sides with regard to Alexander's Persianization policies, which comprised including Persian nobility among his court intimates, adopting aspects of Persian court ceremony, and adding Persian units to the army,²⁷ Plutarch emphasizes that the two clashed primarily

26 On this contentious issue, see Anson 1996: 501–4, for the full argumentation of the above position and a bibliography of the controversy.

27 On Alexander's policy of Persianization, see Anson 2013A: 153–77.

due to their jealousy of one another's closeness to Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 11). Even though on campaign, court politics and jockeying for position proceeded just as if they were back in Pella.²⁸ Indeed, Hephaestion and Craterus acted in concert in bringing about the downfall of another insider, Philotas (Curt. 6. 7. 4, 17; 11. 11). While Eumenes' "friendship" with Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 4) coupled with his difficulties with Hephaestion might be seen as evidence for Eumenes' support for Craterus' position on Persianization, it must be noted that Eumenes was also formally Peucestas' "friend" (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 9), and Peucestas was one of the strongest supporters of Persianization (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 30. 2–3). Indeed, Philotas, whose death was brought about chiefly by Craterus, was, like Craterus himself, opposed to Persianization (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 3; *Alex.* 47. 9–10; Curt. 6. 8. 2; Stagakis 1970: 98). Eumenes and Antigonus are listed as friends (Curt. 6.8.2), but Antigonus and Antipater, Eumenes' adversary, were as well (Diod. 18. 23. 3). Yet, while Craterus and Antipater at least later are found to be friends and later connected by marriage, the evidence suggests that the relationship between Craterus and Antipater's "friend" Antigonus was not close. Indeed, even Antipater's friendship with Antigonus appears to have been limited. Both Craterus and Antipater in their attempt to acquire Eumenes' adherence in 320 offered to grant him continued control of his satrapy and additional territories and troops as well, likely including Antigonus' old provinces (Briant 1973A: 184–5). However, Plutarch's statement that Craterus wished to make Eumenes Antipater's friend instead of the old regent's enemy, and not himself become Eumenes' enemy (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6), coupled with Eumenes' grief at Craterus' death (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 13; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 4), certainly demonstrates that "friendship" could indicate a strong personal bond. Also, the continued enmity between Eumenes and Antipater indicates that like friendship, animosity, could also be something more than a formality.

However, "friendship" among prominent *hetairoi* was most often a formal and ceremonial relationship, a form of political alliance. In 319, Eumenes and Antigonus "renewed their friendship," with outward and physical signs of affection (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5). The formal sense of "friendship" is clear in this incident, for Eumenes required that Antigonus' nephew Ptolemy be given up as a hostage to ensure Eumenes' safe return from this conference with "his old friend" (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5). In these ritualized relationships, those so joined were to render one another reciprocal services. In much the way in-laws through marriage are joined by the formal ritual of marriage, formal friendship established a relationship that bound people together, but as in such familial

28 On the impact on a court on campaign, see Briant 1996: 200–4, 292–5; 2002: 187–91, 280–3; Spawforth 2007: 87–88, 94–7.

relations, they could easily break down into conflict and dispute (Herman 1987: 10–18, 29). These associations were then multi-faceted and often predicated on self-interest. While alliances did periodically come into existence to further particular policies, and certainly among junior officers there probably was a tendency to form attachments to individual leaders, these alliances were often temporary and always self-serving.

While Eumenes' primary duties for Alexander were those of royal secretary, it is apparent that Eumenes' position as adviser and confidant had expanded considerably after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela in 331. He now on occasion undertook minor military and diplomatic missions. Nothing, however, in the sources suggests that during this period these activities were exceptional, either in their military or diplomatic importance, or in their performance. After the capture of the Indian city of Sangala in 326, Eumenes was placed in command of 300 cavalry and sent to announce the capture to two other rebellious cities (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 24. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Curt. 9. 1. 19). This expedition was clearly more diplomatic than military in nature.²⁹ With the death of Hephaestion in the fall of 324 (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 14. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 2. 9–10), Eumenes was appointed as commander of Perdiccas' former hipparchy of the companion cavalry, when that officer was made chiliarch (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). There is controversy over whether at this time Perdiccas became court chiliarch or cavalry chiliarch, supposing that these were two different positions (Collins 2001: 275). However, it is more likely these two designations are not separate and that as the office was meant originally with respect to Hephaestion to be that of a second-in-command to the king, so it continued with respect to Perdiccas. Militarily and primarily the position of second-in-authority came with the command of the elite Companion Cavalry (Meeus 2009: 307–8). Cassander was, in 320, made the chiliarch to Antigonos' "General in Asia." While officially his title was "Chiliarch of the Cavalry" (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38), he was clearly to be the second-in-command (Diod. 18. 39. 7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 42; cf. *HE* 1. 4). Later, he became Polyperchon's chiliarch with the same implication (Diod. 18. 48. 4–5). In the final settlement in Babylon, Seleucus was appointed "commander of the companion cavalry, . . . the same office that had been held by Hephaestion and Perdiccas before him" (Diod. 18. 3. 4; App. *Syr.* 57), and thus the regent Perdiccas' second-in-command (Mehl 1986: 23–4; Heckel 1992: 257). Chiliarch, Chiliarch of the Cavalry, Commander of the Companion Cavalry, likely all refer to the same basic authority as second-in-command.

29 Curtius (8. 11. 5) does relate that a "*scriba regis*" led a light-armed troop against Aornus in India. However, the name of the secretary is given as Myllinas and Arrian (*Anab.* 4. 29. 1) gives the command to Ptolemy.

Eumenes position in the Companion Cavalry may have been meant simply as an honorary position, given that Alexander and the royal army had returned from active campaigning in the East, with no campaigns immediately in the offing. However, the appointment might also indicate that Eumenes participated more in the actual warfare than is indicated in the sources. He was later to demonstrate great skill as a cavalry commander. In 322, Eumenes raised a force of 6300 Cappadocian cavalry for campaigning in Armenia, where he was most successful (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4). In 320, after his infantry had been defeated, Eumenes led his cavalry to victory over his rival Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5), and his cavalry was responsible for his later triumph over Craterus as well (Diod. 18. 30. 6–32. 1). While in overall command of his forces, Eumenes personally led a cavalry wing both at Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 28. 3–4) and at Gabene (Diod. 19. 40. 2) in 316.

Alexander's death on June 11, 323 BC (Depuydt 1997: 117–35) was a major crisis for the Cardian. He still commanded the hipparchy of the companion cavalry, a high honor, but not a command which strengthened his hand during this crisis. The companion cavalry consisted of Macedonian nobles, many of whom would echo Neoptolemus' sentiments regarding Eumenes, expressed after Alexander's death, that the latter was a mere secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). Eumenes' rise to power was directly tied to his close relations with first Philip and then with Alexander. He had not been one of the battalion commanders with troops accustomed to loyalty and reliance on him. He did not possess a satrapy. When Alexander was alive, a governorship was not desired, since it meant to be away from court and, consequently, away from the real center of power, but now in the changed circumstances of Alexander's death, a satrapy represented a tangible base of authority. If Eumenes was to retain a measure of his former standing, he would have to follow a very different and opportunistic path. It would be through his political skills that Eumenes would emerge as a major force in the early years of this new age.

From Babylon to Cappadocia

Eumenes' opportunity to rectify his difficulties came in the dissension which arose after Alexander's death. Alexander had not provided for a successor, and is even supposed to have said when asked to whom he left his empire, "To the strongest" (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 26. 3; Diod. 17. 117. 4). Disputed successions and civil war were not unusual circumstances in Macedonian history and often followed a monarch's death,¹ given that Macedonian tradition made every member of the extended royal family a potential king (Carney 2000: 7–8). However, this particular succession crisis possessed a number of features not seen in the earlier struggles. In the first place, it would be the first not to take place in Macedonia, and in fact, those who would be most involved in the succession had not seen their homeland in over a decade. Moreover, the monarchy itself had changed profoundly since Alexander's accession to the throne in 336. This was no longer the Kingdom of Macedonia, it was now the "Kingdom of Asia" (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 136–66; Anson 2013A: 151–79). Alexander had even planned for the capital of his vast empire to be Babylon (Str. 15. 3. 9–10). Alexander's homeland in the Conqueror's scheme was to be only a part, albeit a very important part, of this new empire.

Moreover, the succession process in Macedonian tradition could be described as informal at best. There was no regular procedure for either the selection or even the acknowledgment of a new monarch, Alexander's chief companions, his officers, and in this succession, as it turned out his troops, were faced with determining not only the future ruler or even rulers, but, in this particular crisis, even the very nature of the monarchy. The new king previously had always come from the surviving members of the royal family, the Argead or Temenid clan (Anson 2013A: 13–14, 21–2; 2014A: 14). The Macedonian kings were by tradition descended from the Argive Temenus, thus the family was often referred to as Temenid (Hdt. 8.137–139, Thuc. 2.99.3). The ruling family was also called Argead, a term that apparently derives from a tribal name, "Argeas, the son of Macedon" (Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. *Argeou*), but which also came to be associated with their claimed Argive origin. Beyond this basic requirement, there were certain elements that did appear previously with

1 In general on disputed Macedonian successions, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 115, 168–171, 180–4, 206, 208; Borza 1990: 133–5, 161–2, 177–9, 190–5, 200–1.

some frequency. Most often sons followed fathers on the throne,² as was the case in the succession of Alexander the Great. In the position of presumptive heir, the son would have through his father's influence formed bonds with powerful Macedonian allies and been associated with his father's rule. Alexander at the age of sixteen had been made regent of Macedonia during his father's absence on campaign (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 1), and had commanded the elite Macedonian Companion Cavalry at Chaeronea, where the Macedonian forces crushed the coalition that had been raised against them by the southern Greek city-states (Diod. 16. 86. 1–4; Plut. *Alex.* 9. 2–3). In the succession crisis that followed Alexander's own death in Babylon, there was no clearly apparent heir. It would now appear to be up to Alexander's chief *hetairoi*, referred to in our sources as the *principes*,³ or *megistoi* (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 2), to determine the new king and the future of the empire.

The traditional *hetairos* relationship of service linked to camaraderie changed during the reigns of Philip II and especially during that of his son Alexander III, the Great. Alexander took on many of the trappings of the old Persian ruling dynasty and began to style himself as the "King of Asia," as noted. The role of the Macedonian aristocrats had significantly diminished with the successes of first the father and then the son. It was this basic change in the traditional relationship along with the acquisition of so much that was Persian that in the last years of Alexander's reign soured the relationship between king and his *pezhetairoi* so carefully nurtured by his father, not to mention that between himself and many of the Macedonian aristocrats.

Previously, as noted, at the death of the sitting monarch, if there was a prominent male member of the family available, and especially present, that individual most often succeeded to the throne. Again, in the case of Alexander

2 Herodotus (8. 139) lists the first seven kings of Macedonia, "From that Perdiccas Alexander was descended, being the son of Amyntas who was the son of Alcetas; Alcetas' father was Aeropus, and his was Philip; Philip's father was Argaeus, and his again was Perdiccas." In the more historical period, Alexander I was the son of Amyntas I (Hdt. 5. 19. 1–2; 7. 173. 3; 8. 136. 1, 139. 1, 140a. 1; 9. 144. 1; Just. 7. 4. 1); Perdiccas II, son of Alexander I (Thuc. 1. 57. 2); Archelaus, son of Perdiccas (Thuc. 2. 100. 2; cf. Pl. *Grg.* 471a); Pausanias, son of Aeropus (with, perhaps, the intervening rule of Amyntas II [Arist. *Pol.* 1311b3–15]; Diod. 14. 84. 6); Alexander II (Diod. 15. 60. 3; Just. 7. 4. 8; Aeschin. 2. 26), Perdiccas III (Diod. 16. 2. 4; Schol. on Aeschin. 2. 29), and Philip II (Diod. 16. 2. 1), sons of Amyntas III.

3 While Curtius uses the term also in a general sense as chief or principal (6. 6. 7, 9. 21, 10. 22; 9. 6. 4, 7. 3; 10. 7. 17), for commanders of army units (4. 13. 28; 7. 2. 33; 9. 7. 6), and with respect to non-Macedonians (3. 13. 13; 4. 11. 1, 14. 22; 7. 6. 11, 11. 6; 9. 8. 16; 10. 1. 3), with respect to the crisis surrounding Alexander's death he uses it consistently to refer to the principal *hetairoi* of the former king (Curt. 4. 10. 4; 5. 1. 42; 6. 6. 11, 11. 39; 8. 1. 9, 18, 5. 9, 6. 2; 9. 3. 1; 10. 6. 1, 7. 8, 13, 10. 1).

the Great, he was present at his father's assassination and was hailed as king immediately (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 25. 2; Curt. 7. 1. 6–7; Just. 11. 2. 2). Yet, as with most successions, there was turmoil. Alexander saw to the deaths of potential rivals and their supporters (Plut. *Mor.* 327C; Diod. 17. 2. 3, 5. 1; Just. 12. 6. 14). Indeed, another of the major differences from previous succession crises was that, whereas before there had been a surfeit of possible Argead candidates, this time there were exactly two, and potentially three: Alexander's half-brother, Arrhidaeus, whose mental deficiency was likely responsible for his survival,⁴ a three or four-year old son, Heracles, the result of an informal liaison with Barsine, the former wife of Memnon of Rhodes, and the daughter of Artabazus, adviser to Darius and Alexander's former satrap of Bactria;⁵ and a potential son. Alexander's Bactrian or Sogdian wife Roxane was pregnant, perhaps, and in fact as it turned out, with Alexander's son (Curt. 10. 6. 9; Just. 13. 2. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8). Since there was at the time of Alexander's death, no suitable Argead candidate for the throne from the Conqueror's family, at the least, there would need to be a regency. Regency, given the very nature of Macedonian kingship, was neither a frequent nor a successful practice down to this time. A true regent, a placeholder for the future underage or otherwise incapacitated king, would only arise when someone outside of the Argead family came to power and sought to rule through the Argead. Otherwise, since any particular Argead could be king, the regency would be dispensed with and the adult Argead would become king in his own right. This had been the case with the death of Perdiccas III, when Philip II became king instead of Perdiccas' young son Amyntas. Justin (7. 5. 9–10) does proclaim that Philip was regent for the youthful King Amyntas Perdicca, but this is based on Justin's confusing Philip's guardianship of the

4 For his handicap, see Chapter 2. Alexander had eliminated all others who might be seen as viable alternatives. His cousin, Amyntas Perdicca, did not long survive Philip's death (Just. 12. 6. 14; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 5. 4), and a possible brother, Caranus, may also have been eliminated (Just. 11. 2. 3), although this individual's very existence has been seriously questioned (Heckel 2006: 78 [#1]). Even though during the Pixodarus affair Alexander considered Arrhidaeus a threat, his name never again comes up during Alexander's lifetime as a potential rival for the throne and, indeed, throughout his life, Arrhidaeus is found being led, never leading. For a more favorable view of Arrhidaeus, see Greenwalt 1984: 69–77; Sharples 1994: 53–60. In truth, much of the once numerous Argead clan had been significantly diminished by the actions of Alexander's father Philip (Ellis 1973: 350–4).

5 Barsine had been captured in Damascus by Alexander's general Parmenio and subsequently had become intimate with Alexander (Curt. 3. 13. 14; Plut. *Alex.* 21. 7; Just. 11. 10. 2). Heracles was the result of this liaison (Curt. 10. 6. 11; Diod. 20. 20. 1). Diodorus lists his age in 310 as seventeen (Justin [15. 2. 3] says fifteen). Tarn (1921: 18–28) rejected Alexander's fatherhood, but see Brunt (1975: 22–34), Carney (2000: 159–60), and Heckel (2006: 138).

young man with regency.⁶ In this case, Philip was both king of Macedonia and guardian of his young nephew, thus combining both the national aspect of kingship with the family responsibilities associated with the preservation of Argead exclusivity to rule or more particularly that of a particular branch of the Argead clan (Anson 2009B: 276–86). Philip's first son, Arrhidaeus, was likely not born until 357 (Griffith 1970: 69–72, 79; Greenwalt 1985: 70), making Amyntas Perdicca during the two year period between Philip's accession and the birth of Arrhidaeus, the primary heir to the throne. Once a son was born to the king that individual would become the chief heir, although in the case of Arrhidaeus, given his infirmities, it was likely the birth of Alexander that saw Amyntas Perdicca demoted to second place. A true regent, a place-holder for the future king, then would only occur under the unusual situation when the guardian was not a member of the Argead clan. Under these circumstances, the only clear Macedonian regency prior to the death of Alexander the Great was that of Ptolemy of Alorus, a non Argead, who was regent for Perdiccas III from ca 370 to 367 BC (Anson 2009B: 280–3).

A new king would after being hailed as monarch cement his authority by making himself be seen as king, performing royal duties associated with the monarchy. These included the formal burial of the current king's predecessor, including a lustration (Just. 13. 4. 7; Curt. 10. 9. 11–12), funeral games, and sacrifices (Diod. 18. 28. 4, 19. 52. 5; Just. 9. 7. 11, 11. 2. 13; Athen. 4. 155A). With no formal Macedonian priesthood, the monarch carried out various religious ceremonies and presided over national religious festivals.⁷ The sacral nature of the monarchy likely accounts for the success of the Argeads in monopolizing the kingship over the centuries (Borza 1999: 14–15; Carney 2000: 7–8; Mitchell 2007: 62–3). A new monarch would also meet with impromptu assemblies of various constituencies (Diod. 16. 3. 1; 17. 2. 1–2; Just. 11. 1. 7–2. 1). Such meetings were important to gather support and acceptance, but were mere formalities and meant primarily to advertise to the nation the person of the new king (Errington 1978: 99–100; Anson 1985A: 307–8; 1991: 236–7; 2013A: 28–30).

In Babylon, with the dead king still in state, the *Somaphylaces* (seven official royal bodyguards, the most elite of the *hetairoi*) called a meeting to be held in the palace of the senior officers and advisers to discuss the situation (Curt. 10. 6. 1). These seven were Aristonous, Lysimachus, Pithon, Leonnatus, Perdiccas, Ptolemy, and Peucestas (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; cf. 7. 5. 4; Heckel 1992: 257–9). Curtius

6 Hatzopoulos (1986: 280), among a number of scholars, following Justin 7. 5. 9–10, accepts the regency of Philip II for Amyntas Perdicca, but see Anson (2009B: 276–86).

7 Dem. 19. 192; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 1, 3. 16. 9; 5. 3. 6; 6. 3. 2; 7.25.2; Plut. *Alex.* 23. 2; Diod. 16. 91. 4, 17. 16. 3, 18. 1; Just. 7.2.9–12, 9. 4. 1; Athen. 13.572D–E.

makes it clear that the meeting called to select Alexander's successor was solely for the *principes* and the military leaders (10. 6. 1). In this particular succession, virtually all of the prominent *hetairoi* were in Babylon. The only exceptions, though notable ones, were Antipater, Alexander's regent in Macedonia, and Craterus, who was in Cilicia and had been ordered to replace Antipater and was bringing home with him roughly 10000 veterans of long service in Asia (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4; Just. 12. 12. 9). Indeed, access was limited to those summoned by name (Curt. 10. 6. 2). However, the soldiers now assembled outside the throne room in the large, 60 × 55 m., courtyard, awaiting news of the decision of their leaders ("desiring to know to whom Alexander's empire would be given" [10. 6. 1]).⁸ The palace's succession of three courtyards leading to the throne room were all filled with soldiers, and, as a result, many of those summoned could not because of the crowds secure passage to the place of meeting (Curt. 10. 6. 1–2).

Prior to the meeting, it seems clear that the senior officers, perhaps the *Somaphylaces* (Curt. 10. 6. 1; cf. Just. 13. 2. 12–3. 1), had made up their minds to await the birth of Roxane's child (Just. 13. 3. 1). If Heracles and Arrhidaeus were considered as possible heirs to the throne (cf. Just. 13. 2. 7–12), it is apparent that such candidacies were rejected.⁹ There was, however, clearly disagreement concerning the nature of the regency that would rule until the birth and subsequently through the child's minority, with the major decision being whether there was to be a single regent and guardian or a regency council (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 9, 15, 7. 8–9; Just. 13. 2. 5). Justin suggests that in this preliminary meeting it was decided to assign as regents Leonnatus, Perdiccas, Craterus, and Antipater (Just. 13. 2. 14), but given subsequent events it would appear that this was only a proposal, not a final decision. What is perhaps curious is how little thought was given to the possibility that the child might not be male. Either the *principes* wished to await that eventuality before considering the other two candidates, or it had been decided that the infant would be male by substitution if necessary (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 21). The difficulties involving the succession were not insurmountable and probably could have been resolved in conclave. But, before a resolution could be achieved, another unique factor in this particular selection process intervened.

The army in Babylon was not the old Macedonian levy tied solely to the traditions of Macedonia; it was the army that had conquered the Persian Empire.

8 The location is confirmed by the presence of a throne (Curt. 10. 6. 4). On the palace complex, see Oates 1986: 150–1.

9 Later, the *principes* declared by their actions that they considered Arrhidaeus unworthy of the position (cf. Curt. 10. 7. 4) and there was outright hostility to Heracles as the new monarch (Curt. 10. 6. 12).

It was now a force more professional than national (Anson 1991: 230–47), and, as noted by H.W. Parke, “all mercenaries in an emergency [become] a democracy (1933: 119).” In the chaos attendant on Alexander’s death, the soldiers, desirous of information, burst into the meeting and showed a disinclination to leave (Curt. 10. 6. 1–3). Many of these same troops had through their lack of enthusiasm, stopped Alexander’s eastern advance into India at the Hyphasis (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 25. 1–29. 1; Diod. 17. 93. 2–95. 2; Curt. 9. 2. 1–3. 19; Plut. *Alex.* 62),¹⁰ and had even jeered him at Opis (Curt. 10. 2. 12–4. 3; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1–11. 9; Diod. 17. 109. 1–3; Just. 12. 11. 1–12. 12; Plut. *Alex.* 71. 2–9).¹¹ These same troops would not be intimidated by the Conqueror’s former lieutenants. The deliberations now had to be carried out before an audience possessed of a very vested interest in the outcome. Disagreements about the nature of the regency which were meant to be settled quietly behind closed doors by hard bargaining now had to be played out before this very attentive audience.

Perdiccas dramatically placed the ring given to him by Alexander on the throne and proposed to the assemblage that they await the birth of Roxane’s child (Curt. 10. 6. 4–5, 9; Just. 13. 2. 5). Alexander gave the ring to Perdiccas most likely not to indicate that he was making Perdiccas his successor, but rather to ensure the continuation of official state functions and the oversight of the succession (so Rathmann 2005: 26).¹² Perdiccas’ proposal drew little support

10 While often called a mutiny, as Elizabeth Carney (1996: 33–7) has pointed out, no order to advance was given and consequently no such order was disobeyed. The troops simply showed by their attitude that they did not wish to proceed. It has even been suggested that the troops’ reluctance was sparked by Alexander himself who once on the border of India regretted his announced purpose of conquest to the ocean (Spann 1999: 62–74; Heckel 2004: 147–74). This scenario appears unlikely, see Anson 2013A: 172–4; 2015: forthcoming).

11 This incident occurred in what is modern day Iraq not far from present day Baghdad. Here, after Alexander announced his intention to send many of his long-serving veterans home to Macedonia, the troops believing that they were being replaced with Asian forces and long upset at the growing Persianization of Alexander’s court objected vocally accusing him of abandoning his homeland and its traditions and treating them with contempt (Curt. 10. 2. 12. 1; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 2; Plut. *Alex.* 71. 2–3).

12 Only the *Liber de Morte* (112; cf. Heckel 1988: 26, 90) states that Alexander intended to make Perdiccas his successor, even proposing that he marry his soon to be widowed wife Roxane. No other source mentions the proposed marriage in any context (cf. Diod. 17. 117. 3; 18. 2. 4; Curt. 10. 5. 4; Just. 12. 15. 12), and it is possible as suggested by Waldemar Heckel (1988: 5) that this entire account owes much to the propaganda battle that ensued in 318 during the Second Diadoch War (see Chapter 5). One does wonder at the effectiveness of such propaganda in an age where the majority of the population was illiterate, including the vast majority of the serving troops. Literacy requires practical applications in order to

(Curt. 10. 6. 16). Nearchus, the fleet commander, was the next to test the waters with a suggestion, apparently in opposition to the wishes of the other *principes*, that Heracles, Alexander's son by Barsine, be given the throne. The troops reacted vocally and angrily (Curt. 10. 6. 12). They were not pleased with Alexander's Persianization of the court and elements of the army (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1–2, 23. 1; Plut. *Alex.* 71),¹³ they were certainly not pleased with a potential ruler who was part Asian. Ptolemy next proposed that neither a king nor a specific regent be appointed, but that Alexander's old council be retained and rule collectively (Curt. 10. 6. 15). Ptolemy had probably favored a joint regency prior to the open meeting, but now seeing the reaction of the troops to Nearchus' suggestion of Heracles, decided to forego the regency completely, declaring it would be disgraceful for Macedonians and Greeks to be ruled by one of their former enemies (Curt. 10. 6. 13–14). Aristonous next called for Perdikkas to be made king, since Alexander had given him his ring before dying (Curt. 10. 6. 16–17). All suggestions were actively and openly debated by the troops (Curt. 10. 6. 16–18). Indeed, Aristonous' suggestion was widely approved, but Perdikkas hesitated to act and the moment was lost (Curt. 10. 6. 18–20). Perdikkas' hesitation may have resulted from his fear that later he might be seen as an usurper, attempting to bypass the Argead lineage. Curtius (10. 6. 18) proclaims that, while Perdikkas desired the position, his indecision resulted from a sense that such action was improper or shameful.¹⁴ It is more probable that he feared the reaction from his fellow *principes*, not to mention the two prominent figures not

be employed by individuals and even here it really refers to “enough to get by” as opposed to all or nothing (Thomas 2011: 13–16). It is difficult to imagine on what population such literary propaganda would be effective. Given the prominence of Holcias in the text, it is very possible that when he returned to Macedonia after the First Diadoch War, he wrote this pamphlet (Heckel 1988: 79–80), perhaps, in his retirement and in his belief of the general truth of the poisoning plot.

- 13 Alexander from the time of his arrival in Asia, but clearly accelerating after his arrival in Babylon, had associated Asians, and Persians in particular, in his administration and his army. This was a necessary by-product of his conquests. He needed the Persian administrative expertise, and there simply were not enough Macedonians, or even Greeks, to control so vast an empire. While it has been claimed that there was some higher purpose in this incorporation of the former enemies into his new empire (Plut. *Mor.* 329C; Tarn 1950: 137–48; Hammond 1989: 273), the truth is clearly otherwise. This was a practical decision linked to Alexander's new role as the self-proclaimed King of Asia. Alexander wished to transcend the traditions of Macedonian royalty to become a king more on the eastern model of autocratic rule. This unity of all races in the new empire was to be in their subjection to the will of this new King of Asia, nothing more (Anson 2013A: 153–79, 183–7).
- 14 Michael Rathmann (2005: 78) notes that Perdikkas was unequivocal in his defense of Alexander's son and this particular line of the royal family, but admits that whether this represents loyalty or opportunism cannot be known.

present in Babylon, Craterus and Antipater. Seeing his indecision, Meleager, a Macedonian battalion commander (Heckel 2006: 159–61), proclaimed that Perdiccas was unworthy of the office. He further stated that, if Roxane's child were made king, this would in effect be the selection of Perdiccas as Alexander's successor (Curt. 10. 6. 20–1). Meleager was likely expressing an opinion that was not entirely his own. While civil war was clearly not the desire of any of the leaders, with no consensus on how to proceed, the meeting quickly degenerated into, in the words of Curtius (10. 7. 1), "sedition and discord."

In this emerging chaos a virtually unknown individual ("*ignotus*") proposed that the crown be given to Arrhidaeus; this suggestion was soon taken up by Meleager (Curt. 10. 7. 1–2). While Curtius is our most detailed source, his description of events has been called into serious question (Bosworth 2002: 35–45; Martin 1983: 161–91), with one commentator stating that his problems as a source are sufficient "almost to preclude belief in anything Curtius says about events after Alexander's death, except items confirmed by another source" (McKechnie 1999: 49). The major point of contention concerns the sequencing of the events that led to the eventual proclamation by the Macedonian infantry of Arrhidaeus as king. Justin's description is in a number of ways significantly different from that found in Curtius. Justin (13. 2. 1–4, 3. 1–2) has the Macedonians initially meeting in three separate groups: the leaders, the cavalry, and the infantry. The leaders made their "unanimous" decisions in private (13. 2. 1–3), then gave out the word to the army, which was divided in location according to whether they were horsemen or foot soldiers (13. 3. 1). For Justin, Curtius' *principes* are able to arrive at a decision with respect to the new monarch with no interference from the infantry. In private, they had agreed to await the birth of Roxane's child. If the child were male, then Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Craterus, and Antipater would be the infant's guardians (Just. 13. 13–14). While the cavalry was in agreement with their leaders, the infantry was incensed that they had not been consulted and immediately hailed Arrhidaeus as king (Just. 13. 3. 1–2). The *principes* now in an attempt to win the infantry to their decision sent two Macedonian battalion commanders, Attalus and Meleager, to them, but these individuals joined the infantry and became its leaders (Just. 13. 3. 2). Attalus would appear an unlikely candidate for this betrayal, especially since he is later found in Perdiccas' good graces and married to the latter's sister, but it has been suggested that the marriage came later as part of Perdiccas' successful attempt to regain Attalus' allegiance (Heckel 1992: 381–4; 2006: 63).¹⁵ There are, however, additional improbable details in Justin.

15 Bosworth (2002: 44n 58) suggests that this may be a different Attalus, which given Justin's claim (13. 3. 7) that this same individual attempted to assassinate Perdiccas, is possible. However, after these two references, this individual apparently disappears from the

Justin (13. 1. 2–8, 2. 1) begins his history of the aftermath of Alexander's death by remarking that while the "barbarians" were grieved at the loss of their king, the Macedonians were delighted at the death of their leader. But, earlier, according to Justin (12. 15. 3), the Macedonians were in tears over the impending demise of their king. Moreover, he has Meleager in the meeting of the *principes* nominating Heracles for the office (Just. 13. 2. 6–7). This last is certainly in error, given that in Justin's account (13. 2. 9–10), Meleager in the same speech that he makes the Heracles' suggestion condemns any offspring from Roxane as unwanted because the child's descent would be from the ranks of the conquered. According to Justin (13. 3. 7), this same Attalus is also responsible for later attempting to have Perdiccas assassinated. Justin's account then might be dismissed out of hand as confusions by the epitimator of his source, but part of this basic outline of events also appears in the brief synopsis found in Diodorus (18. 2. 2–4),¹⁶ indicating that there was a source tradition perhaps used by both Pompeius Trogus and Diodorus. The latter, however, begins with the division between the cavalry and infantry over the succession already in place, without any explanation of what led to it. He then states that envoys, only specifying Meleager by name, were sent from the cavalry to the infantry. Neither Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 1–4; 1b. 1), nor Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 1–2), provide more than the briefest outlines of these events. The basic scenario described in Justin is accepted by many scholars, who reject Curtius' account as either "imaginative fiction" (Mckechnie 1999: 49–50), or "a confused pot pourri" (Bosworth 2002: 35–44).

Curtius' account, however, is more faithful to the specific historical context. The troops, while initially having no expectation that they would select the next king, yet, by the same token not willing to sit meekly by in some distant location while their futures were being decided, ultimately chose a king. The circumstances described by Curtius, the crowded meeting, the division of opinion amongst the *principes*, all led to an emboldening of the rank-and-file and the first true mutiny by the Macedonian army. Much like with mercenaries, many of whose attributes were exhibited by this long-serving royal army, this crisis caused the troops to see to their own interests

record and Attalus, Perdiccas' brother-in-law appears. Neither of the possible two individuals named Attalus in this context appear again in Justin's account.

16 However, in Diodorus' account (18. 2. 2; cf. 18. 4. 7) there are also serious differences with that of Justin. In his brief reference to the events which followed Alexander's death, Diodorus has Meleager initially supporting the conclave leaders. According to Diodorus, it is after the rupture between the cavalry and the infantry, but before the cavalry left Babylon, that Meleager was sent as an ambassador by the cavalry leaders to the infantry; he then joined the infantry as their leader.

through democratic means (cf. Parke 1933: 119). Indeed, it was this very succession crisis that gave rise to the brief period of powerful army assemblies that emerged following Alexander's death (see Errington 1978: 116–17; Anson 1985: 307–8; 1991: 236–7). These were the result of the troops' long service in Asia, the personal nature of that service in the period of both Alexander and his Successors, and the uncertainties that arose in this new age. The Curtian description of events is, therefore, not only the most detailed, but, despite rhetorical flourishes, the most accurate. While certain discordant elements of Justin's account may be explained. For example, the private meeting of *principes* may, indeed, have been the meeting of the *somaphylaces*, the formal bodyguards, who according to the Curtian account were the individuals who summoned the general meeting of "principal friends and commanders" (Curt. 10. 6. 1). Meleager was not one of the *principes*; he had not risen above battalion commander (Heckel 1992: 167; 2006: 160 [#1]). At the time of Alexander's death, as noted earlier, the seven bodyguards were Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdicas, Ptolemy, Pithon, and Peucestas (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4). The two divergent descriptions of Meleager's role at the beginning of the disturbance cannot be easily reconciled. Our other sources proclaim that of the officers only Meleager supported Arrhidaeus and the infantry (Diod. 18. 2. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 2).

Justin (13. 2. 6–8) himself associates the introduction of Arrhidaeus solely with Meleager, but in the private meeting of the leaders. Justin makes no mention of a following general meeting as described by Curtius. Certainly after the unknown, "the *ignotus*," made the proposal it was Meleager who dominated the scene (cf. Curt. 10. 7. 7). While it has been claimed that such a minor individual would not dare make such a suggestion in a meeting dominated by the great commanders (Martin 1983: 163; Bosworth 2002: 35–7), this was not a normal situation. The troops had burst into the meeting; they were clearly well engaged in the debate at least by their vocal support or dissent of the various proposals. In such a situation, a common soldier might be emboldened to suggest a candidate. It is clear from the rapid endorsement of the suggestion by the infantry soldiers that many likely had the same thought.

While the proposal to make Arrhidaeus king was certainly not the wish of the officers, it was the desire of the massed troops who hailed Arrhidaeus as king under the name of Philip (Curt. 10. 7. 3–4, 7–15; Just. 13. 2. 6–8; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 1–3). At this point, whatever order that had existed broke down and a riot ensued with the cavalry ranged with the *principes* and the infantry with Meleager and Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 7. 16–19; Just. 13. 3. 3–4). In the chaos which followed, the cavalry fled the city and camped outside in the plain (Curt. 10.

7. 16–20). In the next few days Eumenes, who apparently, even though he was one of chief *principes* (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 2),¹⁷ had remained quiet during the debate, would ensure his position in the new order.

Eumenes, unlike the other *principes*, remained in the city throughout the disorder (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1–2). He stayed ostensibly to mediate, but in reality to undermine Meleager's control of the infantry. Such efforts are not made reference to directly, but Diodorus (18. 2. 4) does say that “men most inclined toward conciliation persuaded the parties to come to an agreement.” From Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 2), it is known that Eumenes was one such individual. Indeed, this latter passage emphasizes Eumenes' role in calming those in the city and making them more disposed to a reconciliation. Eumenes likely used his influence to subvert the infantry's support for Meleager. From later events, it would appear that Eumenes was working for Perdiccas. The latter had also initially remained in the city when the cavalry left (Curt. 10. 7. 21–8. 4). It may have been while both Eumenes and Perdiccas were in the city that Eumenes proposed to stay and work for Perdiccas' interests.

It is curious that Eumenes verbally based his proclaimed neutrality in the dispute between the infantry and the cavalry on his Cardian birth; “it was not business of his, since he was a stranger, to meddle in disputes of Macedonians” (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1). This was a peculiar position to take, since many other non-native Macedonians thought nothing of involving themselves in the quarrel. Nearchus, as indicated, had proposed to the assembled army that Heracles be recognized as Alexander's successor (Curt. 10. 6. 11), and Pasas, the Thessalian, and Damis of Megalopolis,¹⁸ served as two of the three negotiators for the infantry in the discussions with the cavalry (Curt. 10. 8. 15). The third, Perilaus, is of unknown origin, but likely also a Greek (Heckel 2006: 203 [#1]; contra: Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 199). The prominence of these individuals, who were most likely mercenary commanders,¹⁹ indicates that perhaps many Greek

17 “The chief and most influential commanders of the [cavalry] were Perdiccas the son of Orontes, Leonnatus the son of Anthes, Ptolemaeus the son of Lagus, Lysimachus the son of Agathocles, Aristonous the son of Pisaeus, Pithon the son of Crateuas, Seleucus the son of Antiochus, and Eumenes of Cardia.”

18 Heckel (2006: 102 [#2]) suggests that Amissus is an error for Damis, who was a Megalopolitan veteran of Alexander's campaigns and who conducted the defense of Megalopolis during Polyperchon's siege in 318 (Diod. 18. 71. 2).

19 If Amissus is, indeed, a mistake for Damis, then at least this negotiator was most likely a mercenary commander. While the two other Greek negotiators could be from the ranks of the Greek courtiers, it appears unlikely. The courtiers were the individuals most supportive of Alexander's Persianization policies (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 10. 5; Plut. *Alex.* 51. 4; 53. 4–6); the very policies the infantry most abhorred (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 2–3).

mercenaries had joined their Macedonian counterparts and been involved in the initial rioting. Eumenes' statement was an argument which was just sufficiently plausible to permit him to maintain his supposed and very precarious neutrality. Given his attempt to appear above the fray, it is curious that Arrian identifies him as one of the chief cavalry leaders. Yet, the leaders of the two opposing camps were members of the native Macedonian aristocracy. While Alexander had many foreign *hetairoi*, his military commanders were almost exclusively native-born aristocrats. While Eumenes had led cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 24. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Curt. 9. 1. 19), including the companion cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6); Erigyius of Mytilene had commanded the allied cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6), and Nearchus had led light-armed troops in India (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 30. 6) and commanded Alexander's Indian fleet (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 2. 3; *Ind.* 18. 10), the great commands were, with the exception of Eumenes' command of the companion cavalry, held during Alexander's reign by native Macedonian aristocrats. Macedonian infantry units were always commanded by native Macedonian nobles.

Eumenes' claim of inferiority was generally accepted by the hereditary Macedonian nobility on the grounds that he did not share their birth (Anson 2014B 542–58). The regular Macedonian infantrymen, however, were not nobles either. They would have accepted Eumenes' claim as indicating that his sympathies were with them. They esteemed his previous standing with Alexander, and later his military reputation. After Neoptolemus' jab at Eumenes' lack of military experience, the troops remained unimpressed for "they knew that Eumenes had been deemed by Alexander worthy of being related to him by marriage" (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). While the great talisman of the first years after the conqueror's death was the name of Alexander,²⁰ the Argead mystique was also very powerful. It led to the raising of Arrhidaeus to the throne, and was responsible for the subsequent attempts by many of the contenders for power to marry Alexander's sister, and Philip's daughter, Cleopatra.²¹ Antigonus, indeed, later had her murdered to prevent her union with his rival Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 5–6). Pierre Briant (1973A: 130–1) believes that Antigonus' lack of a close connection to Alexander was for him an almost insurmountable obstacle. Later, when Antigonus had reversed his earlier weakness, he removed from command those who had been close to Alexander (Diod. 19. 46. 2; 48. 5; 56. 1).

20 The political effectiveness of the use of Alexander's name, however, lasted less than a generation (Errington 1976: 157–8).

21 Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5), Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1–3, 25. 3; Just. 13. 6. 4–7), Cassander, Lysimachus, Antigonus and Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 4) all sought her hand in marriage.

Eumenes quickly realized the power of his connection both to Alexander and to the Argead family, and directed his subsequent policies with full cognizance of this fact. Having fled from the city, the *principes* unified themselves under Perdiccas' leadership (Rathmann 2005: 32, 50–2). That commander had subsequently joined those outside Babylon following a failed attempt on his life (Curt. 10. 8. 2–4). Meleager's attempt to have Perdiccas murdered prior to that commander's exit from Babylon had failed when the assassins were overawed by the intended victim (Curt. 10. 8. 3).

In this conflict with the infantry, the *principes* had many advantages. They were in control of a far more formidable force than simply the Companion Cavalry. Present in Babylon at the time of Alexander's death was a force of more than 50000 Persian infantry plus units of Cossaeans and Tapurians (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 1–4). These troops had become part of Alexander's army. In Susa, Alexander had been joined by the *Epigoni*, 30000 young Persians trained and equipped in the Macedonian fashion (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 6. 1; Curt. 8. 5. 1; Diod. 17. 108. 1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 47. 3, 71. 1), and later at Opis, the king created Persian units bearing Macedonian titles and bearing Macedonian equipment (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 11. 3; Diod. 17. 110. 1–2; Just. 12. 12. 3–4). It was also at Opis that Alexander had dismissed roughly 10000 of his Macedonian veterans (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1; Diod. 17. 109. 2; 18. 4. 1), retaining only 2000 cavalry and 13000 infantry (Curt. 10. 2. 8).²² While his regent in Macedonia, Antipater, was to bring new Macedonian recruits to Asia as replacements for those departing, at the time of Alexander's death, these forces were still in their homeland (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4; Just. 12. 12. 9).

The army in Babylon was now primarily Asian. Given the attitude of the Macedonian infantry, as demonstrated in their reluctance to accept a half-Asian successor as their king, these Asian troops would have been loyal to the *principes* and the cavalry. It is unclear how many Greek mercenaries were in Babylon. There were such forces in abundance in Asia, but mostly scattered about in garrisons and in Alexander's many new cities. Once Alexander's death became known, a force of 20000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, primarily mercenaries, abandoned their homes in central Asia with the intent of marching back to Greece (Diod. 18. 17. 2). While it appears clear that at least a number of those in Babylon stood with the Macedonian infantry, the *principes* were their paymasters. Many given their profession may have stayed with their paymasters.

With the city surrounded, supplies interdicted by the forces outside the city (Curt. 10. 8. 11), and Eumenes and unnamed others working within the city,

²² Hammond estimates the number at less than 10000 (1980: 245), and Bosworth (1988: 267) suggests maybe as few as 8000, but there appears no good reason to question Curtius' figure.

the resolve of the infantry began to disintegrate. The troops demanded that their leaders either come to terms with the cavalry or immediately lead them against the latter (Curt. 10. 8. 12–14). Meleager could not gain effective control of the infantry and their officers. Arrhidaeus in this crisis showed no capacity to lead. It was Meleager who had “dragged” him initially before the assembled soldiers (Curt. 10. 7. 10), and Arrhidaeus had soon fled the scene “terrified by the authority of the *principes*” (Curt. 10. 7. 13).²³ Under these circumstances envoys were sent to the leaders outside the city and a compromise was reached (Curt. 10. 8. 14–22). Arrhidaeus would remain as king (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3). The key to the compromise was that Craterus, who was in Cilicia with the veterans and more than 600 miles distant (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4), would be recognized as second in authority only to the king and thereby superior to all other officers. Even though, or more likely especially because, he was not present, he was the perfect foil. His name was popular with the infantry (Plut. *Demetr.* 14. 2; *Eum.* 6. 2–3; *Suda* s. v. *Craterus*), and Meleager had served under his command (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 17. 3). The absent Craterus would become “the *Prostates* of Arrhidaeus’ kingdom” (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3; *Succ.* 1b. 4), or regent for the king.²⁴ *Prostates* was the traditional title for the regent of the kingdom of Macedonia (Anson 1992; 2009B: 280–5). Since the king’s authority was theoretically absolute in all areas of rule (see Anson 2013A: 19–21), the *prostates* would have corresponding powers. However, it would be hard to exercise this authority from such a distance. Perdiccas would become chiliarch (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3; 1b. 4), and thus become the second-in-command to the king’s *prostates*.²⁵ Perdiccas’ office would remain what it had been under the rule of Alexander. Under these circumstances, however, this appointment of Perdiccas to this office, as noted by Arrian, “amounted to entrusting him with the care of the whole empire” (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3).

23 Much later, this same Arrhidaeus, now called Philip, was compelled by Perdiccas to order the execution of the very men whose leadership had secured him the throne (Curt. 10. 9. 17–19).

24 Diodorus never mentions any office for Craterus, but it is also true that in his abridgement he omits much information. Elizabeth Carney (2006: 70) believes that “[the *prostasia*] was not a specific office, but rather an undefined prominence and power.” See Anson (1992: 38–43; 2009: 276–86) and Alexander Meeus (2009: 287–302) for the arguments for *prostasia* referring to an office.

25 See Heckel 1988: 19–20. Since the office of chiliarch was Persian in origin, having been adopted by Alexander during his conquests (Schachermeyr 1970: 31–4), it is very likely that in this context Perdiccas’ power was to be confined to Asia (Rosen 1967B: 108–9; Hammond 1985: 157; Collins 2001: 266–74). This would explain why there is no evidence of Antipater’s position in the new order being changed from *strategos*, general, for Macedonia.

Meleager, who had withdrawn an earlier demand that he share equally in the command of the combined forces with Perdiccas and Craterus (Curt. 10. 8. 22–23), would become Perdiccas' lieutenant (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3).²⁶ In this way both sides would accede to the authority of an absent third party. Meleager, in particular, was pleased with this agreement; he had served under Craterus (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 17. 3), and hoped to enhance his position through his association with the popular commander.²⁷ Since Meleager, even through his puppet Arrhidaeus, was unable to control the infantry, Craterus, the most popular commander (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 6. 3) would be invoked. In Meleager's own mind, he had emerged from the crisis with a new and more powerful role in the new order. In reality, Perdiccas and the other *principes* had no intention of abiding by this agreement. As Errington (1970: 56) states, "the Perdiccans made the compromise only to get control of the king and to eliminate Meleager." While Curtius' statement (10. 9. 7) that Perdiccas rested his only hope for survival on Meleager's death is an exaggeration, it does point to the perceived need to separate Meleager from the king. It was for this reason that the *principes* were willing to appear to grant the *prostasia* to the absent Craterus. For them this agreement with Meleager was never meant to come into effect (cf. Curt. 10. 8. 22).

As part of the understanding with Meleager, a formal reconciliation was to be staged; the period of strife had lasted a week (Curt. 10. 10. 9).²⁸ The treachery was planned around a formal purification of the Macedonian forces (Curt. 10. 9. 11). According to Curtius (10. 9. 8–11), Meleager was tricked by Perdiccas into agreeing to use the purification as a means to eliminate those supposedly working against the agreement. Therefore, with the infantry outside the walls of the city and the cavalry commanding the plain, the surrender of thirty infantry leaders was demanded and obtained (Diod. 18. 4. 7; cf. Curt. 10. 9. 18).²⁹

26 Curtius (10. 8. 22–23; cf. Just. 13. 4. 5) states that Meleager was granted a full share in the leadership with Craterus and Perdiccas as the basis for the reconciliation, but Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 3) is to be preferred. The most reasonable explanation for this seeming contradiction is that the two sources reflect different stages in the negotiations. Meleager had initially demanded to be an equal partner in power with Perdiccas and Craterus, but ultimately acquired only the promise of the subordinate position.

27 Rosen (1967B: 97–8) suggests that the impetus for this aspect of the compromise came from Eumenes. The evidence, however, is far from clear with regard to the origin of the plan.

28 Bosworth (2002: 55) believes that the entire episode took weeks, but there is no reason to doubt Curtius.

29 Diodorus says 30, but Curtius reports that 300 were put to death. While 300 appears to be more than would be necessary to get the attention of the others, Perdiccas in particular,

These men were then trampled to death before the whole army by the elephants. The *principes* wished to demonstrate to their formerly rebellious soldiers that such defiance would not be tolerated. As with Alexander at Opis, the leaders of this insurrection paid with their lives (*Anab.* 7. 8. 3; Curt. 10. 2. 30).³⁰ While Meleager was not among the 30, he was subsequently assassinated (Curt. 10. 9. 21; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 4; cf. Diod. 18. 4. 7).³¹

The cavalry leaders then returned to Babylon and held the conclave they had tried to hold previously to decide the fate of Alexander's empire. This time there were no soldiers present (Curt. 10. 10. 1–4). As mentioned, the compromise worked out between Meleager and Perdiccas was not to be the final settlement. At this meeting, Philip was confirmed as king with the understanding that, if Roxane's child were male, he would also be king (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8; cf. Diod. 18. 18. 6). Later, when a boy was born,³² he was presented to the army who hailed him as King Alexander IV (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8).³³ In this final settlement

was noted as "a man of blood" (Diod. 18. 33. 3). The lesser number, however, would still get Perdiccas' point across without eliminating so many valuable Macedonian infantrymen.

30 At Opis only thirteen were executed, but then there had only been verbal abuse of traditional authority, and such speech had in the past been a Macedonian prerogative, part of the customary relationship between the king and his people (see Adams 1986: 43–52). In Babylon after Alexander's death, there had been an actual insurrection.

31 Both Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 4–5) and Curtius (10. 9. 7–21) place Meleager's death soon after the "reconciliation," and before the *principes* met a second time in Babylon to hammer out a final settlement. Diodorus (18. 3–4), however, places this meeting before the deaths of Meleager and the ringleaders of the infantry. Errington (1970: 57 n. 59) correctly notes, "[D]iodorus] is a mess chronologically, even though his information is from Hieronymus, and it seems unnecessary to see more than his own inaccuracy in the variation."

32 On the time of his birth, Curtius (10. 6. 9) states that Roxane was six months pregnant when Alexander died, but Justin (13. 2. 5) claims that she was eight. With no way to decide between Curtius and Justin the birth could have occurred as early as the final settlement in Babylon or as late as September (Errington 1970: 58). Arrian's context would seem to place the birth after the division of the satrapies in Babylon and possibly before the outbreak of the Lamian War. However, since our major sources (Diodorus, Arrian, and Justin) are fairly uniform in narrating events in Europe separate from those in Asia, perhaps, reflecting Hieronymus' arrangement, that the birth comes in Photius' epitome before the narration of the Lamian War is probably without significance.

33 There is a great deal of disagreement on the actual status of Alexander IV despite the reference to his kingship in Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 8) and the constant mention of "kings" in our other literary sources. Fontana (1960: 127) argues that the phrase "the kings" originates with Hieronymus and that while Philip (Arrhidaeus) was alive, only he possessed the royal title (124–5). Even though the documentary evidence would appear to support Fontana (124–7), it is difficult to argue away Arrian's (*Succ.* 1a. 8) statement that "the throng proclaimed the newborn (Alexander IV) king." Moreover, Heckel (1980B: 249–50) has argued

Perdiccas emerged as the *Prostates* of the Kingdom (cf. Diod. 18. 2. 4, 3. 1, 23. 2).³⁴ As such he was both regent and guardian for the kings (Anson 2009B: 284; Meeus 2009: 296–7). Craterus in the final settlement was to share power in Europe with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), as had been originally proposed by Pithon during the initial stages of the meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10. 7. 9). Specifically, Antipater and Craterus were assigned Illyria, Triballia, Greece, and Macedonia; Thrace, the Chersonese, and the Pontic regions were assigned to Lysimachus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7). The exact relationship between Antipater and Lysimachus can only be surmised, but there is no sign of hostility between the two, at least in part, because each had a war to fight; Lysimachus against King Seuthes and the Thracians (Diod. 18. 14. 2–4), and Antipater faced a Greek coalition in the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 9. 1–13. 6). Diodorus (17. 118. 2) states that Antipater held “most power in Europe”; he probably retained his title of “General of Europe” given him by Alexander (Diod. 17. 118. 1; 18. 12. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3; Diod. 17. 17. 5; Curt. 4. 1. 39; Just. 11. 7. 1). There is no indication that it was revoked. Previously, Thrace had been subject to Antipater’s authority, although his hold on the Macedonian commander in the region had been tenuous at best.³⁵ Theoretically, then, this would have made Lysimachus subject to Antipater and now Craterus’ authority (Lund 1992: 20, 54), but it

on the basis of IG II² 561 that at least after the army assembly meeting at Triparadeisus in 320, Philip III and Alexander IV shared the monarchy, with Philip, on account of his age, being the active member of the tandem. The best solution to the whole situation is probably still the one suggested by Schwahn (1931: 313) that, while both were royal, Philip was to rule until Alexander came of age. This would appear to follow from Diodorus 18. 57. 2, where Polyperchon invites Olympias to return to Macedonia “to take charge of the son of Alexander, and to assume responsibility for him until he should become of age and receive his father’s kingdom.”

- 34 While Diodorus 18. 23. 2 could be taken to mean that Perdiccas had seized the *prostasia* of the kings from the absent Craterus (cf. Rosen 1967B: 104), this passage clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached. Diodorus 18. 2. 4, 3. 1 is very clear that Perdiccas from the time of the final settlement held the regency alone. Throughout this period the actual power remained with those physically present in Babylon (Errington 1970: 54, 56–7; Heckel 1988: 20–1; Anson 1992: 42–3).
- 35 While Alexander had left Antipater in overall authority in Europe, there were separate commanders in Thrace (Diod. 17. 62. 4–6, 63. 1) and in the Peloponnese, the latter, likely headquartered in Corinth (Aes. 3. 165; Heckel 2006: 94 [#1]). These and perhaps certain unnamed garrison commanders were ostensibly subordinate to the regent’s authority, but they apparently also enjoyed a level of independence, since their appointment was in all probability made by Alexander as a way of keeping tabs on his regent in Macedonia (Anson 2013A: 128–9).

is very possible that Lysimachus was made satrap of Thrace which would have put him directly under the authority of the kings and their regent (Delev 2000: 384 n. 5).

For those in Babylon, having Antipater and Craterus share the generalship of Macedonia was an ideal way to deal with the two powerful, but absent, *principes*; let them battle it out for control of Europe (Badian 1964: 266). Perdiccas with the consent of the army had revoked Alexander's command that Craterus replace Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 4. 1–6), and substituted the more amorphous sharing of power between the two (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7). Justin (13. 4. 5), perhaps reflecting the reality of the situation as opposed to the final settlement's official position, states that Craterus was given control of the royal treasury. He was in Cilicia with the Macedonian returnees and thereby probably in control of the royal treasury at Cyinda. As to Antipater's reaction to the events in Babylon, it should be noted that even before the final settlement was reached, he was already preparing for what became the Lamian War, the great revolt of the Greek states against Macedonian authority, which saw Antipater and a Macedonian force defeated and subsequently besieged in Lamia in the winter of 323/322 (Diod. 18. 9. 1–4, 12. 1).

At this second meeting in Babylon, additionally, the satrapies were assigned (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2–7; Diod. 18. 3. 1–2). While the dominant figure was Perdiccas, he clearly did not control the proceedings. The actual assignment of the satrapies was the result of a compromise between the conflicting claims of the *principes* and the entrenched nature of many of the current holders of these positions. Perdiccas, in his official capacity as regent, was carrying out the desires of the *principes*. This is very clear in Diodorus 18. 3. 1 (cf. 18. 23. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 7; App. *Syr.* 52; Just. 13. 5. 9). The limitations on Perdiccas' authority are obvious. Ptolemy, who had opposed the appointment of Perdiccas as regent in the first abortive meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10. 6. 15), got what he desired, the satrapy of Egypt. While there has been much discussion relating to Ptolemy's ambitions, with most recent scholars proclaiming that Ptolemy was no different from the other Diadochs in his ambitions (Hauben 2014; Meeus 2014; Strootman 2014: 314–15), it does need to be pointed out that he always centered his ambitions on Egypt and, even when offered the regency at a subsequent date, he turned the position down. In actuality, Ptolemy early saw that Alexander's empire would ultimately be partitioned among the Conqueror's generals, and, while Ptolemy was covetous enough to desire additional territories, his focus never much strayed from Egypt. Certainly, Perdiccas, if he could have done so, would have blocked his rival's assignment to such an important and defensible satrapy. He did try to

limit the grant by insisting that Cleomenes, the previous satrap of Egypt,³⁶ be made Ptolemy's lieutenant (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 5). Likewise, certain powerful individuals who were not physically present in Babylon had to be taken into account. Indeed, of the roughly 20 satrapies (cf. *Arr. Succ.* 1b. 3–7; Jacobs 1994: 52–88) only eight were reassigned, and of the eight, three most likely were vacant at the time of their assignment and two were replacements or partial replacements of non Graeco-Macedonian officials (*Diod.* 18. 3. 1–3; *Arr. Succ.* 1a. 6; *Just.* 13. 4. 9–15; *App. Syr.* 52–53).³⁷ Even with the replacements, Perdikkas clearly did not control these assignments. Of those clearly his partisans only Eumenes emerged as a newly created satrap (*Diod.* 18. 3. 1; *Arr. Succ.* 1a. 6; *Plut. Eum.* 3. 3); Perdikkas' own brother Alcetas, a distinguished battalion commander, did not secure a province, nor did Aristonous, who had proposed in the initial meeting that Perdikkas be made king and remained a loyal Perdikkas supporter (*Curt.* 10. 6. 16). The possession of a satrapy did not necessarily mean a separation from the court. Pithon was satrap of Media Major (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 5), but would remain with Perdikkas (cf. *Diod.* 18. 7. 9, 36. 5).

36 There is considerable disagreement with regard to Cleomenes' actual title and powers in Egypt during Alexander's lifetime, but for a convincing argument that he was appointed satrap by Alexander, see Seibert 1969: 43–4, 50.

37 Those reassigned were Hellespontine Phrygia, Cilicia, Caria, Cappadocia, Syria, Egypt, Media Major, and Thrace. Of these, it is unlikely that Sabictas, the satrap of Cappadocia, survived the Persian counter-offensive after Issus (*Curt.* 4. 1. 34–35, 5. 13). After that campaign, he disappears from the record and the local dynast Ariarathes appears in total control of Cappadocia (*Diod.* 18. 16. 1). Lycaonia had apparently been divided between Antigonos and Ariarathes (*Curt.* 4. 5. 13; *Str.* 12. 1. 2). It is likely that Sabictas' satrapy had included Lycaonia and little else; Alexander did not cross the Halys into Cappadocia proper, but had only marched "to the Halys River" (*Arr. Anab.* 2. 4. 2; *Diod.* 18. 3. 1; cf. *App. Mith.* 8). Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia, had been slain by the Larandians and the Isaurians prior to Alexander's death (*Diod.* 18. 22. 1). A similar fate probably also befell Demarchus in Hellespontine Phrygia (see Briant 1973A: 80). Media was divided into two provinces (*Just.* 13. 4. 13) with Atropates, Perdikkas' father-in-law (*Arr. Anab.* 7. 4. 5; *Just.* 13. 4. 13), retaining Media Minor, and Media Major being assigned to Pithon (see Berve 1973: 2:91–92 [#180]; Heckel 2006: 61–2); Lysimachus was to replace Seuthes in Thrace (*Diod.* 18. 3. 2; Berve 1973: 1:227–8; Heckel 2006: 155 [#2]). It is unknown who Laomedon replaced in Syria, but Appian (*Syr.* 52) is clear that he was first appointed by "Perdikkas." Despite Justin's statement (13. 4. 14–15) that Lycia and Pamphylia went to Nearchus, these territories remained with Antigonos. Nearchus had held these areas until 329 (*Arr. Anab.* 3. 6. 6; 4. 7. 2), when they were transferred to Antigonos; this fact obviously is responsible for Justin's confusion. Babylonia may also have been reassigned (see Berve 1973: 2:86–87 [#163]; Heckel 2006: 43). If it was, then it would have represented the replacement of a Persian satrap (see Berve 1973: 2:361 [#718]).

With regard to the other satrapies which were reassigned, while their governors' later actions with regard to Perdiccas cannot be taken as proof of their attitudes in 323, it is instructive that Ptolemy, Leonnatus, Pithon (Diod. 18. 36. 5), Laomedon (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6), and Asander (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6), all ultimately proved disloyal to the regent.

While Antipater and Craterus accepted the final settlement in Babylon and did cooperate during the Lamian War, with Craterus deferring to Antipater's authority, Craterus apparently wanted a separate region of his own in Asia (Diod. 18. 18. 7), to be gained not through conflict but rather by negotiation (cf. Diod. 18. 18. 7; Errington 1970: 61–2). Complicating any attempt to unravel Craterus' actions is the likelihood that he would have been Antipater's successor in Macedonia, if he stayed in Macedonia. Even though no source states this directly, Antipater was over 70, and did die in the late summer of 319 (Diod. 18. 48. 4; 47. 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; *Eum.* 12. 1), at 77 years of age (*Suda* s.v. *Antipater*); the regent had married one of his daughters to Craterus, but then he gave his daughters to other Diadochs as well. What makes it appear that Craterus was being groomed as Antipater's chosen successor is that when Antipater was dying, he arranged for the latter's old lieutenant Polyperchon to succeed him in Macedonia, and not one of his six sons (Diod. 18.48.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12.1). Craterus had died in combat the previous year. Of course, the appointment of Polyperchon took place in 319, four years after Alexander's death, making much of the previous discussion purely speculative. It should also be noted that the position as satrap in particular of a satrapy somewhere in Asia Minor would not necessarily be an indication that Craterus was not the chosen heir.

In general, Craterus is an interesting Diadoch. In spite of all of his resources in 323, he did not physically contest or apparently even voice objections to the resolutions reached in Babylon. When he eventually did cross to Macedonia, he immediately deferred to Antipater's authority (Diod. 18.16.5), even though the *Suda*, the Byzantine encyclopedia, states that in Macedonia the army preferred Craterus to Antipater (*Suda* s.v. *Craterus*). Additionally, Craterus never accused Perdiccas of usurping his *prostasia*, and, while Antigonus later accused Perdiccas of many things, he never accused him of usurping Craterus' position either (cf. Diod. 18. 23. 2–3, 25. 3). In the final analysis, Craterus proved to be a loyal Macedonian and royal supporter (Anson 2012: 49–58). Craterus was a good and confident general, but his aspirations were not equal to those of so many of his contemporaries who followed the Conqueror's lead and put their personal ambitions ahead of their homeland (Badian 1964: 203). Antipater and Craterus remained loyal Macedonians, their homeland first, their interests second (Anson 2012).

Eumenes emerged from the crisis as an adviser to the new regent and also a reluctant satrap. The new regent's immediate ambition was to solidify his hold on the royal army. This consideration may help explain why more of his supporters were not sent off as satraps; Perdiccas needed them in Babylon (Billows 1990: 55). At this moment, controlling the army was all important, the actual administration of the empire was secondary. This emphasis is clearly seen with respect to Perdiccas' use of the head of the royal chancellery. Even though Eumenes still saw his position in the new order as tied directly to his presence at court (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14), Perdiccas had other plans. Perdiccas wanted to remove from power in Asia Minor those native rulers who had resisted or rebelled against Macedonian authority.³⁸ The army had seen Perdiccas order the death of 30 of their fellows, one way to regain their support was to be seen as actively safeguarding the empire, and eliminating Asian usurpers of what was considered Macedonian lands and authority would enhance his standing with the core of his army. In consequence, Eumenes was assigned the territories of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia,³⁹ an assignment, Curtius (10. 10. 3) reports, Eumenes initially rejected. Although Perdiccas overcame Eumenes' reluctance, this was not to be an easy task. While Alexander had formally annexed the southern portion of Cappadocia (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 1–2), Ariarathes, the then ruler of northern Cappadocia, had never submitted to Macedonian control (Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4).⁴⁰ Indeed, in the chaos that followed

38 Perdiccas later defeated the Isaurians and the Larandians who had killed Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia appointed by Alexander (Diod. 18. 22. 1). In the East, however, many loyal non Graeco-Macedonians were left in charge of kingdoms and satrapies. Taxiles, Porus, Oxyartes, Phrataphernes and Atropates, for example (Diod. 18. 3. 2–3).

39 Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2; *FGrH* 100 F-8.2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3; Just. 13. 4. 16; Briant (1973A: 141 n. 6) argues that Pisidia was given to Eumenes as well. He bases his claim on Diodorus 18. 3. 1 where it is stated that Eumenes received all those territories bordering Paphlagonia and Cappadocia which "Alexander had not attacked." However, Pisidia had been invaded and many of its tribes had formally submitted to Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 27. 5–29. 1; Str. 12. 7. 3), and the area had been attached to the province of Lycia-Pamphylia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6; cf. Polyæn. 5. 35; see Berve, 1973: 1: 256). Pisidia had not been subject to the Persian satraps (Bosworth 1980: 169), and, while Nearchus may have gained a measure of control over it during his assignment as satrap of Lycia-Pamphylia from late 334 to 328 (Heckel 2006: 171), but that is unlikely. The inhabitants subsequently maintained this independence from Antigonos after the area was technically attached to that commander (Billows 1990: 46, 237). Given their later loyalty to Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, it is unlikely that Antigonos maintained good relations with the Pisidians (Diod. 18. 46. 3–47. 2).

40 Ariarathes had only been nominally under the authority of the Persians (Berve 1973: 2: 59–60 [#113]; Heckel 2006: 44). Appian (*Mith.* 8), claiming to be quoting from Hieronymus

the battle of Issus, when many Cappadocians and Paphlagonians together with other remnants of Darius' army had invaded Phrygia (Curt. 4. 1. 34–35; cf. Diod. 17. 48. 5–6), Ariarathes apparently annexed all of Cappadocia, for in 322, he is found in total control of the region (Diod. 18. 16. 1–3; 22. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 11; Just. 13. 6. 1–3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4). Paphlagonia, likewise, was not under Macedonian authority. While the Paphlagonian tribes had submitted to Alexander and been put under the jurisdiction of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 1–2; Curt. 3. 1. 22–23), they early renounced their allegiance (cf. Curt. 4. 5. 13). Consequently, while Eumenes was allocated these territories, they would first have to be conquered.

The creation of this new satrapy would also limit the power of Antigonos in Asia Minor, as the association of Cleomenes to Ptolemy was hoped to do with respect to the latter in Egypt (Anson 1988A: 476; Billows 1990: 57). During the period from the battle of Issus and the Persian attempt to retake Asia Minor in 333 and Alexander's death in 323, Antigonos and Ariarathes maintained at least a *de facto* peace. There is no record of open hostilities between them, and the two may have simply agreed to leave one another alone. The creation of Eumenes' satrapy would certainly upset what had been for ten years the status quo in Asia Minor. With these purposes in mind, Perdikkas in the name of the kings ordered both Leonnatus and Antigonos to aid Eumenes in the acquisition of his new satrapy (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3–4). The command to Antigonos to participate would test his loyalty to the new order. In the late summer of 323, Eumenes departed Babylon.⁴¹ With Eumenes went Leonnatus and together they

(*FGrH* 154 F-3), states that Alexander never came into contact with the peoples of Cappadocia. Therefore, Alexander acquired Lycaonia but at most only the southern part of Cappadocia, and this not by conquest, but by formal surrender (*FGrH* 154 F-3). Consequently, Arrian, *Anabasis*, 2. 4. 2 (cf. 5. 25. 4), "Alexander conquered all the territory on this side of the Halys River and much beyond it," cannot be relied on (Bosworth 1980: 189). According to Strabo (12. 1. 4) the Macedonians let the northern part of Cappadocia become a kingdom. In any case, after the events following Issus, Ariarathes was clearly in charge of all of Cappadocia. Moreover, Diodorus 18. 16. 1, states that Ariarathes "never took orders from the Macedonians."

41 Alexander died on June 11 (Depuydt 1997: 117–35); the dispute between the infantry and the cavalry had taken 7 days (Curt. 10. 10. 9). Eumenes and Leonnatus probably did not begin their journey west much before July. The journey to Hellespontine Phrygia from Babylon would have taken approximately 90 days. Xenophon's (*Anab.* 1. 2. 20–7. 1) itinerary for Cyrus' army shows that Cyrus took 90 days to cover the distance from Babylon to Cappadocia. The twenty days spent by Cyrus in Tarsus were excessive (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 1), but the other halts were only for "necessary purposes" (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 5. 9). Fifty-three days were spent in actual travel. Given the heat of July and August in Iraq the journey

journeyed from Babylon to Hellespontine Phrygia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5). A large force of mercenaries and Asian troops were sent with the two commanders (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4).⁴² Perdikkas had already dispatched Pithon and 3800 Macedonians to the east (Diod. 18. 7. 3), thus further reducing his forces. Leonnatus and Eumenes had received 5000 talents from Perdikkas for the Cappadocian campaign (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11).⁴³ Perdikkas was not about to apportion out Alexander's grand army, his key to power. To the new satraps Perdikkas provided contingents of mercenaries and foreign troops, along with money with which to hire additional forces from the large numbers left in the wake of the collapse of the Persian Empire. Ptolemy put together an army of mercenaries (Diod. 18. 14. 1), and Eumenes later was able to enlist 12000 mercenaries (Diod. 18. 61. 5). G.T. Griffith (1975: 39) estimates that 100000 mercenaries had seen service with Alexander alone.

Pithon's campaign⁴⁴ in the east against Greek rebels offers a number of insights into the proposed campaign of Eumenes and Leonnatus. In the Upper Satrapies, those east of Babylonia, large numbers of former Greek mercenaries living in various garrisons and in Alexander's new cities, with the news that the Macedonian king was now dead, organized themselves for a march back to Greece (Diod. 18. 7. 1). This revolt had its origins in an earlier rebellion in 326/325 (Curt. 9. 7. 1–11; Diod. 17. 99. 5–6). Then, sparked by a false report of Alexander's death (Diod. 17. 99. 5) and also fueled by the desire to return to Greece (Curt 9. 7. 3; Diod. 17. 99. 5), 3000 Greek colonists marched out of Asia

probably was not accomplished rapidly. Leonnatus and Eumenes would have arrived in Hellespontine Phrygia probably in late September or early October by this reckoning. It is also possible, again because of the heat, that Eumenes proceeded north across the Tigris, following the route Alexander had taken to Babylon (see Engels 1978: 68–70), which would have added over 200 miles to the journey.

42 Briant (1975A: 166–7) argues that this was a force of Macedonians, but this is unlikely given the small number of Macedonian troops in Babylon at this time. The actual number of Macedonians in the grand army was relatively small, according to Curtius (10. 2. 8), of the Macedonians only 2000 cavalry and 13000 infantry remained. Certain modern historians suggest even less. Hammond estimates the number at less than 10000 (1980: 245), and Bosworth (1988: 267) suggests maybe as few as 8000. Mercenaries (see Griffith 1975: 39) and Asiatic troops, however, there were in abundance.

43 Eumenes later fled back to Perdikkas with 5000 talents (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11). While it is nowhere stated where the money came from, it is reasonable to assume that it came from Perdikkas. It is also unknown if the 5000 was the entire treasury given for the expedition or only what Eumenes was able to extricate and return.

44 On this whole episode, see Schober 1981: 28–37; Holt 1988: 81–5; Chapter 8.

and did eventually return home to Greece (Curt. 9. 7. 11). For Pithon's expedition, a Macedonian force of 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry was deployed, but the bulk of the army, 10000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, was to be supplied by the satraps in the area (Diod. 18. 7. 3), and the Macedonian troops were to return to the grand army after the suppression of the revolt (Diod. 18. 7. 9). This army was to be made up predominantly of Greek mercenaries and Asian troops, with the Macedonians only on loan for this expedition. There is no indication that the troops with Leonnatus and Eumenes were to be restored to Perdiccas. They, consequently, were not Macedonians.

It is curious that Leonnatus and Antigonus were "to accompany Eumenes with a great army" (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4). This would suggest that Perdiccas either did not put much faith in Eumenes' ability to conduct a major campaign, or simply that he had more confidence in Leonnatus and Antigonus. Even with the hints regarding Eumenes' possible involvement in cavalry combat, our sources are silent with respect to any overall command especially including large numbers of infantry soldiers. Given that Perdiccas later placed Eumenes in overall command of all forces in Asia Minor in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1), something certainly changed in those three short years.

On the analogy of Pithon's campaign, Antigonus' proposed contribution for the Cappadocian campaign was to be considerable. Against Eumenes at Gabene, Antigonus deployed 1000 Phrygian and Lydian cavalry, and 3000 Lycian and Pamphylian infantry (Diod. 19. 29. 2–3); these would have been the best of the forces from these regions, not the sum total of the region's available manpower, since in the winter 316/315, Antigonus was not just the satrap of Phrygia, but one of the major contenders for power and possessed of the largest Macedonian force fighting in Asia. In 323, it is unknown how many native troops he could have raised, or how many mercenary forces were also in his employ. While most of the troops probably were to come west with Leonnatus, Antigonus was still to supply a significant part of the force. He had been for more than ten years in possession of his satrapy and its resources.⁴⁵ In 318, Arrhidaeus, not the king, but the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, raised 10000 mercenaries (Diod. 18.51.1). With the 5000 talents, literally tens of thousands of mercenaries could be employed for a year or more.

Lysimachus faced circumstances similar to those confronting Eumenes and Leonnatus. His assigned satrapy, Thrace, was occupied by a hostile and powerful opponent (Diod. 18. 14. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 10; cf. Diod. 18. 3. 2). Yet, Lysimachus successfully invaded Thrace with but 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry against a

45 For Phrygia's resources, see Briant 1975: 60, 78–84.

force of 20000 infantry and 8000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 14. 2–3; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 10).⁴⁶ While the status of his forces is nowhere articulated, it is likely that they were mercenaries. Perdiccas probably did not realize the extent of the resistance that Seuthes, the Thracian tribal leader would be able to mount. He, however, must have known about the strength of Ariarathes, since he sent along the 5000 talents to support “a substantial army.”

Eumenes and Leonnatus left Babylon probably with less than ten thousand troops, with the intention of hiring many more. Very quickly the proposed Cappadocian campaign fell apart. Antigonos failed to provide assistance. The exact reasons for this refusal can only be surmised. Antigonos may not have accepted the decisions in Babylon as binding (Billows 1990: 57); he may not have wished to help establish a potential rival in Asia Minor, or he may have believed that Ariarathes’ power had been seriously underestimated. Ariarathes in 322 was able to field an army of 30000 infantry and 15000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 16. 2), and in the final analysis it would take Perdiccas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 11). Perdiccas had assumed that Antigonos would have no choice but to participate. After all, even though Perdiccas was responsible for the order, the formal command came from King Philip.⁴⁷

In spite of Antigonos’ nonappearance, Eumenes and Leonnatus prepared to invade Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5–6). They certainly had sufficient funds to hire many more mercenaries (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11). These preparations then proceeded through the autumn and into the winter months. But before the campaign could commence, Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia and Eumenes’ hereditary enemy, arrived and requested that Leonnatus come to Greece to relieve the siege of Lamia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6). The news of Alexander’s death had sparked this great revolt against Macedonian hegemony, known either as the Hellenic War or the Lamian War. The opposing forces met in Thessaly with the Greek coalition defeating Antipater and his Macedonians. To escape complete defeat and possible annihilation, Antipater and the remainder of his army fled into the city of Lamia where they remained under siege in the winter of 323/322 (Diod. 18. 9. 1–4, 12. 1). Since there were rumblings of Greek

46 While Lysimachus eventually defeated the Thracian leader Seuthes, the initial battle was a draw (Diod. 18. 14. 4). Lysimachus did force Seuthes into a dependent alliance (cf. Diod. 19. 73. 8).

47 Briant (1975: 150) believes that Antigonos refused to follow Perdiccas’ order, because he would be “humiliated,” if he subordinated himself to Eumenes. There is, however, no indication that either Leonnatus or Antigonos were in any way to be under Eumenes’ authority. Indeed, the reverse is more plausible. As noted, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 4) gives the impression that the army would be commanded by Antigonos and Leonnatus.

dissatisfaction at least a year before the outbreak of hostilities (Ashton 1983: 47–56), Antipater had attempted to secure aid from those Macedonian commanders in the East, including Leonnatus, offering to cement an alliance by marrying Leonnatus to one of his many daughters (Diod. 18. 12. 1). Apparently, Leonnatus had ignored the first invitation for he had every intention initially of aiding Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4–6). It was only with the second request that he responded. While Diodorus (18. 14. 4–5) suggests that it was the magnitude of the emergency that determined this action, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 9) makes it clear that this change in Leonnatus' attitude had little to do with loyalty to Antipater. At some time after his rendezvous with Eumenes, Leonnatus had received letters from Alexander's sister Cleopatra proposing that he cross to Macedonia, marry her, and seize the throne. Alexander's mother Olympias was likely behind this proposal; she was no supporter of Antipater (Diod. 17. 118. 1) and was close to her daughter (Carney 2006: 28–9).

At this point, it is interesting to note the vicissitudes in Leonnatus' career. Indeed, it is surprising that Diodorus with his fascination for the vagaries of fortune did not pounce on this great example. Of all those who must have had high hopes at the beginning of the troubles in Babylon, Leonnatus, the now former *somaphylax*, must have been the most disappointed by the ultimate outcome. He had been part of one suggested solution to the regency issue. Pithon had proposed that Leonnatus and Perdiccas be "*tutores*," or regents, for Roxane's unborn child (Curt. 10. 7. 8–9; cf. Just. 13. 13–14). Curtius (10. 7. 20) states that during the mutiny the leaders of the cavalry were Perdiccas and Leonnatus (Curt. 10.8.1–2, 6). However, in the settlement following the army's reconciliation, Leonnatus did not emerge as a major figure, but rather as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 5. 16), and even this prize had been diminished. While Alexander lived Paphlagonia was attached to Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 2; Curt. 3. 1. 22–24; 4. 5. 13), the former territory now had been awarded along with Cappadocia to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 3. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3). Intrinsically Hellespontine Phrygia was of great strategic importance, controlling as it did the Asian side of the strait, but much of this significance had been negated by the peaceful relations then in existence between Antipater, Lysimachus, and Perdiccas. In the early summer of 323, Antipater was firmly in control of Macedonia; soon Lysimachus would be in place in nearby Thrace. Craterus with 10000 veterans and an acknowledged right to interfere in Macedonian affairs was already in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7).

While Leonnatus had not responded to Antipater's earlier call for assistance, the new circumstances—Antipater trapped in Lamia and the offer from Cleopatra—made him decide to cross to Europe and lay claim to Macedonia.

Antigonus' failure to aid in the conquest of Cappadocia may also have helped Leonnatus in reaching this decision. Leonnatus asked Eumenes to join him and even tried to reconcile the latter with Hecataeus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6). Eumenes replied that he had long been the enemy of Antipater and that he feared that Macedonian leader would kill him. It was at this point that Leonnatus informed Eumenes of the correspondence from Cleopatra and of his plans to seize the Macedonian throne (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 7–8). Eumenes, however, was not willing to abandon his standing with Perdiccas for a mad and dangerous dash to Macedonia. To avoid difficulties, Eumenes delayed his reply to Leonnatus' offer and surreptitiously with his men and equipment returned to Babylon (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 10–11). According to Nepos (*Eum.* 2. 4–5), Eumenes formally refused Leonnatus' request and subsequently the latter made an attempt on his life, an attempt which would have succeeded had Eumenes not eluded his guards and escaped. The likelihood is that Eumenes returned to Babylon without incident. To bring Nepos' account of the attempted assassination into agreement with Plutarch's narrative of Eumenes' departure for Babylon would require that Eumenes, 300 horsemen, 200 infantry, and 5000 talents of treasure, all escape from some form of house arrest and evade pursuit. Most likely the reality of the situation was that Eumenes felt threatened and left. Somewhere in the transmission of the material the implied threat became for some writer, perhaps Duris, an actual attempt on Eumenes' life.

Eumenes returned to Babylon early in 322, with Leonnatus crossing to Europe in March/April of that year. Leonnatus' crossing was preceded by a Macedonian naval victory over the Athenian navy near Abydos during the winter of 323/22 (Walek 1924: 28; Ashton 1977: 7 n. 52; Heckel 1992: 373–7). In Macedonia, Leonnatus spent some time in recruitment (Diod. 18. 14. 5), and in the late spring raised the siege of Lamia, but died on the battlefield (Diod. 18. 15. 1).

Once in Babylon, Eumenes informed Perdiccas of Leonnatus' plans; Perdiccas already knew of Antigonus' refusal to provide assistance. With his trust in Eumenes confirmed, the would-be satrap became a member of Perdiccas' ruling council (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12). Perdiccas now knew that the accomplishment of his goals in Asia Minor would require his presence and that of the royal army. Therefore, late in the spring, Perdiccas with the army left Babylon for Asia Minor (Diod. 18. 16. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 11; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12; App. *Mith.* 2. 2; Just. 13. 6. 1).⁴⁸ In Cappadocia, Ariarathes waited with 30000 infantry and

48 This campaign took place in 322. Diodorus (18. 16. 4) states that Perdiccas' invasion of Cappadocia and Craterus' crossing to Europe, which occurred before the battle of Crannon (cf. Diod. 18. 16. 4–17. 8; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1), were roughly contemporaneous. The

15000 cavalry; many of these troops were mercenaries (Diod. 18. 16. 2), perhaps Greeks who had served Darius and who had escaped from the defeat at Issus and staged the unsuccessful counterattack on Asia Minor (cf. Curt. 4. 1. 34–35). The presence of these mercenaries would have added to the difficulty of the task, and it took two battles before the Cappadocian king was defeated by the royal army (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 11).⁴⁹ Ariarathes was captured and along with numbers of his relatives, tortured, and executed (Diod. 18. 16. 3; App. *Mith.* 2. 8).⁵⁰ After the victory, Neoptolemus was dispatched with part of the grand army to pursue the escaping Cappadocians and to put down disturbances in western Armenia (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1).

While Perdiccas and Eumenes were enroute to Cappadocia, Craterus crossed to Europe (Diod. 18. 16. 4). Antipater had requested his assistance along with that of Leonnatus as soon as he had heard of Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 12. 1). Like Leonnatus, Craterus had not responded immediately. One of the curious aspects of Craterus' presence in Cilicia was that he should not have been there in 323. Alexander had sent him west with the discharged soldiers in 324 to replace Antipater (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1; Diod. 17. 109. 2; 18. 4. 1). There is no notice that Alexander was vexed by this delay, and, consequently, it is likely he had approved it. Cleitus, the Macedonian Aegean fleet commander, had accompanied Craterus from Babylon (Just. 12. 12. 8), and with unrest building in Greece, Alexander may have delayed Craterus' departure until a fleet could be mobilized in case the unrest became a revolt. The delay in responding to Antipater's request for assistance was simply the effect of waiting for a clearer picture of events both in Babylon and in Greece to emerge. Moreover, the distance between Cilicia and the Hellespont (approximately 800–900 miles depending on route, or a 50–60-day march), and the time needed for preparation (securing Cilicia and the Hellespont), would have delayed the

battle of Crannon, which brought the Lamian War to an end, took place on 7 *Metageitnion* or the end of July/early August (Schober 1981: 54, 66–8), not August/September (as Smith 1961: 285 n. 8, 286 n. 9). Leaving in April/May. Assuming that Perdiccas' journey from Babylon to the west took, approximately three months, the regent probably arrived in Cappadocia in time to take advantage of the harvest which occurred there in late July and August (Engels 1978: 37). His rate of travel was slowed by the presence of elephants to between nine and twelve miles per day (*Ibid.* 155; Proctor 1971: 34). That elephants were present is not definite, but they were part of Alexander's army and are found later with Perdiccas in Egypt (Diod. 18. 35. 1, 4), making their presence on the regent's march to Cappadocia likely.

49 While Diodorus 18. 16. 2 suggests that only one battle took place, Diodorus' abbreviation has compressed two battles into one.

50 Photius (*Bibl.* 382–388B=Diod. 31. 19. 4) states that Ariarathes fell in battle.

departure. With Alexander's death and the Babylonian settlement occurring in June, the full knowledge of these events would not have arrived in Cilicia before the beginning of July at the earliest. The famous Persian dispatch riders, if the system described by Herodotus (8. 98) was still in operation, would have taken at least ten days to travel from Babylon to Cilicia (Casson 1994: 53). Craterus' departure from Cilicia under the best of circumstances would have been delayed until the following spring. While a Macedonian naval victory in the Hellespont that winter (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9) had facilitated Leonnatus' crossing, the Athenian navy still remained a formidable power (cf. Diod. 18. 15. 8).⁵¹ Leaving an adequate force behind to guard the royal treasury there in Cilicia, Craterus proceeded along the coast towards the Hellespont with 6000 Macedonian veterans, 4000 mercenaries, 1000 Persian bowmen and slingers, and 1500 cavalry (Diod. 18. 16. 4). He crossed to Europe in the late spring of 322. With Craterus' arrival, the balance in Europe was quickly altered. Craterus willingly placed himself under Antipater's command (Diod. 18. 16. 4–5). This united force overwhelmed the opposing Greeks, with the decisive land battle fought at Crannon in July/August of 322 (Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1) and Athens receiving a Macedonian garrison in early October (Plut. *Phoc.* 28. 2; *Dem.* 28. 1).

Back in Asia, after Cappadocia was subjugated, Eumenes appointed his friends to positions of authority, as judges, garrison commanders and administrators (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14). The administration of the satrapies under the Successors continued many of the practices of Persian administration which had likewise been followed in the main by Alexander (Olmstead 1948: 498; Briant 1972B: 44–5; 2002: 66–7). However, Alexander's administrative policy was eclectic. He was primarily interested in what was expedient so he could move quickly to the next conquest. The evidence, sparse as it is, suggests that the Conqueror did not form one or even a couple uniform patterns to deal with his conquests, but rather dealt with each new situation in whatever way appeared to him to be appropriate at the time and in the given situation (Anson 2013A: 141–4, 147–8). He was, however, with respect to critical areas where there resided the necessary sources of wealth and manpower to foster rebellion, given to dividing up responsibilities among a number of officials. This was a practice also of Persian administration, although Alexander made far greater use of it (Anson 2013A: 142–3). Such an example of this policy is seen in the case of Lydia. Alexander assigned the satrapy to Asander, while Pausanias was left in charge of the citadel of Sardis with a garrison, and Nicias was to supervise the finances and the collection of tribute (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 17. 7–8). In other

51 Peter Green (1990: 11) suggests that Craterus delayed until he was certain of the security of his crossing.

areas of his empire, however, satraps or dependent local rulers were given broad authority. Antigonos in Phrygia is not recorded as having any divisions in his authority (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 17. 1–2, 2. 4. 1; Curt. 4. 5. 13), nor did the Indian prince Poros, who retained his kingdom without a Macedonian presence (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 19. 2–3). Alexander with great frequency separated garrison command and control of state treasuries from the local satrap. In Persia, for example, Persepolis was garrisoned by Nicarchides with 3000 men (Curt. 5. 6. 11) and Susa and its citadel were separately assigned (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9; Curt. 5. 2. 16). In Caria, Ptolemaeus was in charge of Halicarnassus with a garrison of 3200 (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 23. 6), and in Bactria, Nicanor had charge of the city of Alexandria and a large number of “unfit soldiers” (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 22. 5), while Amyntas was satrap with a force of 13500 troops. In Babylonia, Mazaeus was appointed satrap, but Apollodorus was general, Asclepiodorus collected the taxes (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 4–5), and Agathon with 1000 troops commanded one of the Babylonian citadels (Curt. 5. 1. 43). It is clear that Perdikkas most often retained these separate jurisdictions established by Alexander. Xenophilus was appointed commander of the citadel of Susa by Alexander (Curt. 5. 2. 16), and he was still in command of that fortress in 316 (Diod. 19. 17. 3). While Perdikkas may have had little choice, the practice of separate authorities certainly would work to the central government’s advantage. These individuals would be answerable to the regent and not to the local satrap, making them a virtual fifth column. Perdikkas tried to establish such a situation in Egypt by appointing Cleomenes as Ptolemy’s second-in-command (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5). Pausanias (1. 6. 3) mentions that Cleomenes was Perdikkas’ “friend.” If Perdikkas had wished, he would have created a similar division of authority in Cappadocia. After all, the province had just been conquered by his army; he was in a position to work his will in Cappadocia. The fact that Eumenes was given such broad discretionary powers was a measure of Perdikkas’ confidence in Eumenes’ loyalty to him personally.

In one short year, Eumenes had reversed the apparent eclipse he had suffered with Alexander’s death; he was satrap of a large and powerful province, but more importantly he was the trusted confidant of the seeming true heir to Alexander’s empire.

From Cappadocia to Triparadeisus

The invasion of Cappadocia took place in the summer of 322. Eumenes, with Perdiccas and the royal army present, then proceeded to organize his satrapy (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14). The two victories over Ariarathes (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 11) and the reorganization of Cappadocia would have taken time. The difficulty of the pacification is emphasized by the need to send Neoptolemus to western Armenia partially in pursuit of remnants of Ariarathes' army. Moreover, Armenia controlled the main lines of communication, including the Royal Road, the great Persian highway connecting Persepolis and Susa in the east to Sardis in Lydia (Cook 1983: 26, 108). Neoptolemus may have been assigned the area of western Armenia as a province in Babylon, an emended Dexippus (Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 6) would make Neoptolemus satrap of Armenia, but no other source supports the assignment, and it is more likely the commander's authority was that given him by Perdiccas to deal with the situation. Diodorus (18. 29. 2) in 320 calls Neoptolemus *hegemon*, not satrap, and Pierre Briant (1973A: 152–3 n. 8) is likely correct that Neoptolemus' official title in Armenia was that of *strategos*, general. Moreover, there is little doubt that the actual satrap of Armenia at this time was Orontes (see Anson 1990: 125–6). Alexander had initially assigned the area to Mithrenes in 331 (Curt. 5. 1. 44; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 5; Diod. 17. 64. 6), but it is possible that Mithrenes never took possession of the area, since after the notice of his appointment he disappears from the record. He may have died in his attempt to secure his position (Heckel 2006: 168). Indeed, it appears that at some point after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela, Orontes made his formal submission to Alexander, who later reassigned him to Armenia (Bosworth 1980: 315; Anson 1990: 125–6; Heckel 2006: 185). Western Armenia, however, may have remained outside of both Orontes' and Macedonian control and Neoptolemus may have been made general of this area (Anson 1990: 127).

It would likely have been fall before Perdiccas, accompanied by Eumenes, left Cappadocia for Cilicia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14–4. 1; Diod. 18. 22. 1).¹ The Cardian was now, in addition to being satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, one of Perdiccas' chief advisers (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12). While in Cilicia, Perdiccas secured the allegiance of Alexander's former infantry guard, the 3000 hypaspists, who became known as the argyraspids after covering their shields with silver while

1 For an explanation of the chronology, see the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

campaigning in India under Alexander (Curt. 9. 3. 21; Diod. 17. 95. 4).² These troops had been separated by Alexander from the main force at Opis and sent west with Craterus in 324.³ When Craterus departed Cilicia to join Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 16. 4), he had left these troops behind to maintain order and to guard the treasury at Cyinda.⁴ Eumenes did not long remain with Perdiccas; he was soon ordered by the regent to return to Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1).

Eumenes' return to his satrapy was due primarily to troubles arising in Armenia. As seen, Neoptolemus had been sent to western Armenia with a sizable force by Perdiccas, including many Macedonians, but was having difficulties achieving his objectives (Plut. *Eum.* 4; cf. Diod. 18. 29. 4). While the sources do not make clear the exact reason for the campaign, the most likely explanation is that it was to pursue the remnants of Ariarathes' defeated forces which had fled eastward to Armenia (Diod. 31. 19. 5; cf. Diod. 18. 16. 2–3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12–13; Just. 13. 6. 1–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 12). Even though Diodorus emphasizes the meager numbers of the survivors, Ariarathes' descendants were able to maintain their independence in Armenia well into the next century (Diod. 31. 19. 5). Additionally, it is possible that residual Persian forces loyal to the memory of Darius were resident in the same location. Prior to becoming King of Persia, Darius had been satrap of Armenia (Just. 10. 3. 4), which, given the noted hereditary control of Greater Armenia by Orontes' family, the Hydarnids, doubtless

2 For the identification of the hypaspists and the argyraspids, see Spendel 1915: 45; Tarn 1948: 151–2; Anson 1981: 117–20; 1988B: 131–3; Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 177).

3 While it is not definitely stated that the hypaspists were included in the 10000, Antigenes, the commander of Alexander's hypaspists, left Opis with Craterus (Just. 12. 12. 8; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4) and later in Egypt is found in command of the argyraspids. Moreover, since Alexander was discharging older veterans (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1) and many of the hypaspists had been with him since the initial invasion, it appears certain that the hypaspists accompanied Antigenes west (On the career of the argyraspids prior to their association with Perdiccas, see Heckel 1982: 60–2; 2006: 30 [#1a]).

4 Heckel (1982: 60–2) argues convincingly that the hypaspists remained in Cilicia and later joined Perdiccas. Craterus, while leaving Opis with 10000 veterans, left Cilicia with only 6000 (Diod. 18. 16. 4). Heckel's claim, however, that these troops joined the regent just prior to his invasion of Egypt in 320 (1982: 62; 2006: 30) is doubtful. It is more likely that they would have joined Perdiccas on his first entry into Cilicia. They were the royal guards and the kings were with Perdiccas. What is interesting is that Craterus chose not to bring the argyraspids with him to Macedonia. Surely the most experienced and best trained unit in Asia would have been useful in aiding Antipater against the rebellious Greeks. Perhaps, they were already exhibiting the independence that was later to characterize them, and Craterus decided to leave this particular problem behind. It is also very possible that, despite claims to the contrary, these troops did not wish to leave Asia.

refers to the western area of that region. Western Armenia had been a separate area of jurisdiction (a hyparchy) during the reign of Artaxerxes II (Xen. *Anab.* 4. 4. 4; Jacobs 1994: 183–4, n. 57); the division may even date from the reign of Darius I (Cook 1983: 82; Briant 2002: 117–19). During the Roman Empire, Armenia was divided into Lesser (western) and Greater Armenia (Str. 11. 12. 3–4; 14. 1,5; Joseph. *AJ* 2. 252), with Lesser Armenia typically in the possession of various warlords (Str. 12. 3. 28). Orontes' family appears to have held Greater Armenia virtually as a hereditary fief (Cook 1983: 170–1). Further suggesting that there may have been two Armenian jurisdictions, Curtius (Curt. 4. 12. 10, 12; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 8. 5) notes that there were two contingents of Armenians serving the Persians at the battle of Gaugamela, “Armenians called Minors” and the “the nation of Armenia Major.” Whatever the source of the problems in western Armenia, Neoptolemus' assigned task was a formidable one. In general, campaigning in Armenia could be brutal (Xen. *Anab.* 4. 3–5; Plut. *Luc.* 32; Tac. *Ann.* 13. 35. 5–6), especially for an army deficient in cavalry. “The Ten Thousand” in 400 BC had experienced difficulties with the Armenian cavalry (Xen. *Anab.* 4. 3. 3, 17, 20–21). Armenia had long been known for its fine horses and had supplied the Persians with 20000 foals each year (Str. 11. 13. 7, 14. 9; Xen. *Anab.* 4. 5. 24, 35–6). Neoptolemus' force, while replete with Macedonian phalangites, was deficient of cavalry (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4). It is also apparent that Orontes, the satrap of Greater Armenia, provided no material aid to Neoptolemus whatsoever. Indeed, Orontes later maintained a remarkable neutrality in the wars that were soon to arise between Alexander's former commanders (Berve 1973: 2:295 [#593]; Heckel 2006: 185).

Eumenes' assigned task in Armenia was to restore order in the ranks of the Macedonian forces. According to Plutarch, the soldiers had become “arrogant and insolent” (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3),⁵ and their commander Neoptolemus had ceased to carry out directives from the regent (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1–2). The exact nature of the “confusion” that Neoptolemus had caused is unknown, but given the inherently difficult nature of the campaign, Plutarch's statements could easily indicate that the troops had balked at further fighting and their commander had proven powerless to persuade them to continue. Clearly this was not a case of Neoptolemus' insubordination. Perdicas did not remove him from Armenia and, indeed, later even put a degree of trust in him (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 2), but this

5 Briant (1972: 58–9) believes that the troubles were with Eumenes' Macedonians. While the exact reference (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 2) is unclear, later in 320, Neoptolemus had under his command “a considerable number of Macedonians” (Diod. 18. 29. 4). These would likely be the very same troops responsible for the problems in Armenia. See Bosworth 1978: 233 n. 26.

Armenian situation did lead the regent subsequently to limit Neoptolemus' authority. He had proven ineffective as a leader.

At first, Eumenes made little headway with either the troops or their commander (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3). Roisman (2012: 121) suggests that the Macedonians did not follow Eumenes' lead initially because they remained loyal to their commander Neoptolemus, but this is unlikely. Eumenes was there because they were apparently already insolent and disobedient (see above). They had not followed the orders of Neoptolemus and they continued this behavior until Eumenes changed the game by creating a substantial cavalry force. Eumenes raised a force of 6300 Cappadocian cavalry through the use of outright gifts and the promise of immunity from taxation (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4). Even though the Cappadocian unit was created as an “opposing force” to the Macedonian infantry, the context makes this more of a counterpoise to them. There is also no evidence that the Macedonians resented Eumenes' cavalry force. “Amazed” and “emboldened” is hardly resentment. Neoptolemus' insolence resulted from his failure and the appearance of the Greek Eumenes to sort things out. For a Macedonian aristocrat this must have been especially galling; indeed, it may even have been during this operation that Neoptolemus uttered the statement, found in Plutarch (*Eum.* 1. 6), belittling Eumenes' position as secretary under Alexander.

Eumenes' concessions to the Cappadocians and his confidence in their military ability secured him a very loyal province. At the time of his death, even though Eumenes had not been in the area for almost three years, his mother, wife, and children were still resident in Cappadocia (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 4). The loyalty of the native populations to those of Alexander's Successors who treated them with favor could be great, as was the case with the Pisidians and Alceas (Diod. 18. 46. 2–47. 3). Accommodating local elites was a policy followed by Alexander the Great himself to great effect (see Briant 2002: 852, 869–70; Anson 2013A: 151–2). Regarding the ability of the Cappadocians, Darius had used Cappadocian cavalry against Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 8. 5, 11. 7; Curt. 4. 12. 12), and Ariarathes had possessed 15000 cavalry in 322 (Diod. 18. 16. 2). The addition of Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry rekindled the Macedonians' enthusiasm for the campaign (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 4). While there is no further word of difficulties in Armenia and Perdicas left Neoptolemus in command (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2), it seems apparent that Eumenes was intermittently involved in Armenia perhaps until 320, campaigning in 322 and 321.⁶ It is also

6 Eumenes' campaigning in Armenia, although not attested in the sources seems probable (see Bosworth 1978: 233). Eumenes had recruited the Cappadocian cavalry force (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4), and it is unlikely that he would have turned this force over to Neoptolemus. In 320,

likely that Eumenes spent at least part of his time with Perdiccas. He was by 321 one of Perdiccas' chief advisers (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21).

In Cilicia, Perdiccas and the royal army spent the winter of 322/321.⁷ While in winter quarters, Perdiccas and his advisers began to make plans for the coming year. At this time, Perdiccas' intentions were to secure unquestioned control of Asia Minor and maintain peaceful relations with Antipater in Macedonia and Ptolemy in Egypt. Neoptolemus and Eumenes were campaigning in Armenia; the regent's presence in Cilicia gave him access to the royal treasury and a prosperous land in which to refresh his troops (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 22). While Perdiccas certainly wished to achieve greater cohesion in the empire, there is no evidence that at this time he contemplated challenging Ptolemy in Egypt or Antipater in Europe. Indeed, Perdiccas demonstrated no apparent interest in the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. If he were expecting to invade Macedonia or to be attacked from Europe, he would have paid closer attention to this province. Since the departure of Leonnatus for Macedonia, there had not been a satrap in this region. In fact, one wonders if Perdiccas was that interested in Asia Minor before the collapse of the Antigonus-Leonnatus-Eumenes campaign. It was the failure of the two Macedonian commanders to aid Eumenes that forced the regent to come west. Would he have come to Asia Minor anyway only later, probably, but then we will never know. After all he did not go east to deal with the rebellious Greeks, but sent a subordinate.

Perdiccas, as part of his general operations in Asia Minor, in the spring of 321 moved into Pisidia for a campaign against two recalcitrant cities, those of the Larandians and of the Isaurians (Diod. 18. 22. 1). These peoples had murdered the Cilician satrap Balacrus sometime late in Alexander's reign (Diod. 18. 22. 1; cf.

while later battling Eumenes, it is clear that Neoptolemus lost primarily because of his great deficiency in cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3; *PSI* XII 1284). He clearly did not have 6300 Cappadocian horsemen in 320.

7 No source gives any indication of the ending of 322; there is no reference to seasonal changes, nor to the army retiring into camp (see the appendix at the end of this chapter). With respect to the location of Perdiccas' winter quarters there are two possibilities. According to Diodorus (18. 22. 1), Perdiccas departed for Pisidia, where he subsequently laid siege to the cities of the Larandians and the Isaurians. Prior to this campaign Eumenes was sent back to Cappadocia from Cilicia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1). These passages suggest that Perdiccas either continued on to Pisidia and entered winter quarters there, or wintered in Cilicia. The latter appears to be the most likely. Perdiccas clearly had entered Cilicia and with this area only having been recently abandoned by Craterus it was certainly in Perdiccas' interest to ensure the loyalty of the forces left there. Spending the winter would have given him the opportunity to accomplish this goal. Diodorus has collapsed events, omitting the wintering in Cilicia. In fact, Diodorus leaves out all mention of Cilicia, including the acquisition of hypaspists/argyraspids.

Arr. *Anab.* 2. 12. 2; Heckel 1992: 260–1; 2006: 69 [#2]).⁸ Both cities fell after short and brutal campaigns (Diod. 18. 22.2–7).⁹ Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother, was made general or satrap of the region (cf. Diod. 18.44.1). With their capture, Perdiccas and his forces settled in Pisidia and took up the question of Antigonus. The latter had shown a reluctance to follow the regent's lead, and it was decided to deal harshly with him for his refusal to aid Eumenes. Even though the actual charges are never specified, Diodorus (18. 23. 4) only states that the charges were "false and unjust," and Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 20) gives no specifics or characterizations, and these allegations do come approximately a year and a half after the event, still Antigonus' only known offense was his lack of response to the call to help Eumenes (Briant 1973A: 155–6).¹⁰ The Phrygian satrap was summoned to answer charges formally before the king and his council (Diod. 18. 23. 4). The invitation was issued probably in the late spring of 321 (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 20; Diod. 18. 23. 3).¹¹ Perdiccas' purpose was to force Antigonus to flee, since Antigonus would be difficult to move against militarily. Antigonus had established a powerful base in Phrygia, having been left in charge of the region in 333. His domains had covered roughly two-thirds of Macedonian-held Asia Minor

8 On the campaign against the Larandians and the Isaurians, see Diodorus 18. 22; for the previous history of Pisidia, see Jones 1983: 124–6. Bosworth (1974: 58–9; 1980: 219) believes Balacrus' death is to be dated much earlier to 332 during the Persian counterattack after Issus.

9 While most assume this campaign against the Pisidians occurred in the following spring (Schober 1981: 58; Billows 1990: 58), Bosworth argues that it occurred in the fall of 322 (1993: 427 n. 45). Nothing in the sources makes this impossible, but Perdiccas left Pisidia early in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6), having spent the winter of 322/321 in Cilicia. There is no apparent reason for him to have moved into Pisidia, if he had during the previous fall taken the two cities and subsequently moved back to Cilicia.

10 Fontana 1960: 328–9) claims that Antigonus was not charged with refusing to help Eumenes, but rather refusing to aid Antipater during the Lamian War. While a possibility, no source indicates that Antigonus was ever asked to send aid to Europe.

11 Diodorus (18. 23. 1–3) places the charges against Antigonus after Perdiccas' marriage to Antipater's daughter which must have occurred in the late spring. Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 20–1), however, places the call to answer charges before her arrival in Asia. Arrian is to be preferred. Diodorus in this same passage states that Perdiccas moved against Antigonus because the latter had become aware of the intriguing with Alexander's sister, Cleopatra. Clearly when Antigonus fled to Europe late in 321 he carried this knowledge with him (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26, cf. 25. 1–2), but then it is unlikely that Perdiccas would have waited on the Phrygian satrap's response. Billows (1990: 59 n. 16) is correct that Diodorus through his radical abridging has confused the initial call to Antigonus to answer charges with the later report to Antipater. The campaigns in Pisidia were of short duration (Diod. 18. 22. 2–4).

(Billows 1990: 46), and he had established ties with many of his Persian and native neighbors (Anson 1988A: 471–7). The insubordination of such a powerful individual threatened the entire Babylonian settlement and the new government, but the regent was obviously in no hurry; it had been, as noted, well over a year since Eumenes' abortive campaign. In the final analysis, Perdiccas hoped to accomplish his purpose without having to invade Phrygia. Not only would he have been more sanguine after the battles in Cappadocia about the strength of the remaining forces in Asia Minor, but attacking Antigonus would represent an internal struggle within the recognized administrative authority of the empire and an attack on a fellow Macedonian official, in short a civil war. Consequently, Antigonus was given time in which to respond (cf. Diod. 18. 23. 4). The regent's campaign in Pisidia must have alarmed Antigonus, since the main military road from the coast passed through Pisidia and continued to Celaenae. Moreover, Pisidia had been ostensibly under Antigonus' control (Billows 1990: 46, 237), and even though in the aftermath of the Battle of Issus the area had gained complete independence, it would have been another case of an area formerly under Antigonus' control that was given to another.

In the spring of 321, one of Antipater's daughters, Nicaea, accompanied by her brother Iolaos, arrived in Perdiccas' camp (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just 13. 6. 6). Perdiccas had requested her hand in marriage shortly after the settlement was reached in Babylon.¹² Antipater's preoccupation with the Lamian War had initially delayed his response to Perdiccas' request.¹³ As part of Antipater's strategy for the new era without Alexander, he wished to create alliances with various *principes* through marriages to his daughters.¹⁴ Eurydice

12 Errington (1970: 61–2) states that the purpose of Perdiccas' request for the marriage was to form an alliance against Craterus. While Errington is right to point out the possible threat that Craterus posed to the settlement and Perdiccas' authority, Craterus showed himself to be surprisingly accommodating to both the settlement reached in Babylon and the regent. When he departed Cilicia, he left the treasury intact and well-guarded, thus acting as a loyal subject of the new regime. Given these actions, there is no evidence that Craterus wished to challenge Perdiccas' overall authority (see Anson 2014B: 539–58).

13 There is no evidence for Errington's claim (1970: 60) that the delay resulted from Antipater's dissatisfaction with the settlement reached in Babylon. There were ample concerns to keep Antipater occupied until 321, nor is there any evidence of dissatisfaction. Antipater despite his assigned joint command with Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), should have been pleased. After all, Alexander had ordered Craterus to replace him in Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4).

14 Antipater had four daughters: Phila, Nicaea, Eurydice, and one whose name is unknown (see Heckel 1992: 39; 2006: 35).

married Ptolemy (Paus. 1. 6. 8),¹⁵ and Phila, Craterus, after the completion of the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 18. 7). Antipater and Craterus had returned to Macedonia late in the winter of 322/21, and had begun to make plans of their own. A full scale invasion against the last holdout of the Lamian War, Aetolia, was to begin in the spring (Diod. 18. 24.1–25. 2). Further, it was decided that Craterus would eventually return to Asia (Diod. 18. 18. 7). The marriage alliance would then be part of a charm offensive to secure Craterus a place in Asia. Nowhere is it made clear in what capacity Craterus was to be accommodated. Satraps were appointed by the authority of the king or his regent and were subject to reassignment, theoretically at any time. Consequently, there was no need to see Craterus' wish to return to Asia as a deliberate assault on the authority of Perdiccas. At this time, the two Macedonians appeared determined to reach a peaceful understanding with the regent (Errington 1970: 61–2). Craterus may even have hoped for some supervisory authority over Asia Minor. As seen, Perdiccas had moved west from Babylon because of the failure of Leonnatus and Antigonus to support Eumenes. Of course, given Perdiccas' current operations in Asia Minor, it is unlikely that Perdiccas would have welcomed the return of Craterus. What might have appeared reasonable in the abstract by this time may indeed have been perceived as a potential threat by Perdiccas (as Bosworth 1993: 427). However, officially Perdiccas was regent of the entire empire, and not a personal dynast establishing his own personally held territories. As remarked earlier, it was the failure of the Eumenes' initial campaign in Cappadocia that had forced Perdiccas to come to the West.

With respect to Antipater, from the time of the settlement in Babylon, he had been scrupulously correct in his dealings with the central government as represented by the kings and, in reality, their regent. Shortly after the surrender of Athens at the close of the Lamian War, Antipater had referred the question of Athenian possession of Samos to the kings (Diod. 18. 18. 6), i.e. to Perdiccas. The Samian exiles were subsequently restored and the island freed on "Perdiccas' order" (Diod. 18. 18. 9). Antipater had been, however, in communication with Ptolemy and these communications had led to an "understanding" (Diod. 18. 14. 2; cf. 18. 25. 4), and, likely, as noted, a marriage. The nature of the understanding is not made clear. Perdiccas, however, was clearly himself preparing for a time when relations with Antipater might sour, perhaps, resulting from his concern over Craterus' overtures. The regent was in contact with the Aetolians and in receipt of letters from the Athenian leader Demades which invited intervention in Europe. Diodorus 18. 38. 1 states that later at

15 There is no indication when this marriage took place, but most likely Eurydice was sent to Egypt about the same time Nicaea was sent to Asia.

the start of hostilities between Perdiccas and Antipater there was already in existence a pact between the Aetolians and Perdiccas, but neither he, nor any source indicates a date when these communications began. Errington (1970: 62–3) believes that negotiations were initiated in 322, and this is very possible. None of these communications did the regent make known to Antipater, who only found out about these after Perdiccas' death (Diod. 18. 48. 2). Why Perdiccas was communicating with these individuals who so clearly were hostile to Antipater is unknown. While Errington argues that Antipater became a threat to Perdiccas through his association with Craterus, given what was discussed earlier, this would appear unlikely. Perdiccas may have become concerned that Ptolemy and Antipater had formed some sort of understanding, which bypassed the overall authority of the regent, and Antigonus was in open disobedience. These circumstances may have begun the process of undermining whatever confidence the regent may have had in the continuation of the empire as officially constituted in Babylon.

Concurrent with Nicaea's arrival, Alexander's sister, Cleopatra, appeared offering herself in marriage to the regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just. 13. 6. 4). It is possible that Eumenes was responsible for Cleopatra's appearance at this time (Errington, 1970: 63). The instigation for the proposal likely came from Olympias (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; cf. Just. 13. 6. 4; Carney 2006: 66), and the former queen mother did have close ties with Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1; Diod. 18. 58. 2–3; Nepos *Eum.* 6).¹⁶ Moreover, after her arrival, it was Eumenes who championed her proposal (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21).

The presence of two potential marriage partners for the regent brought into the open a rift which had developed within the ranks of Perdiccas' councilors. Alcetas supported the marriage with Nicaea and thereby the alliance with Antipater; Eumenes advocated the union with Cleopatra and the creation of a marital bond with the royal family (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21). Given the long-standing enmity between Eumenes and Antipater, it was in Eumenes' interests to discourage an alliance between his new patron and Antipater. At the very least, an alliance between the general in Europe and the regent of the empire would diminish Eumenes' influence. Antipater was no danger to the kings as shown by his later actions; what Eumenes was working towards was certainly not in the interests of Philip III and probably not in those of Alexander IV's either. Michael Rathmann (2005: 32, 65) portrays Perdiccas as the protector of Alexander's family, which centered on the Conqueror's wife Roxane and his infant son, Alexander. The other king in this dual monarchy, Philip III, was

16 Justin (13.6.4) inaccurately implies that Perdiccas himself was responsible for Cleopatra's presence..

made king by the power of the army, not by the choice of his eventual regent and the *principes*, and represented a challenge to the family of Alexander (Rathmann 2005: 32). While this more tempered view of Perdiccas' ambition may in part be true, it was likely only the means to an end which would see Perdiccas on the throne of Macedonia (cf. Diod. 18. 58. 2): First, regent, then king and guardian of the future king Alexander's son, finally setting aside his young ward and becoming the founder of a new dynasty.¹⁷ Eumenes' support of the marriage then calls into serious question his loyalty certainly to one branch of the royal family, and likely to the other as well.

The council apparently was in agreement on the policies being implemented in Asia. There is no mention in the sources of any opposition to the Cappadocian or Pisidian campaigns, nor to the steps being taken to remove Antigonos from Phrygia. Other issues were, however, being discussed. Ptolemy was apparently the object of some unspecified hostile activity (Diod. 18. 25. 4; 14. 2). But factional lines were being drawn principally over the relationship to Alexander's old regent in Macedonia. One group, led by Alcetas, clearly saw a division between the European and non-European areas of the empire, at least, while Antipater lived. Outside of Europe, the regent's power was to be absolute, but in Europe he would recognize Antipater's authority. These advisers would have opposed the concealment from Antipater of the overtures from the Aetolians and the letters from Demades. They saw no need for the marriage alliance with Alexander's family. Perdiccas, they believed, had already secured the loyalty of the royal army through his successful campaigns in Cappadocia and Pisidia. Further, he controlled the persons of the kings and the royal treasuries, which contained over 200000 talents of gold and silver,¹⁸ or more than 11 million pounds, a talent being a unit of weight equivalent to approximately 57 pounds.

The other faction, that headed by Eumenes (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21), wished to make Perdiccas master of Alexander's entire empire; a marriage to Cleopatra would lay the groundwork for Perdiccas eventually to move from regent to king in his own right. The disagreement between the two groups was more about tactics than about actual goals. Alcetas likely also saw an eventual kingship for his brother, but he was willing to wait on events. Certainly one of these

17 In fact, this was the very scenario proclaimed by Meleager back in Babylon (Curt. 10. 6. 20–1).

18 The treasury at Pasargadae in Media contained 6000 talents (Curt. 5. 6. 9); that in Cyinda, perhaps 20000 (cf. Diod. 19. 56. 5); that in Susa, almost 50000 (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 7); that in Persepolis, initially 120000 (Curt. 5. 6. 9; Diod. 17. 71. 1). Additionally, there were similar resources in Babylon and Ecbatana.

events would have been the death of Antipater, who was already in his seventies (*Suda*. s.v. *Antipater*). It is curious that Eumenes and Alcetas were apparently the respective spokesmen for these two positions. There were associated with Perdiccas many commanders with more prominence, such as Seleucus, Antigones, and Pithon (Diod. 18. 36. 5). These commanders are omitted from our sources' accounts of the debate entirely. With respect to Eumenes, who unlike Alcetas was not the regent's brother, in particular, his role in this controversy may reflect Hieronymus' efforts to heighten Eumenes' importance, but, given the later actions of Seleucus, Antigones, and Pithon, Eumenes may in fact have been one of the few prominent leaders supporting the marriage to Cleopatra and the break with Antipater. This was certainly the more dangerous course of action, since it was bound to bring on a response from Antipater. While he had certainly shown no overt denial of the regent's authority, he was, as with all of Alexander's former *hetairoi*, an individual whose pride was not to be trifled with. The change in Eumenes' importance must be directly related to his campaigning in Armenia and his prominence in the eyes of the rank-and-file soldiers (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). These troops approved of Eumenes both for his former connection to the dead Alexander and for his redeeming of the Armenian situation.

To Eumenes and his faction the current monarchy was a farce. The reality was that as regent and commander of the majority of Alexander's former army, Perdiccas was the actual ruler in Asia. Marriage to Cleopatra would enhance his standing with these troops whose respect for the Argead family had made the slow-witted Arrhidaeus king. In any case, in Babylon the troops had shown themselves not at all adverse to the prospect of Perdiccas' kingship (Curt. 10. 6. 18). It was Perdiccas' hesitation to accept such a role that, in part, led to the call for the enthronement of Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 6. 16–19).¹⁹ These same troops subsequently expressed their indignation over Meleager's plot to kill Alexander's former chiliarch (Curt. 10. 8. 5). Of course, the problem now with any attempt to make Perdiccas king was that, unlike in Babylon, when Aristonous had made his proposal, there were currently kings raised to the throne by these very same troops. Moreover, these soldiers would remember Perdiccas' betrayal of the infantry leaders in Babylon (Curt. 10. 9. 7–21; Diod. 18. 4. 7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 4; Just. 13. 4. 8). Claiming the monarchy now would be an entirely different proposition from what it would have been in 323.

19 Perdiccas may already have had a familial connection to the royal family (Curt. 10. 7. 9). This passage, however, is ambiguous; "*stirpe regia genitos*" could refer either to the royal family of Macedonia, but more likely to the royal family of Orestes which only lost its independence in the reign of Philip II (Hammond and Griffith 1979:17–18).

For Eumenes, the risk appeared well worth it. In his view, while Perdiccas was preeminent in Asia, both Ptolemy and Antipater held significant parts of Alexander's empire in virtual independence. In Egypt, Ptolemy's power had increased rapidly after his arrival in his new satrapy. Ptolemy had found 8000 talents in the Egyptian treasury which he had used to hire mercenaries (Diod. 18. 14. 1). Besides the mercenaries, Ptolemy also inherited the 4000 troops and 30 triremes which Alexander had left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4. 8. 4; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 3–5). The satrap had subsequently murdered Cleomenes who had been appointed in Babylon as the former's second-in-command (Paus. 1. 6. 3),²⁰ annexed the North African Greek city of Cyrene without the consent of the kings or their regent (Diod. 18. 19–21; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 16–19),²¹ and may have already begun negotiations with the Cypriot kings (Just. 13. 6. 19; Briant 1973A: 183 n. 2). Additionally, even though no formal alliance between Ptolemy and Antipater was concluded until the winter of 321/320 (Diod. 18. 25. 4), they had corresponded earlier and some sort of understanding had been reached (Diod. 18. 14. 2; Rosen 1968: 182–210).²² These actions taken along with the possibility of Craterus' return to Asia, in the view of Eumenes and unnamed others, made conflict with Antipater and Ptolemy appear inevitable. For such a contest, Perdiccas would need every advantage, if he were to win. In an age when the names of Philip and Alexander were talismans, a marital connection to the Argead family would enhance the chances of, if not insure, Perdiccas' success. In this crisis, as in the one in Babylon, Perdiccas wavered. He apparently wished to marry Cleopatra and claim the kingship, but feared incurring

20 The exact date and circumstances of Cleomenes' death are unknown (see Seibert 1969: 112). All that can be said is that it occurred sometime after Ptolemy's arrival in Egypt and the new satrap was responsible.

21 The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239B F-10) places the acquisition in the archon year 322/21 (see the appendix at the end of this chapter). Seibert (1969: 110) does not see Ptolemy's actions in Cyrene as a cause for war. Ptolemy was given in Babylon both Egypt and Libya (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 34), but at that time Cyrene was an independent Greek city. Seibert also points out that the sources do not mention it as a cause, but the specific charges brought against Ptolemy by Perdiccas are not clearly stated. There are just references to unspecified transgressions (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 28). Diodorus (18. 29. 1; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 28), however, makes it clear that Perdiccas was alarmed by Ptolemy's "growing power," and the acquisition of Cyrene certainly was a demonstrable element in that growth.

22 It is certain that a formal alliance was quickly concluded after Perdiccas' hostile intent towards both parties became known. Some such arrangement was also made between Lysimachus and Antipater. Antipater and Craterus were apparently granted safe passage across Thrace on their way to Asia. No interference is noted and subsequently at Triparadeisus, Lysimachus was confirmed in his satrapy (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 45).

Antipater's wrath (Diod. 18. 23. 3; cf. Just. 13. 6. 4–5). He may have wanted to await more favorable circumstances, and in the interim forestall Antipater. He may even have hoped to wait for the death of the old general.

Errington has suggested that Perdiccas had determined to accompany Alexander's body, which was still in Babylon, to Aegae, the traditional burial ground for Macedonian kings, and with this psychological advantage then confront Antipater (Errington 1976: 142–3). It would appear that Errington has anticipated subsequent events. At this time there is no suggestion in the sources that Perdiccas planned to confront Antipater in Macedonia. As seen earlier, no concern had been shown with respect to Hellespontine Phrygia. Moreover, in the end, Perdiccas did marry Nicaea (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21, 26; Diod. 18. 23. 3).²³ Cleopatra, however, did not return to Europe but remained in Asia Minor, settling in Sardis (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26).

Eumenes' arguments for the immediate marriage to Cleopatra were strengthened by following events. Sometime after Perdiccas' union with Nicaea, Cynnane, a daughter of Philip II and Audata, and the widow of Amyntas Perdicca,²⁴ Philip II's nephew and Alexander's cousin, arrived in Asia demanding that her own daughter Adeia be married to King Philip (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 22; Polyæn. 8. 60; cf. Diod. 19. 52. 5). Cynnane had raised a troop of her own and had forced her way out of Macedonia despite Antipater's attempt to block her departure (Polyæn. 8. 60). Perdiccas sent Alcetas north to intercept her. When her determination proved unshakeable, Cynnane was murdered by Alcetas probably on Perdiccas' orders (Diod. 19. 52. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 22–23; Polyæn. 8. 60; Briant 1973A: 261). While it has been claimed that Perdiccas only wished that she be intimidated, not murdered (Errington 1970: 64), all indications are that Perdiccas did order her death. Soon after Alexander's death, in league with Roxane, Perdiccas had arranged the assassination of Stateira, Darius' daughter and Alexander's pregnant Persian wife, and also her sister Drypetis (Plut. *Alex.* 77. 6). Indeed, the murders, that of Cynnane, Stateira, and Drypetis, are strikingly similar. In the first, Perdiccas did not wish to risk his alliance with Roxane and thereby his control over her potential heir by the possible birth of a rival; in the second, he was unwilling to share his control of Philip. There was no obvious objection to the marriage between Adeia and Philip apart from Perdiccas' own interests. The result of the murder was a riot by the royal army which forced Perdiccas to agree to the marriage. Adeia now changed her name to Eurydice (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 23; Polyæn. 8. 60; Diod. 19. 52. 5). Waldemar Heckel

²³ Justin 13. 6. 6–7) inaccurately states that they were never married.

²⁴ As a potential rival for the throne, after Philip II's death Alexander had this son of Philip's brother, the ruler prior to Philip, killed (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 22; Polyæn. 8. 40).

(1978) has suggested that Eurydice was a royal name taken at the time of a royal marriage by the new bride (cf. Bosworth 1980b: 282; contra Badian 1982; Carney 2000: 33, 280–1 and n. 113). It certainly was a common name of Macedonian royal women. In the case of Adea, her name may have been Illyrian; changing it to that of the mother of Alexander the Great's father, Philip II, would have emphasized her Argead connection and also followed her husband's change of name from Arrhidaeus to Philip, with both thus associating themselves with the monarch who had initially brought Macedonia to prominence (Badian 1982: 101), and distinguishing them from the family of Alexander the Great.

The Cynnane episode was a major turning point for Perdiccas and his allies. It was now very clear to Perdiccas that his control of the royal army was not as total as Alcetas had insisted or as he himself had supposed. His authority over the troops, gained in hard campaigning, was now undermined. Certainly Adea/Eurydice compromised Perdiccas' control over King Philip. The incident with Cynnane demonstrated that the marriage to Cleopatra, despite the risks involved, was essential (cf. Just. 13. 6. 4). Eumenes, who had remained in contact with Cleopatra, was ordered secretly to reopen negotiations concerning a marriage.²⁵ Plans were now made for an invasion of Macedonia (Diod. 18. 23. 3, 25. 3, 6).

That spring Alexander's body was to have completed its long journey from Babylon to Aegae, to be buried in the former capital as required by Macedonian custom (Paus. 1. 6. 3; Borza 1990: 167, 256–60).²⁶ Perdiccas now determined to

25 Eumenes' continued contact with Cleopatra is nowhere stated in the sources, but circumstantial evidence would appear conclusive. Cleopatra had remained in Asia; Eumenes was the chief supporter of her marriage proposal in 321 (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21), and in 320 he was sent to her with a formal offer of marriage from Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 25).

26 Diodorus (18. 3. 5; cf. 18. 28. 3) states that it was decided in the conclave of the *principes* in Babylon following the reconciliation of the cavalry and infantry that the body was to be transported to Siwah for burial (accepted by Badian 1967: 187–8). Here Diodorus is, perhaps, reflecting Alexander's personal wish (Curt. 10. 5. 4), one of those last plans of the dead king rejected by the army in Babylon (Diod. 18. 4), or remembering a detail from his source for Alexander's campaign, or something he may have heard on his own visit to Egypt (Diod. 1. 44. 1; cf. 1. 10. 6–7, 22. 2, 61. 4), having been impressed by the official Egyptian accounts. Perdiccas, argues Badian (1967: 188), had ordered the body to Aegae in the spring, since his relations with Antipater were good. But when this relationship likewise deteriorated, Arrhidaeus was ordered to remain in Babylon. But if the body was not to leave Babylon, why did Perdiccas wait so long before attempting to stop its journey. The departure from Babylon was hardly secret. The cortege drew large crowds in every city along its route (Diod. 18. 28. 1). Moreover, a carriage drawn by 64 mules, all outfitted with gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18. 27. 5) would have moved

accompany the dead king to Macedonia. The propaganda value of returning Alexander's body to Macedonia is obvious. To arrive in Macedonia conveying the dead king, in the company of the kings, as Cleopatra's husband, and likely met by Alexander's mother, would have made Perdiccas invincible. With this change in policy, Perdiccas now likely responded to the earlier overtures from the Aetolians and the Athenian leader Demades (Diod. 18. 48. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 14). It was at this time that Eumenes began his ascendancy to the position of chief adviser to the regent. Eumenes' arguments for the inevitability of hostilities and the importance of the marriage to Cleopatra now seemed proven.

In the winter of 321/320, Antigonus fled to Macedonia (Diod. 18. 25. 3–5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 24; *FGrH* 239 B F-10, 11).²⁷ Since being initially summoned, Antigonus had given every indication that he meant to defend himself before the king, but all the while he clandestinely had planned his flight to Europe (Diod. 18. 23. 3–4). Additionally, he had prepared for his eventual return to Asia by cementing his ties with Menander, the satrap in Lydia,²⁸ and possibly with Asander in Caria (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2; Heckel 2006: 57 [#2]). Diodorus (18. 23. 3) indicates that Antigonus was well informed of the intrigues involving Cleopatra. Menander as satrap of Lydia was ideally situated to know of activities involving Cleopatra, since she was then resident in Sardis. Moreover, when Antigonus returned to Asia early in 320 with but 3000 troops, both Asander and Menander joined him without hesitation (Arrian *Succ.* 25. 1–2, 26). Perdiccas was often heavy-handed with respect to the satraps. Menander, while remaining in command of the military forces in Lydia, was apparently made subservient to the authority of Cleopatra (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2).

A number of scholars have argued that Perdiccas was not personally ambitious; everything he did was to preserve the unity of the empire (Vezin 1907: 35–6; Fontana 1960: 64–5; Rathmann 2005: 78). Perdiccas' marriage to Cleopatra was, then, necessary to increase the regent's prestige and enable him to resist the forces of disintegration. It would appear difficult to defend

very slowly (see Anson 1986: 212). If Arrhidaeus had violated his instructions by leaving Babylon, Perdiccas would certainly have had sufficient time to intercept the cortege long before it left Mesopotamia and entered Syria. The body was from the beginning meant to go to Aegae; Arrhidaeus would violate his instructions by turning south and heading to Egypt (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 25).

27 Antigonus found Antipater and Craterus in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia (Diod. 18. 25. 1–3).

28 Menander had been initially appointed to this position by Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 7–8 [as emended]; 7. 23. 1; *Syll.*³ 302, 4–5) and was confirmed in his satrapy at Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 4. 15). In general, see Heckel 2006: 163 [#1]).

all of the regent's actions on this basis, especially those against members of the royal family (Briant 1973A: 178–80). He had countenanced Roxane's murder of Stateira (Plut. *Alex.* 77. 6), and the murder of Cynnane. While it has been claimed that by these actions Perdiccas only wanted to prevent the emergence of a new dynasty from the descendants of Philip challenging Alexander's son, Alexander IV (Rathmann 2005: 65), this argument does not explain his double-dealing with Antipater. While it is clear that Ptolemy was disloyal to the central government, having murdered Cleomenes, who had been appointed in Babylon as his second-in-command (Paus. 1.6.3), and annexing Cyrene in Libya without authorization (Diod. 18.19–21), Antipater had been very correct in his dealing with the central administration. Perdiccas' treacherous contacts with the Aetolians and with Demades did not serve the interests of centralization, only Perdiccas' personal ambitions. "Perdikkas' career is an unfortunate tale of lofty ideals combined with excessive ambition and political myopia" (Heckel 1992: 151).

Upon his arrival in Macedonia, Antigonus warned Antipater of Perdiccas' designs (Diod. 18. 25. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 24). He stated that Perdiccas would soon divorce Nicaea and marry Cleopatra as a preliminary to proclaiming himself king and invading Macedonia (Diod. 18. 25. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 23. 3).²⁹ Whatever proof Antigonus supplied, it was convincing. Photius' *Epitome* of Arrian (1a. 24) states that it was both an account of Perdiccas' intrigues and a highly colored version of the death of Cynnane that convinced Antipater and Craterus. The Cynnane episode could only have been a small part of the picture, since Antipater himself had attempted to forestall her actions. For Antipater, Craterus, and their commanders, unanimously to decide to end the on-going campaign in Aetolia on virtually any terms,³⁰ and to prepare for an invasion of

29 Billows (1990: 62–3) states that Antipater and Craterus did not decide to invade Asia and attack Perdiccas until Antigonus had returned to Asia and informed them of Eumenes' expedition to Sardis with the marriage proposal for Cleopatra. Diodorus (18. 25. 3), however, makes it very clear that the decision to invade Asia was made immediately upon Antigonus' arrival and warning. There is no reason to believe that Diodorus is simply anticipating the later proposal. The invasion came off promptly in the spring and Antigonus' activities prior to the crossing of Antipater and Craterus would have been foolhardy without the assurance of the coming assault on Asia.

30 While the campaign was concluded, Diodorus (18. 25. 5) states that Craterus and Antipater published a decree setting forth their plans. Hatzopoulos (1996: 286) is correct that the passage must mean that a formal decision was recorded, but his further conclusion that this was passed by an unmentioned army assembly is unwarranted. While the council debated and agreed with the decisions reached by Antipater and Craterus, the decision was officially promulgated as a form of justification to the Macedonians. While this

Asia (Diod. 18. 25. 3–5), would have taken the most damning evidence to create such an abrupt reversal of policy. While Antigonus was one of Antipater's "friends,"³¹ he had apparently neither been approached for aid in the Lamian War, nor had he voluntarily supplied any. In addition, as shown, Perdiccas did nothing to prevent his flight; Perdiccas certainly did not believe that Antigonus' influence with Antipater was sufficient to cause a war. Indeed, after Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia, they were prepared to acknowledge Eumenes' control of his current satrapies and offered additional forces and territory, which apparently included Phrygia (Just. 13. 6. 14), in return for an alliance (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6); certainly, Eumenes' continued control of Phrygia and expanded powers as well would not have benefited the then former satrap of Phrygia.

With respect to Antigonus' information, clearly, he had acquired inside information, the veracity of which could not be doubted. The source of this information was most likely someone in Cleopatra's immediate circle, who had passed it on to Menander, and through him ultimately to Antigonus. In 320, Menander certainly wasted no time deserting the Perdiccan cause and going over to Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2). Cleopatra obviously knew of the debate surrounding her which was going on in the Perdiccan council. After all, she did not leave Asia and return to her mother, but rather took up residence in Sardis, far enough away so as not to antagonize Nicaea, but certainly close enough if Perdiccas' plans were to change suddenly. From later evidence, it seems certain her adviser in these matters was Eumenes (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26).

While Perdiccas prepared to march in the spring to Macedonia with the kings and bring Alexander's body to Aegae for burial, events soon to take place in Syria were to change everything. After two years of construction Alexander's funeral carriage had begun its trek west from Babylon in early September 321

decision may have been presented to the army in some sort of group announcement, there is in fact no such reference (Roisman 2012: 118). The passage in Diodorus is also a bit amorphous about what was actually recorded. Was it the declaration of war against those who were attempting to usurp the power of the kings, or did it refer to the previous sentence which detailed what would happen to the Aetolians as soon as the campaign in Asia was completed? It is very unlikely that a decree was published informing the Aetolians that the agreement just reached was bogus. The decree was the official announcement and justification to the Macedonian people that this was a necessary war. Such justification was necessary since this was in effect to be an attack on the legitimate government, i.e. that of the regent and the kings.

31 For the date of the initiation of their association, see Briant 1973A: 232. Briant places a great deal more faith in the friendship than is deserved.

(Diod. 18. 28. 2).³² Arrhidaeus, however, had decided to disobey the regent's orders and was planning to rendezvous in southern Syria with Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 25; 24–25; Diod. 18. 28. 2; Str. 17. 1. 8).³³ When Perdiccas discovered Arrhidaeus' intentions, he dispatched a force commanded by Polemon and Attalus to intercept the cortege (Arr. *Succ.* 25; 24. 1–4), but this force was repulsed by Ptolemy and the funeral train continued on to Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 25), where the body in the winter of 321/320 was interred temporarily in Memphis with elaborate rites (Paus. 1. 6. 3). Alexander was subsequently entombed in Alexandria (Diod. 18. 28. 3). Arrhidaeus' reason for disobeying the regent is unknown. He may have wanted to fulfill Alexander's original desire to have his body taken to Siwah (Diod. 18. 3. 5; cf. 18. 28. 3), or he may have suspected Perdiccas' grand intentions and wished to forestall them.

Ptolemy's actions make it very clear that he wished to precipitate a war with the regent. He must have known that the seizure would elicit just such a response. Moreover, it would appear that Ptolemy had decided on provoking Perdiccas soon after the settlement in Babylon. The seizing of Alexander's funeral cortege was just the latest insubordination of the Egyptian satrap, but clearly the most provocative. Ptolemy had been against the appointment of a single regent during the initial negotiations in Babylon and apparently never fully acquiesced to Perdiccas' appointment. As noted in Chapter 1, there is much scholarly discussion on Ptolemy and his ambitions. Did he wish to partition the empire or did he like most of the other Diadochs wish to become the new Alexander holding the empire intact? The issue may, however, be put in another way. Ptolemy was opposed to the continuation of the Argead monarchy and may in this sense have been the most ambitious of all the Diadochs from the very beginning. He did later turn down the regency when it was offered to him. His actions when Perdiccas was still alive, and certainly those after the regent's death, showed his ambitious nature. But, was he so confident in his ability and the defensive strength of his Egyptian satrapy³⁴ to take on the regent alone? Clearly the plot to secure possession of Alexander's body must have been underway long before the news would have reached him of the impending invasion of Asia by Antipater and Craterus. Our sources make it very clear that Arrhidaeus did not suddenly in Syria decide to take the body to Egypt (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 25; 24. 1–2). Perdiccas had sent an army to stop Ptolemy in Syria, which failed in its purpose (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 1–4; 25), and later he replaced the governor of Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 3–5), likely because he had assisted

32 On the design of the carriage, see Miller 1986: 401–11.

33 For the date, see the appendix at the end of this chapter.

34 On the natural defenses of Egypt, see Kahn and Tammuz 2008: 37–66.

Arrhidaeus in his purpose.³⁵ Perhaps, Ptolemy's understanding with Antipater was more involved than Diodorus indicates, although by sending his daughter to Perdiccas it would make it appear that Antipater neither anticipated a break in relations or would have been interested in creating one. In the final analysis, it can only be assumed that Ptolemy meant to provoke a confrontation with the regent, a confrontation he assumed that he would win, and, which, indeed, he did win.

Even with the danger of invasion by the Europeans, Perdiccas' council decided unanimously to change plans and launch an assault on Egypt (Diod. 18. 25. 6). The invasion of Macedonia was predicated on returning both the kings and Alexander's body to their homeland. Decisions now needed to be made quickly with regard to the defense of Asia Minor. While Perdiccas with the bulk of the royal army and most of the officer corps would proceed to Egypt, Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus, would be left behind to resist Antipater and Craterus. Eumenes was given the overall command for the defense of Asia Minor (Diod. 18. 29. 1–3; Just. 13. 6. 14–15; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2). Eumenes satrapy was also expanded to include Antigonus' former provinces of Pamphylia, Lycia and Phrygia (Just. 13. 6. 14).³⁶ Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and all other satraps and generals in the area, were ordered to obey Eumenes during this current emergency (Diod. 18. 29. 2).³⁷ While it might appear curious that Perdiccas would place Eumenes in command of so important a military operation, this decision probably reflects, in part, Eumenes' activities in Armenia. This would explain Diodorus' claim (18. 29. 2) that Eumenes was chosen because of his skill as a general. Although the comment regarding Eumenes' skill may either be the copied opinion of Hieronymus or simply Diodorus reading back into the past a reflection of subsequent events, it does remain that Perdiccas picked him for this assignment over more seasoned

35 The reasons for this alteration are not stated, but the assumption concerning Archon's involvement with Arrhidaeus is very plausible. Correspondence between Ptolemy and Arrhidaeus would have been difficult to conceal from the satrap of Babylonia.

36 Justin's list instead of Pamphylia includes Paphlagonia, which was already part of Eumenes' satrapy. Wheatley and Heckel (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 146) are likely correct that this is a mistake for Pamphylia, which like Phrygia had been part of Antigonus' domains. The listing of Lycia has also been challenged as a mistake for Lydia (Briant 1973A: 198; Hauben 1977: 100), but Engel's judgment (1972: 218–19) that Lycia is correct still stands. Lycia was part of Antigonus' grand satrapy (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2), and Lydia had been put under the administrative authority of Cleopatra, with Menander remaining in control of the troops (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2).

37 While it is likely that all of these extra responsibilities were meant to last only as long as the current emergency (cf. Fontana 1960: 82 n. 34), that is unclear.

choices. Eumenes, while probably more engaged in military activities, especially with respect to cavalry, during Alexander's reign than has been presented in the sources, certainly had not developed such a military reputation prior to his involvement in Cappadocia and Armenia. Moreover, most of the experienced officers were in charge of units in the royal army. Seleucus commanded the companion cavalry (Diod. 18. 3. 4; Just. 13. 4. 17), and was probably Perdiccas' second-in-command for the entire operation (Mehl 1986: 23–4; Heckel 1992: 257; 2006: 247); Antigenes commanded the argyraspids; Aristonous accompanied Perdiccas and subsequently led the expedition against the Cypriot kings who had formed an alliance with Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6), and Pithon, the son of Crateuas, held a prominent command as well (Diod. 18. 36. 5). Of those left in Asia, Eumenes' selection for overall command was in part dictated by his previous standing with Alexander and his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the infantry and cavalry in Babylon. Perdiccas had been sufficiently impressed by the Cynnane episode with the residual loyalty of his troops to the Argead family. Moreover, while Neoptolemus could also claim a connection to Alexander, being a member of the Molossian royal house and, therefore, a distant relative of Alexander's (Heckel 1992: 300–1; 2006: 174 [#2]), and from 330 to 323, he had been the commander of the hypaspists, the current argyraspids (Heckel 2006: 174 [#2]), his earlier difficulties in Armenia had undermined the regent's confidence in him (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1). Alcetas' position with the troops had been damaged by his involvement in the Cynnane affair. In addition to Eumenes' connection to Alexander, his successes in Armenia, and his proven loyalty to Perdiccas, his selection was also influenced by his command of a large force of Cappadocian cavalry (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4), which would be crucial in the planned strategy against the invaders from Macedonia.

In Asia Minor, the first line of defense was to be the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 25. 6, 29. 1–3). Cleitus remained in command of the majority of the royal fleet (cf. Just. 13. 6. 16). While most of the transports sailed for Egypt, the battle fleet, which earlier under Cleitus had defeated the Greeks in the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3), sailed from Cilicia to the Hellespont, arriving in March or April of 320.³⁸ Errington (1970: 70 n. 142) believes that Justin's reference (16. 6. 16) to the fleet assignment for Cleitus in 320 is erroneous. Justin is the only source to make reference to this command and given Justin's propensity for confusing names, Errington's suspicion of this reference is understandable. But, if Perdiccas meant to block the crossing of the Hellespont, he would need a fleet in the area. With Attalus and Sosigenes commanding

38 Cleitus left Cilicia in the late winter and arrived in the Hellespont no later than early April (roughly a journey of 30 days, see Anson 1989: 45 and n. 5).

fleet contingents elsewhere, Justin's reference to a fleet command for Cleitus appears correct. While Cleitus' earlier service with Craterus in Asia and with both Craterus and Antipater in the Lamian War (Just. 12. 12. 8; Diod. 18. 15. 8; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3) makes it surprising that Perdiccas would trust him with such an important command, Cleitus had returned with the fleet to Cilicia sometime after the war in Greece, and there had undoubtedly established good relations with Perdiccas (Cf. Hauben 1977: 104–5). An inscription published by J. Keil (1913: 235 and 241) and dated 322/321 grants Ephesian citizenship jointly to Perdiccas' brother, Alcetas, and to Cleitus. Also, there is no mention of the fleet command being taken from Cleitus after the conclusion of the Lamian War. Given Cleitus' subsequent desertion, hindsight certainly indicates that it would have been wiser to have placed the Aegean fleet under the command of another. Of course, such an attempted change might have provoked a desertion. Even though Justin provides few details relating to Cleitus' command, it appears certain that he was to coordinate his activities with Eumenes for the defense of the Hellespont. While it is not always safe to argue on the basis of what would be the most logical strategy, still, it would make a great deal more sense to associate immediately the fleet contingent under Cleitus with Eumenes' command. Preventing a crossing of the Hellespont without control of the strait itself would be impossible (Anson 1989: 44–9); surely, Perdiccas and his advisers knew this.

Eumenes then in conjunction with the fleet would maintain control of the Asiatic coast of the strait. Perdiccan naval superiority made it virtually impossible for the Macedonians to cross. Cleitus commanded a fleet of approximately 150 warships; his fleet in the Lamian War had numbered 240 (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9). Antipater's fleet would now only include those ships of his new ally, Athens. While nowhere is it mentioned that the Athenians had to disband their fleet after their defeat in the Lamian War, the fleet had suffered three major defeats during that campaign (Anson 2014A: 34–5, 38–40), and after the war's conclusion 12000 lower class Athenians emigrated to Thrace at Antipater's urging (Diod. 18. 18. 4–5; Plut. *Phoc.* 28. 7). Many of the emigres would have been those who manned the Athenian fleet as rowers. Cleitus, operating out of any of the eastern coastal cities of the Asian shore of the Hellespont, could intercept ships attempting to make the crossing; those that got through could be dealt with by the forces under Eumenes' command, especially given Eumenes' superior cavalry.³⁹ Moreover, in accordance with their agreement with Perdiccas, the Aetolians were prepared to invade Thessaly as soon as Antipater departed

39 On the essentials for a successful blockade of the Hellespont, see Anson 1989: 44–9. In brief, a blockade involved a fleet, not standing off the coast, but beached and ready to row

Macedonia (Diod. 18. 38. 1), and with them gone, the Aetolians did successfully invade Locris and Thessaly, defeating and killing Antipater's general Polycles. Later, however, Polyperchon, Antipater's general in Macedonia, marched into Thessaly and defeated the Aetolians and recovered the region (Diod. 18. 38. 2–6).

If the defense of the Hellespont for some unforeseen reason failed, the land forces would fall back before the forces of the Europeans; preparing ambushes and in general harassing the invaders. However, the Perdiccans had every confidence that the defense of the Hellespont would succeed. While Antipater and Craterus would be stronger in infantry, Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry joined with certain mercenary units from the royal army (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1) would give the edge in mobility to the Perdiccans. Antipater and Craterus had taken the field against the Aetolians with 30000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod. 18. 24. 1). Later in Asia Minor, these commanders had divided their forces with Craterus' "portion" amounting to 20000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 29. 6, 30. 4). It is likely that Craterus received the bulk of the forces, since he was to engage Eumenes, while Antipater proceeded to Egypt. Eumenes subsequently in battle with Craterus possessed 20000 infantry and 5000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 30. 5). In this second line of defense, the goal would be to slow the Europeans' advance, thus giving Perdiccas and his forces sufficient time to accomplish the conquest of Egypt. If the crossing succeeded, Briant (1973A: 196) is certainly correct that there was no plan to stage a decisive battle in Asia Minor. The quality of the forces accompanying Antipater and Craterus was far superior to the forces left in Asia Minor by Perdiccas (cf. Diod. 18. 30. 4–5). The hope was that, if the defense of the Hellespont failed, Perdiccas would defeat Ptolemy in time to turn and catch Antipater and Craterus between his victorious army moving north from Egypt and his forces still intact in Asia Minor. In the eventuality of a crossing, Cleitus would interdict supplies, aid the Aetolians, and encourage others in Greece to renounce their allegiance to Antipater. This secondary strategy was predicated on the initial Perdiccan advantage of distance. Eumenes, departing with his forces early in 320, would arrive at the Hellespont before the Macedonian troops could cross to Asia; Perdiccas departed Pisidia probably earlier in the year than Antipater and Craterus left Macedonia. The former would have departed in February or early March;⁴⁰ the latter in

to intercept those attempting a crossing. Ancient warships were insufficiently seaworthy to remain at sea for long periods, especially overnight or during storms.

40 Clearly Perdiccas left Pisidia early enough to allow sufficient time to arrive when the Nile was not in flood. The distance from Pisidia to Pelusium is approximately 800 miles or a journey of slightly more than three months (calculated on the basis of a marching rate

March or April.⁴¹ Perdikkas would arrive in Egypt at least 60 days before the Macedonian forces could rendezvous with Ptolemy. Clearly Perdikkas and his advisers believed that Ptolemy could be dealt with long before Antipater and Craterus could arrive with reinforcements.

Perdikkas would be accompanied to Egypt by part of the fleet, perhaps as many as 90 ships, and a great many merchant vessels, under the command of his brother-in-law, Attalus (Diod. 18. 37. 2–3). The fleet was essential for a successful invasion. Not only would it protect the coastal flank, but it was needed to supply the army. Undoubtedly, Perdikkas had ordered grain and water stockpiled along the line of march, but the decision to invade Egypt had been made well after the Syrian harvest, and the march to Egypt would occur before the next.⁴² The fleet would insure that no supply problems developed. It, also, must be recalled that Ptolemy did possess a small fleet of warships (cf. Diod. 18. 21. 7).⁴³ Later, while in Cilicia, Perdikkas dispatched Sosigenes to

of 10 miles per day with one day of rest every seven, or an average daily rate of slightly less than 9 miles per day, the rate for an army with elephants (Engels 1978: 155–6), or, perhaps, under ideal conditions, such an army might have made an average 12 miles per day (Proctor 1971: 34), but given Engels' evidence this seems very high. Indications in Diodorus are that the Nile had begun to flood during Perdikkas' invasion (18. 33. 2, 34. 7, 35. 3). This would fix Perdikkas' death fairly precisely in early July.

41 Grain in Asia Minor did not ripen until May at the earliest (Engels 1978: 29). This consideration had influenced the timing of Alexander's invasion of Asia (*ibid.* 27–9). Moreover, the Macedonian troops were in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia when Antigonus arrived with the tale of Perdikkas' ambition. It would take time to conclude, albeit unsatisfactorily, a peace with the Aetolians and to prepare for the new offensive. The march from Macedonia to the Hellespont would take approximately 20 days (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 5), putting the crossing likely in late April or early May.

42 The harvest took place in Syria in May/June (Naval Intelligence Division 1943: 257). By leaving early in the spring, Perdikkas could take advantage of the streams and wells of Palestine before the summer heat dried up these sources, but Sinai would still present formidable logistical problems (see Engels 1978: 57–60).

43 Hauben (1977: 105–6) argues that Attalus' fleet must have included a considerable number of warships to counter the Ptolemaic fleet. Hauben points out that in 306, Antigonus in his unsuccessful invasion of Egypt had in his fleet 150 warships, "even though the Ptolemaic navy had been reduced to virtually nothing in the preceding spring." Ptolemy probably had at least 30 triremes in 320 (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 5); it is doubtful that at this time he had access to warships from Cyprus (see Hauben 1977: 114; contra: Briant, 1973A: 206). A fleet of 80–90 ships would have been sufficient to forestall any naval operations by Ptolemy's fleet. Certainly there is no record of any naval operations during this campaign. Attalus had remained with the fleet at Pelusium, while Perdikkas marched up river to Memphis

transport troops to Cyprus where the Cypriot kings had declared for Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6).⁴⁴

After Eumenes was placed in charge of Asia Minor with both Neoptolemus and Alcetas subordinated to his authority, the Cardian departed to take up the defense of the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 25. 6; 29. 1–3).⁴⁵ While sending the army on ahead, Eumenes with a small force rode to Sardis with a proposal of marriage for Cleopatra from Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26; 25. 2–6),⁴⁶ a proposal the sister of Alexander chose for the moment to decline.⁴⁷ She would wait for the outcome of the coming conflict. Unknown to the Perdiccans, at the same time Eumenes was heading to Sardis with his proposal, Antigonus in command of ten Athenian warships and 3000 men had landed in Caria (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 1). As prearranged, Asander in Caria and Menander in Lydia joined him. Ephesus and apparently much of the Ionian coast also joined with Antigonus (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–6). Menander, learning that Eumenes was in Sardis, sent the news to Antigonus in Ephesus. Antigonus counseled him to remain openly friendly and keep Eumenes in the city. Meanwhile, Antigonus hurriedly assembled his 3000 infantry and some cavalry and set out for Sardis. Warned by Cleopatra, Eumenes managed to escape (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–4, 6–7), but Antigonus had achieved a notable success. Much of western Asia Minor had repudiated

(Diod. 18. 37. 3); afterwards the former had retreated to Tyre (*ibid.*), and subsequently launched an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 39).

44 Aristonous was in overall command of this expedition against the kings of Cyprus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6).

45 The size of Eumenes' force on the Hellespont is unclear. Nepos (*Eum.* 3. 3) implies that Eumenes was sent out with a comparatively small infantry force, and Diodorus (18. 29. 2–3) only states that the force was "suitable" for his mission. It is unlikely that Eumenes had a large army; a "suitable" force needed to be mobile, but much less numerous than the army coming from Europe. If Cleitus did his job well, only a small part of the Macedonian forces would ever reach the Asiatic shore. If Cleitus failed, no Perdiccan force made up of those left in Asia Minor would be sufficient to stop the crossing. Even though Diodorus (18. 29. 2) states that Neoptolemus and Alcetas were sent with Eumenes to the Hellespont, neither of these commanders actually joined Eumenes either at this time or subsequently. Alcetas flatly refused to obey Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3) and never left Pisidia (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4); Neoptolemus later colluded with Craterus and Antipater (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5).

46 Hans Hauben (1977: 93–5) places Eumenes in Sardis before the deliberations in Pisidia. However, Billows (1990: 63 n. 24) successfully refutes this contention.

47 Only the Heidelberg Epitome (*FGrH* 155 F-4) states that the marriage took place. Diodorus (20. 37. 3), recounting the death of Cleopatra, certainly implies that there was no marriage. "She was the sister of Alexander who conquered Persia ... and had been the wife of the Alexander who made an expedition to Italy."

the regent. Antigonos himself sailed for the Hellespont to prepare for the Hellespontine crossing of Antipater and Craterus.⁴⁸

The desertion of Asander and Menander were not as serious as other defections that soon followed. Cleitus and the Aegean fleet deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after their arrival in the Hellespont.⁴⁹ Additionally, the long neglect of Hellespontine Phrygia after Leonnatus' departure, now proved costly. The Hellespontine cities in response to overtures from Antipater, perhaps, brought by Antigonos, also went over to the Europeans (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26). Many of these Greek cities had acquired a special semi-autonomous status under Alexander which in the absence of evidence to the contrary was retained after his death (Badian 1966: 37–61). A clear example of this status is the case of Cyzicus. In 318, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arrhidaeus, tried to strengthen his position in his satrapy by placing garrisons in the coastal cities (Diod. 18. 51). Cyzicus successfully resisted and Diodorus (18. 51. 3) states that they did so in order to “maintain their freedom.” The long absence of satrapal authority in the region would have heightened this sense of independence. These reverses forced Eumenes to abandon any attempt to block or even to hinder Antipater's crossing; with his troops he retreated into the interior, while reporting the military situation to Perdiccas.⁵⁰ This report

48 Briant (1978: 202, 207–8, 211) argues that Antipater and Antigonos moved together to Asia with Antigonos arriving at Ephesus after Antipater and Craterus had already crossed to Asia. Briant insists that Cleitus only deserted the Perdiccan cause after the crossing (*ibid.* 195–7; cf. 202–3), and consequently, Antigonos was the fleet commander at the crossing. Photius' *Epitome* of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 26), however, places Eumenes' mission to Cleopatra and Antigonos' activities in Asia Minor before the crossing of the Hellespont by Antipater and Craterus. Antigonos was following the example of Parmenio and Attalus who in 336 by the command of Philip II advanced to Asia to secure the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont in preparation for a full scale invasion (Diod. 16. 91. 2). As noted, it would be absolutely essential that at least part of the Asiatic coast be secured, if the army was successfully to cross the strait (Anson 1989: 44–9).

49 While the sources are silent on Cleitus' actions, his desertion to Antipater is certain. There is no evidence he ever contested Antipater's passage to Asia. Moreover, after Perdiccas' death in Egypt, Cleitus was rewarded with the satrapy of Lydia (Diod. 18. 39. 6).

50 Briant (1973A: 209) and Hauben (1977: 108) believe that in Arrian, *Succ.* 1a. 26, “Antipater and Craterus crossed having subverted through emissaries those guarding the strait,” the forces subverted were Eumenes' troops. Briant holds that almost all of Eumenes' force, including his Cappadocian cavalry, deserted, while Hauben would preserve for Eumenes his cavalry (*ibid.* 116–117). Indeed, Briant (1973A: 189–95, 202–3) argues that Eumenes' mission to Cleopatra in Sardis took place after Antipater and Craterus had already crossed to Asia. For Briant, Eumenes arrived in Sardis in full retreat from the Hellespont with only a handful of troops still remaining loyal to him; the majority of his soldiers having gone

reached Perdiccas in Cilicia. In response to the failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas, in conformance with the plan for the second line of defense agreed to in Pisidia, ordered, this time by letter, Neoptolemus and Alcetas to obey Eumenes' commands for the operations in Asia Minor (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1–2). That these letters had to be sent is indicative that in all likelihood neither Alcetas, nor Neoptolemus, had accompanied Eumenes to the Hellespont. The regent must have been very well aware of the difficulties arising from his appointment of Eumenes to chief command in Asia Minor. Earlier in Pisidia, Perdiccas had ordered Neoptolemus and Alcetas to accompany Eumenes to the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 29. 2; cf. 18. 25. 6), but they had not gone. That he would have to reconfirm his commands shows his knowledge of these difficulties.⁵¹ Perdiccas also replaced satraps he believed might emulate their colleagues in Asia Minor, notably in Cilicia and, if he had not done so earlier, in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2–3). About the latter governor, Archon, virtually nothing is known, certainly nothing that would tie him to any particular faction (Heckel 2006: 43). He may even have been appointed by Alexander in 324 and only been reassigned by the *principes* in Babylon (see Berve 1973: 2:86–7 [#163]; Heckel 2006: 43). Philotas in Cilicia was removed because he was “well-disposed” toward Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2; Just. 13. 6. 16). Philoxenus, who replaced Philotas, however, deserted to Antipater when that commander entered Cilicia (Errington 1970: 70; Heckel 2006: 220 [#2]). Also, in response to the revolt of most of Cyprus to Ptolemy, Perdiccas sent Sosigenes in charge of a newly raised Phoenician fleet with Aristonous commanding the land forces to meet the threat on the island (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 14–28). After his successes along the Asiatic coast, Antigonus sailed to Cyprus and joined the pro-Ptolemaic faction (cf Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30).

With the inevitability of the crossing by the Europeans now albeit assured, Eumenes and his forces fell back before their advance in line with the alternate

over to the enemy. While Photius' summary has no antecedent for “those guarding the strait,” Cleitus' fleet was certainly the first line of Hellespontine defense. This ambiguous reference in Photius relates, therefore, to the desertion of the Aegean fleet and various Hellespontine coastal cities to Antipater and Craterus. If Eumenes had a large force desert him on the Hellespont, his subsequent possession of a large army becomes inexplicable (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 4–5).

- 51 Hornblower (1981: 135) doubts the authenticity of these letters, arguing that Plutarch's reference to Eumenes' military skill calls the entire passage into question. However, as noted earlier, Eumenes had successfully campaigned in Armenia, and, perhaps, in the Cappadocian campaign as well. Moreover, if Eumenes had no command experience, why would Perdiccas commit the defense of Asia Minor to him in any case?

plan decided upon in Pisidia.⁵² While the number of loyal commanders in Asia Minor was dwindling rapidly, the combined forces of Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus would be sufficient to carry out successfully their mission. There were, despite Perdiccas' letters, still serious problems within Eumenes' command.

The two Macedonian commanders were jealous of Eumenes' authority over them (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2–3). While Perdiccas' choice of Eumenes to lead the defense of Asia Minor made sense from the standpoint of the common soldiers, neither of the Macedonian aristocrats, Alcetas and Neoptolemus, was willing to be commanded by Eumenes. This reluctance resulted in part from their earlier dealings with the Cardian. Neoptolemus had seen the former chief secretary reorganize and reinvigorate his command in Armenia; Alcetas found his policy of accommodation with Antipater attacked by Eumenes and, subsequently, abandoned by his brother. Indeed, the split over the correct policy to be followed with regard to Antipater was probably very bitter; Photius' summary gives no details (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21). Additionally, prejudice played a role in

52 Briant (1973A: 192–9) argues that in Cilicia with the news of Eumenes' failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas changed his strategy. For Briant, while the army was still in winter quarters in Pisidia, the decisions to invade Egypt and block Antipater's passage of the Hellespont were made. He claims further that while on the march to Egypt and in Cilicia, in the absence of Eumenes, Neoptolemus, and Alcetas, a second council was held where Eumenes' powers were expanded. According to Briant (*ibid.* 196–8, 202, 212–5), in this second council Eumenes was given the supreme command, made *strategos autocrator*, in Asia Minor, and Cleitus was sent to the Aegean. This new strategy, continues Briant (*ibid.* 271–2), was dictated by Perdiccas himself and gave rise to much opposition. There is little evidence to suggest that decisions other than the replacement of satraps were made after Perdiccas left Pisidia. Diodorus (18. 29. 1–2) implies but one meeting on general strategy and attaches both Alcetas and Neoptolemus to Eumenes' command for the defense of the Hellespont at this meeting; Justin (13. 6. 14–16) associates all of the decisions with one meeting which is mistakenly placed in Cappadocia; Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 26–28) gives no information concerning Perdiccas' planning for the campaigns; Nepos (*Eum.* 3. 2) mentions no deliberations, but speaks of Eumenes' authority over most of Asia Minor. Only Plutarch (*Eum.* 5. 2) could be interpreted as providing support for Briant's reconstruction. Plutarch associates the grant of overall authority in Asia Minor to Eumenes, the sending of letters to Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and the invasion of Cappadocia by Craterus. However, Plutarch is obviously summarizing a number of events spanning the end of the Lamian War (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1), through the crossing of the Hellespont (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2), to Neoptolemus' eventual desertion of the Perdiccan cause (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3). In the absence of any substantive evidence to support Briant's position, it makes much more sense to assume that Eumenes' expanded authority was given to him with the command on the Hellespont.

their dissatisfaction with Eumenes' command. Eumenes was not a member of the hereditary Macedonian nobility, he was a foreigner, a Cardian Greek.⁵³ Both commanders were jealous of Eumenes' preferment. They may also have feared confronting the popular Craterus in their anxiety that he might subvert the loyalty of their Macedonians (cf. *Plut. Eum.* 5. 3).⁵⁴ Further, Errington (1970: 64 n. 108) suggests that Alcetas' actions, at least, may have been based on a hoped for a reconciliation with Antipater. As indicated, Alcetas was opposed to any break with Antipater and this, indeed, might have played a role in his reluctance to serve under Eumenes, the self-proclaimed enemy of Antipater (*Plut. Eum.* 3. 8; 5. 7). It is unlikely that the depth of this hostility manifested itself during the meeting in Pisidia where command assignments were made, or assuredly the assignments would have been different. Indeed, it may never have risen beyond the grumbling stage, if the defensive line at the Hellespont had held. But with the circumstances in Asia Minor deteriorating, such jealousies did manifest themselves.

While the decision to invade Egypt had been approved by consensus, the decision to place Eumenes in charge in Asia Minor must have sparked bitter debate and rancor. Yet, Perdiccas had used his authority to overwhelm the opposition, and, again, if the Hellespontine defensive line had held, it is probable that none of these problems would have occurred. In the final analysis, it was not due to Eumenes that the desertions of the fleet commander, or of the satraps, happened, or was he solely responsible for those of Neoptolemus and Alcetas. Clearly Perdiccas lacked the necessary qualities of leadership so obviously demanded by the circumstances. He could not even get his own brother

53 On the general pervasiveness of this prejudice on the part of Macedonian nobles, see Chapter 8, Anson 1980: 55–9; 2014B: 539–558.

54 Eumenes' later measures to conceal from his troops the knowledge that Craterus was the opposing commander (*Plut. Eum.* 7. 2–3; *Nepos Eum.* 4. 4) show that the problem was indeed a serious one. Moreover, Craterus had been treated virtually as a king by the Macedonians upon his return to his homeland (*Arr. Succ. frg.19=Suda. s.v. Craterus*). It is unlikely, as claimed by Hammond (1984: 56), that the troops serving with Neoptolemus and Alcetas were part of the contingent of veterans brought west by Craterus in 324. If such troops were still present in Asia Minor, Perdiccas would have taken them with him to Egypt, as he did with Alexander's hypaspists (see Anson 1988: 131–3), in preference to leaving them to face their old commander (cf. Heckel 1982: 60–2). As noted earlier, Craterus had returned to Europe with 6000 veterans who had crossed to Asia with Alexander and 4000 others who had joined on the subsequent campaign (*Diod.* 18. 16. 4). With the deletion of the argyraspids, and assuming that most of the remaining 4000 were mercenaries, there would not have been many Macedonians left from Craterus' original force in any case.

to obey his authority. The definitive weakness with Perdiccas' leadership is reflected in the comments found in Diodorus (18. 33. 3), most likely derived from Hieronymus, about Perdiccas being "a man of blood." His leadership style was clearly that of intimidation. When during the dispute in Babylon he was threatened with death by the agents of Meleager, he taunted and terrified his would-be assassins (Curt. 10. 8. 3). Under the pretext of a reconciliation, he had the leaders of the infantry in Babylon killed (Diod. 18. 4. 7; Curt. 10. 9. 18). Meleager was executed shortly thereafter on a charge of "plotting" against the regent (Diod. 18. 4. 7). Perdiccas had ordered his troops to execute all the Greeks who had rebelled in the upper satrapies on the news of Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 7. 5); Ariarathes after capture was tortured and impaled (Diod. 18. 16. 3; App. *Mith.* 2. 8);⁵⁵ the male Larandians of fighting age were all killed, the rest of the population enslaved (Diod. 18. 22. 2); Cynnane was killed most likely on his orders. Alexander's former chiliarch was not a man to be crossed. Apparently, most acceded to his demands in his presence, rather than incur his wrath.

Upon arriving in Asia, Craterus and Antipater sent appeals to both Eumenes and Neoptolemus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; Diod. 18. 29. 4).⁵⁶ Eumenes was promised continued possession of his satrapies with additional lands and troops besides (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6). The clear implication is that he would continue to possess most, if not all, of the territories awarded him most recently by Perdiccas.⁵⁷

55 Diodorus 31. 19. 3–5 states that Ariarathes died in battle, but the surviving narrative is to be preferred to this extract from Diodorus collected in Photius' *Bibliotheca* (382–388B).

56 Briant's insistence (1973A: 222) that Neoptolemus initiated the contact is possible (Diod. 18. 29. 4), but without direct support. Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 26) mentions that after Antipater and Craterus crossed the Hellespont they sent ambassadors to both Neoptolemus and Eumenes. Given the abbreviated nature of Photius' epitome, it is possible that he has omitted a notice of a previous exchange initiated by Neoptolemus. While Plutarch (*Eum.* 5. 2–3) does not state who commenced the exchange, he does later state that an embassy was sent to Eumenes (*Eum.* 5. 4–5). Plutarch, then, would appear to support the Photian epitome of Arrian. Moreover, the language of Diodorus 18. 29. 4 is too ambiguous to conclude from it that Neoptolemus proposed betrayal first. From the evidence it must be concluded that, however ready Neoptolemus might have been to desert the Perdiccan cause, the contact was most likely initiated by the Antipater and Craterus.

57 Plutarch states that Eumenes was offered continued possession of his "satrapies." While Plutarch may be making reference to the different territories included in Eumenes' satrapy assigned in Babylon, i.e. Cappadocia and Paphlagonia (Diod. 18. 3. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3), the context of the passage suggests that much more was involved. Antipater and Craterus were trying to win over Eumenes. Certainly they would not offer less than he already possessed, especially since Eumenes would be distrustful of Antipater in any case. Eumenes must have been offered control of virtually all of Asia Minor, including

Moreover, Craterus promised to reconcile Eumenes with Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6). Eumenes, however, refused, stating that Antipater long had been his enemy, but he did offer to reconcile Craterus and Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7–8). What is interesting in what little our sources present with respect to the particular incentives offered to support or desert the regent, there are no references to the good of the empire or Macedonian nationalism. All of the reasons are personal in nature. Eumenes is promised satrapies; Neoptolemus was jealous of Eumenes (Diod. 18. 29. 4); Perdiccas encourages his commanders in Egypt with “gifts and promises” (Diod. 18. 33. 5); Antipater through marriage alliances cemented personal relationships with various of the *principes*. Other indications of the personal nature of power in this new age are the replication of Macedonian royal institutions in the entourages of these powerful individuals. Each diadoch would eventually establish his own cavalry companions and his own corps of hypaspists. In 316, at Paraetacene Eumenes is listed as having in his army a personal corps of hypaspists, distinct from Alexander’s former hypaspists, the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 28. 1, 40. 3–4), companion cavalry (Diod. 19. 28. 3), and a cavalry guard, an *agema* (Diod. 19. 27. 2, 28. 3). Nor is this creation of personal units paralleling the traditional Macedonian royal military organization unique to Eumenes. At Paraetacene, Diodorus (19. 28. 3) speaks of Antigones and Peucestas having their own cavalry *agemai*. These “*agemai*” are clearly distinct from Eumenes’ *agema*, since they are mentioned specifically in this passage. Additionally, Alcetas, after his defeat in the Pisidic *Aulon*, fled to Termessus in Pisidia with his “hypaspists and his pages” (Diod. 18. 45. 3). The latter was an institution created by Philip II, consisting of youngmen whose duties had been to guard the king while he dined and slept, mount the king on his horse, attend him in the hunt, and fight along side him (Anson 2013A: 58–9). Antigonus, in 318, is recorded as having his own “hypaspists” (Polyaen. 4. 6. 8). Leonnatus, as well, after Alexander’s death is reported as possessing a personal cavalry *agema* (*Suda* s.v. *Leonnatus*=Arr. *Succ.* frg. 12).

While Eumenes resisted the overtures from Craterus and Antipater, and remained loyal to the regent, Neoptolemus deserted to those newly arrived from Maceonia. Although he tried to conceal his treachery, Eumenes soon discovered it (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26–7). When ordered to comply with Perdiccas’ orders, Neoptolemus drew up his phalanx in battle

Antigonus’ satrapy of Phrygia (see Briant 1973A: 185). Perdiccas placed these territories under Eumenes’ authority prior to the former’s departure for Egypt (Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; Just. 13. 6. 14–15). Such a promise, if ultimately carried out, would certainly appear to be a betrayal of Antigonus, Menander, and Asander. It should be noted that ultimately Antipater did replace Menander in Lydia with Cleitus (Diod. 18. 39. 6).

array (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4). It is difficult to know the location of the respective forces, but most likely Eumenes and Neoptolemus fought in western Phrygia.⁵⁸ In the ensuing battle Eumenes' infantry was defeated, but his cavalry secured the victory (Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6; Just. 13. 8. 4).⁵⁹ Neoptolemus had either permitted his infantry to pursue in a disorderly manner or they had followed their own inclinations, allowing Eumenes' cavalry, already victorious over the enemy's cavalry and in possession of Neoptolemus' camp, to attack the scattered soldiers. While many were killed, the majority laid down their weapons and swore an oath to serve Eumenes; only Neoptolemus and 300 horsemen escaped (Diod. 18. 29. 5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6). Eumenes now sent word to Perdiccas of his victory and of his acquisition of most of Neoptolemus' army; the news reached Perdiccas shortly after his arrival in Egypt and before any actual hostilities had commenced.⁶⁰ This battle took place in late May or early June of 320.

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- 58 Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 1) mistakenly places the battle at or near (*apud*) the Hellespont (accepted by Hornblower 1981: 6 n. 11, 30 n. 43; Billows 1990: 65). Diodorus (18. 37. 1) places the battles “near Cappadocia.” Nepos is most likely reflecting the original location of Eumenes' forces (Diod. 18. 29. 3), while Diodorus clearly in the midst of abbreviating his source has left the location of the battle ambiguous. Somewhere in the central plains would appear to be the correct location.
- 59 Briant (1973: 223–4 n. 13), Bosworth (1978: 229–237), and Schäfer (2002: 81–4) argue that the papyrus fragment *PSI* 12. 1284, from Arrian, refers to Eumenes' battle with Neoptolemus, not to Eumenes' victory over Craterus and Neoptolemus (so Latte 1950: 23–7; Wirth 1965: 283–8; Thompson 1984: 113–20; Roisman 2012: 132). In the fragment, the hostile phalanx is drawn up in a tight battle formation and remained intact, but in Plutarch's description of the battle between Eumenes and Neoptolemus (*Eum.* 5. 4–5), Neoptolemus' soldiers are scattered in pursuit of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen. In the later battle between Eumenes and Craterus, it is clear that Craterus' forces are drawn up and remained in formation (Diod. 18. 32. 1). Justin (13. 8. 6) in his account of the battle with Craterus and Neoptolemus states that Eumenes caught his enemy while unprepared and routed them. Justin's account clashes significantly with that of Diodorus (18. 30. 1–2), where Craterus holds an assembly to encourage the troops before the battle, then orders his phalanx. Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 1) makes it very clear that Craterus was the first to form up his phalanx, since Eumenes then arrayed his troops so that none of his Macedonians would face Craterus directly.
- 60 In Diodorus 18. 33. 1, Perdiccas is informed of Eumenes' victory over an unspecified opponent. Clearly this is the victory over Neoptolemus (see Vezin 1907: 52, and Errington 1970: 66 n. 127); the news of Eumenes' defeat of Craterus arrived only after Perdiccas' death (Diod. 18. 37. 1). The first battle against Neoptolemus occurred 10 days before the second against both Neoptolemus and Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1). The fighting in Egypt was clearly over in a matter of weeks (contra Bosworth 1992A: 76). The news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus reached Egypt two days after Perdiccas' death (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 37. 1).

After his defeat Neoptolemus fled to Craterus and Antipater.⁶¹ While he asked that both come to his aid, he intimated that because of his popularity Craterus would be sufficient (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 1–3).⁶² As a result, it was decided that Craterus with the bulk of the Macedonian forces would attack Eumenes; Antipater would continue on to Egypt with the remainder of the army (Diod. 18. 29. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 6. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 27). With 20000 infantry, primarily Macedonians, and more than 2000 cavalry, Craterus advanced into Phrygia (Diod. 18. 37. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 6. 4). Eumenes now decided to change the agreed upon strategy, which had been to avoid battle. With the forces of the Europeans divided and with his superior cavalry, Eumenes planned on going to the offensive. While the division of the forces of his enemy meant that Eumenes' infantry was now equal in numbers to Craterus' infantry, it was certainly not equivalent in quality. Eumenes did, however, have 5000 Cappadocian cavalry who had proven both loyal and victorious (Diod. 18. 29. 4–5).⁶³ Because of Craterus' popularity, Eumenes concealed from his men the name of this opponent. He announced that Neoptolemus and an otherwise unknown Pigres were coming against them after enrolling new native forces (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 7; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 4–5).⁶⁴

When the armies were drawn up for battle and Eumenes saw that Craterus was occupying the right wing, he placed two hipparchies of his Cappadocian cavalry, commanded by Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus and Eumenes'

Also indicative of a conflict of relatively short duration is that after the failure of the invasion and Perdiccas' death under new commanders the royal army turned north but only encountered Antipater's forces driving south in upper Syria.

- 61 Justin (13. 8. 5) names the allies as Antipater and Polyperchon, rather than Antipater and Craterus. Polyperchon had been left in charge of Macedonia (Diod. 18. 38. 6).
- 62 He may also have claimed that Eumenes' troops suffered from low morale (cf. Schäfer 2002: 84). He certainly would have noted that Eumenes' Macedonians were primarily those troops who had previously served under his authority and given the right circumstances, the presence of Craterus and his forces, would likely return to their previous allegiance.
- 63 In the battle against Craterus, Eumenes had only 5000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 30. 5), while earlier he had 6300 cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3). However, the figure of 6300 dates from two years prior to the time of the 5000 figure. It is, therefore, very possible that both totals are correct. The difference in them may reflect casualties from Eumenes' earlier campaigns and/or internal Cappadocian concerns. The latter is probably closer to the truth. In his Armenian campaign and in the battle against Neoptolemus, it does not appear that many casualties were suffered.
- 64 Pigres is a name apparently of southwestern Asian origin (Hoffmann 1969: col. 1314). This individual was probably a commander of mercenary cavalry who had been attached to Neoptolemus by Perdiccas when the former was originally sent to western Armenia.

brother-in-law,⁶⁵ and Phoenix of Tenedos on his left (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1).⁶⁶ No Macedonians were to face Craterus. Eumenes also gave these commanders strict orders to launch their attack as soon as the enemy came into view in order to make sure that this deception was not discovered until after the battle. Eumenes himself with his cavalry guard, his personal *agema*, of 300 horsemen held the right wing, opposite Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1–2). As soon as Eumenes' army crossed a small rise and the opposing force came into view, he launched his attack. This sudden assault caught Craterus by surprise; he had been led to believe by Neoptolemus that Eumenes' Macedonians would desert.⁶⁷ With this prospect in view, Craterus had assumed that at the very least Eumenes would be hesitant to force the issue.

Both cavalry contingents rode well in advance of their respective infantries. In the first collision of forces, Craterus was killed (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 27; Diod. 18. 30. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 1). With his death the right wing was quickly crushed and fled back to the phalanx (Diod. 18. 31–2. 2; *PSI* 12. 1284; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 4–7; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2; Just. 13. 8. 8).⁶⁸ Several different versions of Craterus' death are preserved in the sources. In Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 27), Craterus is killed by Paphlagonians, but in Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 5) the deed is done by a Thracian. Plutarch's account (*Eum.* 7. 4, 8) of the dying Craterus is much dramatized.

65 Pharnabazus had taken command of the Persian Aegean fleet on the death of Memnon (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 2. 1; Curt. 3. 3. 1). In 332, he was captured at Chios (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 2. 4; Curt. 4. 5. 17), but later that same year he escaped (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 2. 7). Nothing further is heard of him until he shows up as one of Eumenes' cavalry commanders. Most likely he was pardoned as were his brother and father by Alexander (Berve 1973: 2:379–80 [#766]; Heckel 2006: 206). In 324, Alexander had arranged marriages for himself and 80 of his *hetairoi*, including Eumenes, to various Persian princesses (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 4). Eumenes married Artonis, the daughter of Artabazus (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 6).

66 On Phoenix, see Heckel 2006: 222 [#2].

67 Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 2) gives the impression that Craterus did not know of Eumenes' movements until Eumenes crossed an intervening hill and launched his attack. However, Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 1) also mentions that Eumenes arranged his troops for the battle according to the arrangement of Craterus' army. Diodorus (18. 30. 2–4) relates that prior to the battle Craterus summoned the army to an assembly and gave a speech. There was then no surprise attack. The only surprise was that Craterus had expected a desertion by Eumenes' Macedonians and, therefore, an easy victory. He had not expected Eumenes to launch an immediate attack (Vezin 1907: 47n. 2).

68 Bosworth (2002: 86) believes that in the conflict the two phalanxes never actually engaged, but this would appear unlikely. Certainly the narrative follows the personal battle between Neoptolemus and Eumenes and the battle was won on the flanks in the cavalry engagements. The infantries just played no serious role in the outcome of the battle.

First the dying Macedonian is guarded by the young Macedonian, Eumenid, officer, Gorgias (Heckel 2006: 127 [#1]), then tearfully pitied by Eumenes. Joseph Roisman (2012: 130) notes the Homeric qualities of this entire episode. In Diodorus (18. 30. 5), Craterus' horse stumbles and the Macedonian general is ingloriously trampled to death. What is clear here is that there were multiple traditions regarding this officer's death which are reflected in our surviving sources. Eumenes' left was also victorious with Eumenes killing Neoptolemus in single combat (Diod. 18. 30. 4–5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 27; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 3–12). Here again the description of this combat is highly theatrical, and unlike in the case of Craterus, this single tradition permeates our sources. In fact, the account in Diodorus and Plutarch in particular are almost mirror images of one another. Their mutual, long-standing, hatred brings a certain ferocity to the hand-to-hand combat (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2; Just. 13. 8, 8; cf. Diod. 18. 31. 1). They grappled while still on horseback until thrown to the ground (Diod. 18. 31. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 8–9; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2), where Eumenes delivered the first blow, and Neoptolemus though only able to rise on one knee continued the fight and succeeded in wounding his opponent (Diod. 18. 31. 3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 10–11; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2). Eumenes, “transported by ancient hatred,” ultimately kills Neoptolemus and strips the body (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 12; cf. Diod. 18. 31. 5). While these descriptions do appear to come from an historian like Duris, Hieronymus simply may not have been quite so boring as Dionysius claimed when he was extolling the virtues of Eumenes (Schäfer 2002: 88).

This victory occurred just ten days after his initial defeat of Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1). Eumenes now sent Xennias, his Macedonian herald, “a Macedonian speaker,” to the surrounded enemy, who were not disheartened and in close array awaited Eumenes' attack. Xennias told the Macedonians that Eumenes would not attack them with his phalanx, but would rather use his cavalry and light-armed troops to prevent them from gathering provisions (*PSI* 12. 1284). Having delivered this ultimatum, the enemy phalanx was now invited to join Eumenes; an invitation they readily accepted (Diod. 18. 32. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3). With their surrender, Eumenes gave them permission to forage for supplies in the nearby villages. These Macedonians, however, after they had collected sufficient supplies, deserted and by forced marches reached Antipater and continued with him toward Egypt (Diod. 18. 32. 3–33. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3). Unlike the Macedonian troops who had long campaigned in Asia and who as a result exhibited many of the characteristics of mercenaries, these troops were still loyal to their original commanders and did not readily take up service with their former enemy.

If the news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus had arrived sooner, Perdikkas might have emerged supreme, the successor of Alexander, but he was slain

in a mutiny of his own officers one day before the report of Eumenes' second success arrived (Diod. 18. 36. 1–5; *HE* 1).⁶⁹ His death occurred no later than early July.⁷⁰ Perdiccas' campaign in Egypt had been a disaster almost from its inception. Upon entering Egypt the regent had spoken to the troops attempting to justify the campaign by making accusations against Ptolemy (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 28).⁷¹ There is nothing in the passage in Arrian which suggests who initiated the assembly, or the nature of the assemblage, and the clear implication is that Perdiccas was personally accusing the Egyptian satrap. Whatever the unspecified charges, the troops were unimpressed. Despite this apparent display of dissatisfaction with the war in Egypt, Perdiccas, as commander-in-chief, decided to continue. It is possible that, as in the case of Cynnane, forces outside Perdiccas' control caused him to attempt to convince his troops of the justice of this attack on a fellow Macedonian. Alexander had been in the habit of calling such meetings the further he penetrated into Asia after the defeat of Darius at Gaugamela, and the more distant his soldiers were from home, the more reluctant they became to take orders. Such meetings were common with forces more mercenary than national. "All mercenaries in an emergency [become] a democracy" (Parke 1933: 119)." Ptolemy, then, either personally,⁷² or, as would appear more likely, through surrogates successfully defended himself against these charges. While the "many" did not accept Perdiccas' rationale for the war, Perdiccas continued the campaign anyway. There would have been no formal vote only a clear indication of the soldiers' disapproval by their attitude. Perdiccas was not violating any law or custom when he ignored the wishes of his troops. He was the regent, and the campaign was technically being carried

69 Diodorus (18. 37. 1) states that the report came immediately after Perdiccas' death.

70 See the appendix at the end of this chapter.

71 Fontana (1960: 218–19) and Briant (1973A: 264–5) believe that the passage, while referring to an actual incident, has been misrepresented in Photius' epitome. The former wishes to place the incident before Perdiccas left for Egypt and the latter sees Photius confusing the call to Ptolemy to answer charges with that commander's subsequent appearance before the army after Perdiccas' assassination. Both reconstructions do great violence to the very clear chronological order in Photius' epitome, and neither, therefore, is convincing. This incident is not corroborated in any other source and some scholars have claimed that the entire episode comes from a pro-Ptolemaic source and is, consequently, suspect (Seibert 1969: 104–5), but there is no great reason to reject it. In general, see Anson 1991: 240–4.

72 The presence of Ptolemy at this assembly and his survival are not mutually exclusive. Later, at Triparadeisus, the army demonstrated its power to protect particular individuals from harm. At this meeting, Attalus, a condemned follower of the then former regent Perdiccas, was present and permitted to leave unharmed (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 33; cf. Diod. 18. 41. 7, 50. 1; 19. 16. 1).

out by King Philip. The soldiers were willing to follow the orders of their king, and Diodorus (18. 37. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2) states that, if the news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus had only arrived sooner, Perdiccas would have defeated the Egyptian satrap. This claim reflects greater optimism than the situation supports, but clearly the news would have helped the regent's situation. Also, while many of the common soldiers had expressed their dissatisfaction with "threatening shouts" after the disaster attempting to cross the Nile (Diod. 18. 36. 4), in the final analysis, it was their commanders who assassinated Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 36. 4–5).⁷³

With the troops' obvious reluctance to proceed against Ptolemy, Perdiccas was certainly risking a reaction similar to that which forced him to accede to the marriage of Philip and Adea/Eurydice, but it is doubtful that he had much choice but to continue. Antipater and Craterus had already landed in Asia (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26–27), and there was no possibility that Perdiccas could be reconciled with Ptolemy (Briant 1973A: 264). Perdiccas in order to rekindle his commanders' enthusiasm for the Egyptian campaign gave gifts to some and made promises to others (Diod. 18. 33. 5). The army's rejection of the need for war with Ptolemy would explain the reluctance of Perdiccas' commanders to continue the invasion (Diod. 18. 33. 5). Initially his officers had unanimously endorsed the Egyptian campaign (Diod. 18. 25. 6); the failure to convince his troops of the crimes of Ptolemy compounded by the lack of success during the invasion would explain their loss of confidence.

If Perdiccas had enjoyed success in the campaign, the disgruntlement and lack of confidence would have been replaced by enthusiasm. Unfortunately for Perdiccas the campaign was a disaster. Near Memphis, his army failed to force a crossing of the Nile, and 2000 men were lost (Diod. 18. 36. 1). Desertions soon began and a conspiracy was formed in which the leading figures were Pithon, Antigenes, and Seleucus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 29; Diod. 18. 36. 4; Paus. 1. 6. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1).⁷⁴ However, Errington (1970: 65–6) is correct that Ptolemy must have been involved as well. While Errington's evidence is circumstantial,

73 Various descriptions of his death do appear in our sources. Pausanias (1. 6. 3) states that his own bodyguards killed him; Photius' *Epitome* of Arrian (1a. 28), that he was killed in combat; Strabo (17. 1. 8), by his own infantry men, but Diodorus' more detailed account is to be preferred.

74 Errington (1970: 66) suggests that Pithon was the leader in the attack on Perdiccas, which is certainly possible given his later reward (Diod. 18. 36. 7). However, Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 35) states that Antigenes was the first to attack the regent, which could be interpreted to mean that Antigenes led the plot. But taken literally the passage only means that Antigenes was the first physically to assault Perdiccas.

it is nonetheless convincing. Ptolemy was welcomed in the Perdiccan camp the day after the murder (Diod. 18. 36. 6). Moreover, in an address to the royal army he expressed his “debt of gratitude” to Pithon (Diod. 18. 36. 6); this debt seemingly could only have involved the latter’s role in the death of Perdiccas.

The aftermath of Perdiccas’ death is unclear in the sources. Diodorus (18. 36. 6–7; 37. 1–2) makes reference to an assembly meeting the day after the regent’s murder, in which Ptolemy defended his actions, new regents were selected, and the surviving Perdiccans were condemned. Photius’ epitome of Arrian’s *Successors* (1a. 30), however, makes no reference to an address to the troops by Ptolemy after Perdiccas’ death and has the decisions regarding the regency and the condemnation of the Perdiccans made jointly in a council of *principes*. In this very abbreviated epitome of Arrian there are no references to an assembly after the one regarding Perdiccas’ charges against Ptolemy and before that at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 31–33). Diodorus, on the other hand, makes no reference to any councils of the *principes* following Perdiccas’ death. Based on these indications in the sources, the following reconstruction appears the most plausible. Soon after the assassination, that evening or the next morning, a meeting of all the conspirators, including Ptolemy, was held in which it was decided to convene the army and present their reasons for the murder. With the regent dead and the army unruly, the conspirators wished to get the army’s endorsement for their actions while the troops were still hostile to the memory of their former commander. The soldiers had been against the invasion (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 28), and Diodorus (18. 36. 4) makes it clear that by the time of the assassination the entire army had been alienated from Perdiccas. In this same council, it was decided that Ptolemy himself would address the troops presenting both a defense of his opposition to the former regent and a justification for the murder (cf. Diod. 18. 36. 7); in short, the assembly was to ratify the assassination.⁷⁵

As earlier in Babylon, the Macedonian troops would be acting in a capacity not part of the traditions of Macedonia; however, unlike the initial meeting in Babylon, this decision-taking assembly would not occur spontaneously,

75 Briant (1973A: 272–4) argues that Ptolemy addressed the Macedonians in a separate meeting of the assembly, but there is no reason to presume that there was more than one assembly meeting held in the immediate aftermath of Perdiccas’ death. Diodorus (18. 36. 6–37. 2) has interrupted his account of the meeting to report the arrival of the news of Craterus’ death, once he has done so, he has then proceeded with the business of the assembly. There is no reason to interpret this passage as referring to two different assemblies.

but by the design of the conspirators.⁷⁶ The regency would have been one of the issues discussed in the council. Here, the great difficulty was that Ptolemy, while preferred by the army, did not want the position (Diod. 18. 36. 6), and neither Antipater, nor Craterus was present. The knowledge of the death of Craterus was not yet known. It was, therefore, decided on Ptolemy's suggestion that Arrhidaeus, who had brought Alexander's corpse to Egypt, and Pithon, who had played a major role in the conspiracy against Perdiccas, would assume the regency. The next day this was the position presented to the troops by Ptolemy, who presided over the assembly (Diod. 18. 36. 6–7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30–31). It is unclear if the conspirators planned to charge the former Perdiccan leaders before the assembly, or if this was to be left to the new regents. Perhaps, the conspirators hoped to reach some settlement with these still powerful individuals.⁷⁷ Antipater had earlier attempted to reach an accommodation with Eumenes (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 26; Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6). In any case, while the council's recommendation for the regency was being approved by the assembly, the news of Craterus' and Neoptolemus' deaths in Asia Minor arrived and enraged the troops (Diod. 18. 37. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2). The army now passed a sentence of death on all Perdiccans, both those present and absent.⁷⁸ Even Perdiccas' sister Atalante, the wife of Attalus, was slain; Eumenes, Alcetas and Attalus were among those condemned in absentia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30; Diod. 18. 36. 6–37. 2).⁷⁹ Attalus with the Perdiccan fleet had fled to Tyre where he

76 This was also the case in Babylon with the rejection of Alexander's "plans" and the acknowledgment of the newborn son of Alexander as Alexander IV. In both of these cases, the army ratified what had been decided by the *principes*.

77 Errington (1970: 67) suggests that the violent reaction to the news from Asia Minor represented the propaganda activities of the anti-Perdiccan generals. They hoped, says Errington, to represent Eumenes as a Greek rebel similar to those put down in Asia by Pithon and in Greece by Antipater. The other Perdiccans could then be represented as supporters of Greek rebels. There is no evidence to support this suggestion; the sources make it clear that it is the connection to Perdiccas which condemns them all. Goukowsky (1978: 91) argues that the Macedonians regarded Craterus' death as a case of regicide, so great was their regard for him.

78 Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30; Diod. 18. 37. 2, 59. 4, 62. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1; App. *Syr.* 53; *Mith.* 8; Just. 13. 8. 10.

79 The condemnation of the Perdiccans was not the result of a formal trial for treason (as Granier 1931: 70–1; Engel 1974: 127–34; Rosen 1967B: 104, and n. 65; Briant 1974A: 273 and n. 4). While the sources do speak of these individuals as "enemies" of the Macedonians (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30; App. *Syr.* 53; *Mith.* 8; Just. 13. 8. 10), it is clear in Diodorus' description (18. 37. 1–2) of the condemnation that formality did not exist. Moreover, if Diodorus is to be believed, the condemnations occurred almost spontaneously upon the arrival of the news of Craterus' death. Diodorus is the only source who describes anything of the

was joined by many other supporters of the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 39; Diod. 18. 37. 3).

The army with the kings and new regents proceeded north to rendezvous with Antipater. The troops got as far as Triparadeisus in northern Syria.⁸⁰ Here by late August or early September, what had been for some time general insubordination in the ranks became mutiny.⁸¹ Eurydice, the wife of King Philip, was its focus.⁸² She had become Philip's wife through the support of these same troops and her influence with them was considerable. Under this pressure, Pithon and Arrhidaeus abdicated in favor of Antipater, who was not present but near (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 31–32; Diod. 18. 39. 1–2). The new arrangement worked for a short period of time, but not for long. When Antipater finally arrived, agitation had broken out anew. Eurydice was again at its center, but various Perdiccan elements were also present, notably Attalus recently arrived from Tyre (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 33, 39; cf. Diod. 18. 39. 3–4).⁸³ The troops were upset over arrears in pay (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). Antipater addressed the troops and told them that he was without funds, but would pay them eventually. As might be imagined, this news did not soothe the soldiers, whose displeasure was enhanced when Eurydice spoke against the new regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 33). In the rioting that followed, Antipater was almost killed, but was saved through the intervention of Antigonus, himself only recently returned from

process by which the Perdiccans were condemned; the other sources only note the fact. Most likely as part of Ptolemy's and the other conspirators' defense, they had proposed to the assembly a refutation of Perdiccas' acts and, perhaps, the condemnation of the leading Perdiccans. It is highly doubtful that the *principes* sought the death of Perdiccas' sister and Attalus' wife, Atalante, yet, her condemnation is associated by Diodorus (18. 37. 2) with the others. Atalante's condemnation fits more readily into a scenario of spontaneous anger over recent events in Egypt and the report of Craterus' death, than it does into one of legal formality.

- 80 While Triparadeisus has not been positively identified, it was most likely in the valley of the Orontes river in northern Syria (Perdrizet 1898: 34–9; Abel 1952: 1:26; Dussaud 1899: 113–21; 1927: 112; Schlumberger 1969: 147–9).
- 81 Perdiccas' death occurred no later than early July. The march from Egypt to Triparadeisus in northern Syria where the royal army rendezvoused with Antipater (Diod. 18. 39. 1), would have taken approximately two months; the distance is roughly 650 miles and the average march-rate for a large army with elephants was, as noted previously, minimally 9 miles per day.
- 82 Roisman (2012: 137n. 44) rightly points out that this was a struggle over control of the army.
- 83 While Berve (1973: 2:95 [#184]) denies that the Attalus mentioned at Triparadeisus is the same as Perdiccas' brother-in-law, the context suggests that the identification is correct (see Briant 1973A: 278 n. 6; Heckel 2006: 62–4 [#2]).

Cyprus, and Seleucus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32–33, 39; Diod. 18. 39. 4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). Antigonus convinced the soldiers to be patient and that their money would be forthcoming (Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). With order restored, an assembly was called in which Antipater's regency was ratified by the army (Diod. 18. 39. 4; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 33). Following his confirmation by the army in assembly, the new regent in concert with the *principes* distributed the satrapies and organized a campaign against the surviving Perdiccans (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 35–38; Diod. 18. 39. 6).⁸⁴ The campaign against Perdiccas' remaining associates was made necessary by their intervention at Triparadeisus and their continued influence with the army. Eumenes' province of Cappadocia was given to Nicanor (Diod. 18. 39. 6; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 37), and Antigonus received the command of the royal army, consisting of most of Perdiccas' old forces,⁸⁵ and was to operate in Asia against Eumenes and the other remaining Perdiccans (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7–40. 1; Just. 14. 1. 1). Many have questioned Antipater's grant of such powers to Antigonus given the latter's later actions, especially in light of suspicions raised concerning Antigonus' ambitions by Antipater's own son Cassander (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38). Fritz Schachermeyr (1925: 454) even suggests that Antipater was suffering from some sort of mental impairment. However, rational reasons do exist for Antigonus' rewards at Triparadeisus. As Briant (1973A: 230–3) is at pains to point out, Antipater had very little choice but to grant such broad powers to Antigonus. A war was needed to be carried on in Asia against the surviving and hostile Perdiccans. Antipater did not wish to conduct it; Craterus was dead; Ptolemy had opted out (Diod. 18. 36. 6–7, 43. 1–2); Lysimachus was not present at Triparadeisus and apparently had his hands full in Thrace (Lund 1992: 20–1, 49), although he did assist Antipater when that new regent crossed back into Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 45). Antipater's eldest son Cassander was obviously not regarded by his father as either sufficiently experienced for, or capable of, such an assignment; Antipater later left the regency to an old comrade, Polyperchon, not to Cassander (Diod. 18. 48. 4). The other potential candidates were all former Perdiccans. Antigonus had proven to be loyal, capable, and at Triparadeisus, a life saver (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 33). He had served Antipater

84 While Granier (1931: 65–6), Fontana (1960: 149) and Seibert (1969: 32) all see an assembly of soldiers playing a role in this distribution, Briant (1973A: 255) is correct that the evidence indicates that it was the regent and the council who made the distribution.

85 Certain deletions were made from the royal army before its assignment to Antigonus. Antigènes and 3000 “rebellious Macedonians” (clearly the argyraspids, see Anson 1988B: 118–19) were separated to convey treasure from Susa to Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38), Arrhidaeus was given 1000 Macedonians (cf. Diod. 18. 51. 1), and presumably certain other commanders received troops as well.

well and had requested the command against Eumenes. Billows believes that Antipater even wished to designate Antigonus as his successor (1990: 69–71), and he may well be correct. Antipater was in his seventies at this time and did die the very next year. The thought that a successor would soon be needed must have crossed his mind. However, Antipater initially placed certain checks on Antigonus' authority. Antigonus' friend Menander was not reinstated in Lydia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 37; Diod. 18. 39. 6).

As at Alexander's death, Eumenes' position close to the seat of power was destroyed. In so many ways he was in far worse circumstances than he had been at Alexander's death. He had been declared a criminal by the royal army and a powerful force had been sent against him. He did, however, possess Cappadocia and a loyal army, things he had not possessed in the earlier crisis. It was now up to him to make the most of these resources.

Appendix: Low or High Chronology?

Among the many difficulties in reconstructing the ancient past is arriving at a timeline of events. Ancients used many different chronological systems, when they even deigned to provide a clear chronological framework. Years in different places and at different periods began at different starting points, were commonly based on phases of the moon, and years were generally identified by reference to the name of some eponymous official or officials, or to specific regnal years. Our major narrative source for the period of the *Diadochi* down to the preliminaries to the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Diodorus, attempted to place his history within not one but three chronological frameworks: Athenian archon years, Roman consulships, and Olympiads. Unfortunately, none of these had the same beginning or ending dates (see Chapter 1). Diodorus, moreover, frequently ignores all of these beginning dates, and starts his years with the start of the campaigning year, typically in the spring. Dating by campaigning years and by seasons was apparently the system used by Hieronymus. Unfortunately, the other surviving narrative sources for these years are not especially helpful for chronology. While both Justin's abridgment of Pompeius Trogus and Photius' epitome of Arrian's *History of the Successors* tend to narrate events in a sequential fashion, neither presents a systematic chronology; nor for these years are Plutarch's or Nepos' relevant biographies more than occasionally useful chronologically. For the years following Alexander's death, which is now dated convincingly on June 11, 323 (Depuydt 1995: 98–117), there are now three different chronological schemes adopted by modern historians.

One, the so-called "Low Chronology" (Manni 1949; 1951: 67–73; Errington 1970: 75–7; 1977; Billows 1990: 64–80; Anson 2002/3; 2014), which dates most events one year later than the "High Chronology" (Beloch 1967: 237–41; Bosworth 1992A; 1992B; Romm 2011:

xiv), and a third, hybrid system, that combines aspects of each of the two preceding arrangements (Stylianou 1994: 71–84; Boiy 2007B; 2010). While there are minor disagreements about events as to season or sequencing for the period from Alexander's death through 322, the major disagreement concerns the year which saw the death of the regent Perdiccas and the meeting at Triparadeisus. For those adhering to the Low Chronology, these events occurred in 320, for the High Chronology adherents, 321. The determination of the timing of the events described in this chapter is hindered by the absence in Diodorus' often flawed chronology of any reference to two crucial years: 321/20 and 320/19.⁸⁶ For these years, he provides none of his usual references: no archon years, consular years, Olympic years. However, unanimity concerning the sequence of events from Alexander's death down to the conclusion of the First Diadoch War is beginning to appear (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 163). There are certain indications that for the years of the first conflict of the Successors the "Low Chronology" is the correct framework. Diodorus (18. 36. 7) notes that Perdiccas served as regent for three years before his death during his invasion of Egypt. Since Alexander the Great died in June 323, a determination based on a surviving Babylonian cuneiform tablet, with the period of strife which followed his death lasting a week (Curt. 10.10.9; for Bosworth [2002: 55] weeks), this would place Perdiccas' death in the late spring or early summer of 320. Moreover, the date is confirmed by the Parian Marble, an inscription discovered on the island of Paros relating events chronologically from the mythic kings of Athens to 264/63 BC, when it was likely inscribed. The Marble places Perdiccas death in the Athenian archon year 321/20, sequenced after Antigonos' flight to Macedonia and the internment of Alexander's body in Memphis (*FGrH* 239 B F-11). The exact chronological reference to the length of Perdiccas' regency in Diodorus, as well as a reference to the "almost exactly two years" associated with the building of Alexander's funeral carriage, in all likelihood comes from Hieronymus (Anson 1986: 209–11). This would give a date probably in May/June 321 for the hearse's completion. The carriage would then have had to travel the approximately nine-hundred miles to its rendezvous with Ptolemy in southern Syria. The carriage, given its elaborate and ceremonial nature would have journeyed very slowly. It was drawn by sixty-four mules, all outfitted with gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18. 27. 5). In addition, its progress must have been very slow because of the large crowds it drew wherever it went (Diod. 18.28.1), and even the roads had to be widened en route to accommodate its size (Diod. 18.28.2). Now, mule trains in the American West with better harnesses (the horse-collar

86 Brian Sheridan (2014: 123–8) argues that these omissions are lacunae in the text and not the result of any deliberate or forgetful action on the part of Diodorus. However, the Byzantine summary of chapter 18 does not indicate, when compared to the text itself, any significant lacunae at these points from the manuscripts at least available in the Byzantine period.

was not invented until the Middle Ages [White 1964: 59]) and better mules, achieved a usual speed of between fifteen and twenty miles per day, resting completely one day out of seven (Walker 1966: 125). Given the complexity of Alexander's funeral carriage, its ceremonial nature, and the inferiority of the equipment, a speed of between ten and fifteen miles per day with a seventh day for rest would be optimistic. Even if the maximum rate is assumed, it would still take the cortege a minimum of forty-five days to travel the approximately five hundred and fifty miles from Babylon to Thapsacus, and, perhaps, another 30 from there to the rendezvous with Ptolemy in southern Syria (Diod. 18.28.3), where the sarcophagus was shipped to Egypt. Ptolemy, consequently, could not have intercepted the body before July of 321 at the earliest. Moreover, given the average temperature in the summer in Iraq during this time of year, the cortege likely did not leave until later in the year. In any case, since Perdiccas died in Egypt no later than early July, these two events could not have happened in the same year. It was only after the seizure of Alexander's corpse that Perdiccas launched his invasion march in the following spring (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 25; Diod. 18. 28. 2; Str. 17. 1. 8).

Additionally, the *Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs* (BCHP 3, Obv. 23–6) (Finkel and van der Spek 2013), a fragmentary, cuneiform, chronological listing of events, indicates that Perdiccas died during the fourth year of the reign of Philip III, or 320/19. The Babylonian year began with the first new moon after the vernal equinox. The *Chronicle* (BCHP 3, Obv. 23) lists a battle between the king and the satrap of Egypt prior to the year 319/18, in the month of Aiaru, or Ajjar, (Smith 1924: 140, 142, lines 3–4, 6; Grayson 1975: 115–16, lines 4–7; Del Monte 1997: 183, line 6), or May/June (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 34, 36). The invasion then by this reading of the *Chronicle* occurred between May 11 and June 8, 320 BC (*ibid.* 36). Finkel and van der Spek (2013) read the word accepted by other commentators as Aiaru as “same month,” however. Since there is only one time when King Philip III was in Egypt, i.e. Perdiccas' invasion of Egypt, the reference must refer to this event. While the year is not specified, line 26 makes reference to Philip's fifth year, noting an event that takes place in a following year. There is no significant gap in the text here, so the events in line 23 must refer to that monarch's fourth year.

While Brian Bosworth (1992B: 75–9) has argued that Philip became king of Babylonia the year before Alexander's death, this assumption has been shown to be incorrect and that Philip's first regnal year in Babylonia is synonymous with the first year as Alexander's heir for the entire empire (Del Monte 1997: 184–6; Boiy 2000: 118 n. 15; Anson 2002/3: 376–80). Finally, the *Babylonian Chronicle* reports that Seleucus entered Babylon on November 14, 320 (BCHP 3, Obv. 24–5). He left for Babylon later in the same year as Perdiccas' Egyptian expedition. While all three sources of these dating referents have limitations—Diodorus does not specify the dates in this situation and is often confused otherwise; the Marble on occasion in clear error (Anson 2002/3: 376); and the *Chronicle* both fragmentary and without a definite provenance (Anson

2006a: 2–3)—there is nothing in the narrative of events that would indicate that this chronology is suspect. Arguments for the high chronology with respect to this war, on the other hand, are based entirely on speculation: Philip being named the king of Babylonia in the year before Alexander's death; Diodorus' three years for Perdiccas' regency being an exaggeration, and the almost two years for the completion of the funeral carriage being in reality much less. The Low Chronology certainly after the publication of Boiy's *High and Low* (2007B) has become more generally accepted for the years from 321 to 318. Serious disagreements remain with respect to the years from 318–312 (see the appendix at the end of Chapter 6).

“The Fickleness of Fortune”

With Perdiccas' death and his own condemnation by the Macedonian army in Egypt, Eumenes found his position in Asia Minor anything but secure. When he learned of these events, he informed his men. Those wishing to leave were given permission (Just. 14. 1. 1–2). Eumenes, however, maintained that Perdiccas had been murdered and the kings seized by those disloyal to Alexander's family and memory; in short, he and the remaining Perdiccans were the true loyalists to the Argead house (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 5, 12). Such a belief was essential if he were to retain the loyalty of his Macedonian troops.¹ Here, as in Babylon, Eumenes convinced the soldiers of the validity of his claim. In the winter following Perdiccas' death, when his opponents sent notices into his camp offering a reward of 100 talents and other honors to whomever would carry out the sentence enacted by the army in Egypt, the “Macedonians became incensed and made a decree that a thousand of the leading soldiers should serve him continually as a bodyguard” (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9–10).² Eumenes rewarded his loyal Macedonians by distributing to them “purple caps and military cloaks,” gifts usually bestowed by kings on their favorites (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 12; cf. Just. 14. 1. 6–11). To the surviving Perdiccans, the kings were captured, their legitimate regent dead. Obviously, in the minds of his soldiers, Eumenes, as the former regent's second-in-command, became the chief representative of legitimate authority.³

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- 1 While Bengtson's assertion (1937: 1:174–5) that loyalty to the royal house was the only criterion the Macedonian soldiers used in choosing their leaders is demonstrably false, it was certainly an important one.
 - 2 According to Justin (14. 1. 11) Eumenes came forward and claimed responsibility for the letters. This aspect of the incident is unlikely. If it were correct, why would Eumenes' men still believe there was a need for a bodyguard?
 - 3 Rosen (1967: 72–3) believes that Plutarch and Justin have placed in this context details which properly belong to a similar incident which occurred two years later. He argues that the creation of the bodyguard to protect Eumenes and Eumenes' bestowal of “royal gifts” on these troops should be associated with Antigonos' later attempt to subvert Eumenes' troops in Cilicia (Diod. 18. 62. 3–4). At that later time, Eumenes had been appointed by the kings “supreme general” in Asia. For Rosen, the “royal gifts” would more likely be given by the “supreme general,” than by an individual under sentence of death from the Macedonian army in Egypt (*ibid.* 73). The context, however, makes it clear that Eumenes was not royal

Eumenes scrupulously maintained at least the fiction of loyalty to the royal house and his position as the lawful power in Asia. In Aeolis, near Mount Ida, he took the horses he needed for his cavalry from the royal herd, but gave the overseers a receipt for the number taken (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 5). Eumenes, however, was careful not to rely exclusively on his legitimist claims; he was well aware that while his Macedonians retained some residual loyalty to their heritage, they were also after a decade's service in Asia professional soldiers. These troops, like the Greek mercenaries with whom they served, were loyal to those who paid them well and regularly (Anson 1990: 230–47). During the Macedonian army's long service in Asia under Alexander it had evolved from a national force loyal to homeland, its officers, and especially to the king, into a corporate body to whose allegiances was added the fidelity to self-interest so common among mercenarysoldiers. The military camp had become their home; it contained their families and all their worldly goods (Parke 1933: 207; Chapter 8). Even during Alexander's lifetime these troops had shown some of these characteristics. After Darius' death in 330, as Alexander moved east, he increasingly made use of mass meetings both to instill enthusiasm in his troops and to test his authority.⁴ Mercenaries from the Greek world tended to resolve issues involving their interests by assembly. This was certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus on the *Anabasis* recorded by Xenophon.⁵ It was also the case with the "mercenaries" who accompanied Alexander into Asia. In the revolt of the "Greeks" occupying the settlements in Bactria and Sogdiana in 326/325, there were a number of assemblies in which various leaders attempted to justify their actions to their troops, and in which the troops made decisions (Curt. 9. 7. 5, 8, 10). In 323, many of the "Greeks" remaining in the "upper satrapies" met, decided on a return to Greece, and elected a leader (Diod. 18. 7. 2). For Alexander, prior to the Persian king's death in 330, the tradition of royal autocracy had been sufficient to ensure obedience, but later the troops had become increasingly restless (Diod. 17. 74. 3–4; Curt. 6. 2. 15–4. 1).⁶ The premise for Alexander's campaign was changing. In the late spring of 330, Alexander burned the Persian palace of Xerxes in Persepolis. Earlier he had

general with the wealth of the empire at his disposal. To pay his troops Eumenes had to confiscate land from the inhabitants (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9).

4 The latter aspect is emphasized by Errington 1978: 86–91.

5 Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 2–6, 9–20, 4. 12–16; 3. 2. 1–39; 5. 1. 1–14, 4. 19–21, 5. 7–24, 6. 1–12, 21–37, 7. 3–26; 6. 1. 14, 25–33, 2. 4–12, 4. 10–14, 17–19, 20–22, 6. 11–19, 29–30, 37; 7. 1. 24–35, 3. 2–6, 10–14, 6. 7–41.

6 Other than addresses to inspire his troops prior to battle, Alexander is not recorded by the sources as addressing his soldiers in a mass meeting prior to 330. Before that date, Alexander exclusively made decisions on his own, or after consultation with his commanders.

permitted his troops to pillage the city. Alexander's actions came about even though Persepolis, like the other Persian capital cities, had surrendered to him without resistance. The others had remained virtually untouched. The wrath wreaked on Persepolis was to mark the end of the war of revenge whose propaganda had carried the armies of Macedonia and symbolically all of the Greek world to victory on the Granicus, at Isus and Gaugamela (Anson 2013A: 156–7). But, Alexander had no interest in calling a halt to his conquests. Not long after the burning of the palace in Persepolis, on arriving in Ecbatana in Media still in pursuit of the fleeing Darius, Alexander dismissed the allied contingents (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 4–5).⁷ Those of the allies who wished to continue, in full knowledge of the change in the nature of the war, were enrolled as mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 6). Darius' death followed a couple of months later (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 21. 10; Curt. 5. 13. 15–25; Diod. 17. 73. 2). The first recorded mass meeting was called to gain the support of the soldiers for a further advance into Asia given the new circumstances. Here, Alexander still presented the issues in nationalistic terms; territories were not yet secure and further campaigns were necessary to complete their subjugation (Diod. 17. 74. 3–4; Curt. 6. 2. 15–4. 1; Just. 12. 3. 1–4). But, subsequently, the king had to resort to more personal appeals to keep his troops' loyalty. Prior to his campaign against the Indian Gandaridae, Alexander had permitted his soldiers to plunder neighboring lands to secure their favor (Diod. 17. 94. 1–3; cf. 104. 5–7). Earlier on the Hyphasis in an attempt to secure their acquiescence to a further advance he had promised among other things riches and booty (Curt. 9. 2. 27; Arr. *Anab.* 5. 26. 8). By 323, these Macedonian troops serving in Asia exhibited a combination of professional and national attributes, for which Alexander was the nexus of both qualities. He was the most successful general ever, an excellent paymaster, and the national leader of Macedonia. Much of the unrest after his death can be attributed to the inability of any other commander to emulate the great Alexander (cf. Just. 14. 2. 7). Many were excellent paymasters; many were successful military commanders; none was the embodiment of these qualities with traditional Macedonian royal authority. The last would only come after the first generation of Alexander's Successors had left the stage (Anson 2014A: 190–3).

Soon after the news of the disaster in Egypt reached him, Eumenes had moved his troops to the Hellespont where he forced the local population to pay his forces and those that refused he plundered (Just. 14. 1. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9–10). If he had cared to do so, Eumenes could justify his actions by proclaiming that these lands were loyal to traitors to the cause of the kings. It is doubtful that his troops were that interested in the legal niceties. Eumenes' various actions

7 Diodorus (17. 74. 3) places this dismissal somewhat later, after the death of Darius.

had the desired effect; his army stood by him in the immediate crisis and he now confidently prepared for the coming struggle. Eumenes even plundered Hellespontine and western Phrygia while Antipater and Antigonus were present, but the latter two remained inactive (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 72r14–73v11; Plut. *Eum.* 8.9–11).⁸ Earlier, Eumenes had actively sought an engagement with Antipater on the plains of Lydia where he could use his cavalry to good advantage. As part of his plan, Eumenes had journeyed to Sardis to try to gain Cleopatra's active support (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6; Just. 14. 1. 7–8). Her adherence would have made his role as the avowed legitimist more credible. But, with Antipater near, Cleopatra requested that Eumenes withdraw.⁹ Eumenes' operations brought him into great esteem even among the soldiers of his enemies, who began to despise their overall commander, Antipater (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* 72r14–73v8), given his reluctance to confront the Cardian. Eumenes' confidence and likely much of Antipater's reluctance must have been based on Eumenes' superior cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6).¹⁰ While his actions did raise his standing among his troops, a victory over the new regent would have accomplished much more. While not actively engaging Eumenes, Antipater was not

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- 8 The palimpsest is a parchment document believed to have originally contained a fragment of Arrian's lost history of the Successors, which was preserved by being erased and overwritten. Given modern techniques, much of the original Arrian text has been uncovered. See Dreyer 2007: 251–5 for the most current edition and translation.
- 9 Hornblower (1981: 162; also, Schäfer 2002: 101) suggests that Cleopatra did not send Eumenes away empty-handed. She argues that it was Cleopatra who empowered Eumenes to distribute the "special gifts of royalty." This is doubtful. Officially Cleopatra had no such authority. Moreover, she "was afraid to give Antipater any cause for complaint" (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7). As it was, when Antipater reached Sardis, he reproached Cleopatra for having sided with Perdiccas and Eumenes. She defended her actions and in the end Antipater withdrew, leaving her in peace (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 40). Eumenes based his authority on his appointment as royal general in Asia Minor; a command given him by the then regent Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 5.1; cf. Diod. 18. 29. 3).
- 10 Antigonus and Antipater followed the southern or Pisidic route west (cf. Cary 1949: 151), traveling up the coast from Syria, passing through the Cilician Gates, and turning west at Tyana (basically the same route except in reverse followed east by Cyrus in 401); Antipater proceeded on to Sardis (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 4; Just. 14. 1. 7), and hence to Hellespontine Phrygia; Antigonus' camp was at some distance "near Phrygia" (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 43). Billows (1990: 72) believes that the royal army proceeded north from Tyana to the Royal Road and then turned west. While the exact course is not known, this would have taken them well out of their way. Antipater was interested in avoiding direct conflict with the Perdiccans, but this route would have taken them well into Eumenes' province and onto the plains of Cappadocia, where geography and proximity would have given the Cardian an overwhelming cavalry superiority. It was also a land of marginal agriculture (Engels 1978: 37).

entirely quiescent. While passing north of Alcetas' strongholds in southern Pisidia, he did detach a force under the command of Asander to invade Pisidia, but this force was defeated (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 41). Asander subsequently rejoined Antipater and Antigonos, and continued on to his recently reassigned satrapy of Caria (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6; 19. 62. 2). Another factor influencing Antipater's decision not to engage Eumenes besides the Cardian's superior cavalry was the questionable loyalty of the newly acquired royal army. These troops had rioted against Antipater at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32–33, 39), and later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe, they would riot again (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 44–45). The trouble at Abydus was, as it had been at Triparadeisus, mostly over money (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). At Triparadeisus, there were other issues involved, including devotion to the royal family in the person of Eurydice, who had encouraged the mutinous behavior (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32–33; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4; Diod. 18. 39. 2–4), and at Abydus, she may again have played a role, although our only source here (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 44) just notes grievances over past due remuneration. Moreover, Antipater clearly had no long-term interests in Asia. He was almost eighty years of age (*Suda* s.v. *Antipater*). His invasion had been to forestall Perdiccas' contemplated assault on Macedonia. He was apparently in a great hurry to return to Macedonia. All indications are that Antipater did not wait for spring, but departed for Macedonia before the end of winter (Bosworth 1992B: 59). He left for Europe as soon as he could and did not involve himself further in affairs in Asia. He died in the following year (Diod. 18. 48. 1, 4, 50. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1).

In response to Cleopatra's entreaty, Eumenes had left Lydia, ultimately retiring to southern Phrygia where he would be in closer proximity to the other Perdiccans in Pisidia. Here, after his campaign of harassment in Hellespontine and western Phrygia, Eumenes spent the winter of 320/319 in Celaenae (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7–9), Antigonos' former satrapal capital (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 29. 3; Diod. 18. 39).¹¹ Antigonos and Antipater had continued into Hellespontine Phrygia

11 Billows (1990: 74) believes that Plutarch's statement (*Eum.* 8. 7) placing Eumenes' winter quarters in Celaenae should be rejected. He argues that Diodorus (18. 40. 1) indicates that Eumenes wintered in Cappadocia. However, Diodorus only states that Antigonos left winter quarters seeking Eumenes who at that time was in Cappadocia. Diodorus' use of "διατρίβοντα" only indicates that Eumenes delayed in the sense that after wintering at Celaenae he had moved into Cappadocia where he was then encamped. Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 8) shows that there was a meeting of the former Perdiccan commanders during this winter. Celaenae would have been a far more convenient location than somewhere in Cappadocia. Polyænus (4. 6. 6) does state that Antigonos spent the winter of 320/319 in Cappadocia, but this is highly doubtful. Antigonos would have had to have moved back across Phrygia late in the year after his final arrangement with Antipater.

after their stay in Sardis, where they camped separately, but not at too great a distance from one another (cf. *Arr. Succ.* 1. 42–43). There had apparently been growing friction between the two commanders. Even though Antipater showed a great reluctance to engage the remaining Perdiccans in Asia Minor himself, Antigonus was apparently criticized for doing likewise, and felt the sting of the criticism. He had, after all, requested the command against the forces still loyal to the former regent (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 38), but had done little against them. Cassander, who had been made Antigonus' chiliarch, or second-in-command, advised his father not to trust the new general in Asia (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 42). While the nature of Cassander's suspicions are not made clear, it is telling that he insisted that his father take the kings with him to Macedonia and keep a watch on Antigonus. Antipater summoned Antigonus and after consultation new arrangements were made. The kings and Cassander would accompany Antipater to Macedonia; 8500 Macedonian infantry along with a number of Macedonian cavalry from Antipater's force would be exchanged for the bulk of the Macedonian veterans serving Antigonus.¹² It is unknown how many of the veterans returned to Macedonia with Antipater. Billows (1990: 72–3) is probably correct that the numbers in the exchange may have been rough equivalents. While it is unclear how many troops remained of the royal army that had accompanied Perdiccas to Egypt after Antipater's departure and that of a subsequent contingent, it was likely only a few thousand. Antigonus would remain as royal general in Asia (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 43). These revisions strengthened Antigonus militarily. In the first place, the kings, Eurydice, and the soldiers who had brought them power, would no longer be able to intrigue with the Perdiccans. Secondly, the troops brought in 320 to Asia from Macedonia by Antipater and now given to Antigonus were not the jaded, independently minded, often insubordinate, and occasionally murderous, veterans of Alexander's campaigns. These Macedonians gave Antigonus a considerable advantage over all of his rivals. Many of these soldiers had fought with Craterus, and after their defeat and surrender to Eumenes had nevertheless returned to Antipater, displaying a fidelity to their overall commander absent from those veterans who served Alexander and later Perdiccas.

12 While Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 43) states that Antipater gave Antigonus 8500 cavalry as well as 8500 infantry, the cavalry figure must be an error (Errington 1970: 71 n. 149; Goukowsky 1978A: 149). Later, even after acquiring additional horsemen, Antigonus' cavalry total was still only 7000 (Diod. 18. 45. 1). Clearly some cavalry were given to him, but probably less than 2000, not 8500. Much of his cavalry may have been native. In 315, Antigonus possessed 1000 Phrygian and Lydian cavalry (Diod. 19. 29. 2). These forces were most likely acquired much earlier.

Alexander's veterans were a very independent lot, even with the departure of the bulk of these troops with Antipater, those who had been left with Antigonus proved troublesome. During the winter of 320/319, 3000 Macedonians under Holcias, a Macedonian officer, deserted Antigonus (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6).¹³ These troops from a base in the mountains engaged in pillaging the countryside of Lycaonia and Phrygia, and in light of Antigonus' fear of the possibility, were probably in communication with Alcetas, as well (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). They were subsequently recaptured and escorted to Macedonia. Pierre Briant (1973B: 66) claims that this episode shows that the Macedonians left in Asia desired to return to their homeland. Briant (*ibid.* 61) points out that, while Alexander was alive, the troops expressed this desire to return home with some frequency. The unrest, then, at Triparadeisus would have been at least in part the result of this desire to return to Macedonia (*ibid.* 68), but this is very doubtful. Both Photius' *Epitome* of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 32–33) and Polyaeus (4. 6. 4) are very clear that the overriding cause for the unrest was lack of payment for services; nowhere is the claim made that a longing to return to Macedonia had any impact on the unrest. With respect to Holcias and his forces, their Macedonian homecoming was not their choice; they were forcibly returned to Macedonia (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). Prior to their capture there is no evidence that these troops showed any interest in going back to Macedonia. In fact, as noted, there is evidence that they wished to join Alcetas in Pisidia (cf. Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). In any case, after withdrawing from Antigonus' army they spent their time pillaging the countryside (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6), not in attempting to return to their homeland. The various garrison and treasury commanders repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the kings without ever a word on repatriation. Even for those Macedonians separated from the army by Alexander and sent west with Craterus our sources are silent with respect to any complaints concerning Craterus' delay in Cilicia. Moreover, Alexander's hypaspists were part of the forces dismissed at Opis and

13 While Polyaeus does not indicate the origin of these Macedonians, the majority at least must have come from part of the royal army that was chosen to remain in Asia. If this Holcias and the Holcias mentioned in the *Liber de Morte* are identical, then it is likely and both he and his 3000 troops had been in the royal army (Heckel 1988: 79–80; 2006: 140), the force that had accompanied Perdicas to Egypt and had revolted later at Triparadeisus and conspired with former Perdiccans. His attempt to reassociate himself with those he had earlier served, and perhaps, conspired with, then would appear likely. Antigonus still had 8000 of the 8500 Macedonian infantry given him by Antipater in 316 (Diod. 19. 29. 3). The incident is not dated by Polyaeus, but it must have occurred in the winter of 320/19 (see Errington 1977: 485 n. 30). On Holcias, see Berve 1973: 2:283 [#580]; Heckel 2006 140–1).

in Cilicia with Craterus at the time of Alexander's death, but they never did return to Macedonia, nor ever showed any inclination to want to do so.

With the departure of the bulk of the old royal army, both those forces who returned with Antipater and those with Holcias who were escorted there afterwards, Antigonus was now in a position to pursue his goal of ridding Asia of former Perdiccans without serious concerns regarding the loyalty of his own forces to these other commanders. With this final arrangement, Antigonus with his new army moved into Phrygia where he spent the winter of 320/319; Antipater had remained in Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42), before crossing to Europe late in the winter of 320/319.¹⁴

For Eumenes the winter did not bring such welcome results. While in winter quarters, he had sent envoys to Alcetas and to the other Perdiccan leaders in Pisidia, suggesting strongly that they unite their forces and make war on Antigonus in common (*Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 11-F72^v 6; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 41; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8).¹⁵ Alcetas, when the news of his brother's assassination and his own condemnation in Egypt reached him, was in Pisidia (cf. Diod. 18. 44. 1, 45. 3,

14 Brian Bosworth argues that it would have been impossible for Antipater to move from northern Syria to Hellespontine Phrygia in 5–6 months (1992A: 76). Much of the difficulty he perceives is due to his dating Perdiccas' death to mid-summer and Triparadeisus to autumn. Dating Triparadeisus to late August or early September, however, eliminates the problem. The distance from the probable location of Triparadeisus to the Hellespont would require a journey of three months for an army encumbered with elephants and making only necessary stops (cf. Engels 1978: 156). The conference with Cleopatra and, perhaps, an extended stay in Sardis would not have added more than a month, and probably a good deal less. There were no major military operations other than the force separated from the main army and sent with Asander, and no reason to suppose that Antipater and Antigonus could not have entered winter quarters as early as late November. Eumenes had not harassed the royal army along its march, but had planned a battle in Lydia (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9–11; *Gothenburg Palimpsest* fo. 72^r 14–73^v 11); only after all three forces withdrew from Lydia did Eumenes begin his military operations against Antipater and Antigonus. By this time the latter were very likely already in winter quarters (cf. *Gothenburg Palimpsest* 73^v 6).

15 Billows (1990: 75 n. 43, 77 n. 50) places Alcetas in winter quarters in Caria. He bases this conclusion on Appian's report (*Syr.* 52) that Laomedon fled to Alcetas in Caria when the former's satrapy was attacked by Ptolemy. Appian (*Syr.* 52), however, has probably confused Alcetas with Asander, who was the satrap of Caria (Diod. 18. 39. 6). The *Parian Marble* (FGrH 239 B F-12) dates Ptolemy's incursion into Syria and Phoenicia in 319/318, and as Seibert (1969: 130) has pointed out, if the earlier date is accepted, it puts Ptolemy in open rebellion against Antipater, which is unlikely. Alcetas, therefore, wintered in Pisidia, which was his location when, during this same winter, he traveled briefly to Celaenae to negotiate with Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8).

46. 1),¹⁶ where he was ultimately joined by most of the other former Perdiccan commanders (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). Included among these was Attalus, Perdiccas' brother-in-law. After Perdiccas' assassination, Attalus had initially fled to Tyre, which served as a collecting point for many supporters of the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 39; Diod. 18. 37. 3–4). He joined in the short-lived agitation at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32–33), and later, with the other Perdiccans who joined him, and with additional forces recruited in Phoenicia, mounted an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes before joining Alcetas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 39; cf. Diod. 18. 45. 3). Attalus' army numbered 10000 infantry and 800 cavalry (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 39); he had also acquired 800 talents in Tyre (Diod. 18. 37. 4). Docimus, who was replaced in Babylon by Seleucus,¹⁷ and Polemon, Attalus' brother (Heckel 2006: 63 [#3]), also joined Alcetas in Pisidia (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 3; Diod. 18. 39. 6, 45. 3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). Clearly the Perdiccan forces were still formidable. From Plutarch and the palimpsest (*Eum.* 8. 8; 73v l.11–72v l.1), it would appear that the various commanders came together in Celaenae to discuss the situation. The fuller palimpsest provides the best description of the negotiations. Eumenes stated that combined their forces would be equal to those of their

16 August Vezin's (1907: 57 n. 4) suggestion that Alcetas fled from Syria back to Pisidia is possible. After refusing to cooperate with Eumenes and with the defeat of Craterus, he may have wished to aid his brother by trapping Antipater between two hostile armies. No source, however, states that Alcetas attempted to join his brother.

17 Bosworth doubts that Seleucus could have moved from Triparadeisus to Babylon and expelled Docimus and that the latter could have arrived in Pisidia by the winter of the same year as Perdiccas' death in Egypt (1992A: 77–8). Again, here as earlier with respect to Triparadeisus, the difficulty is removed by placing events earlier in the year. An army journeying from northern Syria to Babylon would have taken approximately two months. This would have put Seleucus' entrance into Babylon in late October or early November (so Mehl 1986: 40 and n. 42; Schober 1981: 68). The Babylonian Chronicle (cf. *BCHP* obv 24–25) would appear to place his arrival on November 14 (van der Spek 2014; Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 36). The sources do not indicate that there was any resistance to the change in command (see Mehl 1986: 40). Docimus had only after a struggle himself occupied the position (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 3–5), and probably had not been able to establish his authority before Seleucus appeared on the scene with the order of the kings and regent. Additionally, Seleucus was likely accompanied by Pithon who may have had a sizable army with him (see Chapter 6). Docimus' retreat to Pisidia with whatever meager forces he retained could have taken as little as one month, if these forces were cavalry and/or light-armed troops. It is also very possible that Docimus after replacing Archon in Babylon had returned to the regent and joined him in Egypt (Mehl 1986: 39–40), and from there fled to Pisidia (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6, 45. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). If this was indeed the case, then he may have brought whatever troops he had back with him, leaving only a small garrison in Babylon.

enemies, that they controlled a prosperous territory from which their army could be regularly supplied; that Antipater and Antigonus were despised by their own troops and an active Perdiccan operation would cause many of the disaffected to desert. The result, continued Eumenes, would be an armistice in which they would promise their rival commanders that they could keep those lands they currently physically possessed. Eumenes welcomed other proposals (72v l.5–73r l.9). In the end, however, the negotiations proved fruitless; neither Eumenes, nor Alcetas, was willing to concede the chief command. Apparently Alcetas himself did not exercise authority without difficulties raised by his fellow commanders in Pisidia. Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 8) reports that in their negotiations with Eumenes, "Alcetas, Polemon, and Docimus" all sought the chief command.¹⁸ In any case, there would not to be a united Perdiccan force; these commanders' pride had once again taken precedence over their judgment. This jealousy and rivalry had divided the Perdiccans at the time of Antipater's invasion and it now divided them again. This lack of cooperation was, of course, a serious blunder, since Antipater, while having left Antigonus with 8500 infantry and a contingent of cavalry, had returned to Macedonia in the same winter with the bulk of the former royal army (*Arr. Succ.* 1a. 43–44; *Diod.* 18. 39. 7). The united Perdiccan armies would have in numbers been much superior to the forces of Antigonus; they would also have been more experienced. In 319, Eumenes possessed 20000 infantry and 5000 cavalry (*Diod.* 18. 40. 7; cf. *Plut. Eum.* 9. 3), and Alcetas, 16000 foot and 900 horse (*Diod.* 18. 45. 1). Antigonus must have had roughly two-thirds as many infantry as his opponents' combined forces, but was much inferior in cavalry. The failure of the Perdiccans to cooperate emboldened Antigonus. He left his winter quarters actively seeking an engagement with Eumenes, who had himself already left Celaenae and was encamped in Cappadocia (*Diod.* 18. 40. 1), since he wished to make full use of his cavalry on the plains of Cappadocia.

18 The hostility towards Eumenes evidenced by Alcetas may not have been shared by the other Perdiccan leaders. In 316, a number of imprisoned Perdiccans, including Attalus and Docimus, overpowered their guards, and while Docimus urged that they escape into the countryside immediately, others counseled that since the fortress was strong and well-supplied, they remain and await aid from Eumenes (*Diod.* 19. 16. 1–3). Indeed, these same commanders spent so much time disputing what action to take in this instance, that the option of escape disappeared, and they were trapped in their former prison by Antigonus' troops (*Diod.* 19. 16. 3). Docimus, who had wished to escape into the countryside all along, did escape by a secret route, which he then betrayed to the besieging troops. His former prison companions were subsequently killed, while he passed into the service of Antigonus, apparently through the intervention of the latter's wife Stratonice (*Diod.* 19. 16. 4–5).

Although his troops had remained loyal in the wake of the disaster in Egypt, during the winter one of Eumenes' commanders, Perdiccas (Heckel 2006: 202 [#2]), deserted with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Eumenes recaptured the deserters, put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18. 40. 1–4). While Eumenes' earlier stratagem of plundering lands loyal to his rivals had alleviated his difficulties in paying his forces for a time, this procedure had only delayed the problem. Eumenes was cut off from access to the wealth of Asia. Even though he maintained that he, not Antigonus, represented the legitimate authority in Asia, the various "royal" officials of Asia took their orders from "King Philip" and his general in Asia. Antigonus could represent himself to his troops as a regular paymaster; Eumenes could not. Attalus and Alcetas presumably still had some financial resources left over from Attalus' acquisition of 800 talents at Tyre (Diod. 18. 37. 4), but these commanders were unwilling to cooperate with Eumenes, at least on Eumenes' terms. It is difficult to accept the obvious arrogance of all of these commanders, including the supposed selfless Eumenes, who having been designated as Perdiccas' chief commander in Asia Minor was not about to demote himself to a lesser standing no matter the cost of his pride. In 318, facing a similar conflict over the chief command, Eumenes created the fiction that none of the commanders was in charge, but rather all were in service to the spirit of the dead Alexander (Diod. 18. 60. 5–61. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 5–8; Polyæn. 4. 8. 2). Unfortunately for the remaining Perdiccans, this idea apparently did not occur to him at this earlier juncture.

While Eumenes' position in the new world order was precarious at best, that of Antigonus was very strong. He was by decree the official satrap of Phrygia and "*Strategos Autocrator*" in Asia with access to the royal resources of Asia. While Antipater assigned the satrapies at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 34–38) and granted Antigonus the title of "royal general" on his own authority (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7, 40. 1), the official enabling decrees all were issued in Philip's name, as the adult member of the "kings." While this is not stated by any source, it would appear a reasonable assumption. When later the title of "royal general" was offered to Eumenes it was done in the name of the "kings" (Diod. 18. 57. 3). Antipater at Triparadeisus was most likely named in the official edicts as the executing magistrate, as was Polyperchon later with regard to the decree granting the title of royal general to Eumenes (Rosen 1967A: 47 n. 28). The custodians of the various treasuries located throughout the empire remained loyal to the official government, i.e. the "kings." Eumenes in 318 and 317, on the strength of letters from the "kings," despite his earlier condemnation by the army in Egypt, was granted access to the treasury in Cyinda

(Diod. 18. 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 2), and to that in Susa as well (Diod. 19. 15. 5), by officials who previously would have denied him funds. But in 319, it was Antigonus who had the authority from the "kings," and as a result was able not only to pay his soldiers readily, but was even able to offer the 100-talent reward to anyone who would murder Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11).

Antigonus, using his resources, made "great promises" to Apollonides, a commander of Eumenes' mercenary cavalry, who likely had previously served Perdiccas and, perhaps, even Alexander (Heckel 2006: 41 [#2]). These horsemen were not part of Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry, who were not mercenary soldiers, but rather land owners who were rewarded for their services by the remission of taxes and gifts of horses and other honors (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3), not with pay (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9–10). Patronage was the means of securing loyalty from indigenous populations. This was a practice that was followed by Alexander himself. One of the secrets to Alexander's success was his ability "to create the conditions for a balance between his own ambition and the [indigenous] nobility's desire not to perish in the turmoil" (Briant 2002: 870). Since most of these individuals, therefore, had their own local concerns, Eumenes could not count on all of these troops serving him on a continual basis (cf. Diod. 18. 41. 3, 53. 7). Eumenes' remaining cavalry were part of the "considerable army" given to him by Perdiccas in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6). Mercenary cavalry played a prominent role in Eumenes' battle against Craterus and Neoptolemus; "he arrayed against Craterus not a single Macedonian, but two troops of 'mercenary' horse" (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1).

Apollonides agreed that during the coming battle he would desert Eumenes (Diod. 18. 40. 5–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3). Eumenes had moved to a position at Orcynia where the ground was highly suitable for cavalry maneuvers (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3).¹⁹ Antigonus advanced against him with more than 10000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 30 elephants (Diod. 18. 40. 7); a sizable portion of his forces had

19 The actual site of Orcynia is unknown, but it is likely that it was somewhere on the central plateau (cf. Diod. 18. 40. 6). Ramsay (1923: 8–9), followed by Wheatley and Heckel (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 170–1), has suggested the Vale of Loulon below UluKişla, in what is today southeastern Turkey. Such a location, however, does violence to our sources that have Eumenes wintering in Celaenae (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7) and Antigonus likely in western Phrygia, having moved east after his separation from Antipater. Both Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3) and Diodorus (18. 40. 1, 44. 1) place the battle in Cappadocia. Antigonus left his winter quarters in pursuit of Eumenes (Diod. 18. 40. 1). Finally, after the battle Eumenes was attempting to escape to Armenia (Diod. 18. 41. 1), which makes sense given his campaigning there earlier. While this discussion gets us no closer to identifying the site of the battle, it would appear to put it in the central Cappadocian plain.

been left behind to guard against an attack by the Perdiccans in Pisidia.²⁰ Opposed to Antigonus, Eumenes had approximately 20000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. In the course of the battle Apollonides, as prearranged, deserted; 8000 of Eumenes' men were killed and his entire supply train captured (Diod. 18. 40. 6–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3; Just. 14. 2. 1).²¹ Apollonides, however, may not have long survived his treachery. According to Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3), he was later captured by Eumenes' forces and hanged. It is curious that Eumenes should succeed in capturing Apollonides given his defeat, flight, and now inferior cavalry,

20 While Antigonus is credited with only 10000 infantry at Orcynia (Diod. 18. 40. 7), he must surely have had at his disposal significantly more troops. He was given 8500 Macedonian infantry and, perhaps, 2000 cavalry by Antipater before the regent crossed to Europe. Additionally, even though the majority of the old royal army returned with Antipater, certain elements from Perdiccas' old forces, including cavalry, elephants, and Greek and Asiatic infantry were retained by him as well. Later against Alcetas, Antigonus possessed 40000 infantry (Diod. 18. 45. 1), and even though Antigonus had acquired many of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18. 41. 4), Eumenes only had 20000 foot (Diod. 18. 40. 7) and his forces had suffered 8000 casualties (Diod. 18. 40. 8). The difference in the infantry numbers at Orcynia and in the battle against Alcetas must represent troops who were detached to watch the other Perdiccans while Antigonus dealt with Eumenes (Tarn 1969: 471; Engel 1971: 228; Billows 1990: 75 n. 43). These likely included 40 elephants (in 320, Antigonus had 70 [Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 43]), 10–15000 infantry, and, perhaps, 2000 cavalry.

21 Polyaeus 4. 6. 19, in all likelihood referring to this battle (see Billows 1990: 75–6), states that Eumenes' phalanx fled before any advance against Antigonus as the result of an Antigonic ruse. According to Polyaeus, Antigonus arranged for a soldier, while envoys from Eumenes were present, to announce, "the allies are here." Antigonus then dismissed the delegation and led out his army the next day drawing up his phalanx with its front twice as long as usual. The passage does, however, present difficulties. Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus mention this stratagem, and, indeed, both state that it was the desertion of Apollonides that caused Eumenes' defeat. Nor are the two descriptions of the battle compatible. Polyaeus has the phalanx in full retreat before the commencement of hostilities, while Diodorus (18. 40. 8) is clear that Eumenes' defeat resulted from Apollonides' desertion to the enemy while the battle was in progress. Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3) also refers to treachery. Moreover, Eumenes had cavalry superiority. He could easily ascertain whether the announcement was true; especially since he had a day in which to check the report's veracity. Briant, followed by Billows, on the basis of this passage declares that Eumenes was "outgeneraled" in this battle. As shown, such a claim is justified only if subversion is "outgeneraling." In all likelihood this particular stratagem derives from Duris or a similar writer and is untrue (see Melber 1885: 625). It is claimed that the importance of the desertion has been exaggerated by Hieronymus (Engel 1971: 227–31; Schäfer 2002: 112–113; Landucci Gattinoni 2008: 188–9). While possibly exaggerated, if one is depending on one's cavalry and a significant portion of that force deserts, you are in serious trouble.

but Engel (1971: 230) argues plausibly that Apollonides, while pursuing part of Eumenes' fleeing troops, through some accident, was captured.

After his defeat Eumenes marched rapidly toward Armenia where he hoped to replenish his army (Diod. 18. 41. 1). Part of Armenia may have remained loyal as a result of his campaigning in that area in 322 and 321. He probably also wanted to make contact with Orontes, the satrap of Armenia Major. Antigonos' now superior cavalry, however, made Eumenes' movements difficult. Even though Antigonos' infantry had fallen behind Eumenes' retreating force, his cavalry continually forced the latter to engage in rearguard actions (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 2). According to Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 4–5), Eumenes and his entire army eluded Antigonos and returned to the scene of the battle where they collected and burned their dead. Only a force with superior cavalry could have carried out such a movement unnoticed, and Eumenes did not possess this advantage, otherwise he would not have been subsequently overtaken (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 1). A small party of cavalry, perhaps, could have escaped notice, but then would not have had sufficient numbers to collect the 8000 dead. Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3–6) and Polyaeus (4. 8. 5) also relate that on this retreat Eumenes' scouts reported that Antigonos' supply train was vulnerable to capture. Eumenes wished to overlook this opportunity, since he was afraid that the acquisition of the enemy's baggage would slow his withdrawal. His men, however, who had so recently lost their own possessions when Antigonos had captured Eumenes' camp (Diod. 18. 40. 8), could not resist the temptation. Eumenes, therefore, secretly informed Menander, the commander of Antigonos' supply train, of the danger, and Menander quickly withdrew to safety.²² When Eumenes' scouts reported that the train was no longer vulnerable, Eumenes feigned disappointment. It is difficult to know the veracity of these anecdotes; the corresponding sections of Diodorus are very abbreviated and supply nothing either to confirm or to deny these passages. Engel's claim (1971: 230) that such details could only come from an eyewitness, i.e. Hieronymus, is unconvincing. Bosworth (1992B: 75n. 100) believes that this pursuit, especially given all of the incidents reported during it, must have taken months.

22 This has been seen as a blunder (Schäfer 2002: 114–115; Roisman 2012: 168–70). However, when retreating from an enemy of overwhelming superiority escape without encumbrance is preferable to possessions. Given such military superiority, Antigonos could have negotiated for the return. He currently was in possession of the families and goods of Eumenes' troops (Diod. 18. 40. 8), having taken these in his victory. Moreover, most of Antigonos' force was made up of relatively newly arrived Macedonians, whose families were likely still back in Macedonia. Even considering that Eumenes would later be exchanged for his soldiers' possessions, it was still best to move on hurriedly.

However, given the extent of the disaster, 8000 dead, Antigonus' new superiority in cavalry, and that commander's concern about Alcetas and the remaining Perdiccan forces, this is unlikely. It is more reasonable to assume that it was only a matter of weeks, not months. Moreover, desertions of the survivors and their enrollment with Antigonus would have made the retreat increasingly desperate (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Just. 14. 2. 3).²³ Antigonus had captured Eumenes' baggage train, which for the troops who had spent the past decade in Asia contained their families and their worldly possessions.²⁴ With escape becoming impossible, Eumenes dismissed most of his remaining forces and with 600 men (Nepos [*Eum.* 5. 3] says 700) retreated into the nearby fortress of Nora in Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 41. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 3; Just. 14. 2. 2–3).²⁵ Entering the fortress with a larger force would have accelerated and aggravated the hardships of a siege, and Eumenes reasoned that he might under those circumstances be surrendered to the enemy (Just. 14. 2. 3). Eumenes' flight into Nora occurred in the late spring of 319 (Anson 1977: 251–6).²⁶ Nora was a small

23 Plutarch (*Eum.* 10. 1) states that after his defeat at Orcynia Eumenes persuaded most of his soldiers to leave him. This passage would appear to be in direct conflict with Diodorus (18. 41. 1), where the troops are deserting Eumenes. However, the two sources may be speaking of different contingents of Eumenes' defeated army. In all likelihood, most of Eumenes' surviving infantry surrendered to Antigonus immediately after the defeat. That was the common practice of these old veterans. Many, if not most, of Eumenes' Macedonian infantry had formerly served Neoptolemus and deserted that commander for Eumenes when he was defeated (Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6; Just. 13. 8. 4; see Chapter 4). Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry would probably have proven loyal, and being mobile able to keep ahead of their pursuers.

24 On the importance of baggage, see Chapter 8.

25 With respect to the location of Nora, Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 3) places the fortress in Phrygia; Plutarch (*Eum.* 10. 2), on the border of Cappadocia and Lycaonia; Strabo (12. 2. 5) positions Nora in Cappadocia at a site later called Neroassus, and Diodorus (18. 44. 1; cf. 18. 41. 7) implies the same. W.M. Ramsay (1923: 8) suggests that a castle six miles east of Eregli called Hrakla, near the Cilician Gates, is the site of Nora. This would fit Diodorus' (18. 44. 2) statement that Antigonus marched 287 miles to Pisidia after Eumenes retreat into Nora, but Diodorus (18. 41. 1) earlier also relates that Eumenes tried to escape to Armenia but was overtaken and forced to retreat into Nora. The modern consensus, with which I now tend to agree, is Neroassus (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 173). One of the very curious aspects of Nora is that this fortress was so well supplied, but apparently had none or very few inhabitants. Such a situation suggests that this well-supplied fortress with apparently no effective guard may have been part of the old Persian defensive and supply system (cf. Hdts. 5. 52. 2–3).

26 Diodorus (18. 53. 5) states that the siege lasted one year. While Diodorus is often confused with regard to chronology, such precise indications of time usually come from his sources

but virtually impregnable fortress, little more than 1200 feet in circumference, perched on the top of a mountain and well-fortified. In addition, it contained sufficient supplies for Eumenes and his party to endure a long siege (Diod. 18. 41. 2–3). After Antigonos surrounded the fortress and began the construction of double walls, ditches and palisades, he invited Eumenes to a conference (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 2–11. 3). Antigonos undoubtedly believed that Eumenes was defeated and would be amenable to his demands. While the two renewed their former friendship, Eumenes refused to attach himself to Antigonos as a subordinate. Instead he demanded that he be reinstated in his satrapy and cleared of all charges (Diod. 18. 41. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6).²⁷ Antigonos referred Eumenes' demands to the regent Antipater and proceeded to finish his siege works (Diod. 18. 41. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 11. 1).

After leaving sufficient troops to maintain the siege, Antigonos moved in seven days by forced marches into Pisidia to meet the remaining Perdiccans (Diod. 18. 41. 7; 44. 1; Polyae. 4. 6. 7).²⁸ Antigonos' forces now numbered 40000 infantry and 7000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 43. 1; cf. 40. 7; 50. 3), including a sizable part

(see Anson 1986: 209–11), in this case Hieronymus of Cardia. Therefore, since Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7) has Eumenes leaving Nora in the spring, Eumenes must have retreated into the fortress in the late spring of 319. Antigonos then proceeded to construct his siege works, including double walls, ditches, and palisades (Diod. 18. 41. 6). This fits into Diodorus' stated chronology of placing the subsequent defeat of Alcetas in July (18. 44. 1).

27 Plutarch's (*Eum.* 10. 3–11. 3) account differs markedly in tone from the corresponding one in Diodorus (18. 41. 6–7). According to Plutarch, when Antigonos demanded that he be addressed as a superior, Eumenes refused stating, "I regard no man as my superior so long as I am master of my sword" (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 4). The basic situation is the same in the two sources, but Plutarch's account is distinctly embellished, and it is likely that he is here using a source such as Duris. Eumenes' demand that all charges against him be dismissed (Diod. 18. 41. 7) must refer to the condemnation of him by the army in Egypt. Eumenes clearly believed that there was no need for a subsequent assembly of the army to be convened to dismiss these charges; he wanted the kings' representative in Asia to cancel them. Antigonos forwarded this request not to the royal army or to a Macedonian assembly of any kind, but to the regent Antipater (Diod. 18. 41. 7). Plainly both Eumenes and Antigonos believed such decisions were royal prerogatives, as they had traditionally been in Macedonia (Anson 1985: 303–16; 2013A: 26–42).

28 According to Diodorus (18. 44. 1), Antigonos completed this march of seven days, 287 miles, with "all" his forces. This would have been a prodigious feat for any army. Even Alexander never achieved such rates for his entire army (see Engels 1978: 153–4). It is likely that this march must have been carried out by cavalry and light armed troops only (so Billows 1990: 78–9). The rest of the army, excluding the elephants, would have taken probably another week to arrive. Antigonos had already divided his army before his battle with Eumenes, leaving sizable forces already on the Pisidian border. Moreover, after Eumenes'

of Eumenes' former force (Diod. 18. 40. 8–41. 1). In the Pisidic *Aulon* the two opposing armies met and the last major Perdiccan force was defeated (Diod. 18. 44–47; Polyæn. 4. 6. 7).²⁹ According to Polyænus (4. 6. 7), Antigonus surprised his enemy and captured the camp with most of Alcetas' infantry still arming themselves for battle. Antigonus offered terms, and his former enemies now became part of his ever-expanding army. In short, this was a victory without a battle. Diodorus (18. 44–5), however, presents a very different scenario, and is to be preferred. Here, while the element of surprise is also attested, its results are not so overwhelming. Antigonus was able to seize the heights above Alcetas' camp secretly, but his presence was betrayed by the trumpeting of the elephants (Diod. 18. 44. 2). Alcetas and his fellow commanders then organized quickly a cavalry attack on the heights, which gave their phalanx time to form for battle. Despite a gallant effort with many casualties on both sides, the Perdiccan attempt to dislodge Antigonus' forces from their superior position failed. Victorious in this engagement, Antigonus launched 6000 of his cavalry into the gap between Alcetas' now defeated cavalry and his phalanx, preventing the two from joining. With the cavalry fully engaged, Antigonus launched his own phalanx down from the ridge and onto the enemy. The Perdiccans, as a consequence of these separate actions, found themselves attacked on the flanks and rear by the enemy's victorious cavalry and in the front by Antigonus' elephants and far more numerous infantry. Alcetas' forces only contained 16000 infantry and 900 cavalry. Antigonus obtained the surrender of the enemy survivors through negotiation and enrolled these units in his forces (Diod. 18. 45. 4). Not long after this battle Antigonus' army had grown to 60000 infantry

defeat and with the desertions, Antigonus may have pursued Eumenes with only cavalry and light-armed forces, sending the rest of his army on ahead.

- 29 Ramsay (1923: 1–3, 5–6) argues convincingly that the actual battle occurred some distance northeast of Cretopolis (on the location of Cretopolis, see Stillwell 1976: 410), in the pass which lies just south of the Pisidic or southern route across Asia Minor (Cary 1949: 151). Polyænus (4. 6. 7) does not mention Cretopolis, but places the battle in the “Pisidic *Aulon*.” Ramsay believes that this pass was specifically known as the Pisidic *Aulon* and was the major point of departure into Pisidia from the main southern route across Asia Minor. Both forces do appear to know that the other must take this route (Ramsay 1923: 7). Diodorus' placement of the battle near Cretopolis (18. 44. 2) probably derives from his confusion with regard to the reference to the Pisidic *Aulon*. Diodorus knew that the battle was fought in the vicinity of Cretopolis, but was unable to locate the site with any greater precision (so Ramsay 1923: 3). Antigonus after the siege of Termessus left Pisidia for Phrygia and passed through Cretopolis (Diod. 18. 47. 4). Billows (1990: 78 n. 50) argues for a pass closer to Cretopolis “towards Milyas and Selge,” Ramsay's argument that the battle occurred near a major east-west road is preferable.

and 10000 cavalry, reflecting this addition as well as that of Eumenes' forces (Diod. 18. 50. 1, 3).

Attalus, Docimus, and Polemon, and many other former allies of Perdiccas were taken captive (Diod. 18. 45. 3). Alcetas, who had long cultivated the Pisidians, escaped into the Pisidic fortress of Termessus (Diod. 18. 45. 3–46. 3),³⁰ but was subsequently betrayed and committed suicide (Diod. 18. 46. 7). When the body was turned over to Antigonos, he maltreated it for three days before abandoning it and Pisidia.³¹ Alcetas' supporters amongst the Pisidians, then, recovered his corpse and paid it proper rites (Diod. 18. 47. 3). Antigonos now went into winter quarters at Celaenae in the fall of 319 (Diod. 18. 52. 1).³²

Eumenes spent the winter under siege in Nora. Even though the fortress was in no danger of falling by assault or through starvation, morale was a problem which Eumenes did his best to alleviate by freely associating with his men (Plut. *Eum.* 11. 2–3). Moreover, the close confines of the stronghold made it impossible to exercise the horses in the usual fashion. To alleviate this problem Eumenes used a training technique to keep the horses in proper physical condition. Employing a pulley system, ropes were suspended from the beams in the ceiling and placed around the horse's neck. The horse was then drawn up into the air until only its hind legs remained in firm contact with the ground. As the horse began to strangle, it kicked out seeking a firm footing. The grooms would also prod and shout at the horse to intensify the action. Through this means the horses were kept in good physical condition in spite of their confinement (Diod. 18. 42. 3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 11. 4–8; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 4–6). In addition to being inhumane, one wonders how many horses had their necks broken in this manner.

Since the siege showed no sign of ending, Eumenes in the late summer of 319 dispatched Hieronymus of Cardia, the historian, to Macedonia to negotiate terms of surrender to Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1).³³ Diodorus only states that the delegation was sent; he is silent on whether it succeeded even in reaching

30 For a description of the ancient fortress, see Arr. *Anab.* 1. 27. 5–6 (cf. Str. 14. 3. 9).

31 This particular hatred shown by Antigonos towards Alcetas, but not the other Perdiccan commanders is curious. Perhaps, Alcetas had been especially insistent that Antigonos be removed from his satrapy back in 322 (see Chapter 3).

32 With the investment of Nora in the late spring, followed by the creation of the siege works (Diod. 18. 41. 6), the defeat of the other Perdiccans in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 44–45. 3; Polyaeus 4. 6. 7), and the subsequent actions at Termessus (Diod. 18. 45. 3–47. 3), Antigonos probably retired into winter quarters in Celaenae no later than early October, 319 (Diod. 18. 52. 1).

33 While the exact time of the dispatch of the embassy is unknown, it is a fair guess that Eumenes would not have negotiated readily with his old enemy Antipater unless he saw no other alternatives. Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7) indicates that Eumenes had tried other options.

Macedonia. In any case, nothing came of the embassy.³⁴ That Eumenes sent it at all shows how desperate his situation was becoming. No aid had reached him from any source, nor, after the defeat of Alcetas and Attalus, did it appear that any was likely to be sent to him. Eumenes had earlier avoided an alliance with Antipater, in part, because of their long-standing enmity (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7). Eumenes may have hoped to arouse Antipater's fears of Antigonus; in 320 Antipater had suspected Antigonus' "ambition" (Diod. 18. 39. 7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38). However, one very curious aspect of this mission is that not just Hieronymus, but a delegation was sent. Despite Eumenes' apparent inability to escape from Nora,³⁵ a group of individuals was able to cross the ditch, scale the palisade, and cross two walls without being noticed by the besiegers? It appears likely that, if the embassy succeeded in reaching Macedonia, it departed with the blessing of Antigonus. The implications are that as with Eumenes' earlier demands the new embassy was properly sent to the regent for adjudication. Diodorus only mentions negotiations with respect to surrender; there is no mention of alliance; there is no mention of rousing Antipater's suspicions of Antigonus. Added to these ambiguities is the death of Antipater

Eumenes certainly would not have sent the mission until the fate of the other Perdiccans had been sealed by Antigonus.

- 34 Justin (14. 2. 4) states that Antipater did send assistance, and that Antigonus immediately raised the siege as a result. This is corroborated, however, by no other source, and Justin is here likely confusing Antipater with Arrhidaeus, the former regent and satrap (see Vezin, 1907: 75n. 2), who did later attempt to send aid to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 52. 4), or, perhaps, with Polyperchon (Kanatsulis 1968: 179n. 2). Briant (1973B: 72–3), however, accepts Justin's evidence in modified form, arguing that Antipater had been informed of Antigonus' ambitions and wished to establish Eumenes as a counterpoise to the "royal general" in Asia (cf. Rosen 1968: 199). Antipater, continues Briant (*ibid.* 74), died before the aid could be sent, but the central government had been roused to Antigonus' ambitions. While Diodorus (18. 41. 5) implies that immediately after his defeat of Eumenes, Antigonus had decided to revolt from the central government, he also states that Antigonus wished for the moment to maintain good relations with Antipater. The demands made by Eumenes at Nora had been properly forwarded by Antigonus to Antipater (Diod. 18. 41. 7). It was not until the news of Antipater's death arrived in Asia that Antigonus began to consult with his *philoi* on his ambitious new plans (Diod. 18. 50. 5). Moreover, it was Cleitus who early in 318 brought the news of Antigonus' revolt to Europe (Diod. 18. 52. 5–6). Finally, Justin states that aid was sent to Eumenes and the arrival of this assistance caused Antigonus to lift the siege; he does not say that the sending of troops was contemplated, but that they were sent.
- 35 Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7), however, states that Eumenes could have escaped any time he wished and that he only remained through the winter because he did not want to camp in the open.

in the summer of 319, making it doubtful that Hieronymus, if he even reached Macedonia, found Antipater still alive. Since later he is found with Antigonus, even if he made it to Macedonia, he may have been captured as soon as he arrived back in Asia (Diod. 18. 50. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1).³⁶ Antipater, after a protracted illness, had died in the late summer of the same year as Hieronymus' mission (Diod. 18. 48. 4; 47. 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; *Eum.* 12. 1).³⁷ Antigonus learned of Antipater's death while at Cretopolis on his way to Celaenae to enter winter quarters (Diod. 18. 47. 4; 52. 1).

The news of the regent's death elated Antigonus; he now saw new vistas opening before him (Diod. 18. 47. 5; 50. 1).³⁸ In line with his new expectations, in the late fall or winter of 319, he summoned Hieronymus, who in all probability had been captured and was being held by the commander of the besieging force at Nora. While this is nowhere stated, Hieronymus is found under Antigonus' control, but had to be summoned to Celaenae from an unspecified location (Diod. 18. 50. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1). There is no reference to his having returned to Eumenes in Nora, nor to his being sent to Antigonus by Eumenes. Afterwards, Hieronymus was sent back to the fortress with new proposals for

36 Schäfer (2002: 119–21) and Dixon (2007: 165–7) insist that Hieronymus arrived in Macedonia before Antipater's death and was able to meet with Polyperchon, where he in some fashion became privy to Polyperchon's difficulties and plans. This would appear very unlikely, even if he arrived in Macedonia. Polyperchon, it could be argued had no plans until the departure of Cassander which occurred in the winter, not in the fall (so Dixon 2007: 165–6), and the arrival of Cleitus with the news of Antigonus' rebellion in the following spring.

37 Antipater was in his last illness when Demades arrived on a mission from Athens (Diod. 18. 48. 1; Plut. *Phoc.* 30. 4–6; *Dem.* 30. 3–4). Demades did not leave Athens earlier than mid-June 319 (see Errington 1977: 488 and n. 35). Antipater's death then probably occurred in the late summer (Billows 1990: 80; Bosworth 1992B: 80). This dating corresponds to the Parian Marble's (*FGrH* 239 B F-12) date of 319/318 for the death of Antipater.

38 Billows (1990: 80 n. 52) doubts that Antigonus contemplated such broad ambitions in the winter of 319/318, claiming that these are the product of "Diodoros's hindsight." Diodorus is remarkably consistent in his allegation. Antigonus offers to reconcile himself with Eumenes as part of his plan "to dominate all Asia" without recourse to the new regent, Polyperchon (18. 50. 2–4); Arrhidaeus to counteract Antigonus' "plans" begins to strengthen his position in Hellespontine Phrygia and also to send a force to relieve Eumenes (18. 51. 1, 52. 4); Antigonus launches an unprovoked attack on Lydia (18. 52. 5); he makes an alliance with Cassander, because he "wished [the new regent] Polyperchon to be surrounded by many great distractions, so that he himself might proceed against Asia without danger" (18. 54. 4). It would appear that most of these actions had to have been planned in the previous fall or early winter. Also, such uniformity probably derives from Diodorus' source here, Hieronymus.

Eumenes (Diod. 18. 50. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7). These new terms were quite generous. In fact, they were basically the same ones that Eumenes had proposed at the earlier meeting with Antigonus shortly after the former had retreated into Nora (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6; cf. Diod. 18. 47. 6–7). Eumenes would receive a satrapy, presumably Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 50. 4).³⁹ In exchange Eumenes was “to share in [Antigonus’] own undertakings” (Diod. 18. 53. 5; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2–3; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7). With the news of the death of Antipater, there was no apparent alternative to an alliance with Antigonus. Therefore, “at the approach of spring” (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7), Eumenes swore an oath of loyalty to Antigonus and was released from Nora (Diod. 18. 53. 5). An additional question can be raised. Why did Antigonus wish to ally himself with Eumenes? The answer is not clear but likely revolves around the Cardian’s earlier association with Alexander, his cavalry experience, and, perhaps, that many of Antigonus’ troops had formerly served Eumenes. Eumenes’ Cardian birth and his previous loyalty to Perdiccas likely convinced the General in Asia that like Nearchus he would become a trusted lieutenant, hoping to rise with the success of his Macedonian superior. Their previous “friendship” may also have played some part.

Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 2–4) and Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7) paint quite a different picture of the circumstances surrounding Eumenes’ release. According to them, Eumenes changed the wording of the oath of loyalty proposed by Antigonus, so that he swore allegiance to the kings and Olympias as well as to Antigonus, thereby obtaining his release without compromising his independence.⁴⁰ This section of Plutarch’s biography is false. The arguments against its acceptance are numerous and convincing. The inclusion of Olympias is peculiar in and of itself. At this early date, she had not returned to Macedonia, nor was she part of any official government arrangement. The government was officially the kings, and in particular Philip and the regent. The presence of Alexander’s mother in the oath would be a singular invention at this time.

39 While Diodorus 18. 50. 4 only says a “greater satrapy” than he had controlled, Eumenes, after his release, remained in Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 53. 6). Nicanor, who was appointed satrap of Cappadocia at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), may never have physically acquired the province (Billows 1990: 409; cf. Heckel 2006: 178 [#10]). Nothing is known of his activities after his appointment unless this is the same Nicanor who in 312 shows up as an Antigoniid general in Media (Diod. 19. 92. 1), as is claimed by Billows (1990: 409). Eumenes had won over the native Cappadocian population with his favors in 322 (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4), and in Nora he retained certain Cappadocian hostages (Plut. *Eum.* 12. 5).

40 Schäfer (2002: 119–21) and Dixon (2007: 166–7) support the altered oath, arguing that Eumenes did have some promise of assistance from Polyperchon prior to his release, but the evidence is otherwise. See the following.

Moreover, when the oath was sworn allegiance to the kings and Antigonus was in essence the same. Antigonus was the kings' royal general in Asia. The entire incident implies that Eumenes must have known of the coming struggle not only brewing in Europe, but of its eventual impact on Asia. But, most importantly, Diodorus (18. 53. 5; 19. 44. 2) makes no reference to a changed oath. Nor is this the result of careless abridgement on Diodorus' part; the corresponding sections of Plutarch and Diodorus differ markedly in other respects as well. The causes for and the timing of the renewal of hostilities between Eumenes and Antigonus are not the same in the two sources. In Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 7), Antigonus sends a force against Eumenes as soon as he learns of the altered oath; in Diodorus (18. 58. 4–59. 1), Antigonus moves against Eumenes only after the latter's alliance in the summer with Polyperchon, Antipater's successor as regent in Macedonia.⁴¹ Moreover, Diodorus (18. 57. 3–4) has Polyperchon calling on Eumenes "to turn from [Antigonus] to the kings." This author continues (18. 58. 4; cf 19. 44. 2) that after the receipt of the request for the alliance from the new regent "[Eumenes] decided not to take orders from Antigonus." Strabo (14. 5. 10), additionally, reports that Eumenes "revolted" from Antigonus; and Pompeius Trogus apparently stated that "the war was renewed by Eumenes" ([Pompeius Trogus] *Prol.* 4). These authors, therefore, imply that for a period of time Eumenes was acting as Antigonus' loyal subordinate.

If the oath were altered as a means of extricating himself from Nora but also from subordination to Antigonus, it is difficult to imagine what Eumenes hoped to accomplish by obtaining his freedom under these false pretenses. Even if news of the impending war on the Greek mainland had reached Eumenes, as indicated earlier, it is unlikely Eumenes would have seen much hope in it for him; he was in Asia. Altering the oath would then have secured his release from Nora but only as a desperate fugitive. Besides, the terms offered by Antigonus were basically the same as those he had demanded shortly after the siege

41 Diodorus (18. 58. 1) states that "immediately" after Eumenes left Nora he received letters (plural) from Polyperchon. This statement can only be the result of Diodorus' abridgement of his source. According to Diodorus (18. 57. 3), Polyperchon's offer to Eumenes was to counter the "revolt" of Antigonus. However, the news of Antigonus' actions was only brought to Macedonia by Cleitus early in 318 (Diod. 18. 52. 5–6). The letters to Eumenes, then, could not have been sent until the spring. However, Eumenes was released from Nora "at the approach of spring" (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7). The reference in Diodorus 18. 58. 1 to "letters" suggests that Diodorus may have in 18. 57. 3 condensed a whole series of exchanges into a single occurrence. The best explanation is that the first communication arrived in the spring, as soon as Polyperchon learned that Antigonus was in revolt and that Eumenes was free. The final agreement was not, however, reached until the early summer of 318.

began (Diod. 18. 41. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6). Later, in the summer of 319, Eumenes was desperate enough to dispatch Hieronymus to Macedonia to negotiate his surrender to Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1). The evidence is, therefore, reasonably clear that Eumenes early in 318 had become one of Antigonus' subordinates; a condition which remained in effect until the acceptance of the offer of an alliance from Polyperchon. Eumenes was probably to join Antigonus in the summer. Diodorus (18. 53. 6) vaguely mentions that Eumenes was, after his release, but before his alliance with Polyperchon, preparing for a campaign. This in all probability refers to Antigonus' proposed offensive; Antigonus planned to reorder the satrapies of Asia, replacing those governors who were not personally loyal to himself (Diod. 18. 50. 5).

The tale of the altered oath supports our sources' general picture of Eumenes' loyalty. Like Plutarch's earlier description of Eumenes' refusal to surrender to Antigonus "so long as I am master of my sword" (Plut. *Eum.* 10.4), this episode appears overly theatrical, and like certain other passages, these anecdotes may originate with Duris of Samos' more embellished history. Moreover, Eumenes would trick his "friend," but would never violate an oath! Earlier with respect to the dead Craterus' troops who had sworn an oath to obey Eumenes and then fled to Antipater, Diodorus (18. 32. 2–3), possibly quoting Hieronymus, calls these oath-breakers and "faithless" men (see Roisman 2010: 138). Eumenes emerges from this tale of the altered oath as one who does not break oaths, but does break faith. Using the old scientific principle of Occam's Razor, why alter the oath at all, if you are simply going to break faith with its proposer anyway, why not just take it and then ignore it.⁴²

During the winter Antigonus had received an important fugitive, Antipater's son Cassander (Diod. 18. 54. 3). Diodorus' language (18. 54. 3–4) at this point makes it clear that Cassander did not know of Antigonus' ambitions. Indeed, Diodorus (18. 54. 4) states that, while Antigonus told Cassander he was aiding him because of his friendship with Antipater, in reality he "wished Polyperchon to be surrounded by a many great distractions, so that he himself might proceed against Asia without danger." Cassander's flight then must have occurred before Cleitus brought the news of Antigonus' "revolt" to Macedonia in 318 (Diod. 18. 52. 5–6). If there were any doubts regarding Cleitus' claims, these were quieted by Antigonus' subsequent seizure of 600 talents of silver bound for Macedonia from Cilicia (Diod. 18. 52. 7). Moreover, the Parian Marble (*FGrH*

42 Diodorus (19. 44. 2) states that later after Eumenes' surrender to Antigonus the latter had Eumenes executed because previously when the Cardian had been spared by Antigonus "he had nonetheless supported the kings."

239 B F-12; cf. Diod. 18. 52) places Cassander's flight before Arrhidaeus' siege of Cyzicus, which occurred very early in 318.

Antipater had not left his position as regent to his son, but rather to Craterus' old second-in-command, Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 48. 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1); Cassander was made chiliarch, or Polyperchon's official second-in-command (Diod. 18. 48. 4-5). Despite Cassander's fury at being passed over for the regency, he had bided his time; the nobles and the army commanders supported Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 49. 1; 54. 2). While Cassander did not attack Polyperchon openly, there was a certain amount of obvious hostility between the two (Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1). During the fall, Cassander privately gathered support (Diod. 18. 49. 2). Those he had bound to his cause he sent secretly to the Hellespont in preparation for his own flight from Macedonia (Diod. 18. 54. 2). It is unclear, however, how long he remained in Macedonia before fleeing to Antigonos. In addition to securing the loyalty of his friends in Macedonia, Cassander also sought alliances with "other commanders and cities" (Diod. 18. 49. 3). Outside of Greece he sent envoys to Ptolemy to renew their friendship and to secure an alliance (Diod. 18. 49. 3; 54. 3). The success of this operation is unclear. Cassander asked that Ptolemy send a fleet to his aid (Diod. 18. 49. 3), but there is no evidence that Ptolemy complied. When all was arranged, Cassander fled to the Hellespont and then on to Celaenae, where he joined Antigonos in winter quarters. He counted on Antigonos' loyalty to his family; his command in Asia had been given to him by Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7) and his son Demetrius was married to Phila, one of Cassander's sisters (Diod. 19. 59. 3-6).⁴³ Of course, Antigonos would remember that Cassander had denounced him to Antipater before the latter crossed back to Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42), but, then, if Cassander had suspected Antigonos' intentions back in 320, he would have realized that Antigonos might welcome a conflict in Macedonia. As it was, Cassander's arrival convinced Antigonos and his advisers that with this development there could not possibly be any interference with their plans from Macedonia. Antigonos and his counselors now with confidence continued to prepare for the coming campaigning year.

Before Antigonos could launch his spring offensive, however, Arrhidaeus, the former regent and current satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, learned of Antigonos' intentions and began to secure his satrapy from attack (Diod. 18. 51); cities throughout the province were strengthened with garrisons. When the

43 While the actual date of the marriage is unattested, the available evidence would suggest 320 and probably at Triparadeisus or shortly thereafter (Errington 1970: 71-2 and n. 151; Heckel 2006: 208 [#3]). Antigonos Gonatas, Demetrius and Phila's son died in 240/39 at 80 years of age ([Lucian] *Macrob.* 11).

autonomous Greek city of Cyzicus refused to cooperate with the satrap (Diod. 18. 52. 3), Arrhidaeus without warning launched an attack on the city early in 318.⁴⁴ The attack was poorly executed and proved unsuccessful. When Antigonus heard of the assault, he set out for the coast with 20000 infantry and 3000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 52. 1). While arriving after the siege had been abandoned, Antigonus still accused Arrhidaeus of attacking an allied city without provocation and preparing to rebel against legitimate authority (Diod. 18. 51. 7–52. 3). Arrhidaeus was ordered to surrender his province and retire to a single city (Diod. 18. 52. 3), but the satrap refused and prepared to resist. Part of his forces he detached and sent to relieve Eumenes in Nora (Diod. 18. 52. 4). There is no indication in the sources as to the fate of this expedition. Eumenes was likely already Antigonus' ally. Arrhidaeus' army may have been intercepted by forces loyal to Antigonus before it reached Cappadocia.

Antigonus detached part of his army and left them to carry on the campaign against the recalcitrant satrap; these succeeded in driving the latter into the city of Cius, where they placed him under siege (Diod. 18. 72. 2). Antigonus himself proceeded still early in the year to Lydia where he planned to depose the satrap Cleitus (Diod. 18. 52. 5). His plan had been to replace a number of the satraps in Asia Minor, the only change now was that thanks to the precipitous actions of Arrhidaeus this campaign was begun sooner than Antigonus had contemplated. Prior to Antigonus' arrival, Cleitus had secured many of his cities with garrisons and then with the royal fleet fled to Macedonia where he revealed Antigonus' revolt to Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 52. 6). Antigonus captured Ephesus on his first assault, and by the end of spring or early in the summer of 318, he had conquered all of Lydia (Diod. 18. 52. 7–8). It must have been about this time that Antigonus sent Cassander back to Greece with 35 ships and 4000 mercenaries (Diod. 18. 68. 1; cf. 18. 54. 3). With these forces Cassander sailed to Piraeus in May 318 (Diod. 18. 68. 1), by the summer of the following year all of Athens was under his control with his agent Demetrius of Phalerum officially in charge of the city.⁴⁵

44 The assault was even by Hellenistic standards very early in the year. Antigonus and his army were still in winter quarters when news of the attack reached Celaenae (Diod. 18. 52. 1; cf. 18. 50. 1). Arrhidaeus also after his attempt on Cyzicus was thwarted sent troops to relieve Eumenes. Since Eumenes was released at the approach of spring (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7) and Antigonus had planned an offensive for 318 (Diod. 18. 50. 1–5), the attack on Cyzicus must have occurred well before the start of the regular campaigning season, very early in 318.

45 Even though Diodorus (18. 54. 3) states that after Cassander's arrival in his camp Antigonus "immediately" gave Cassander an infantry force and a fleet, it is very clear that these forces were not officially turned over to the latter until much later. Cassander did

In Macedonia, Cassander's flight to Asia was seen by Polyperchon as an imminent threat to his regency. He knew that in addition to possible alliances with Ptolemy and Antigonos, many of the Greek cities were either held by garrisons placed there by Antipater or in the control of governments loyal to Antipater's house (Diod. 18. 55. 2). Indeed, soon after his father's death, and before news of his disloyalty to the regent became known, Cassander in his capacity as chiliarch replaced Menyllus, the garrison commander in Munychia, with Nicanor, an individual personally loyal to him (Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; cf. Diod. 18. 64. 1; Heckel 2006: 177–8 [#9]). After Cassander's departure for Asia, Polyperchon and his advisers discussed various options. Polyperchon and his council decided to meet the threat posed by Cassander's loyalists in Greece by issuing in the name of King Philip III, a decree calling for a restoration of "the peace and the constitutions that our father Philip [II] established . . . preparing peace and such governments as you enjoyed under Philip and Alexander" (Diod. 18. 56. 2–3). As Diodorus (18. 55. 4–56. 8, 64. 3) relates, even though not specifically noted in the decree itself, this meant the restoration of democratic governments and a return of those specifically exiled by Antipater (Diod. 18. 17. 7–18. 6; Plut. *Phoc.* 23–6; Paus. 1. 25. 3–5; Hyp. 6. 1–20). While this new proclamation mirrored many of the features of Philip's League of Corinth, created in 337, and was meant to call to mind the predecessor, this was not a recreation of that former alliance (Poddighe 2002: 187; contra: Dixon 2007: 151–78). In this earlier decree, all Greek cities were to retain those governments then in existence "when they took the oath concerning the peace" ([Dem.] 17. 10; *IG* II² 329, lines 12–14). Philip III's decree does not mention "freedom" or "autonomy" specifically, even though these concepts are found in the subsequent correspondence with the Greek cities (Diod. 18. 64. 3–5, 66. 2, 69. 3–4; Plut. *Phoc.* 34. 4), but here also demands were made that former oligarchs be executed and democratic governments installed which flies in the face of any pretense of autonomy. By the terms

not sail to Athens until after Phocion's death in May 318 (Plut. *Phoc.* 37. 1; see Ferguson 1997: 31–4; Williams 1984: 300–305; Tritle 1988: 133; Bosworth 1992B: 69, 80; Habicht 1997: 42 n. 20). Errington (1977: 491–2), followed by Billows (1990: 86), believes that Cassander did not arrive in Piraeus until 317. The main argument for this position is that the *anagrapheus*, an official who gained prominence during the Athenian oligarchy imposed after the Lamian War, appears in all surviving decrees from 319/318, thus suggesting that the oligarchy was still in place in this archon year. The upcoming struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon would see the brief restoration of democracy in Athens (see below). Williams (1984: 301–2), however, points to the decline in the status of this official in the second half of the year and the moderation of the restored democracy to cast serious doubt on Errington's case.

of the 337 alliance, governments, whether oligarchic, democratic, of tyrannical, when the agreement was made, were then the legitimate governments of those polities (Tod 1948: 224–5; Rhodes and Osborne 2007: 372–4). Moreover, there is never any mention of a league in the new decree, nor a league council made up of representatives from the Greek cities having legislative authority as had existed in Philip II's original decree. The new decree was an appeal to those who had been disfranchised by Antipater, especially after the Lamian War, and intended to eliminate the garrisons imposed by that former regent, which now likely supported his son Cassander. As in the 337 understanding, all states were to pass laws ensuring that “no one shall engage either in war or in public activity in opposition to us [the kings]” (Diod. 18. 56. 7). This decree was issued in the winter of 319/18,⁴⁶ and gave the cities until the thirtieth day of the Macedonian month of *Xandicus*, late March/early April (see Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 26, 36; Samuel 1972: 140–1, 143) for full implementation (Diod. 18.56.5). While the time to the deadline might appear to be short, it clearly was meant to be. If the absent Cassander's powers in Greece were to be short-circuited, this would need to take place before the Macedonian refugee's allies could rally to his cause. Moreover, the decree was announced to representatives from the Greek cities already present in Pella, who were immediately sent to promulgate the decree in their respective cities. Polyperchon also wrote personal letters to many Greek cities ordering them to exile or execute those who had led their states as Antipater's allies (Diod. 18. 57. 1). What the document makes very clear is that the changes from the original provisions of the League of Corinth and the rule of Philip II and Alexander III were the policies of Antipater and that he, and by implication his family, were responsible for all the suffering that had then ensued. The decree also obscured the differences in the policies of Philip and those of his son Alexander, subsuming all the changes since 337 under the aegis of the former Macedonian regent Antipater (Poddighe 2013: 226–38). Moreover, this decree in essence proclaimed that anyone who interfered with the decree was an enemy of all Greeks, and thereby the decree was a call to arms against those who continued to enforce these violations (Dmitriev 2011: 114). With respect to the critical Greek city of Athens, not only was the democracy to be restored but, sweetening the deal, Samos was again to be Athenian (Diod. 18. 56. 7). In his letter to the city, Polyperchon declared that King Philip “ordered

46 Diodorus (18. 55. 2) states that when the decree was published it was already known that Antigonus was in “revolt.” This information was brought to Macedonia by Cleitus (Diod. 18. 52. 6) who fled to Macedonia after Antigonus' attack on his satrapy early in the year.

that all Athenians were to take part in the administration of the city" (Plut. *Phoc.* 32. 1). Nothing is stated specifically in the decree or in the letter with respect to the various Macedonian garrisons established throughout Greece, but the Athenians and others certainly thought that these were to be eliminated by the terms of the new proclamation (Diod. 18. 64. 1, 5; cf. Diod. 18. 55. 2, 65. 1).

After the issuance of this proclamation, Polyperchon also wrote to Olympias, inviting her to return to Macedonia to take charge of her grandson (Diod. 18. 57. 2). He had written to her immediately after becoming regent (Diod. 18. 49. 4), but she had hesitated as long as Cassander remained in Macedonia (cf. Diod. 18. 57. 2).⁴⁷ After the second request, she wrote to Eumenes to seek his advice;⁴⁸ she had long been in correspondence with him either directly or through her daughter Cleopatra. Cleopatra's offer of her hand to the then regent Perdiccas in 321 probably resulted from correspondence between Eumenes and Olympias. Eumenes had remained in contact with Cleopatra after her settling in Sardis,

47 Diodorus (18. 49. 4) states that the offer to Olympias was initially made shortly after Antipater's death and before the flight of Cassander. Both Rosen (1967A: 69) and Briant (1973B: 77) argue that Diodorus here has anticipated events and that Polyperchon's offer to Olympias was only made after Cassander's flight (Diod. 18. 57. 2). There is evidence, however, that these references are not part of a doublet. Diodorus 18. 49. 4 speaks of Olympias' departure from Macedonia due to her enmity with Antipater, but in Diodorus 18. 57. 2, it is stated that Olympias remained in Epirus because of her hatred of Cassander. The second passage could be interpreted to mean that she "delayed" her departure from Epirus because of Cassander's presence in Macedonia. In other words, Olympias hesitated to return to Macedonia while Cassander remained and the exact relationship of the regent and his chiliarch was unclear. Prior to Cassander's flight, Polyperchon may have wished her return as a counterpoise to Eurydice.

48 Briant (1973B: 76–7) argues that the letter from Olympias to Eumenes was a forgery made up by Hieronymus and Eumenes. He finds it difficult to believe that a woman as independent as Olympias would seek advice as to whether to return to Macedonia, or that Alexander IV needed protection when he was in no way menaced by Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 58. 3; Nepos. *Eum.* 6. 1). Of course, Alexander IV may have needed protection from Eurydice. That Olympias would seek advice regarding her possible return to Macedonia is very understandable, especially when taken in the full context of her letter. Olympias probably asked whether she could trust Polyperchon, Antipater's chosen successor (Diod. 18. 58. 3). Eumenes could provide insight into the character of the new regent, since both men had served with Alexander in Asia until Polyperchon's departure with Craterus in 324 (Heckel 1992: 189–92). Moreover, Olympias' request that Eumenes return to Europe to aid her (Nepos *Eum.* 6. 3–4) is consistent with her earlier request, issued through her daughter, to Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9). Eumenes was an old and trusted friend (see Chapter 2).

carrying to her Perdiccas' marriage proposal in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–6; 26), and himself meeting with her after Perdiccas' death in Egypt (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6–7).⁴⁹

Finally, to offset Cassander's alliances with Antigonus and Ptolemy, Polyperchon opened communications with Eumenes in Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 57. 3–4, 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1).⁵⁰ Letters were written in the names of the kings requesting an alliance. In these letters Eumenes was offered either a share in the guardianship, if he decided to march to Macedonia, or to remain in Asia as "*Strategos Autocrator*" (Diod. 18. 58. 1), the same title that had been given by Antipater to Antigonus for his campaign against Eumenes (Diod. 18. 50. 1; cf. 39. 7, 40. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38). The title issued in the names of the kings gave Eumenes officially supreme authority in Asia. The satraps, generals, and treasurers of Asia would as a result be placed under his authority. Additionally, the argyraspids, then in Cilicia, and the treasurer at Cyinda were commanded to obey Eumenes (Diod. 18. 58. 1). The argyraspids, Alexander's former hypaspists, were 3000 of the best soldiers in Asia. These troops had been separated from the royal army at Triparadeisus and under the command of Antigones, their commander under Perdiccas and the newly appointed satrap of Susiane (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 35),⁵¹ sent to transport some of the vast treasure then in Susa to

49 On Eumenes activities with regard to Cleopatra, see Chapter 4.

50 Diodorus' account gives the picture of Polyperchon in the same letter in which he offers the command to Eumenes having already put the argyraspids and the royal treasury at Cyinda into his power. The best explanation is that the first communication arrived in the spring, as soon as Polyperchon learned that Antigonus was in revolt and that Eumenes was free. The final agreement was not, however, reached until the early summer (cf. Rosen 1967A: 69–71). Against this view, Briant (1973B: 75–6), argues that the first letter reported in Diodorus (18. 57. 3–4) is a forgery drawn up by Eumenes and Hieronymus. The contents of this letter Briant declares to be incomprehensible. He doubts that Polyperchon would offer to share his regency with Eumenes; and wonders why Polyperchon would press Eumenes to continue his hostility toward Antigonus when Eumenes clearly intended to do so anyway. With regard to the first objection, the offer was simply a way of showing commitment and good faith; Eumenes previously had shown no desire to return to Macedonia and would likely choose to stay in Asia. As to the second complaint, it is based on the false assumption that Eumenes was still at odds with Antigonus when the letter would have arrived. On the contrary, Eumenes had come to terms with Antigonus and had agreed to become his ally. On the basis of this agreement he had been freed from Nora in the winter of 318 (see above and Anson 1977: 251–6).

51 Although appointed satrap of Susiane at Triparadeisus, Antigones apparently never governed this province directly, nor is there any evidence to suggest who did (see Heckel 1992: 62; 2006: 30 [1a]). It is possible that the commanders in Susa may have assumed authority over the satrapy. In 331, Alexander had left Archelaus, the son of Theodorus, as general (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9; Curt. 5. 2. 16), and either Mazurus (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9) or Xenophilus as

Cyinda in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38).⁵² With the completion of this task, these troops and their commander Antigenes, who in some fashion came to share his command with an otherwise unknown Macedonian named Teutamus, remained in Cilicia.⁵³

All of these efforts show considerable diplomatic skill either on Polyperchon's part or that of his advisers. His call for a restoration of the Greek exiles was to counter the power Cassander would possess with the oligarchies established

commander of the citadel of Susa (Curt. 5. 2. 16). Indeed, Xenophilus is found in the same command in 316 (Diod. 19. 17. 3). It appears clear that neither Perdiccas nor Antipater interfered with these commands, since these individuals would be answerable to the central government and not the local satrap. Another very real possibility is that Peucestas assumed authority over Susiane (see Tarn 1969: 477). Antigenes and Peucestas in their meeting in 316 in Susiane exhibited hostility towards one another which might have resulted from Peucestas usurpation of Susiane. However, the sources list a different cause for their differences (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2).

52 The wealth which was housed in Cyinda was enormous. Simpson (1957: 504) suggests that when Eumenes gained access to the treasury it may have contained around 20000 talents. There were still 10000 talents left in Cyinda when Antigonus took over the treasury in 315 (Diod. 19. 56. 5). Eumenes had not expended 10000 talents just on his own needs, but had sent part of the treasure on to Polyperchon (*ibid.* 503).

53 On the career of Antigenes see Heckel 2006: 30–1 [1a]; for Teutamus nothing is known of his career prior to 318, but Berve (1973: 2:372 [#744]) is probably correct that he was a Macedonian nobleman and had been a high ranking officer in Alexander's hypaspists (See Heckel, 1992: 316–7; 2006: 262). Bosworth (1992A: 66–7, 83 ns. 61–3) argues that Antigenes and Teutamus came from Susa to meet Eumenes, and that the otherwise unknown Teutamus was the satrap of Paraetacene (tentatively accepted, Heckel 2006: 262). His evidence comes from two statements in Diodorus and one in Arrian. Diodorus 18. 58. 1 relates that the two came a considerable distance to meet Eumenes, and 18. 62. 7, refers to "satrapies" with respect to both Teutamus and Antigenes. Arrian does report the destination, not as Cilicia, but "the sea" (*Succ.* 1a. 38). The problem with this scenario is that Antigenes, Teutamus, and the argyraspids moved to join Eumenes only after receiving the letters from Polyperchon and Olympias (Diod. 18. 58. 1, 59. 3). Given the chronology of the letters, it would have been impossible for Antigenes, Teutamus, and the argyraspids to arrive in Cilicia at the same time as Eumenes. Moreover, his choice of Cilicia must have been with full knowledge of the presence of the argyraspids. Antigonus' ally Ptolemy controlled Syria (*FGrH* 239B F-12; Diod. 18. 43. 1–2; App. *Syr.* 52). Diodorus' reference to a great distance could mean most anything; it could simply make reference to the fifty or so miles from Cyinda (located somewhere south of Soli [Str. 14. 5. 10]), to northeastern Cilicia, where they rendezvoused with Eumenes. With respect to Teutamus' governorship of Paraetacene, "satrapies" may be an error arising from Diodorus abbreviation of his source. Whether Teutamus had been awarded a satrapy at Triparadeisus, and whether that satrapy was Paraetacene, must remain undetermined.

by Antipater. By associating Olympias in the rule, the regent strengthened his connection to the Argead family and thereby his hold on Macedonia, likely hoping to use Alexander's mother as a counterpoise to Eurydice; his offer to Eumenes was designed to open a second front in Asia. The proposal of a joint regency was an especially clever touch, since it would show the sincerity of the offer, while not endangering Polyperchon's position in Europe in the slightest. Eumenes had neither the inclination nor the means to march to Europe. Joseph Roisman (2012: 180) has also pointed out that, even if insincere, the offer would enhance Eumenes' prestige as "a protector of royalty." Most importantly for Eumenes, because of Polyperchon's offer, his pursuit of power, seemingly ended by Perdiccas' death and his own defeat in Cappadocia, now opened anew before him. It is no wonder that this surprising turn of events so enchanted Diodorus with his preoccupation with the workings of fate.⁵⁴ If Eumenes accepted the alliance with Polyperchon, he would once again have an army to command in his own right. The argyraspids would be placed under his authority and with the resources contained in Cyinda he could hire a great many mercenaries. Olympias in her letters to Eumenes offered to write to the various commanders in Asia on his behalf (Diod. 18. 58. 2–4; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 1–2). Even though by accepting the alliance with Polyperchon Eumenes would once again come into conflict with Antigonus, he could not refuse. Eumenes' favorable response to the offer from the new regent is a clear testimony to the Cardian's ambitions. Just as the appointment as "Supreme General in Asia" had whetted Antigonus' dreams of power, so it did for Eumenes as well. As Plutarch observed nineteen centuries ago, Eumenes was not satisfied with a subordinate role (Plut. *Comp. Eum. et Sert.* 2. 3). These negotiations which started soon after Cleitus's flight culminated in a final agreement in the summer of 318.

54 "All wondered at the incredible fickleness of Fortune... for who, taking thought of the inconstancies of human life, would not be astonished by the alternating ebb and flow of fortune?" (Diod. 18. 59. 4–5; translation from Loeb Classical Library edition, Geer 1969: 175). For extensive citation of Diodorus' references to fate, see Palm 1955: 162.

The Reckoning with Antigonus

While the diplomatic exchanges between Eumenes and Polyperchon resulted in Eumenes regaining his independence, they also put him again in conflict with Antigonus. After his release from Nora, Eumenes had been Antigonus' ally. However, in the summer, as soon as Antigonus discovered Eumenes' change of allegiance, he sent an army commanded by Menander to Cappadocia. Eumenes was forced to flee with only 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry. He did not have time to await the others who had promised to join him; until the agreement with Polyperchon there had been no reason to gather forces hastily. Now there was need for great haste. As it was, Menander missed intercepting Eumenes and his meager forces by only three days. Eumenes fled south over the Taurus mountains by forced marches into Cilicia. Menander followed to the mountains, but unable to overtake him, returned to Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 59. 1–2), where he may have remained as *strategos* (Billows 1990: 403). Fortunately for Eumenes, Antigonus was occupied in Asia Minor. In part, he was outfitting a fleet to seize control of the Hellespont (cf. Diod. 18. 72. 3–4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8). Such control was necessary if he was to ensure that Polyperchon could not cross to Asia with an army of fresh Macedonians.

In Cilicia, Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the argyraspids, in obedience to the letters from the kings and Olympias, joined Eumenes (Diod. 18. 59. 3). It was these very same troops with the other Macedonians present in Egypt who had condemned Eumenes and the other Perdikkans (see Chapter 3). This willingness by the argyraspids to support Eumenes is, perhaps, the best argument against the proposition that there existed a traditional Macedonian army assembly with clear powers. Now, with the call from the kings and regent, they joined the very individual they had earlier condemned. Neither the regent, nor the king, issued a pardon; the sentence was simply ignored. It is difficult to believe that an assembly possessing the authority to arraign and convict could have its decisions so easily ignored by all parties, including many who had comprised the very assembly that had issued the condemnation in the first place. These assemblies clearly had no constitutional authority (see Chapter 2).

Eumenes with the forces that had come with him from Cappadocia and the argyraspids then moved on to Cyinda.¹ Even though Antigenes and Teutamus

1 The actual site of Cyinda has not been identified, but it was somewhere between Soli and the mouth of the Cydnus (see Simpson 1957: 503; Bing 1973: 346, 348).

promised to cooperate fully with Eumenes, and the argyraspids had as a body greeted Eumenes with friendship and enthusiasm (Diod. 18. 59. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 3–4), these troops and their commanders regarded themselves as an autonomous force. The argyraspids represented a curious blend of Macedonian custom and mercenary characteristics (Anson 1991: 230–47). They responded to the call from King Philip and his regent as loyal Macedonians, yet these troops often displayed a distinct lack of fidelity to any authority other than their own. Antigenes had participated in the assassination of Perdikkas in Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35; Diod. 18. 39. 6; cf. Diod. 18. 36. 4),² and the argyraspids as a body at Triparadeisus had been separated from the army given to Antigonos because of their mutinous behavior (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 35, 38).³ They were charged with transporting part of the royal treasury from Susa to Cyinda (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38). Since the completion of this task, the argyraspids had been operating in virtual independence in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38).⁴ Their commanders were not pleased with the subordinate role now ordered for them (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4; Just. 14. 2. 8–9; cf. Diod. 18. 60). Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 4) is especially clear that Eumenes' subsequent difficulties with his new command came principally from the commanders of the argyraspids. Justin's remark (14. 2. 7) that the argyraspids regarded service under anyone other than Alexander as dishonorable and served others unwillingly is probably not short of the mark. Eumenes was, therefore, immediately faced with a serious threat to his authority. He needed these Macedonians, and, consequently, he had to placate both them and their commanders.

This challenge to his authority was met in part by relying on a tactic which had worked well for him in Babylon. Eumenes told Antigenes and Teutamus, both Macedonian aristocrats,⁵ that as a Greek his only concern was the defense of the royal family, an interesting claim since he had for more than a year been resisting both the king's regent and his general in Asia. Furthermore,

² See Chapter 4.

³ Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 38) refers to them as "the most rebellious of the Macedonians." For the identification of these "3000" with the argyraspids, see Chapter 4, Anson 1981:118–19.

⁴ In 320, Philoxenus (Berve 1973: 2:390–1 [#794]; Heckel 2006: 220 [#2]) was appointed satrap of Cilicia by the then regent Perdikkas (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2); this appointment was confirmed at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 34; Diod. 18. 39. 6; Just. 13. 6. 16). The argyraspids, however, saw themselves answerable only to the kings or their regent (cf. Diod. 18. 59. 3), as did the garrison commanders at Cyinda (Diod. 18. 62. 2). Indeed, except for the notice of his appointment and reconfirmation as satrap, Philoxenus disappears from the record.

⁵ While little is known concerning Teutamus, he was apparently a Macedonian aristocrat (see Heckel 1992: 316–19). When bribed to betray Eumenes to Antigonos in 318, he was dissuaded by Antigenes who emphasized Eumenes' foreign birth (Diod. 18. 62. 7).

he claimed that no office was in prospect for one who was not a native-born Macedonian (Diod. 18. 60. 3). The truth was quite obviously otherwise. By decree of the kings, Eumenes was now royal general in Asia and satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia (Diod. 18. 57. 3–4, 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 2). These Macedonians were well aware of these facts. What Eumenes wanted to emphasize was that because of his non-Macedonian aristocratic birth he did not have the ability to usurp their authority. He could not have the ambitions attributed to Perdiccas, and that were now being ascribed to Antigonus. Eumenes thought to assuage their fears of his possible ambitions through this claim of racial inferiority. It was just plausible to the Macedonian nobility who were, indeed, conscious of their birthright, but in post-Alexandrine Asia this birthright was far less important than it had been when these commanders had left Macedonia. Increasingly mercenary and native forces were being incorporated into the armies of the various contenders. Eumenes in Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3), Antigonus in Phrygia (Anson 1988A: 471–7), Alcetas in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 46. 1–47. 3), and Peucestas in Persis (Diod. 19. 14. 5), had shown the strength of native forces. Moreover, there was an abundance of mercenaries ready to follow any successful general who also was a reliable paymaster, and common Macedonian troops had shown no reluctance in accepting Eumenes as their commander even after his condemnation in Egypt. For the present, Eumenes found himself in dire need of the veterans commanded by these Macedonian nobles, and needed to convince them of his limited ambitions.

As part of this effort, Eumenes refused to accept the personal gift of 500 talents offered him by the kings (Diod. 18. 60. 2). He did, however, use the treasury in Cyinda to hire large numbers of mercenaries. While Diodorus (18. 61. 5) states that in “little time” Eumenes collected a considerable army, it is evident that this process took months, continuing until late in the year. His friends (*philoi*) were sent throughout Pisidia, Lycia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Cyprus, recruiting soldiers (Diod. 18. 61. 4). Since Eumenes was offering a high rate of pay, many perspective mercenaries came from the Greek mainland itself (Diod. 18. 61. 5). In a matter of months Eumenes had collected a force, excluding the argyraspsids and those who had accompanied him from Cappadocia, of 10000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 61. 4–5).

Eumenes’ attempt to organize his command, however, continued to be hindered by Antigones and Teutamus. To meet this challenge to his authority, Eumenes devised a most ingenious stratagem. To control his fellow-commanders he would invoke the vision of Alexander.⁶ Eumenes claimed that

6 Nepos (*Eum.* 7. 2) inaccurately places the initiation of the Alexander Tent in Susiane. Diodorus (19. 15. 3), also, repeats this incident in Susiane as if it had not occurred previously.

in a dream he had seen Alexander alive, in full regalia, presiding over his council, giving orders and actively administering the empire. Eumenes described this dream as a divine sign. Henceforward, the conclave of commanders would be held in a tent in the presence of a throne, with replicas of Alexander's diadem, scepter and armor, all manufactured from the Cilician gold, placed on it.⁷ In the morning before each meeting, the commanders would offer incense and do obeisance before the shrine of the god Alexander. After this ritual, the meeting would be held in the tent as if in Alexander's presence. Orders would be issued in Alexander's name, and during the deliberations everyone would be placed symbolically on an equal footing before the throne (Diod. 18. 60. 5–61. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 5–8; Polyæn. 4. 8. 2). Joseph Roisman (2012: 200) has pointed out that the use of the Alexander Tent implies that Eumenes' commission from the kings was insufficient to obtain obedience from his supposed subordinates. What is occurring is likely less about the office and far more about the disintegrating myth of Alexander's empire. In Asia, in particular, loyalty to Macedonia, to the kings, to the regent, to Greek freedom, with respect to the players in the conflicts among Alexander's Successors, great and small, were almost always means to personal ends. One regent had been assassinated; another ignored. While such loyalty lingered in the persons of certain garrison commanders and imperial treasurers (e.g. Diod. 19. 15. 5, 17. 3, 18. 1), in the attitude of the argyraspids, there were always ulterior motives. The argyraspids had "conquered

However, Diodorus' earlier account (18. 61) is replete with details fixing the location at Cyinda (the use of the royal treasury) and the chronology to 318 (Diod. 18. 61. 3–4). Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 4), also, dates the incident before Eumenes' departure for the upper satrapies; Polyænus (4. 8. 2) describes the event in detail, but supplies no information of the location, however, he only mentions participation by Eumenes, Antigenes, and Teutamus. If he were referring to Susiane, he should have noted Peucestas.

- 7 While Goukowsky (1978: 163) believes that these were Alexander's actual regalia, Errington (1976: 140–1) rightly holds that they were manufactured for the occasion. The evidence is definitely against Eumenes' regalia being truly that of Alexander's. For it to be so, it must be assumed that the royal objects were not placed with Alexander's body (cf. Curt. 10. 10. 13), but given to the new king, Philip Arrhidaeus, a not unlikely supposition since the regalia was a symbol of royalty (see Anson 1985: 307–8). It is doubtful that Philip Arrhidaeus, if in possession of the regalia, would have left these symbols of authority behind in Asia Minor when he accompanied Perdikkas to Egypt. If he had taken them to Egypt they would have ended up either with Ptolemy in Egypt or been returned with Philip himself to Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 45; Diod. 18. 39. 7). Moreover, in Diodorus' description (18. 60. 3–61. 3) of the creation of the "Alexander Tent" the availability of the Cilician gold is twice made reference to (18. 60. 6 and 61. 1). In the former reference it could be argued that the gold was to be used solely to create the throne, but in the latter passage "everything" needed was quickly made ready, for the royal treasure was rich in gold."

the empire with Alexander"; the garrison commanders and treasurers owed their positions to the Conqueror, and subsequently to whatever passed as the central government. These individuals' very identity came from their service to the carcass of state and empire left by the dead king.

Eumenes' cult of Alexander is the only indisputable example of an essentially military cult in the Hellenistic era (Launey 1950: 2:945–6, 951). Our sources, however, include in the worship only the commanders and not the commanded (Roisman 2012: 183). It is likely that, while the soldiers were excluded from the Tent, the worship was carried on in general as a form of lustration before the entire army. Prayers and sacrifices were part of the normal ritual (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 25. 2–6). In Persepolis in 316, Peucestas organized sacrifices to the traditional gods and to Alexander and Philip (Diod. 19. 22. 1; cf. Diod. 19. 24. 5).⁸ Certainly as Roisman points out: "Respect for Alexander's memory was, to a significant degree, an exercise in self-admiration" (2012: 185). Eumenes' innovation apparently never caught on in the other Hellenistic armies, which may be the result of the limited number of those Macedonians who had served under Alexander still in Asia, and died with Eumenes' final defeat and the dispersal of the argyraspids (Launey 1950: 2: 947, 950–51). Moreover, what commander would want to compromise his authority in this manner? For Eumenes, there was simply no choice. While certainly the cult represented a brilliant solution to an immediate problem, it may not have been without precedent. Errington (1970: 75) may be correct that Ptolemy's proposal made in Babylon shortly after Alexander's death that the empire be ruled by a council meeting in the presence of the royal objects (Curt. 10. 6. 15), gave Eumenes the idea. One wonders what would have happened if Eumenes had inaugurated this cult in 320 during his unsuccessful negotiations with the other Perdiccans in Asia Minor (see Chapter 5). This cult was entirely Greek, not Asian (as Schäfer 2002: 25–32).⁹ Persian or other Asian aspects would have been resented by the very leaders Eumenes was most interested in placating, the Macedonians. The throne and the other royal symbols

8 Schäfer (2002: 141–3) suggests that this later general worship was an attempt by Peucestas to rival Eumenes' Alexander Tent. Even though there is no reference to Eumenes offering such sacrifices as part of the "Alexander Tent," this is certainly possible and even likely. Eumenes is only recorded as offering general sacrifices once (Diod. 19. 24. 5), but it must have been a daily occurrence (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 6. 44–6). Moreover, according to Plutarch (*Eum.* 6. 11), Eumenes was well aware of the importance of evoking Alexander's name whenever and wherever possible. All of these considerations suggest that, even though our sources do not allude to such regular worship of Alexander, it is very likely that it took place in the context of the worship of all pertinent deities, and it is certainly plausible that Peucestas would wish to rival the goodwill and authority that accrued to Eumenes from this worship.

9 For a refutation of this contention, see Bosworth 2005: 685–6.

had long been recognized as signs of sovereignty in Greece as well as in the East (Picard 1954: 1–2, 4). These emblems of authority were well known to those Macedonians who had served Alexander (cf. Diod. 17. 116. 2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 73. 3–4). Traditionally after a king's death, sacrifices were offered to that monarch (Schol. Dem. *Olyn.* 1. 5; Aristid. *Or.* 38. 480; Just. 9. 7. 11; 11. 2. 1). Ptolemy built a temple to Alexander and offered sacrifices to him (Diod. 18. 28. 4).

Whether the commanders believed in the cult can only be surmised. Certainly amongst the common soldiers such a cult would have been readily accepted “sans scepticism” (Picard 1954: 5). Clearly the Macedonian troops were superstitious. There were annual lustrations, and most of the gods were regularly invoked for protection or victory (Launey 1950: 2:882, 921–2, 951). Acceptance of Alexander's cult is especially likely in light of the prestige Ptolemy acquired through the acquisition of Alexander's corpse (Diod. 18. 28. 4–5). With regard to the attitude of the commanders, Diodorus (18. 61. 3) does state, “as their reverence for the king grew stronger, they were all filled with happy expectations, just as if some god were leading them.” Such possible reverence notwithstanding, it is unlikely any would have opposed the resultant increase in their own prestige through the use of this new procedure for deliberations. In spite of the Tent, Eumenes, however, never relinquished his command (Diod. 18. 63. 4). By placing himself visually on a par with his fellow commanders, he was able to make them more agreeable and so secured a measure of goodwill from them. As a result of this arrangement, Eumenes would now have to lobby for the acceptance of his plans, rather than order them to be carried out, but this appears not to have been an insurmountable obstacle. Most often Eumenes' opinions were followed (Nepos *Eum.* 7. 3). Eumenes did have the letters from King Philip and the regent, access to the treasuries of Asia, and control of his mercenaries and Cappadocian cavalry. In any case, his earlier commands had often been ignored; this system was obviously superior.

The coalition against Polyperchon, faced with these new circumstances in Asia, began a campaign in the summer of 318 to undermine Eumenes' position especially with his Macedonian troops. Ptolemy sailed to Zephyrion, a port in Cilicia near Cyinda,¹⁰ from where he continually sent his own commanders to the argyraspids (Diod. 18. 62. 1). Eumenes' presence in this general area

10 Zephyrion is the modern town of Mersin, which is 30 miles west of Adana (Stillwell 1976: 999–1000). The coastal area near Zephyrion (Mersin) broadens and is fronted by a sandy beach which would have afforded Ptolemy's fleet a suitable landing (Naval Intelligence Division 1942: 99).

threatened Ptolemy's recent acquisition of Syria and Phoenicia.¹¹ The latter's envoys attempted to sabotage Eumenes' authority by reminding Alexander's old guard of their earlier condemnation of him in Egypt. Moreover, Ptolemy had on four occasions during the reign of Alexander commanded all or part of the hypaspists/argyraspids (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 27. 5; 4. 24. 3, 8–10, 29. 1–2; 5. 23. 7). In addition to his calls for the argyraspids to repudiate Eumenes, Ptolemy also protested to the garrison commanders in Cyinda concerning their giving Eumenes access to the royal funds. Ptolemy promised whoever revolted from Eumenes that he would guarantee their safety. All of these attempts to subvert the loyalty of Eumenes' troops and allies failed. King Philip, Olympias, and the regent Polyperchon, had all written that they were to serve Eumenes (Diod. 18. 62. 1–2). For the present the Macedonian traditions of loyalty to royal authority held.

Antigonus also made several attempts to undermine the allegiance of Eumenes' troops (Diod. 18. 62. 3–4). Not only did Eumenes pose a military threat to his plans for Asia, but Eumenes' control of the treasury of Cyinda eliminated Antigonus' major source of funds. It is very likely that the transfer of funds from Susa to Cyinda had been ordered specifically to supply money for the campaign against the surviving Perdiccans, a campaign which had been placed under the direction of Antigonus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 35, 38). Antigonus, therefore, like Ptolemy attempted to corrupt the allegiance of Eumenes' new allies. He selected one of his companions, Philotas, to carry a letter, which he had written, to the Macedonians in Eumenes' army (Diod. 18. 62. 4).¹² With

11 Ptolemy seized these areas from the lawful satrap Laomedon in the spring of 318. The *Parian Marble* (FGrH 239 B F-12) dates Ptolemy's incursion into Syria and Phoenicia in 319/318. There is some difficulty in accepting the *Marble's* dating, however. Appian (*Syr.* 52) reports that Laomedon fled to Alcetas in Caria when his satrapy was attacked by Ptolemy. Likewise, Diodorus (18. 43. 1) implies that the occupation took place shortly after the failure of Perdiccas' Egyptian expedition, but this section is a self-contained description of Ptolemy's expedition. In similar circumstances where Diodorus is radically abbreviating and summarizing his source, he is often most cavalier with his relative chronology (see Anson 1986: 209–10). Appian's reference (*Syr.* 52) to Alcetas is most likely a mistake for Asander, who was the satrap of Caria (Diod. 18. 39. 6). Moreover, as Seibert (1969: 130) has pointed out, if the earlier date is accepted, it puts Ptolemy in open rebellion against Antipater, which is unlikely. Given these circumstances, the *Parian Marble's* dating is to be preferred, and since the *Marble* places Ptolemy's seizure of Syria after Cassander's flight to Asia and Arrhidaeus' siege of Cyzicus (FGrH 239 B F-12), it is most likely that Ptolemy's expulsion of Laomedon took place in the late spring or possibly very early summer of 318.

12 This Philotas is probably to be identified with the former satrap of Cilicia (Heckel 1988: 329–30; 1992: 330; 2006: 219 [#6]; Billows 1990: 423–4).

Philotas also went thirty “meddling and talkative persons” who were to make contact with Antigenes and Teutamus and organize a plot against Eumenes. Additionally, they were to seek out former acquaintances among the argyraspids and secure their adherence to Antigonos with promises of great rewards. This operation was, like Ptolemy’s, unsuccessful with one important exception. Teutamus was corrupted. However, when he attempted to win over his fellow commander, Antigenes pointed out the disadvantages of an alliance with Antigonos. Antigonos was already removing other satraps and replacing them with his personal companions. Antigenes emphasized that what Antigonos was capable of giving, he was equally able and even likely to take away. Eumenes, on the other hand, had need of their support, “since he was a foreigner, and would never dare to advance his own interests” (Diod. 18. 62. 5–7). Eumenes’ propaganda based on the biases of the Macedonian aristocratic class had worked.

Having failed in private conversations, Philotas gave the commanders the letter given him by Antigonos to be read to all the Macedonians serving in Eumenes’ army. “All the Macedonians” could not have been a great many besides the argyraspids. Eumenes had emerged from Nora with 500 “friends” (Diod. 18. 53. 7), many of whom may have been Macedonians, but his army had surrendered the previous year to Antigonos (Diod. 18. 41. 4), and some of these “friends” were undoubtedly Cappadocian aristocrats (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12. 5). He had eluded Antigonos’ pursuing troops, and, while Diodorus does refer to infantry in Eumenes’ retreating force (Diod. 18. 41. 3), the majority must have been cavalry. It is unlikely that the 2000 soldiers enrolled in the days immediately after Eumenes’ release were Macedonians; these new recruits would undoubtedly be Cappadocians and mercenaries. For all intents and purposes the Macedonians associated with Eumenes’ command with, perhaps, at most a couple of hundred exceptions, were the argyraspids.

Without Eumenes’ knowledge the “argyraspids and the other Macedonians” now came together, obviously prompted by Philotas, and demanded that the letter be read (Diod. 18. 63. 1–2). In it, Antigonos ordered that they seize Eumenes and put him to death. If this were not done, Antigonos threatened them with war. With the reading of the letter, the Macedonians were thrown into a state of confusion; the Macedonians wished to obey the command of King Philip and his regent, but feared a war with Antigonos (Diod. 18. 63. 3). This is a peculiar incident. The troops were already in a state of war with Antigonos. Menander had attempted to forestall Eumenes’ flight to Cilicia. Perhaps, the fact that Menander had not continued the pursuit and Antigonos had not, as yet, followed it up with one of his own, minimized the possibility of a direct confrontation with Antigonos in the minds of Eumenes’ soldiers. While the

letter was still being discussed, Eumenes arrived on the scene. After he read the epistle, he urged the troops to ignore Antigonus, who had rebelled against the kings, and follow the royal decree ordering them to serve him. Eumenes persuaded the Macedonians of their duty to their kings; in fact, he emerged from this confrontation with increased authority (Diod. 18. 63. 3–5). While the Macedonian troops were showing signs of their true mercenary nature, the old traditions of loyalty to the Argead rulers were still strong, and as noted earlier, with respect to those who had served with Alexander part of their identity.

After weathering this crisis, Eumenes ordered his soldiers to break camp, and in the winter of 318/317, he led them into Phoenicia (Diod. 18. 63. 6), where using part of the Cyindan treasure he planned to gather a fleet to help Polyperchon secure control of the Aegean (for the disputed chronology, see the appendix at the end of this chapter). He occupied the northern section easily. Ptolemy, who, as previously noted, had seized Phoenicia in the spring of 318, did not try to block his advance. With the use of his newly acquired war chest, Eumenes assembled a considerable number of Phoenician ships under the command of Sosigenes (Polyaen. 4. 6. 9), the Rhodian who had commanded part of the Perdiccan fleet in Aristonous' expedition to Cyprus in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6; cf. Hauben 1977: 104–5; Heckel 2006: 253). Since it is doubtful that Ptolemy would have permitted large numbers of warships to be captured by Eumenes, it is likely that the bulk of the Phoenician fleet had sailed with the satrap back to Egypt, making it necessary to construct a fleet from whatever was available.¹³ As a result, Sosigenes and the newly created fleet only set sail in early August 317,¹⁴ stopping in Cilicia on its journey north (Polyaen. 4. 6. 9). Unfortunately for Eumenes and his fleet, at about the same time his warships set sail from Phoenicia the royal fleet under the command of Cleitus was defeated by Antigonus in the waters near Byzantium (For the chronology, see the appendix at the end of this chapter).

Cassander's fleet commander, Nicanor, who had been placed in overall command of both Cassander's and Antigonus' fleets, had earlier been beaten

13 In 314, when Antigonus invaded Phoenicia, he had to build a fleet virtually from scratch, since the Phoenician fleet was in Egypt with Ptolemy (Diod. 19. 58. 2). It is very probable that Ptolemy had withdrawn the navy in a similar fashion to forestall its falling into Eumenes' hands.

14 Considerable time had to be spent repairing ships, completing construction of those in shipyards, building some from scratch, and assembling crews; quite literally creating a fleet from next to nothing. The actual time spent in this process is unknown. Antigonus apparently built his fleet in the matter of a few months during the spring and summer of 314 (cf. Diod. 19. 58. 6; Billows 1990: 112).

by Cleitus with heavy losses (Diod. 18. 72. 3–4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8). Antigonus redeemed this defeat by surprising Cleitus and winning the decisive victory (Diod. 18. 72. 5–6; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8); Cleitus was subsequently killed attempting to flee across Thrace (Diod. 18. 72; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8). While Eumenes' fleet was still in Cilicia, and apparently unaware of the events that had taken place in the north, Antigonus' victorious squadrons appeared. Sosigenes' Phoenician commanders immediately seized much of the fleet treasury and deserted to the enemy (Polyæn. 4. 6. 9). With his naval victory over Cleitus and the acquisition of Eumenes' fleet, Antigonus was now the undisputed master of the sea.¹⁵ More importantly for Eumenes, Antigonus no longer had to worry about Polyperchon interfering in western Asia. Antigonus was now free to pursue Eumenes. In one sense the naval debacle in Cilicia was fortunate for Eumenes. For as a result, he knew that Antigonus was coming.

After his naval victory, Antigonus selected from his army 20000 light infantry and 4000 cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 1), and with a minimum of encumbrance set out rapidly for Phoenicia.¹⁶ The rest of his forces were to follow as quickly as possible. Eumenes in late August or early September quickly departed Phoenicia. He moved east with the intention of making contact with the governors of the upper satrapies (Diod. 18. 73. 2). This was Eumenes' only option. If he remained where he was, he would risk being caught between the forces of Antigonus and those of Ptolemy. Eumenes had no choice but to hope that the satraps of the

15 Only one ship of the royal fleet escaped being destroyed or captured in Antigonus' victory in the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 72. 8); Sosigenes escaped the desertion of his fleet (Polyæn. 4. 6. 9) and disappears from the record.

16 Diodorus 18. 73. 1 states that Antigonus and these troops were heading for Cilicia, but, as confirmed by this very passage, their goal was Phoenicia and Eumenes. The infantry are described as "unencumbered," which has been taken to mean "light-armed" (Geer 1969: 211), but Bosworth (2002: 103n. 21) interprets the word to mean that there was little in the way of a baggage train. Diodorus in his narrative of these books uses the word *εὐζώνος* in both senses (18. 15. 1; 19. 32. 1, 47. 3, 93. 2, 94. 1, 95. 2), but most often as light-armed. This force was meant to move quickly. The difference amounts to strategy. If the 20000 were light-armed, then it was Antigonus' intention to harass and slow the movement of Eumenes' forces to the east, giving his overwhelming numbers a chance to catch up. If these were heavy infantry with little encumbrance with respect to supplies, wagons, etc., then it must be assumed that Antigonus intended to engage Eumenes. Both scenarios have strengths and weaknesses. Even with unencumbered heavy infantry, Eumenes' advantage in terms of distance could not have been overcome before he reached his destination. However, without his heavy infantry, Antigonus would be vulnerable to Eumenes' force which included 13000 infantry, including the argyraspids (Diod. 18. 61. 5). It would appear more likely that the 20000 were, indeed, light-armed and designed to slow Eumenes' progress.

upper provinces would respond to the letters from King Philip and his regent which ordered them to obey Eumenes "in every way" (Diod. 19. 13. 7). Eumenes and his army, therefore, marched rapidly through Coele-Syria (the Beqaa valley), and into Mesopotamia (Diod. 18. 73. 2–3). In Mesopotamia, Eumenes was joined by Amphilochus, the satrap of Mesopotamia and Arbelitis (Diod. 18. 39. 6).¹⁷ The union with Amphilochus eliminated any supply problems Eumenes might have encountered in Mesopotamia. Indeed, prior to this alliance Eumenes may have planned on following Alexander's course, by-passing Mesopotamia proper and traveling along the Tigris and proceeding directly to Susa. This area would have supplied adequate pasture land being semi-arid, while much of Mesopotamia was desert (Engels 1978: 67).

Eumenes advanced into Babylonia with 15000 infantry and 3300 cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 4). Upon his arrival, he sent emissaries to Seleucus, the satrap of Babylonia, and to Pithon, the satrap of Media, who was then in Babylon, requesting in the name of the kings that they join him (Diod. 19. 12. 1).¹⁸ Both refused. Seleucus replied that, even though he supported the kings, he would never consent to obey someone whom the Macedonians had condemned to death (Diod. 19. 12. 2). Having been one of those who had been involved in the assassination of the first regent, Perdikkas, Seleucus may have feared that Eumenes might seek revenge. Seleucus had also sided with Pithon in his struggles with the other upper satraps, those with whom Eumenes was seeking an alliance. He may also have done a calculation based on the opposing forces

17 While it is not definitely stated that Amphilochus joined Eumenes in Mesopotamia, it is a reasonable assumption. Eumenes left Cilicia with 15000 infantry and 2500 cavalry (Diod. 18. 61. 5), and on his arrival in Persia his army, despite losses incurred on the Tigris (Diod. 18. 73. 3), consisted of 15000 infantry and 3300 cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 4). The additional forces must have come from Amphilochus. Later in 316, Amphilochus as one of Eumenes' commanders is mentioned as personally leading a force of 600 cavalry (Diod. 19. 27. 4), and he may have brought additional troops as well. Nor is Amphilochus mentioned among those satraps joining Eumenes later in Susiane (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8). Moreover, the total given for the forces of the upper satraps joining Eumenes (Diod. 19. 14. 8) is greater by 390 cavalry and 200 infantry than the sum of the individual additions. Part of the explanation for this discrepancy is that Diodorus had probably misread Hieronymus and mistakenly included Amphilochus' troops in the total of the forces provided by the commanders of the upper satrapies.

18 Diodorus (19. 12. 1) places this exchange after Eumenes entered winter quarters. However, since Eumenes spent the winter in the Carian villages (Diod. 19. 12. 1) and these are north-east of Babylon (cf. Diod. 17. 110. 3), for Diodorus' account to be correct Eumenes would have had to march past Babylon without contacting or being contacted by Seleucus and Pithon.

moving east and concluded that Eumenes had little chance. While failing to secure an alliance with the satrap of Babylonia, Eumenes did, however, enjoy a notable success in his operations in this satrapy. The commander of one of the citadels in Babylon, loyal to the royal letters, gave his support to Eumenes (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 33–4).¹⁹ For their part, Seleucus and Pithon sent an envoy to Antigenes and the argyraspids, requesting that they remove Eumenes from his command; a request that was ignored (Diod. 19. 12. 3). Since it was late in the year and his army was worn out by its journey, Eumenes entered winter quarters for 317/316, in the area of the Carian villages (Diod. 19. 12. 1), approximately 20 miles northeast of Babylon (cf. Diod. 17. 110. 3–8, 112. 1; Str. 15. 3. 12).²⁰ While in winter quarters, Eumenes sent the letters given him by King Philip and the regent to the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies (cf. Diod. 19. 13. 7).²¹

Pithon's presence in Babylon at this time was the result of his failed attempt to gain power over the upper satrapies (Diod. 19. 14. 1–3). Pithon, who had been appointed satrap of Media at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), had tried to assert his authority over all the provinces east of Babylonia. He probably was attempting to revive the power that had been given to him by the former regent Perdikkas to deal specifically with the Greek revolt which broke out in the upper satrapies soon after Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 7. 3–4). Officially, Pithon's authority had lapsed on the completion of this mission (cf. Diod. 18. 7. 9).²² He may also have claimed certain rights as a former regent (cf. Diod.

¹⁹ See the appendix at the end of this chapter.

²⁰ This is the same area Alexander passed through on his way from Susa back to Babylon (Diod. 17. 110. 3). These villages were occupied by displaced Carians; the time and circumstances of their displacement are unknown (Bosworth 1980: 291).

²¹ In the spring of 316, Diodorus (19. 13. 7) states that Eumenes "had already sent to the commanders of the upper satrapies the letters from the kings." The obvious time for the dispatch of these letters would have been the previous winter.

²² Bengston (1937: 179–80), followed by Schober (1981: 74–8), believes that Pithon acquired his "generalship" by usurpation. Diodorus (19. 14. 2) certainly suggests that Pithon was exceeding his authority. However, while Pithon may have exceeded his authority, the text makes it clear that he in some capacity was "general of the upper satrapies." Vezin (1907: 86 and n. 3) argues that Pithon was appointed to this position by Antigonos sometime after Triparadeisus. There is, however, no notice of Antigonos making this appointment in our sources. It is possible that Pithon was appointed to this position by Antipater (so Tarn 1969: 470; Goukowsky 1978: 307 n. 82). However, as Vezin (1907: 86 n. 3) accurately points out, in the fairly complete record of the arrangements made at Triparadeisus there is no account of an overall command of the upper satrapies given to Pithon; only his satrapal appointment is mentioned. The most likely possibility is that Pithon reclaimed the command he had held under Perdikkas in 323 (Heckel 2006: 195 [#3]); a command, which had only been temporary to deal with the immediate emergency of the revolt of

18. 36. 6–7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 30–31). Whatever the basis of this claimed authority, Pithon had put to death Philotas, the general of Parthia, and placed his own brother Eudamus in the latter's place (Diod. 19. 14. 1).²³ To resist this threat to their positions, the leaders of the upper satrapies had combined their forces under the overall command of Peucestas, the satrap of Persis (Diod. 19. 14. 4). This combined army had defeated Pithon in Parthia (Diod. 19. 14. 2). Following his defeat, Pithon retreated back to Media and from there, not long before the arrival of Eumenes and his forces, to Babylon where he encouraged Seleucus "to share in his expectations" (Diod. 19. 14. 3). Pithon's operations and the resulting war with the satraps must have taken place fairly recently.²⁴ Diodorus (19. 13. 7, 14. 4, cf. 19. 15. 1) states that when Eumenes arrived in Susiane he found that the forces of the up-country satraps were still united from their previous actions against Pithon. Pithon may have been emboldened by reports of Antigonus' activities in the West; the news of which probably only arrived in the latter part of 318. While it is unclear whether Seleucus would have joined him in his quest

the Greeks in the upper satrapies with Pithon returning to the royal army after the rebels' defeat (Diod. 18. 7. 3).

- 23 Both Diodorus (18. 39. 6) and Photius' *Epitome* of Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 35) state that at Triparadeisus Philip was named satrap of Parthia. Since Diodorus (19. 14. 1) calls Philotas a general, not satrap, the most likely explanation is that Philip had died and the effective control of his satrapy had fallen to a companion. *Strategos*, like *hegemon*, was a general title which did not necessarily require formal appointment from the kings. The title of satrap could only be formally conferred by the king or regent acting in the king's name (cf. Diod. 18. 3. 1–3; 39. 5–6; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5–7; 1b. 2–3; 1. 35). By his language, Diodorus is very clear that whatever Philotas' title he was in effect legitimately in control of Parthia. Diodorus 19. 14. 2 states that the death of Philotas caused "all the other satraps" to join forces. Moreover, Diodorus is definite (19. 14. 1) that Pithon by supplanting Philotas with Eudamus briefly acquired control of Parthia.
- 24 Bosworth (2002: 104) has the conflict erupting soon after Pithon's return to the East after Triparadeisus. This is possible. It may have taken Peucestas some time to form the coalition against him. The size of the forces under the satrap of Persis's authority, 8700 infantry, 10000 Persian archers and slingers, 4600 cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8), would explain why Pithon was in Babylon. It is unknown how many soldiers he had taken with him to Babylon, however, Bosworth (2012: 109) claims that the forces under the command of Seleucus and Pithon were substantial. While Diodorus (19. 27. 1) states that "with reinforcements from Seleucus and Pithon" Antigonus had 28000 infantry (heavy infantry only, light-armed are most often overlooked by Diodorus), 8500 cavalry, and 65 elephants, but especially with respect to the heavy infantry, these could virtually all have come from the large force Antigonus had acquired from Antipater and from the defeated armies of Eumenes and Alcetas. His heavy infantry would have joined the light-armed forces initially chasing Eumenes in winter quarters.

if events had not intervened, it is telling that Seleucus did offer Pithon sanctuary and that the two did deliberate jointly with regard to Eumenes (Diod. 19. 12. 2). It is probable that they had moved east together after Triparadeisus on their way to assume command of their respective satrapies, and it is possible that Pithon had helped Seleucus expel Perdiccan forces from Babylon, even though there is no reference in the sources to any fighting (Mehl 1986: 40). While Seleucus probably was given few troops from the royal army,²⁵ Pithon may have acquired a notable force at Triparadeisus, perhaps, as a solace for the loss of the co-regency (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 1–2). Pithon's position as satrap of Media (Diod. 18. 3. 1) was simply confirmed at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), while Arrhidaeus, the other former co-regent, was given in addition to the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. 18. 39. 6), vacant since the death of Leonnatus, 1000 Macedonians and 500 Persian archers and slingers.²⁶ The addition of such a force is probably what gave Pithon the confidence to attempt to secure the rule of the East. Much of Seleucus' and Pithon's hostility towards Eumenes may have derived from their fear that he would hinder their plans regarding the upper satrapies. Eumenes' intentions of allying himself with these territories' leaders probably had become known to them through deserters. Antigonos appeared a less dangerous interloper, because of his stated purpose to suppress Eumenes. His power base was back in Asia Minor; those who supported him now might benefit later with extended satrapies in the East.

The attempted usurpation and subsequent defeat of Pithon were apparently unknown to Eumenes, when in the spring of 316 he departed winter quarters and set out with his army for Susa (Diod. 19. 13. 7). In Susa, he planned to summon the forces of the upper satrapies, already alerted to his presence the previous winter by the dispatch of the letters, and also collect funds from the royal treasury there (cf. Diod. 19. 15. 5).²⁷ Although he wished

25 As noted earlier in Chapter 3, after Alexander's death the then regent Perdiccas was very reluctant to parcel out the royal army; instead he gave to the recently appointed satraps money from the treasury to hire mercenaries. It is likely that Antipater followed a similar policy. With a major campaign facing Antigonos in Asia Minor, it is doubtful that many troops would be separated from the royal army. It was not until later in the year with Antipater ready to cross to Macedonia that the regent exchanged many of his soldiers for Antigonos' disgruntled veterans (see Chapter 5). At Triparadeisus, it was assumed that Perdiccas' former army would be used to pursue and defeat the Perdiccans in Asia Minor.

26 Arrhidaeus is not found with these forces until 318 (Diod. 18. 51. 1), but it does not appear that they could have been acquired except from the royal army.

27 Schäfer (2002: 132n. 5) suggests that the letters were sent by Eumenes while he was still in Phoenicia, which is perfectly possible. The only thing telling against this is that Eumenes appears only to have sought an alliance with Seleucus and Pithon when he was in the

to keep to his present course, thus staying in Babylonia at least long enough to move beyond the effective range of Seleucus, his wintering in the land had exhausted its available resources,²⁸ forcing him to cross the Tigris further west than he had planned. He crossed at a point only about thirty-four miles northeast of Babylon (Diod. 19. 12. 3–5). During this operation Seleucus and Pithon sailed down with ships (Diod. 19. 12. 5) which had survived from those built by Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 19. 4). After putting ashore, they again tried to persuade the argyraspidi to remove Eumenes, whom they called a foreigner responsible for many Macedonian deaths, from his command. When they were ignored, Seleucus sailed to an ancient canal, cleared its intake, and flooded the entire area around Eumenes' camp (Diod. 19. 13. 1–4).²⁹ Eumenes' entire base was now in danger of being destroyed. While Eumenes and his army reached high ground, they were surrounded by water. Here they remained inactive for the remainder of the day, but on the next the vessels that had been collected for the river crossing were used to transport the army to safety (Diod. 18. 73. 3). Since their forces were greatly inferior to those of Eumenes, neither Seleucus nor Pithon opposed these actions.³⁰ Eumenes, however, realized

vicinity (Diod. 19. 12. 1). However, this section of Diodorus is very condensed. Already in his previous book Diodorus (18. 73) has summarized this entire episode, leaving out any reference to Eumenes' attempt to recruit the two. Moreover, even in the later section he has left out any reference to Eumenes' singular success in obtaining the allegiance of one of the city's citadel commanders (see the appendix at the end of this chapter). It is then very possible that he has ignored any correspondence sent to the leaders in the East from Phoenicia.

- 28 Seleucus prevented supplies from reaching him from the latter's store-houses where most of the previous year's harvest was kept. Due to the abundance housed in these granaries, in 331, Alexander and his entire army were able to remain in Babylon for 34 days before leaving for Susa (Curt. 5. 1. 36, 39; cf. Diod. 17. 64. 5).
- 29 In a summary statement, Diodorus (18. 73. 3) mistakenly places these operations near the Euphrates, however, he later makes it very clear that they occurred along the Tigris (19. 12. 3).
- 30 The size of Pithon's and Seleucus' forces cannot be known. They did possess some troops, because when Antigonus arrived in Babylon they contributed troops to his army, but how many is not mentioned (Diod. 19. 17. 2). Mehl (1986: 49) believes that Seleucus had but few soldiers. When he was ordered by Antigonus to besiege the citadel at Susa, he had to be given forces by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 18. 1). With respect to Pithon, there are indications that he may have had more substantial forces than his colleague. Later, in 316, Pithon is listed as commanding 1500 cavalry, but also present were 1000 "mounted archers and lancers from Media and Parthia" (Diod. 19. 29. 2), who may represent part of Pithon's contribution. Also, when Antigonus with Pithon and Seleucus arrived in Media, Pithon had been sent out to acquire cavalry men and mounts; he brought back to Antigonus 2000

that if he were to evacuate his men by this avenue his baggage might be lost. Consequently, he returned his troops to their former location and abandoned this means of escape. Later with the help of a local inhabitant, who showed Eumenes how the waters could be drained, the land was made passable. With his attempt to prevent Eumenes' passage unsuccessful, Seleucus proposed a truce whereby he would concede the crossing, if Eumenes would evacuate Babylonia. While giving up his own efforts to stop Eumenes, Seleucus did send messengers to Antigonus in northern Mesopotamia, where he had wintered (Diod. 19. 15. 6),³¹ informing him that Eumenes had passed through Babylonia. He had earlier told him of the army of the upper satraps which had gathered in Susiane (cf. Diod. 19. 13. 5).

Once across the Tigris, Eumenes passed into Susiane, where the lack of grain forced him to divide his army into three columns and to subsist on rice, sesame and dates. Here he sent envoys again to the up-country satraps requesting that they join him with their armies (Diod. 19. 13. 6–7). Unknown to Eumenes, the satraps were mobilized and had left winter quarters themselves in response to his first summons. Even before Eumenes could reach Susa he was joined by these individuals (Diod. 19. 15. 1, 5),³² with their forces of 8700 infantry, 10000 Persian archers and slingers, 4600 cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8).³³ While these governors were willing to ally with Eumenes,

horsemen and an additional 1000 horses (Diod. 19. 20. 2). While defeated in his attempt to extend his authority beyond his own satrapy, Pithon must have salvaged from his defeat some infantry. His initial army was large enough to frighten the up-country satraps into uniting their forces.

31 The only reference to Antigonus' winter quarters simply mentions Mesopotamia (Diod. 19. 15. 6). However, Vezin's assumption (1907: 91) that the camp must have been in north-western Mesopotamia is the correct one. The sea battles occurred in July 317, and Eumenes left Phoenicia in September. If Antigonus left the Hellespont in late August or September and entered winter quarters in November, such a journey with light-armed infantry and cavalry would have covered about 1500 miles (see Engels 1978: 153–5). Some time may also have been spent pacifying Cilicia and Phoenicia (Billows 1990: 88). Eumenes probably went into winter quarters at about the same time as Antigonus.

32 The location of the combined army of the up-country satraps in the spring of 316 cannot be exactly determined. All Diodorus (19. 14. 2–3) says is that they had driven Pithon from Parthia into Media from where he had gone on to Babylon. It is not clear whether he was also driven from Media, but it would appear unlikely. Later, in the summer, Antigonus and his forces move to Media and there they are supplied by Pithon (Diod. 19. 20. 1–4, cf. 27. 1). Our sources do not indicate any difficulties in entering Ecbatana.

33 Peucestas, the satrap of Persis, commanded 10000 Persian archers and slingers, 3000 heavy infantry, 600 Greek and Thracian cavalry, and 400 Persian horsemen; Tlepolemus, the satrap of Carmania, 1500 infantry and 700 cavalry; Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, 1000

there was rivalry concerning the overall command (Diod. 19. 15. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 5). Peucestas argued that because of his high standing with Alexander; he had been a *somaphylax* (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4), the large contingent of troops he led, and his leadership of the forces of the upper satrapies, he deserved the command. Antigenes argued that the right to choose belonged to “his Macedonians” alone, meaning the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2).³⁴ Many of his new allies attempted to usurp Eumenes’ authority over the “Macedonians” through gifts and praise, producing what Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 5) describes as an army behaving like a “democracy.” Eumenes, who saw that this rivalry would eventually break up their combined forces, making them an easy prey for Antigonos, decided to invite these new commanders to the Alexander Tent (cf. Diod. 18. 60. 5–61. 3). As first constituted in Cilicia, no single supreme commander would be chosen, but now all the satraps and generals would gather in council each day in the Tent to decide on common actions; the proposal met with immediate approval (Diod. 19. 15. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 2).³⁵ While theoretically, as in Cyinda, democracy was to rule the council of the commanders, Eumenes still was the royal general of the kings with access to the royal treasuries (cf. Diod. 19. 15. 5). However, the division in Eumenes’ command, which had been troublesome before, was now compounded by the addition of Peucestas and his forces and allies.

infantry and 610 cavalry; Androbazus, general for Oxyartes, the satrap of Paropanisadae, 1200 infantry and 400 cavalry; Stasander, the satrap of Aria and Drangiana, 1500 infantry and 1000 cavalry; and Eudamus from India with 300 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8). The total given by Diodorus does not equal the sum of the listed individual commands. Diodorus’ total, as noted earlier, may reflect in some fashion the addition of the forces of Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia.

34 It is unclear whether Antigenes was here speaking in support of Eumenes or putting forth a claim for himself. Given his earlier cooperation and the absence of direct evidence for such a demand, it appears that the former was the case. There may have been additional cause for hostility between Antigenes and Peucestas. It is possible that Peucestas had usurped control of Susiane in Antigenes’ absence (see Tarn 1969: 477).

35 Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 10–13) implies that the crisis was more severe and drawn out than does Diodorus. However, it appears that Plutarch has summarized the many incidents of command rivalry which occurred during the year in which this polyglot army was in existence and placed them all roughly at this time. His mentioning of “lavish banquets and sacrifices” (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 5) is an obvious reference to Peucestas’ famous feast held later in Persepolis (Diod. 19. 22), and the reference to Eumenes’ pretended need to borrow money (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12–13) is wholly implausible with Eumenes so close to the treasury in Susa. It is very clear in Diodorus that the Alexander Tent was expanded to the new commanders before the army reached Susa and it alleviated the difficulties for a time (Diod. 19. 15. 1–5).

The army in late May marched to Susa where, using the royal treasury to which he alone had access, Eumenes paid his troops six months' wages.³⁶ He also gave 200 talents to Eudamus,³⁷ the satrap of India, ostensibly for the maintenance of his elephants, but in reality to win his favor. Each of the other satraps had to provide for his own troops (Diod. 19. 15. 5). Eumenes, in consequence, was the paymaster for only that part of the army he had brought from the West. In Susa, Eumenes remained for a considerable time refreshing his troops.³⁸

Antigonus left winter quarters in northwestern Mesopotamia in the spring in hopes of catching Eumenes before he could rendezvous with the forces of the up-country satraps (Diod. 19. 15. 6); this resolve was strengthened with the arrival of the emissaries from Seleucus and Pithon calling for Antigonus to hurry as fast as possible (Diod. 19. 13. 5). However, when he heard that Eumenes had already joined with the satraps, he slowed his pace, rested his troops, and enrolled additional ones for the coming campaign. During the winter the rest of his forces had joined him. Included in these were his heavy infantry and his war elephants.³⁹ When Antigonus arrived in Babylon in May,⁴⁰ he arranged

36 Eumenes left camp in the spring of 316 and proceeded to Susa. If he arrived in Susa approximately thirty to forty days later, his arrival would have been in May. This assumes that ten days to two weeks was spent in organizing the new combined army before its arrival in Susa (on this sequence of events see above and Diod. 19. 15. 1–5). Alexander took 20 days to travel from Babylon to Susa (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 7).

37 This is not Pithon's brother, Eudamus, the son of Crateuas (Berve 1973: 2154 [#310. 311]; Heckel 2006: 120 [#1, 2]).

38 In late July, Eumenes engaged Antigonus' advance forces in a skirmish on the Coprates River (Diod. 19. 18. 2). The time is fairly well fixed by Diodorus' (19. 18. 3) reference to the "season of the rising of the dog star," which corresponds to the latter part of July (see Bickerman 1969: 144). Since the Coprates, the modern Dez (Ab-i Diz) (See Vezin 1907: 93, 95 n. 5; Sykes 1969: 1:21, 40) is less than 10 miles from Susa, Eumenes and his forces obviously spent some time in the Persian city. The Dez flows south from the mountains past the modern city of Dizful and joins the Karun about 25 miles north of Ahwaz (Naval Intelligence Division 1945: figure 14, 54–5; Hansman 1967: 28; Barthold 1984: 185–6).

39 Since these forces are found later associated with Antigonus' army (Diod. 19. 19. 7, 27. 1), they must have joined Antigonus in winter quarters. Antigonus' war elephants later in 316 numbered 65 (Diod. 19. 27. 1, 40. 1). Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 43) states that Antigonus was given half of the elephants which had accompanied Perdicas' army to Egypt, or 70 of the animals.

40 The distance from Antigonus' winter quarters and Babylon is between 400 and 500 miles. While he left his winter quarter early hoping to catch Eumenes still in Babylonia, when informed that the Cardian had passed through, he slowed his march. Once again he was in all probability leading an advance force, but then he waited for his entire army and

for common action against Eumenes with Seleucus and Pithon. After incorporating their forces into his own, he proceeded to cross into Susiane (Diod. 19. 17. 2). With the overwhelming number of troops under his direct command, Antigonus, unlike Eumenes, did not face any rivalry from his new allies. Pithon and Seleucus in light of their inferior numbers were clearly subordinates. When Eumenes learned of the crossing, he ordered Xenophilus, who commanded the citadel of Susa, not to give any of the treasure to Antigonus (Diod. 19. 17. 3). In company with the other commanders, he marched four days to the Pasitigris River,⁴¹ the modern Karun,⁴² where he wished to await the enemy.⁴³ The river was not fordable, and, consequently, after Eumenes crossed by means of a pontoon bridge,⁴⁴ he was in an ideal position to block Antigonus' advance (cf. Diod. 19. 17. 3, 18. 4). To ensure that his enemy did not cross unnoticed, Eumenes wished to disperse his troops along the river's entire course. However, the Pasitigris stretches some 80 miles from the Zagros mountains to its southern estuary (Diod. 19. 17. 3). To accomplish his goal, Eumenes needed additional forces. Consequently, both he and Antigenes asked Peucestas to summon an additional 10000 archers from Persia. At first, Peucestas ignored this request; he was still angered over not receiving the chief command. But, eventually his fear of Antigonus won out over his pride and the troops were summoned (Diod. 19. 17. 5–7). Diodorus (19. 17. 6) further reports that Peucestas reasoned that the more troops he had directly under his command the stronger his position would become in the combined command structure.⁴⁵

proceeded to Babylon. This journey with elephants would have taken about 50 days, making his arrival in May most likely.

41 Diodorus (19. 17. 3) says a day's march from Susa, but in Book 17 (67. 1; cf. Curt. 5. 3. 1) he correctly refers to the distance as a four-day journey. The Coprates River is but one day's journey from Susa, the distance being less than ten miles. The confusion at this point is most likely the result of the attempts by Diodorus to comprehend what must have been a long and complex section of Hieronymus' history.

42 For this identification, see Barthold 1984: 185.

43 The text (Diod. 19. 17. 3) states that Eumenes and his forces moved to the Tigris. It is very clear, however, that Diodorus is confused at this point. The actual river was the Pasitigris, as Diodorus (19. 18. 3) later acknowledges.

44 Alexander on his way back from India crossed the Pasitigris by means of a "bridge of boats" (Arr. *Ind.* 42. 7).

45 Diodorus (19. 17. 7) relates that even though some of the Persians were 30 days' march away, all of the Persian archers received the order on the same day Peucestas issued it. According to Diodorus, "Persia is cut by many narrow valleys and has many lookout posts that are high and close together, on which those of the inhabitants who had the loudest voices had been stationed. Since these posts were separated from each other by the distance at which a man's voice can be heard, those who received the order passed it on

Antigonus reached Susa in July. He appointed Seleucus satrap of this country in addition to Babylonia, and gave him troops to besiege the citadel, since Xenophilus remained loyal to Eumenes. Antigonus, however, with the rest of his forces pushed on after the enemy. On this march, the heat was so oppressive that Antigonus was forced to travel at night, but he still lost many men even though the journey only lasted until sunrise (Diod. 19. 18. 2).⁴⁶ On reaching the Coprates River, the modern Dez, Antigonus made preparations for a crossing.⁴⁷ This river was approximately 400 feet in width and possessed of a swift current (Diod. 19. 18. 3), as a result it could not be forded but required that the army be ferried across. Antigonus, using small boats which he seized in the vicinity, sent an advance party of more than 3000 infantry and 400 cavalry across the river to secure a landing area for the rest of the army. Eumenes' camp, however, was nearby, at a point a little more than nine miles from where the Coprates entered the Pasitigris (Diod. 19. 18. 3; cf. 19. 21. 2), or about 20 miles down river from the modern city of Shushtar.⁴⁸ Therefore, when scouts

in the same way to the next, and then these in turn to others until the message had been delivered at the border of the satrapy" (*Loeb Classical Library* translation, Geer 1969: 279). While Hornblower (1981: 151) rejects this account as a "tall story," Cook (1983: 109) accepts the practice, and the testimony of an earlier eye-witness would appear to confirm it (Xen. *Anab.* 5. 4. 31). The Persians also used fire signals to transmit information (Diod. 19. 57. 5; cf. Cook 1983: 109).

46 The heat in this part of Persia is truly oppressive in July and August. In the valleys of southern Iran the mean temperature is in the mid to high 90s during these months. In Ahwaz the mean in both July and August is 99°F, and Shushtar well over 100°. At this time there is also very little rainfall in this area (see Naval Intelligence Division 1945?: 591–2, 595–6; Ganji 1968: 223–5; Oberlander 1968: 266–7). With respect to Shushtar, the temperature as I write this (July 24, 2014) is 118°F.

47 Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 3) mistakenly places the battle between Eumenes and Antigonus on the Pasitigris, but it is very clear that it actually occurred on the Coprates (Diod. 19. 18. 3–4).

48 The location of Eumenes' camp put him at a point which bisected the Pasitigris in its course from the mountains to the sea, and only about a day's march from the main road to Persepolis (Stein 1940: 18–27; Hansman 1972: 118–19; Cook 1983: 107). Eumenes had left Susa for the country of the Uxians (Diod. 19. 17. 3), a people who occupied the plain and mountains of the upper reaches of the Pasitigris (Bosworth 1980: 321–2), where he had crossed to the eastern bank of the river (Diod. 19. 17. 4). The road from Susa to Persepolis passed through the Uxian plain (Str. 16. 1. 17). Antigonus probably tried to cross the Coprates at a point about 30 to 40 miles from its juncture with the Pasitigris. Eumenes' forces came upon Antigonus' advance party very quickly (cf. Diod. 19. 18. 4), implying that Eumenes' camp was not too distant. Since Eumenes intercepted Antigonus' forces with cavalry and light-armed troops only, Eumenes camp was probably at the most 40 miles

reported the enemy's activity to Eumenes, he selected 4000 infantry and 1300 cavalry and recrossed the Pasitigris by means of his pontoon bridge. Eumenes' forces surprised those troops who had crossed to the eastern shore (Diod. 19. 18. 2–4; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 3).⁴⁹ In addition to the soldiers sent over on Antigonus' orders, as many as 6000 additional soldiers had crossed in scattered groups looking for provisions (Diod. 19. 18. 4). Eumenes' forces fell on these unsuspecting troops and routed them easily. Few escaped back to Antigonus; 4000 were taken prisoner. As previously indicated, this battle took place in late July 316 (Diod. 19. 17. 3, 18. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 14. 3).

With Eumenes firmly entrenched on the opposite shore of the Coprates, Antigonus regarded the crossing as impossible and set out toward the city of Badace (Diod. 19. 18. 5–19. 2), which was situated on the banks of the Eulaeus river.⁵⁰ After another grueling march in which once again many soldiers were

away (Alexander's cavalry and light-armed units were capable of daily rates as high as 50 mpd over short periods; see Engels 1978: 155).

49 Plutarch relates that Eumenes was the only commander to participate in this defeat of Antigonus' forces. He implies that this was because the other commanders were hostile to Eumenes and too given to luxury (Plut. *Eum.* 14. 2). While Eumenes did have to deal with the jealousy of Peucestas almost continually, the other commanders were cooperating amiably and effectively at the time of the battle on the Coprates. Even Peucestas after some initial hesitation had summoned the extra soldiers (Diod. 19. 17. 6–7), and Antigenes and the argyraspids appear to have become more supportive of Eumenes in light of Peucestas' demands. In the initial meeting of Eumenes and those who had accompanied him from the West with the satraps of the upper provinces, while Peucestas demanded that he be given over-all command, Antigenes only asserted that the final decision be left to the Macedonians (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2). Moreover, the argyraspids had proven loyal in Babylonia, resisting the entreaties of both Seleucus and Pithon (Diod. 19. 13. 1–2). This victory over Antigonus not only in part retrieved Eumenes' reputation with respect to this commander, but certainly increased the troops' confidence in his leadership.

50 The site of Badace has not been identified, nor is there agreement among scholars as to the identity of the Eulaeus. Both Sykes (1969: 1: 40) and Bosworth (1980: 321) believe that the Eulaeus was a tributary of the Pasitigris (Karun); Hansman (1967: 28–9) identifies the Eulaeus as the modern Karkha, while Barthold (1984: 185), however, equates the Choaspes with the modern Karkha. Confusion with regard to the river's identity also exists in the sources. Pliny (*NH* 6. 31. 135) states that the Eulaeus flowed past Susa. This author also comments on the pure qualities of its water, stating that the Persian kings would drink only the waters from this stream; Herodotus (1. 188. 1) gives this same information for the Choaspes. Strabo (13. 3. 4) states that Susa was situated on the Choaspes River, and that "the Choaspes, Eulaeus, and the Tigris meet in a lake" (15. 3. 4). It is very unlikely that the Eulaeus was a branch of the Pasitigris, since Antigonus did not cross the Coprates, which is west of the Pasitigris, and the latter river has its origins high in the Zagros mountains. Moreover, after spending some days in Badace, Antigonus chose to take the more direct

overcome by the heat, Antigonus reached Badace, where he remained for a few days to permit his army to recover from its recent setbacks (Diod. 19. 19. 1–2). When they had rested, Antigonus decided to proceed north to Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) (Diod. 19. 19. 2). There were two routes from his current location to his destination. One route was along a royal road, but was a forty-day journey through the hot plain; the other was short and cool, but mountainous and through territory occupied by the hostile Cossaeans. Antigonus chose the more direct route through the mountains (Diod. 19. 19. 2).⁵¹ It was not easy for an army to proceed, however, without the consent of the Cossaeans. These mountaineers exacted payments from the Persian kings whenever they passed between Ecbatana and Babylon (*FGrH* 133 F-1g=Str. 11. 13. 6). Because of the tribesmen's bellicosity and the difficulty of the terrain, Pithon advised Antigonus to purchase the right of safe passage (Diod. 19. 19. 8). Antigonus, however, "regarded it as beneath his dignity" to pay tribute to these people. Consequently, he decided to fight his way through (Diod. 19. 19. 4) and soon came to regret his decision.⁵² Finally, after suffering heavy casualties, eight days after he had set out, Antigonus and his forces arrived at their destination in August (Diod. 19. 19. 6–8; cf. 19. 19. 2).⁵³ Most of Antigonus' losses here and in Susiane, given the nature of the military operations, were amongst his light-armed troops.⁵⁴ As a result of these various disasters, the army was disaf-

route to Ecbatana (Diod. 19. 19. 2), which probably corresponds to the modern road leading from Hamadan to Khuristan (Barthold 1984: 180). This route would place Antigonus west of the Coprates.

51 On this route see Barthold 1984: 180.

52 Antigonus may have been influenced by Alexander's reaction to the demands for tribute made by the peoples in these same regions. Alexander in 324 invaded the land of the Cossaeans and forced them to submit to his commands (Diod. 17. 111. 6; against another group of mountaineers in the same general area in 330, Alexander in response to their demands had imposed tribute upon them [*Arr. Anab.* 3. 17. 1–5]). Billows' claim (1990: 92–3) that Antigonus' reluctance to pay the tribute was due to financial problems is unlikely. While Antigonus' expenses were great and he had not had recourse to a royal treasury since Cyinda, there is no record of dissatisfaction among his troops over arrearages in pay. Moreover, he had taken unspecified funds from Cyinda and had access to whatever resources were possessed by his allies. Diodorus (19. 19. 4), likely following Hieronymus, states that Antigonus believed "it was beneath his dignity to pay."

53 Diodorus (19. 20. 1) relates that in "forty days" Antigonus' army had met with three disasters. The first was the march from Susa to the Coprates, the second, the battle on the Coprates, and the third, the crossing of the country of the Cossaeans.

54 The nature of the conflicts on the Coprates and with the Cossaeans would dictate very high losses among such soldiers. Against the Cossaeans light-armed troops were almost exclusively employed in the fighting (Diod. 19. 19. 4). Billows (1990: 92 n. 20) argues that

fected (Diod. 19. 20. 1). Antigonus eliminated the danger by mingling with his troops and making supplies available in abundance. Ecbatana was one of the old Persian treasuries of the Persian Empire and, while much of the funds had been moved to Babylon (Diod. 17. 108. 4), Antigonus still was able to extract 500 talents from its coffers (Diod. 19. 20. 3). Moreover, in Media, he partially offset his losses by sending Pithon out to recruit 2000 additional cavalry; Pithon also acquired more than 1000 horses and a large number of baggage animals whose numbers had been severely diminished by the recent ordeals (Diod. 19. 20. 1–4, cf. 27. 1).

Antigonus' retreat to Ecbatana created turmoil in Eumenes' camp. Eumenes and those who had come east with him now saw a great opportunity. If they returned to the West, they could secure Asia Minor.⁵⁵ But the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies wished to remain in the East; they feared to leave their lands unprotected, lands which were now very much threatened by Antigonus. After it became clear to Eumenes that he was not going to dissuade those who wished to remain, he gave way (Diod. 19. 21. 1–2). He realized that if the army were divided, neither half would be a match for the forces of Antigonus. Once again, the difficulties of divided command affected Eumenes. He now marched twenty-four days to Persepolis, following the same route taken by Alexander in 331.⁵⁶ Once in Persis, the army, due to Peucestas' attentions, lacked for nothing (Diod. 19. 21. 1–3). After their arrival, Peucestas offered a magnificent sacrifice to the old gods and to Alexander and Philip (Diod. 19.

Diodorus' source, Hieronymus, has exaggerated Antigonus' casualty figures, but given the circumstances it is not surprising that casualties would have been high. Once in Media, Antigonus had recruited additional troops and had acquired large numbers of additional horses and baggage animals to replenish his losses (Diod. 19. 20. 1–4, cf. 27. 1).

55 Schäfer (2002: 140) suggests that Eumenes may in addition to reacquiring Cappadocia and much of Asia Minor even have contemplated acquiring Egypt, but doubts that he had much interest in aiding Polyperchon. In actuality, with little knowledge of the war in the West, helping the latter would have appeared more beneficial (cf. Billows 1990: 93), than an attack on Egypt where the argyraspids would remember that last attempt by Perdikkas. Bosworth (2002: 120–1) sees more behind Eumenes' capitulation to the will of the satraps. He claims that Eumenes had some knowledge of the deteriorating position of Polyperchon in Macedonia. There is no such evidence in our sources that Eumenes was reluctant to return to the West.

56 Alexander took 30 days to march the approximately 390 miles from Susa to Persepolis (Engels 1978: 73 n. 14), but he was passing through hostile territory (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 17–18. 10; Curt. 5. 2. 16, 3. 1–4. 33). That Eumenes, even though burdened with elephants, took only 24 days is indicative of the distance of his camp from Susa and the helpfulness of Peucestas' hospitality (Diod. 19. 21. 3).

22. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5–6). Here the army was feasted in four concentric circles. These four respectively included: generals, hipparchs, and prominent Persians; lower-ranking officers, “friends and generals who were unassigned, and the cavalry”; the argyraspids and other infantry who had fought with Alexander; and finally, mercenaries and allies (Diod. 19. 22. 2). This act of largesse, as intended, greatly increased Peucestas’ popularity (Diod. 19. 23. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 4).

To offset Peucestas’ new found support, Eumenes fabricated a letter supposedly written by Orontes, the satrap of Armenia, which reported that Olympias with Alexander IV had gained control of Macedonia, Cassander had been slain, and Polyperchon had crossed to Asia with a large army (Diod. 19. 23. 2–3; Polyae. 4. 8. 3).⁵⁷ In part, the letter was believed because it was written in Syrian and Orontes was one of Peucestas’ *philoï* (Diod. 19. 23. 3; Bosworth 1980: 315–16), but also because the fabrication was based on facts known to the army. In the fall of 317, Eurydice had announced that her husband, King Philip III, had dismissed Polyperchon and that she had taken over the regency (Just. 14. 5. 1–3; Diod. 19. 11. 1).⁵⁸ She had also sent emissaries into the Peloponnesus to Cassander requesting that he come to Macedonia as quickly as possible (Diod. 19. 11. 1; Just. 14. 5. 3). Polyperchon, acting in concert with Aeacides, the king of Epirus, invaded Macedonia with Olympias and Alexander IV (Diod. 19. 11. 1; Just. 14. 5. 9). Alexander, the king, was betrothed to Aeacides’ daughter Deidameia (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4. 3). Eurydice and Philip’s army in the presence of Alexander the Great’s mother and son went over to Polyperchon (Diod. 19. 11. 2–3). This was probably the limit of the knowledge known of the situation in the Persian plateau.

In the aftermath of the successful invasion, Philip and Eurydice were captured (Diod. 19. 11. 3). Polyperchon had earlier invited Olympias to return to Macedonia and become “the *Epimeletes* of Alexander IV and the *Prostates* of

57 Paschalis Paschidis (2008: 233–46) has argued that in the summer of 317 (as an advocate of the mixed chronology, Paschidis says summer of 318), Polyperchon did launch an invasion of Asia Minor. Cassander’s first invasion of Macedonia might then have occurred during a time when Polyperchon was in Asia. While such an invasion into Asia is possible, especially given the lack of information regarding Polyperchon’s activities in 317, it would appear doubtful. Polyperchon did not command the Aegean, nor was he in alliance with Lysimachus, who controlled the land approaches to the Hellespont, thus making it difficult either to launch an invasion, or to return from one successfully. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that Polyperchon would have been operating so far from Macedonia with Cassander in Greece.

58 While Polyperchon’s location at the time she and her husband took power is not precisely known, he was not in Macedonia (Just. 14. 5. 1), but was probably in Epirus. Polyperchon was negotiating with Olympias (Just. 14. 5. 1–2; cf. Diod. 18. 57. 2).

the kingdom" (Diod. 18. 49. 4, 57. 2, 65. 1), i. e. guardian and regent respectively.⁵⁹ In Macedonia, Olympias now took charge. She appointed generals (Diod. 19. 35. 4), commanded troops (Diod. 19. 35. 4–5, 50. 1), dispatched orders to garrison commanders (Diod. 18. 65. 1), and administered justice (Diod. 19. 11. 8–9). As one of her first acts, she immediately took control of the captured Eurydice and Philip III, and after maltreating them for "many days," saw to their deaths (Diod. 19. 11. 5–7; Just. 14. 5. 9–10). Diodorus (19. 11. 5; cf. Just. 14. 5. 10) states that Philip III ruled for six years and four months, which would put his death in October or early November 317.⁶⁰ It is very likely that these murders were not immediately revealed,⁶¹ nor is it likely that this information was known to either Antigonus or Eumenes. If it had been, since Eumenes' command was given under the authority of the kings, with the clear signatory being King Philip, Antigonus would have used this information to attempt to undermine Eumenes' authority, and he did not. The *Chronicle of the Diadochi* (BCHP 3, Obv. 33–4) still lists Philip III as king in the spring of 316, as does a contract from Uruk dated that same summer (AION Suppll 77 79=BM 79012). However, these dates may not reflect a lack of knowledge of Philip's death, but rather the uncertain nature of the political situation after this murder (Del Monte 1997: 186; Boiy 2000: 116–18). In 316, Cassander had himself invaded Macedonia and by mid-summer had subverted most of Polyperchon's army and was besieging Olympias in Pydna (Diod. 19. 35. 36. 5; Just. 14. 4).⁶²

Clearly Eumenes' forces knew of Olympias' return, but not of Philip's death and Cassander's subsequent triumph. The reference to Cassander in the letter refers to Cassander's abortive invasion of Macedonia in the late summer of 317.⁶³ Eumenes ordered that the forged letter be sent around to all the

59 See Chapter 3 and Anson 1992: 39–43.

60 See the appendix at the end of this chapter.

61 Philip's murder was committed by "certain Thracians" (Diod. 19. 11. 5), perhaps, indicating a desire to keep knowledge of the death from the Macedonians. Also, Olympias would not want to alert "the 100 prominent Macedonians" (Diod. 19. 11. 8) she also planned to slaughter. Bosworth (1992B: 62–3) is correct that Errington's assumption (1977: 483) that Eumenes' forces knew of Philip's death prior to Eumenes' own demise is unlikely.

62 For this chronology, see the appendix at the end of this chapter.

63 Diodorus 19. 35. 7 (cf. 18. 75. 1) states that Cassander had acquired part of Polyperchon's war elephants "in his previous expedition into Macedonia." Errington (1977: 494 n. 54), dates this first invasion to the fall of 317. This is too late in the year. By the fall Eurydice had already assumed the regency or would do so shortly, and this is sequenced before Cassander's successful invasion, and, therefore, by implication after Cassander's abortive invasion. It is likely that Cassander's first invasion was soon after the installation of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens in July 317. Polyperchon was back in Macedonia, after his

commanders and that it be shown to as many of the soldiers as possible. Since Orontes and Peucestas had enjoyed a friendship while Alexander still lived (Bosworth 1980: 315–16), the letter was instantly believed and changed the sentiment of the entire camp. Eumenes was once again in control of this polyglot army (Diod. 19. 23. 3). With his troops' renewed confidence, Eumenes moved against one of his supposed allies, Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia. He was to stand trial before the "many." Apparently, this was to be a show trial. Sibyrtius, in part, was a pawn in the struggle between Eumenes and Peucestas; he was one of Peucestas' confidants. Also, Eumenes wished by this action to intimidate the other commanders (cf. Diod. 19. 24. 1). The Cardian charged Sibyrtius with conspiring with Antigonus and sent a cavalry contingent into Arachosia that seized the satrap's baggage, forcing him to flee (Diod. 19. 23. 4).⁶⁴ To his troops and their officers Eumenes now presented himself with the trappings of the royal general of Asia (Diod. 19. 24. 1). But behind the scenes he secured the loyalty of his fellow commanders through promises and praise. Also, according to Diodorus (19. 21. 2–3), he borrowed 400 talents from them in the name of the kings, thus binding them to him as anxious creditors.⁶⁵ In Persis, the need for money was real. It was some time since Eumenes had accessed a royal treasury.⁶⁶ Bosworth (2002: 123) believes these loans were the result of Eumenes' intimidation of the other commanders, but Schäfer (2002: 146) is correct that this was more an investment in their own interests. While there was rivalry with Eumenes, Antigonus was the true enemy.

While Eumenes was attending to these matters, Antigonus in the late summer or early fall left his camp in Ecbatana and set out for Persis. He and his forces had spent considerable time in Media recuperating. When Eumenes learned of Antigonus' advance, he immediately broke camp; with his recent

breaking off the siege of Megalopolis (cf. Diod. 18. 72. 1–2). Now, if Cassander's first expedition occurred in the summer of 317 following Polyperchon's failures in the Peloponnesus and in the Hellespont, this would explain the presence of both Polyperchon and his elephants. Cassander's invasion, although obviously repulsed, emboldened Eurydice to seize the regency at the first opportunity.

64 There may have been considerable truth to the charges against Sibyrtius, since he is later confirmed in his satrapy by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 48. 3).

65 Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 12, cf. 16. 3) inaccurately places this incident shortly after Eumenes' arrival in Susiane and before his march to Persis. Plutarch has presented the incidents of Eumenes' life from Susa to the Battle of Gabene thematically with little regard for chronology.

66 The treasury in Persepolis that had once existed in Achaemenid times was emptied by Alexander and its holdings sent to Susa (Diod. 17. 71. 2). It is unknown what particular resources Peucestas had, but these were his, not Eumenes'.

actions having secured the loyalty and enthusiasm of his troops and officers, Eumenes now believed that the time was right for an immediate confrontation with Antigonus. Eumenes' relationship with his forces, however, was still precarious. Consequently, on the march, he entertained them sumptuously, again emphasizing his role as patron/general. With troops more mercenary than national, a good leader was both victorious and generous. But, during the heavy drinking which accompanied these activities Eumenes became ill (Diod. 19. 24. 4–5; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 6).⁶⁷ For this reason, Eumenes' now halted his march for some days (Diod. 19. 24. 5). The confidence of his troops was badly shaken; the enemy was expected shortly and their general was handicapped with illness. As soon as the infirmity lessened, to offset the sad deterioration in his army's morale, Eumenes set out once more against Antigonus. His recovery, however, was not complete and he was forced to turn over the active command of the army to Peucestas and Antigenes, while he followed, borne in a litter (Diod. 19. 24. 5–6; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 7–9). As soon as Antigonus learned of Eumenes' condition, he hastened to take his army into battle (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 1–2). Antigonus wished to take advantage of the blow to his opponents' morale. The troops associated with Eumenes had every reason to see the Cardian as their best commander. He had saved his forces from disaster in Babylonia and in the only confrontation with Antigonus which they had witnessed Eumenes had been victorious. Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 4–15. 3) presents a tale not found in Diodorus that when Antigonus and his forces appeared the argyraspids refused to go forward until Eumenes was there to lead them. He then was carried to the front in his litter. This last is a great tale, but either entirely untrue or greatly embellished (for the latter view, see Bosworth 2002: 126–7).⁶⁸ That he was ill and carried in a litter appears certain. However, it is

67 Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5–6) places Eumenes' illness "a few days" after Peucestas' banquet, but Diodorus (19. 24. 5) has it beginning after Eumenes heard of Antigonus' breaking camp in Media and on the second day of his own army's march, all of which took place considerably after Peucestas' banquet (Diod. 19. 23–24).

68 Bosworth (2002: 126–7) believes that the illness was enhanced by Eumenes to call to mind parallels to Alexander's last sickness, which many associated with poison. The miraculous recovery would then raise the hopes of the troops much as the return of an injured star player affects the morale of the team. "Eumenes displayed himself as a second Alexander, exposed to the same perils, and his troops responded to the charade" (Bosworth 2002: 127). All is possible, but this seems much too clever. To surrender the day-to-day leadership to one's rivals and appear physically weak would appear to negate all of Eumenes' previous efforts to establish his overall leadership, a dangerous gambit, if true, which is unlikely.

very clear that from the moment the troops were within a day's march of one another, Eumenes was up and in charge (Diod. 19. 24. 6–30. 4).

The two armies were in the Median district of Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 34. 7), which was located to the north of Pasargadae between the Zagros mountains and the central desert.⁶⁹ Neither side wished to initiate the action, for both had taken up defensive positions separated by a river and a ravine (Diod. 19. 25. 2). Under these circumstances, even though the armies were encamped a mere 600 yards from one another, and carried out skirmishing and plundering raids, no large scale offensives were launched by either side. In the midst of this stalemate, on the fifth day after they had first sighted one another, Antigonus sent envoys into Eumenes' camp urging the satraps and the argyraspids to desert Eumenes. He promised the satraps that they would retain their provinces, and to all he offered great rewards. The argyraspids paid no attention to these offers, and, in fact, threatened the emissaries, eliciting praise from Eumenes for their steadfastness (Diod. 19. 25. 2–7). It is clear that, if Antigonus had known of the death of Philip and the success of Cassander in Macedonia, this would have been made known to the argyraspids, and, indeed, to all of Eumenes' forces.

That same night deserters reported that Antigonus had given orders to break camp at the second watch (around 9–10 P.M.). While the deserters did not know Antigonus' destination, Eumenes guessed that it had to be the neighboring region of Gabene. Since it was late in the year, he knew that Antigonus would be seeking an unplundered area, rich in provisions, and easily defended for his winter quarters. Gabene was the only such area in the vicinity, and it was but three days distant (Diod. 19. 26. 1–2).⁷⁰ In consequence, Eumenes was anxious to occupy this region before Antigonus. He, therefore, paid certain mercenaries to pretend to desert to the enemy. They were to report that Eumenes was planning a night attack on Antigonus' camp. Since Antigonus believed them, he postponed his departure and drew up his forces for battle. Eumenes

69 For the location of Paraetacene, see Bosworth 1980: 334. The site of the battle was obviously north and west of Persepolis. Antigonus was moving from Ecbatana (cf. Diod. 19. 19. 2) towards Persepolis. Eumenes started his march to intercept Antigonus well after the former had left Ecbatana (Cf. Diod. 19. 24. 4) and was forced to halt his march for some days because of his illness (Diod. 19. 24. 5). Both Antigonus and Eumenes probably followed the ancient road between Ecbatana and Persepolis (Cary 1949: 192).

70 While the actual site of Gabene is unknown, it may well be identified with the region of Isfahan, an area situated on the southern border of the Dasht-i Kavir and noted since antiquity for its comparative fertility (Le Strange 1930: 202–3; Bosworth 2002: 127–8). Moreover, a number of rivers flow through the region which corresponds to Diodorus' (19. 43. 3) reference to a river in the region.

immediately sent his baggage and elephants on ahead with the rest of the army to follow after a hastily prepared meal (Diod. 19. 26. 3–4; Polyæn. 4. 8. 3).⁷¹ When Antigonus discovered from his scouts what had taken place, he hastily broke camp and led his forces after Eumenes in a forced march. Eumenes, however, had a two-watch (six to seven-hour) head start, which Antigonus soon realized was too great to overcome. He, therefore, devised his own strategem (Diod. 19. 26. 5–6). While Antigonus instructed Pithon to continue with the infantry at a regular rate of march, he with his cavalry pursued Eumenes at top speed. At daybreak, he overtook Eumenes' rearguard as they were descending from some hill country. Antigonus occupied the now evacuated ridges and made his forces clearly visible to the enemy. When Eumenes saw Antigonus' cavalry on the crest, he believed that the latter's entire army was near. Accordingly, he drew up his own forces in battle array. While Eumenes and his troops awaited the expected assault, the rest of Antigonus' army was given the chance to join the cavalry (Diod. 19. 26. 7–9).

After his infantry arrived, Antigonus drew up his forces for battle and marched down into the plain against Eumenes.⁷² Antigonus' army contained 28000 heavy infantry, 10600 cavalry, 65 elephants (Diod. 19. 27. 1, 29. 2–6), and probably 15000 light infantry.⁷³ Eumenes' forces numbered 35000 infantry, 6300 cavalry and 125 elephants (Diod. 19. 28. 4).⁷⁴ The Cardian's army was arranged

71 While Diodorus does not specifically mention the elephants, it stands to reason that Eumenes would have sent them ahead with the army's belongings. Both the elephants and the baggage moved more slowly than the rest of the army; consequently, Eumenes would want them to have a head start.

72 Nepos (*Eum.* 8. 1) incorrectly states that at Paraetacene the antagonists fought "non acie instructa, sed in itinere." Diodorus' involved description of the respective generals' dispositions of their armies shows conclusively the two armies did fight in battle order.

73 While Diodorus only enumerates the heavy infantry (28000; Diod. 19. 27. 1) in his description of Antigonus' battle order. Both armies contained an unknown number of light infantry. These must have been initially numerous, since he began his journey to the east with 20000, but these troops also suffered heavy losses (see above). With respect to cavalry the total given in Diodorus 19. 27. 1, does not agree with the total of the individual detachments set forth in Diodorus 19. 29. 2–6. Diodorus 19. 27. 1 gives the total as 8500, but the individual units listed in Diodorus (19. 29. 1–5) total over 10000. The difference in the figures may represent some last minute addition to Antigonus' forces, but it is more likely that Diodorus has in chapter twenty-seven used a total given by his source in an earlier context, which failed to reflect the additional troops acquired by Pithon in Media (Diod. 19. 20. 2).

74 Diodorus' summary figures for Eumenes' forces do not agree with the totals for the enumerated units (Diod. 19. 27. 2–28. 4). Diodorus only mentions 17000 infantry specifically in his listing, but these are clearly heavy infantry; these enumerated units are all part of

with his best troops stationed on the right side of his line. Here were the argyraspids and Eumenes' own hypaspists,⁷⁵ all under the command of Antigenes and Teutamus. The cavalry on the right wing were also elite units, led by Eumenes himself (Diod. 19. 28. 1, 3–4, 29. 1). The entire phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops (Diod. 19. 28. 2), with the right cavalry wing screened by an additional corps of elephants (Diod. 19. 28. 4). When Antigonus saw this arrangement, he stationed his light cavalry on his left under the command of Pithon (Diod. 18. 29. 1–3). These were drawn up in open order and were to avoid any frontal action, but rather attack Eumenes' right flank (Diod. 19. 29. 1–2). Antigonus placed his best cavalry and the 8000 Macedonian heavy infantry on his own right (Diod. 19. 29. 3–5). Antigonus and his son Demetrius commanded the cavalry on this wing (Diod. 19. 29. 4). Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right (Diod. 19. 29. 6).

the phalanx (Diod. 19. 27. 6–28. 1). However, there are references to light-armed troops taking part in the battle (Diod. 19. 27. 5, 28. 2, 30. 4). Peucestas alone prior to the march to Persepolis supplied a total of 20000; he met Eumenes in Susiane with 10000 (Diod. 19. 14. 5) and summoned 10000 more prior to the battle on the Coprates (Diod. 19. 17. 6). Therefore, the infantry figures presented by Diodorus can be reconciled by assuming that Eumenes still retained at least 18000 light-armed troops (so Devine 1985A: 78). The cavalry figures also do not agree; Diodorus' summary (19. 28. 4) gives Eumenes 6100 horsemen, but the individual units (Diod. 19. 27. 2–28. 4) total 6300. The figures he presents as representing the respective forces before the battle may actually be reflective of totals given by Diodorus' source after the battle. The total number of Eumenes' elephants described in Diodorus' description (19. 27. 5, 28. 2, 4) of the battle of Paraetacene is 125 (since Eudamus only supplied 120 [Diod. 19. 14. 8], Eumenes must have acquired 5 additional elephants, perhaps from Peucestas), but Diodorus' summary figure (19. 28. 4) is 114; the same figure is found describing Eumenes' forces before the battle at Gabene (Diod. 19. 40. 4). It is known that the elephants suffered casualties at Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 30. 2), and, perhaps, in an engagement which occurred only a few days prior to Gabene (cf. Diod. 19. 39. 5).

- 75 The term "hypaspists" is used most often in the period after Alexander to refer to the personal guards of various of his Successors; with "argyraspids" used exclusively for Alexander's former hypaspists (Anson 1988: 131–3). In 316, in addition to the argyraspids and his personal hypaspists, Eumenes is listed as having companion cavalry (Diod. 19. 28. 3), a cavalry *agema* (Diod. 19. 27. 2, 28. 3), and pages (Diod. 19. 28. 3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11). At some point after Alexander's death, Leonnatus had a personal cavalry *agema* (*Suda* s. v. *Leonnatus*), as do Antigenes and Peucestas in 316 (Diod. 19. 28. 3). Alcetas, after his defeat in the Pisidic Aulon, fled to Termessus with his "hypaspists and pages" (Diod. 18. 45. 3), and Antigonus in 318, after Nicanor's defeat by Cleitus in the Hellespont, "renewed the action placing on board the ships the bravest and most resolute of his hypaspists" (Polyaen. 4. 6. 8).

With his army thus disposed, Antigonus advanced downhill on the enemy in an oblique movement, with his right leading.⁷⁶ He counted on this flank crushing Eumenes' left before his own left was destroyed (Diod. 19. 29. 7).

Antigonus' plan was unsuccessful. While Pithon's troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes' right and inhibited this wing's advance (Diod. 19. 30. 2), Eumenes reinforced his endangered right with additional lightly equipped cavalry with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills (Diod. 19. 30. 3–4).⁷⁷ Elsewhere, Eumenes' phalanx, even though inferior in numbers, proved superior in ability. Antigonus' heavy infantry was forced back to the hills as well (Diod. 19. 30. 5, 10). Antigonus now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat further, Antigonus saved himself and his army from this potential disaster. As Eumenes' phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes' left. Antigonus charged through this break easily routing the forces there under Eudamus' command. With his left threatened, Eumenes had to recall his victorious right wing. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up in a line along the foothills (Diod. 19. 30. 9–10). Although it was already growing quite dark, both generals rallied their forces and prepared to renew the struggle. By midnight the two armies were formed into line about three and half miles from the site of the previous battle. However, both armies were too exhausted to continue (Diod. 19. 31. 1–2). Eumenes wished to march back to the site of the previous battle to gain control of the dead and thus claim victory,⁷⁸ but his troops were anxious

76 Diodorus preserves the only account of this battle; of the other sources only Nepos (*Eum.* 8. 1) even mentions it. Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5–15. 3) and Polyaeus (4. 8. 1) make allusions to events which precede the battle, but do not actually describe the battle itself. Polyaeus (4. 6. 10) also describes the negotiations concerning the dead after the battle. On the tactics and course of the battle, see Kromayer and Kahnes 1931:393–424 (followed in the main by Devine 1985A: 75–86); Bosworth 2002: 130–41.

77 Devine's (1985A: 81–2; followed by Billows 1990: 95) assumption that Pithon did not adhere to Antigonus' tactical plan is incorrect. Diodorus makes no reference to Pithon's "insubordination," and at Gabene, Pithon is again found commanding the left wing (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Moreover, Pithon's maneuver not only halted Eumenes' opposing force, but even necessitated the transfer of troops from Eumenes' left (Diod. 19. 30. 1–4). Diodorus (19. 29. 1) states that Pithon was to avoid a frontal attack but maintain a battle of wheeling tactics. Pithon did as he was ordered; Eumenes' transfer of troops to his right wing negated these tactics and forced the now significantly weaker force to flee (Diod. 19. 30. 2).

78 It is interesting that there is no references to either side dispatching the enemy's wounded. But, this would certainly be another reason for securing control of the battlefield.

to return to their baggage train and Eumenes acquiesced (Diod. 19. 31. 3).⁷⁹ Eumenes was afraid to force the issue for fear that given the rivalry for leadership in his camp, he might jeopardize his hold on the supreme command (Diod. 19. 31. 4). Antigonus, however, had no such fears. None of his subordinates, including Seleucus and Pithon, had the power to challenge his authority; he was not dependent on these commanders for the bulk of his troops. With few exceptions, Antigonus was the commander and paymaster of his soldiers. In the battle, Antigonus' forces suffered the loss of 3700 infantry and 54 cavalry, with 4000 wounded. Eumenes' troops lost only 540 infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900 (Diod. 19. 30. 9–31.5; cf. 19. 37. 1).⁸⁰ The battle was fought in late October or early November of 316.⁸¹

79 Eumenes has been accused of not understanding the importance of “baggage” (so Billows 1990: 102n. 26), which for many of these troops and certainly the argyraspsids represented their families and worldly possessions. Of course, much of this impression is due to his final betrayal by the argyraspsids which was tied to the loss of these possessions. As will be seen, the loss was more the result of a brilliant move by Antigonus, than any lack of interest on Eumenes' part. For a defense of Eumenes' concern for such matters, see Roisman 2012: 196 and n. 46).

80 Devine (1985A: 86) believes that the figures given for Antigonus' casualties are the result of “Eumenid partisanship.” He argues on the basis of eighteenth and nineteenth century statistics that there are too many dead in proportion to the number of wounded. However, it should be pointed out that the figures given for Antigonus' losses are in accord with the later description of that commander's forces at Gabene. At Gabene, Antigonus possessed 22000 heavy infantry, 9000 cavalry and 65 elephants (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Both the infantry and cavalry figures are significantly down from what they had been at Paraetacene; the infantry by 6000, the cavalry by 1000 despite the acquisition of additional cavalry after Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Moreover, Polyaeus (4. 6. 10), while giving no figures, states that Antigonus' losses were greater than those of his enemy. The figures given in Diodorus for both Eumenes' and Antigonus' casualties do not include those for light-armed infantry. In the case of Antigonus, these were probably exceptionally heavy. It should, also, be noted that at the battle of Gabene, Eumenes is listed as having only 6000 cavalry (Diod. 19. 40. 4). Why Eumenes' cavalry should have declined is unknown. Only a few of Eumenes' horsemen were killed in the actual battle (Diod. 19. 31. 5), but, perhaps, they suffered a high proportion of wounded (900 unspecified individuals in Eumenes' army were wounded [Diod. 19. 31. 5]). Part of Peucestas' cavalry contingent may have returned to Persis for the winter, planning to rejoin the army early the next year. Antigonus' next attack came after both armies had entered winter quarters (Diod. 19. 37. 1–38. 1), but Eumenes had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign, having stationed troops along the roads leading to Gabene (Polyaen. 4. 6. 11).

81 The battle of Paraetacene took place some time before the winter solstice (December 21) (Diod. 19. 37. 3), since both armies were subsequently already in winter quarters when Diodorus references the solstice.

While Eumenes was unable to convince his troops to return to the battlefield, Antigonus marched his forces to the site and made his camp by the bodies. With the field of combat now in his possession, he proclaimed himself the victor. His men, however, did not behave like victors. They were greatly discouraged by the course of the previous battle, and in light of this despondency, Antigonus decided to move as far as possible from the enemy as soon as possible. Before dawn, he sent his wounded and the heaviest part of his baggage ahead; at dawn he began to burn his dead (Diod. 19. 32. 1; cf. Polyæn. 4. 6. 10). While the funeral rites continued for his fallen, Antigonus detained the herald who had come from Eumenes to treat for the recovery of their dead. In part, Antigonus delayed the herald in order to give his wounded and baggage sufficient time to get away, but also to hide the full extent of his losses from the enemy (Polyæn. 4. 6. 10). At nightfall, after the ashes of his fallen had been interred, Antigonus sent the herald back to Eumenes, assigning the removal of the bodies to the following morning (Diod. 19. 32. 2; Polyæn. 4. 6. 10). Antigonus, however, at the beginning of the first watch (sunset) broke camp and by forced marches withdrew his army to Gamarga in Media (Diod. 19. 32. 2).⁸² When Eumenes learned of Antigonus' departure, he refrained from following him; his own soldiers lacked supplies and were exhausted. He instead attended to the dead, arranging a magnificent funeral (Diod. 19. 32. 3). Afterwards, he moved the army from Paraetacene into Gabene (Diod. 19. 34. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 3). As August Vezin (1907: 110) points out, this battle was a defeat for Antigonus. He was forced to retire into Media, while Eumenes occupied the original objective of Gabene (Diod. 19. 34. 7). It was Antigonus' action at the end of the battle and the superior discipline of his forces that saved him from what could have been a decisive defeat.

While in winter quarters, Antigonus assessed the situation. He realized that as a result of the engagement in Paraetacene his forces were now fewer than those under Eumenes' overall command. Therefore, he decided to launch a surprise attack. This move was precipitated by reports that Eumenes was not encamped in a single location, but that his army was scattered as much as six days' journey apart (Diod. 19. 37. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 4–5; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13).⁸³ Our sources' explanation for the separate camps was a resurgence of insubordination in the army (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 3; Nepos, *Eum.* 8. 1–4), but insufficient supplies

82 Polyænus (4. 6. 11) calls the location Gadamarta, while Diodorus himself later calls it Gadamala (19. 37. 1). There is no good evidence on either the correct spelling or its exact location.

83 Plutarch (*Eum.* 15. 4) gives the distance between the most distant units as approximately 113 miles.

may also have played a significant role (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 8. 3).⁸⁴ This was a very large force with equally substantial needs. Gabene was twenty-five days' march from Gamarga, if a route through inhabited country was taken, but through the desert wastes of the Dasht-i Kavir a journey of only nine or ten days (Diod. 19. 34. 8; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 4; cf. Diod. 19. 37. 3). The desert way, while shorter, was not traveled because it was without water or grass (Polyaen. 4. 6. 11; Diod. 19. 34. 8; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 5). To effect the surprise, Antigonus determined to lead a forced march through the desert (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 8. 6). A march along the roads which traversed inhabited country would be easily observed and reported to Eumenes, who had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign and had stationed troops along the routes leading to Gabene (Polyaen. 4. 6. 11). Eumenes had not, however, considered it necessary to guard the desert approaches. In addition to its dearth of water or grass, in the winter the temperatures were often well below freezing (cf. Diod. 19. 37. 5–6).⁸⁵

For this march, Antigonus had prepared 10000 casks of water, collected barley and fodder for the horses, and had the soldiers prepare a ten-day supply of food that would not require cooking (Polyaen. 4. 6. 11; Diod. 19. 37. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 6–7). To eliminate the possibility of any advance warning reaching the enemy, Antigonus gave out word that they were marching to Armenia. When the army was ready, he made known their actual destination, and set out into the desert about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19. 37. 3). Antigonus ordered that while fires might be used during the day, they would have to be extinguished at night so that they would not be seen from the hills. But after five days, the bitter cold of the desert night became too severe and the soldiers built fires at night as well. These, as Antigonus had feared, were observed by the mountain villagers and reported to both Eumenes and Peucestas (Diod. 19. 37. 4–6; Polyaen. 4. 6. 11, 8. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 7; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 1, 3).

When Peucestas heard the news, he was afraid that Antigonus would arrive before the whole army could be assembled. Consequently, he decided to withdraw his forces to safety in the most distant part of Gabene.⁸⁶ Indeed, in a

84 On the supply problems in this part of Iran, see Engels 1978: 78–9; Bosworth 2002: 142).

85 The Parthian kings did not dare encamp in the open in winter because of the severity of the cold (Plut. *Ant.* 40. 2); on the desert fringe the mean minimum temperature in December is 29°F (Naval Intelligence Division 1945?: 592). It should, however, be noted that Sir Percy Sykes found “the cold seldom trying,” even though “the thermometer occasionally sinks below zero” (Sykes 1969: 1: 9–10).

86 Roisman (2012: 222–3 and n. 22) believes that Peucestas is maligned by Hieronymus, who explains all of the satrap's actions as the result of cowardice, when other explanations might be more appropriate.

meeting of the satraps and generals there was general panic (Nepos *Eum.* 9. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 8). Eumenes, however, convinced Peucestas and the others to remain by laying out a plan that would cause Antigonus to delay action three or four days; he pointed out that such a wait would give their forces sufficient time to assemble. He further noted that their troops would be rested while Antigonus' forces would be worn out by the desert crossing (Diod. 19. 38. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 9). The satraps and generals were persuaded and messengers were sent to order the troops to assemble (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 10; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 9. 2).⁸⁷ Eumenes now directed the commanders of those units directly under his personal command to collect their troops and bring with them fire vessels. These troops then dispersed along the mountains which fringed the desert, setting fires each evening in exposed areas to create the illusion of a camp to those approaching across the desert (Diod. 19. 38. 3–4; Polyæn. 4. 8. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 3–5; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 11). The fires were seen by Median shepherds and reported to Pithon, who informed Antigonus. When Antigonus learned of these sightings, he held up his march, since he believed his plan had been betrayed to Eumenes and an army awaited him on the desert's fringe. He now turned aside and went into the inhabited areas bordering the desert to refresh his troops for a day before confronting what he believed to be Eumenes' fully assembled and fresh forces (Diod. 19. 38. 5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 11–12; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 5–6; Polyæn. 4. 8. 4). Antigonus soon learned the truth (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 13), but Eumenes' stratagem had succeeded in delaying the confrontation with Antigonus' forces until his own troops were assembled.⁸⁸

While Eumenes' plan in the main gave him time to collect his forces, Eudamus and the war elephants had been slow in leaving their camp (Diod. 19. 39. 1). When Antigonus learned that Eudamus had not yet joined Eumenes and, indeed, was not much distant from his own camp, he sent all his light infantry and 2200 cavalry to intercept that commander and his elephants. Even though Eumenes quickly learned of Antigonus' action and had dispatched a contingent of 1500 cavalry and 3000 light infantry, Antigonus' forces arrived first. Eudamus arranged his elephants in a square with his baggage in the center and his 400-man cavalry force in the rear. The enemy attack overwhelmed the cavalry, but the elephant corps, though receiving numerous wounds, resisted

87 Diodorus (19. 39. 1) implies that Eumenes' did not begin to assemble his forces until after his stratagem had proven successful, but subsequently (19. 39. 2) makes it clear that the troops must have been summoned earlier.

88 It is surprising that Antigonus did not send scouts forward to see exactly what did await them on the mountain fringe. Especially, since Antigonus had used a strikingly similar stratagem to delay Eumenes prior to the Battle of Paraetacene.

successfully. Before they could be worn down by these attacks, Eumenes' force arrived, and joining with the elephants drove Antigonus' troops off (Diod. 19. 39. 2–6).

Eumenes' ability to thwart Antigonus' attempted surprise attack raised his prestige among the rank-and-file to the point where they demanded that he be the sole commander. Apparently, this was also the feeling of the argyraspids, because prior to the coming battle Antigenes and Teutamus organized a conspiracy among the satraps and generals. It was decided that after defeating Antigonus they would eliminate Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–3, 6). Even though this plot is not mentioned by Diodorus, and Antigenes, listed as one of the main conspirators by Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 1), was previously in the main loyal to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 62. 6; 19. 12. 2, 17. 4, 21. 1), the plot appears to be genuine. The desire for chief command by the commanders of the argyraspids likely had not abated since this unit first joined Eumenes in 318. Antigenes' loyalty to Eumenes was based more on his fear of Antigonus than on any personal tie to that commander (Diod. 18. 62. 6–7). Moreover, the purpose of the plot was not to benefit Antigonus. Eumenes was to be eliminated only after Antigonus' defeat (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3); the plan was to eliminate both Antigonus and Eumenes, leaving the field clear for the conspirators. There clearly was a plot and the likelihood is that Antigenes was one of the participants. The conspiracy's absence in Diodorus most probably results from that author's abbreviation of his source.⁸⁹ Diodorus presents far less detail with respect to this coming battle than he did regarding that at Paraetacene. These commanders were displeased with Eumenes' popularity with the troops (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1). They believed that after the battle a victorious Eumenes would, at the least, cease to treat them as equals. Certainly, with the probable addition of Antigonus' defeated forces, plus those troops already directly under his authority, Eumenes' power would be preponderant.

The plot was formed before all of the units had reassembled (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3). When Eudamus arrived and discovered the conspiracy, he and an otherwise unknown Phaedimus reported their findings to Eumenes who contemplated flight, but in the end decided to await events (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3).⁹⁰ His

89 This plot is accepted by Bosworth 1992A: 69–70; 2002: 143 and n. 160; Anson 2013B: 99–109; Schäfer (2002: 158) accepts the plot but wishes to place it after the loss of the belongings of the argyraspids; Roisman (2012: 223) is doubtful that such a conspiracy existed.

90 Both Eudamus and Phaedimus are reported by Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 3) to have brought this information to Eumenes only because they were afraid of losing the money they had loaned him in the event of his death (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12; Diod. 19. 24. 2–3). It is very doubtful that these commanders would have jeopardized their own lives in this manner, when

ambition would not let him do otherwise, and a victorious and wary Eumenes could turn the tables on the conspirators after the battle. More cynically, what were his options? He had surrendered to Antigonus once before and betrayed that alliance. This avenue, therefore, was not open to him. Eumenes was not a coward and obviously an individual confident in his own ability. When victory would bring so much, it was worth the risk. In any case, Eumenes alerted his closest advisers to the danger, made up his will, and destroyed all his papers which might be used against his correspondents (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 4–6). Apparently, Eumenes and the conspirators both considered that there was a high probability of victory in this new encounter with Antigonus. A defeat would, with the discovery of the plot, likely lead to a breakup of the army with Eumenes and those survivors who had accompanied him from the West and who did not surrender to Antigonus hurrying to escape back to Asia Minor. It is unknown how much at this time was known of the struggle going on in Europe, but any struggle would give hope of a possible alliance. Those from the upper satrapies would likely retreat to Persis and attempt to raise new forces. What apparently was not contemplated was the possibility of another stalemate. Eumenes prepared for victory or defeat by associating himself with his loyal cavalry forces, either to protect himself in the transitional time following a victory, or to accompany him in flight in the case of defeat. The lack of a clear decision in the battle led Eumenes to expect a continuation of the campaign much as had followed a similar result after the Battle of Paraetacene. This miscalculation would cost Eumenes his life (Anson 2013B: 105).

A few days after the attack on Eudamus, both armies drew up for battle within four and a half miles of one another (Diod. 19. 39. 6). While Hieronymus' account of the battle of Gabene was probably as detailed as that of Paraetacene, Diodorus had clearly lost interest by this point, for his account of Gabene is unfortunately much abbreviated. Despite Diodorus' brevity, the general outline of the contest can be determined. Antigonus, here as in the earlier battle in Paraetacene placed his cavalry on the wings and extended his elephants across the whole front (Diod. 18. 40). His army was smaller than at Paraetacene,

the success of the conspiracy would have acquired for the conspirators the wealth of Asia. It is more likely that either Eudamus and Phaedimus were personally loyal, or that they did not believe that they would fare well in the new order which would emerge should the conspiracy prove successful. Eudamus was later executed by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 44. 1). It is likely that Hieronymus over time came to believe that none of Eumenes' fellow commanders was loyal (see Chapter 1). When the satraps first joined Eumenes, Eudamus is identified by Diodorus (Diod. 19. 14. 8), who is certainly following Hieronymus, as the individual who had "treacherously" slain King Porus.

with only 22000 heavy infantry, 9000 cavalry, 65 elephants, and an unknown number of light infantry (Diod. 19. 40. 1). As before, Antigonus strengthened his right. When Eumenes learned that Antigonus had taken his place on the right with his best cavalry, he drew up his army placing his best troops and himself on his left wing, facing Antigonus. In all Eumenes' army consisted of 36700 infantry, of whom probably 17000 were heavy infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 114 elephants (Diod. 19. 40. 2–4).⁹¹ The respective strategies for the battle were designed to take advantage of the strengths in each force. Antigonus planned to use his superior heavy cavalry stationed on his right to win the victory while the center and left held their ground (cf. Diod. 19. 40. 1); Eumenes drew up his forces to counter Antigonus' dispositions, while putting his emphasis on his phalanx and especially the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 40. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 16. 6; Devine 1985B: 87–96; Bosworth 2002: 147–9, 152–7). Pithon, as at Paraetacene, commanded Antigonus' left. Philip, satrap of Bactria, led Eumenes' weaker cavalry on his right wing. It appears from the course of the battle that both Pithon and Philip had been ordered to refrain from any large scale engagement.⁹²

As at Paraetacene, Antigonus placed his best cavalry on his right under the command of his son Demetrius (Diod. 19. 40. 1–2), but this time he faced on Eumenes' left that commander's best cavalry, protected by a screen of 60 elephants and light infantry (Diod. 19. 40. 2–3). The first to join battle were the elephants, followed by the cavalry stationed with Demetrius and Eumenes (Diod. 19. 42. 1, 7). Since the plain was large and barren because of the high salt content of the soil, these movements raised a cloud of dust which obscured the battlefield. When Antigonus observed these conditions, he sent his Median and Tarentine⁹³ cavalry to capture Eumenes' camp, while Pithon engaged in some diversionary activity to keep Philip from observing this action. These troops rode around the enemy's flank unnoticed, and easily defeated those guarding Eumenes' camp (Diod. 19. 42. 3; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Plut. *Eum.* 16. 10–11; Just. 14. 3. 3). In the battle itself, Antigonus' cavalry on the right defeated Eumenes'

91 Despite Eumenes' losses at Paraetacene, his infantry increased in numbers prior to the battle of Gabene. The explanation probably lies in reinforcements arriving during the winter from Persis. While the number of infantry has increased, the number of cavalry has declined by the time of the later battle. As noted earlier, Eumenes' horsemen may have suffered most in the previous battle.

92 Philip was ordered not to engage until the issue had been decided on his left (Diod. 19. 42. 7). Since later, when Eumenes, after the defeat of his left wing, joined Philip that commander had still not engaged, it appears reasonable to assume that Pithon had not directly attacked him.

93 Tarentine refers to a style of cavalry where horsemen could dismount, hurl javelins, and then remount (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 20–1).

left. This victory was achieved primarily because Peucestas retired at the start of Demetrius' onslaught. While Diodorus (19. 42. 4) describes Peucestas' withdrawal as one of panic, Diodorus also comments on the large force of cavalry under Antigonus' command. Because the dust generated by the troop movements obscured the battlefield, Peucestas' retreat led 1500 other troops to follow him from the battlefield (Diod. 19. 42. 4). After these withdrawals, Eumenes' left was overwhelmed. With his defeated forces he retreated behind his phalanx to his right wing (Diod. 19. 42. 4). While defeated on the left wing in the cavalry battle, Eumenes' infantry swept all before it. Once again our sources attribute the victory to the skill of the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 43. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 16. 7–8).⁹⁴ In the course of the infantry battle 5000 of the enemy were slain, while only 300 of Eumenes' men, and none of the argyraspids, fell (Diod. 19. 43. 1; Polyae. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 5).⁹⁵ After Eumenes' withdrawal to his right wing, Antigonus sent half of his cavalry under Pithon's command against the argyraspids who were now without cavalry support. With this attack, the Macedonians formed a square and withdrew safely from the battlefield (Diod. 19. 43. 4–5).

Cavalry in antiquity had difficulties operating against organized infantry. Without stirrups, heavy cavalry could only attack infantry under special

94 Diodorus (19. 41. 2; cf. 30. 5) and Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 7) both state that the argyraspids were all at least 60 years of age, with the majority over 70. While Hammond (1978: 133 n. 21) accepts the testimony of these sources, most scholars are very skeptical (for example, Simpson 1959: 376; Hornblower 1981: 193; Roisman 2012: 178). For the corps as a whole, this is undoubtedly an exaggeration. After all, veterans of Alexander's expedition need not have been more than in their forties. Gabene was only 18 years after Alexander crossed to Asia. However, many of the officers may, indeed, have been in their 60s or 70s. The hypaspist corps had been created by Philip in 359 (see Anson 1985: 248; 2013: 51); the corps, therefore, could have had men still enrolled in the unit at 60 or 70 years of age. It was an elite unit and as with such units, while recruiting the best from among the troops to fill the ranks, would be noted for its highly skilled veterans. Recently Elizabeth Baynham (2013: 110–120) has sprung to Hammond's and Hieronymus' defense, holding out hope to all of us of a certain age that there may be more truth in the tale than might be assumed. But, while I would love to accept the statement, if only for the sake of my own ego, and while, perhaps, there were a number of such aged soldiers, with maybe a majority of the unit in their 40s, to my students an ancient enough age, sixty and seventy-year old men making up the majority of frontline infantry appears to me very unlikely.

95 Devine (1985B: 92) believes that the figure for Antigonus' losses is again too high and that for the argyraspids too low. He, however, presents little argumentation to support his position. It should be noted that after the battle Eumenes argued that they should renew the action as soon as possible because the phalanx of the enemy had been destroyed (Diod. 19. 43. 6). Also, talent and experience cannot be overestimated. Alexander proved that numbers were not the most important determinant of victory.

circumstances. Typically this meant when infantry either panicked and ran, or when gaps or thinning for whatever reason formed in the infantry line, or at the vulnerable flanks or rear of these formations. In the case of a thinned or gapped line, direct assault was possible, if the cavalry charge was done in a wedge formation (as apparently was the case at Chaeronea: Willekes 2013: 300 and n. 496, 319). Under these circumstances the momentum of the group served both to keep the pack in formation and to hit the line with tremendous force. The dangers in such an operation were great. If one horse in the front went down, it could lead to a cascading event. But, it would also take a very disciplined hoplite infantryman to stand and take the hit. Here numbers would be critical. If the line was thick enough, like a square, the charge would stall. A skilled rider could stay on the horse, despite the lack of stirrups, during the initial charge, but a dead stop would see him thrown. A pike phalanx was a very different case, however. The horses would have to penetrate a good distance through the spears to get to the actual infantry. Moreover, the pikes could be anchored in the ground and thus able to take the full weight of the horse. The direct assault by cavalry against such a phalanx would be a fool's errand.

Eumenes after his defeat tried to collect all of his remaining cavalry and renew the battle, but Peucestas refused to join him and only retreated further. Since night was approaching, Eumenes was forced to withdraw (Diod. 19. 43. 2–3). That evening all of the satraps and commanders took counsel together. The satraps believed it was necessary to retreat into the upper satrapies as rapidly as possible, but Eumenes declared that they should stay and renew the battle. The phalanx had been victorious inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Moreover, their cavalry had not been significantly reduced (Diod. 19. 43. 6). The argyraspids, however, since their baggage had been taken and with it their children, wives, relatives, and the accumulated booty of their long service (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 6; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6–7, 10; Chapter 8), ignored both suggestions (Diod. 19. 43. 7). As a result, the meeting broke up without a decision being reached as to any future course of action (Diod. 19. 43. 7; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6–7, 10).

With the dissolution of the meeting, Teutamus immediately sent an embassy to Antigonus to treat for the argyraspids' lost possessions (Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1).⁹⁶ Antigonus responded that he would not only return what he had seized, but would provide additional rewards as well, if the argyraspids would surrender both the elephants and Eumenes to him (Just. 14. 3. 11, 4. 18; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 17. 2). When Teutamus presented Antigonus' terms to the argyraspids, they agreed to deliver Eumenes. He was seized and placed under guard (Diod. 19. 43. 8–9; Plut.

96 Justin (14. 3. 11) reports that the argyraspids went to Antigonus and offered to surrender Eumenes without the knowledge of their officers.

Eum. 17. 2–4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 4. 1). Justin (14. 3. 12) relates that Eumenes attempted to flee, but Plutarch (*Eum.* 17. 2–4) states that Eumenes was taken unawares. Diodorus (18. 43. 8) only states that the Macedonians entered into secret negotiations. Given the revealed plot which preceded the battle and the obvious tension in the camp after its conclusion, Eumenes must have been alert to some such machinations. He obviously assumed that his skills were still needed for the coming struggle. Once again, Antigonus had seized the moment. At Paraetacene, he had salvaged a minor defeat from what might have been a disaster, and here at Gabene, a victory from a stalemate.

On the third day after his seizure, while he was being led to Antigonus, Eumenes requested an opportunity to speak to the army. Permission was granted and Eumenes berated the argyraspsids for their treachery. He also requested that they not turn him over to Antigonus alive, but his plea was ignored. Despite the general sympathy of the majority of the army (Plut. *Eum.* 17. 6–18. 1; Just. 14. 4. 1–14), the actions of the argyraspsids were not challenged (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1–2). With Eumenes' surrender, most of the satraps fled; Tlepolemus to Carmania and Stasanor to Bactria, where they were allowed to retain their satrapies (Diod. 19. 48. 1, 5). Peucestas and others surrendered to Antigonus (Polyæn. 4. 6. 13).⁹⁷ Among those who surrendered and henceforward served Antigonus was Eumenes' fellow countryman, Hieronymus (Diod. 19. 44. 2). Neither Eudamus nor Stasander escaped, but were captured and executed (Diod. 19. 44. 1, 48. 2). Antigones, the commander of the argyraspsids, was put into a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19. 44. 1). As for the argyraspsids, 1000 of the most troublesome were given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Anachrosia, who was commanded by Antigonus to see to their destruction. The rest of this infamous unit were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyæn. 4. 6. 15; Diod. 19. 48. 3).⁹⁸

With respect to Eumenes, while Antigonus might have wished to acquire Eumenes' adherence, he had little faith in the latter's promises, given that Eumenes had violated his oath of allegiance to Antigonus after his release from

97 Peucestas joined Antigonus at this time with 10000 Persians (Polyæn. 4. 6. 13). Later Antigonus removed him from his satrapy (Diod. 19. 48. 5), but Peucestas survived and subsequently is found as one of Demetrius' "friends" (*FGrH* 81 F-12). While it is not stated, it is apparent that the majority of Eumenes' forces were incorporated into Antigonus' grand army. Certainly this had become standard practice and Antigonus did have losses to rectify. These troops may be the ones to whom Pithon later, when planning to revolt from Antigonus, appealed (cf. Diod. 19. 46. 1–4; Anson 2014A: 125–6).

98 Diodorus (19. 48. 4) clearly quoting Hieronymus declares that those 1000 argyraspsids sent to Sibyrtius were those most responsible for Eumenes' betrayal.

Nora (Diod. 19. 44. 2; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 10. 3). Besides, Antigonus' own Macedonian troops wanted the death of the man who had caused them so much suffering (Diod. 19. 44. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 4, 12. 2–4).⁹⁹ Therefore, even though his own son Demetrius pleaded for Eumenes' life, Antigonus had him put to death in January of 315 (Diod. 19. 44. 2–4; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 6, 19. 1; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 4).¹⁰⁰ When he had decided to kill Eumenes, he deprived him of food for two or three days and then sent an agent to strangle him (Plut. *Eum.* 19. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 12. 4). After the execution, Antigonus turned Eumenes' body over to his friends and permitted them to perform the proper funeral rites. After the body was burned, the ashes were collected, placed in a silver urn, and returned to his wife and children in Cappadocia (Diod. 19. 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 19. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 13. 4). With the death of Eumenes, Antigonus returned to the area around Ecbatana and spent the remainder of the winter (Diod. 19. 44. 4).

So, who was this Cardian, this naturalized Macedonian, secretary and military commander? Clearly he was not the boy scout of our sources, but rather a smooth manipulator of men and events. In terms of his ambitions, it is clear that, as with most of the other Diadochs, these were limited only by events. He had risen to power in a world dominated by the Argead monarchy and its greatest kings. With Alexander's death, and essentially with it the end of the Argead monarchy, the game changed significantly. Eumenes early assessed the situation and backed Perdiccas as the individual most likely to succeed.

In analyzing Eumenes' actions during his association with that regent, it is clear that he used him to achieve his ends. He emerged from the crisis in Babylon with a large satrapy, which the regent then conquered for him. Eumenes' advice during the marriage controversy is very interesting. By supporting the marriage to Cleopatra, Eumenes was pushing the regent to break his alliance with Antipater and seize Macedonia. Whether a victorious Perdiccas would then remain regent and guardian or would seize the throne for himself, the practical effect would be the same. And, what then of Eumenes? When Perdiccas left for Egypt he put Eumenes in charge of Asia Minor. If Perdiccas remained in Macedonia, might Eumenes have hoped to be his viceroy in Asia? As with the other Diadochs, Eumenes was an opportunist. If in charge of Asia,

99 According to Nepos (*Eum.* 12. 1–3) the question of Eumenes' future was given to Antigonus' council. While Plutarch confirms that Antigonus deliberated long with his advisers on Eumenes' fate (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 6), it is certain that the formal decision was taken by Antigonus himself (so Diod. 19. 44. 2–3).

100 Nepos inaccurately reports that Eumenes was strangled without Antigonus' knowledge, but both Diodorus (19. 44. 2) and Plutarch (*Eum.* 19. 1) state that Antigonus ordered Eumenes' death. For the time of his death, see the appendix at the end of this chapter.

what dreams might then have come? His ambition was all consuming. The fact that when offered the opportunity he broke off his allegiance with Antigonus is the clear case in point. Plutarch had it right: "Eumenes waged war for the sake of power" (*Sert. et Eum.* 2. 4). Eumenes only accepted junior positions as paths to greater ones. While second guessers might lament his acceptance of the generalship of Asia as a mistake that led directly to his death, he came very close to actually defeating the *crème de la crème* of the Diadochs. After Eumenes, Antigonus was successful to the end. Only in his final battle at Ipsus in 301, when he was in his eighties and so heavy that he found it difficult to move about, and, perhaps, too confident in the ability of his eldest son, did he fail and die. When one considers that Eumenes, unlike his rival, had a seriously divided command with competing commanders vying for supremacy, it is remarkable that he came so close to winning what is called the Second Diadoch War, fighting his last battle even under the cloud of a plot against his life, and ultimately losing not on the battlefield, but being surrendered by his own troops to his enemy.

The divided command, in particular, was clearly Eumenes' most serious problem. He had to deal with aristocratic prejudice, but used that repeatedly to his advantage, since no one other than Macedonian aristocrats appeared to be concerned with his Greek heritage. He, perhaps, more than anyone else, realized the changing world in which they all now lived. The Macedonian presence had diminished to a minority even in the army of Alexander. Mercenaries and indigenous troops were coming to dominate the battlefield. While Macedonians early on remained as the core, certainly, in the armies of Perdiccas, Eumenes, and Antigonus, these were becoming increasingly mercenary in their outlook. In fact, Eumenes, even though he was most aware of the changing dynamics of post-Alexander warfare, may have come to believe too much in his propaganda concerning the argyraspids as stalwart Macedonian loyalists. For when the chips were down, they showed themselves to be true mercenaries, with their loyalties tied entirely to self-interest.

Antigonus had certain clear advantages. Most of his skilled Macedonians had not served under Alexander in Asia and consequently while not as expert, also far less independent. He was in charge of the vast majority of the troops under his command; with prominent subordinates like Pithon and Seleucus having by comparison too few to challenge Antigonus' supremacy. Moreover, Antigonus was leery of those who had served prominently either under Eumenes, or with Alexander himself. Of those who had served with Eumenes, Antigenes, Eudamus, the otherwise unknown Celbanus (Diod. 19. 44. 1), and likely also Stasander (Heckel 2006: 255) and Amphimachus (Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 219), were executed shortly after the battle. The argyraspids

were broken up, sent to distant outposts, and the most rebellious given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, to be destroyed (Polyaen. 4. 6. 15; Diod. 19. 48. 3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 19. 3). Even Peucestas, who had surrendered to Antigonus, was thought to be too popular with the Persians and was replaced (Diod. 19. 48. 5). His prominence with Alexander was likely also a factor. Subsequently, Antigonus eliminated his former allies, murdering Pithon (Diod. 19. 46. 4) and forcing Seleucus to flee from his satrapy (Diod. 19.55.2–56.1).

Looking at the situation with hindsight, it would appear that the deck was stacked against Eumenes and the smart move would have been to keep the alliance with Antigonus. But, if one, as Odysseus with respect to Achilles, were to journey to the underworld and ask Eumenes what he regretted most, his likely response would be far different from that of the great Homeric hero. He likely would have regretted a number of things, but never his ambition to attempt to win it all.

Appendix: The Chronology from Nora to Eumenes' Death

The chronology of the years following Eumenes' release from Nora down to his death has generated considerable debate. The key element concerns the year in which Eumenes departed Phoenicia, either in 318, according to the "high chronology," or in 317, by the "low." Those proposing a mixed chronology, while accepting the low's determination of the year of the death of Perdiccas and the meeting at Triparadeisus (see the appendix at the end of Chapter 4), support the high for the great campaign between Antigonus and Eumenes. After Eumenes' departure for the East, Diodorus (19. 12–34, 37–44. 4) narrates his progress up to and including his death, which occurred approximately a year and a half later during the winter of either 317/16 or 316/15, with a fair degree of precision. The time of Eumenes' flight to the East then becomes critical for the chronology of this period.

Diodorus places Eumenes' flight in the archon year 318/17 (Diod. 18. 58. 1), however, he clearly begins this year at the approach of spring of 318, with Eumenes' release from Nora (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7; Diod. 18. 58. 1), and in Europe soon after Cassander's flight to Asia, during the winter of 319/18, early in 318. Diodorus' archon year 317/16 (19. 2. 1) begins in Macedonia with Eurydice's seizure of the regency (19. 11. 1), which must have occurred in the fall 317, given that Philip III, would reign six years and four months (Diod. 19. 11. 5; cf. Just. 14. 5. 10), putting his death in October or early November 317. However, the Babylonian *Astronomical Diaries* (2001: 7, no. 2 V' 12') suggest that he may have died in late December of 317. In Asia, the year 317/16 begins with Eumenes in winter quarters (Diod. 19. 12. 1), therefore, also in the fall of 317. Diodorus, then, has continued his archon year 318/17 from the winter of 318 to the fall of 317. Diodorus con-

cludes his archon year 317/16 with Eumenes in Susiane refreshing his troops (19. 15. 6) in the late spring of 316, before his confrontation with Antigonus on the Coprates river in July at the “rising of the Dog Star” (19. 18. 2–3). Diodorus places the battle after the start of his new archon year, 316/15 (19. 17. 1), consequently, in July of 316. The archon year 316/15 with respect to Antigonus begins with him leaving his winter quarters, therefore, also in the spring of 316 (19. 17. 2), and Cassander hastening to Macedonia (19. 35. 1), but this archon year’s events are continued through the following winter and spring (19. 46. 1, 50. 1), and into the summer of 315 (19. 47. 1–48. 8, 51. 6–54. 4). Thus, Diodorus has included the events of a year and a half under a single archon year. 315/14 (19. 55. 1) begins in the summer of 315.

The evidence of the *Parian Marble* likewise supports the low chronology. The *Marble* (*FGrH* 239 B F-13) dates the sea battle between Nicanor and Cleitus in the Hellespont in 317/16, an event which preceded Eumenes’ flight from Phoenicia. Errington (1977: 494, 496) assigns the sea battles in the Hellespont to July of 317. If one accepts the *Marble*’s dating, then July is the earliest month in which the battles could have occurred in 317, since this Athenian archon year began in early July (Bickerman 1969: 120). Gullath and Schober (1986: 352) place the battles simply in the summer of 317. By the reckoning of the *Marble*, these campaigns must have occurred in the summer of 317. Eurydice’s seizure of the regency occurred sometime after Cleitus’ defeat in the Hellespont (cf. Diod. 18. 75. 1, 19. 11. 1), and Philip III died probably in October of 317, but no later than December. However, it is to be noted that the *Marble* omits all reference to the archon year 318/17.

Additional chronological references are provided with respect to the career of Demetrius of Phalerum, Cassander’s agent in Athens. He is reported to have served in this position for “ten years” (Diod. 20. 45. 5; Str. 9. 1. 20), and was deposed in 308/7 ([*Parian Marble*] *FGrH* 239 B F-20; Plut. *Demetr.* 8. 3–5; Diod. 20. 45. 1), which deposition occurred after Antigonus’ son Demetrius’ entrance into the city, an event most likely taking place in May or June of 307. The *Marble* (*FGrH* 239 B F-20) places “his [Demetrius of Phalerum] legislation,” that which created the moderate oligarchy, in 317/16. Diodorus (18. 74. 3), likewise, places Demetrius’ rule in Athens as beginning in 317.

Diodorus’ (19. 91. 2) reference to the flight of Seleucus from his satrapy of Babylon to Egypt (19. 55. 5), as part of Antigonus’ acquisition of the East after his defeat of Eumenes, has been claimed to support the high chronology (Stylianou 1994: 83–4; Meeus 2012: 77–8). Diodorus reports that this flight occurred after he had been satrap for “four years.” Since Seleucus was appointed satrap of Babylonia at the Triparadeisus meeting in late August or early September of 320 (see Chapter 3) and entered the city on November 14, 320 (*BCHP* 3, Obv. 26–7), this would put his later flight from Babylon in either the late summer, from the date of his appointment at Triparadeisus, or in the fall (November) of 316, from the time of his actual occupation; the latter date more

clearly fits the context of Diodorus' narrative. It is reasonably clear that Seleucus fled from Babylon in the late spring in the year following the Battle of Gabene. Using the November start of the time period, then, if the year of his flight was 316, as claimed by those supporting the high chronology, the actual time period from arrival in and departure from Babylon was roughly three and a half years; if in 315, as in the low, about four and half. This claimed evidence for the high chronology, then, is clearly not as decisive as some have believed. As noted above, while the *Parian Marble* does not specifically mention Eumenes' departure from Phoenicia, it does place Cleitus' sea victory over Nicanor in 317/16. This victory was followed by Antigonus' defeat of the former victor, which in turn precipitated Eumenes' flight east, and by the implied dating of the *Marble* the sea battle occurred in the summer, likely in July of 317.

Other evidence from Babylonian cuneiform tablets or Idumaeian ostraca has brought support for both the high and the low chronological schemes. Both of these sources date by regnal years. The *Babylonian Chronicle* (BCHP 3, Obv. 33–4) states that in October of the seventh year of King Philip III, a “royal” army, operating near the city of Babylon, secured possession of one of the Babylonian citadels. This would place the action in 317, since Philip had become king in June of 323 (Boiy 2000; Anson 2002/3: 376–80, chapter 2). Officially the only “royal” army operating in this area during this time would have been that of Eumenes of Cardia. However, there are problems with this identification. It is very clear from Diodorus' narrative that Eumenes never occupied the city, and it has been questioned who exactly controlled these “royal forces.” Was it the current royal general in Asia, Eumenes (Anson 2012b), or the previous occupant of that office, Antigonus (Boiy 2010)? Since the year is clearly 317, as indicated in the Babylonian tablet, then, if the former, Eumenes began his flight from Phoenicia in 317; if the latter, in 318, since Antigonus arrived on the scene in the spring of the year following Eumenes' arrival. The fragment does make reference to King Philip (III) under whose auspices Eumenes held his command. Moreover, this fact was not unknown in the region. Eumenes carried with him letters to be delivered to satraps and garrison commanders, including those in Babylon, explaining his commission (Diod. 19. 13. 7). In the refusal by Seleucus to join with Eumenes, there was apparently no attempt to refute Eumenes' commission. At least, no such argument is put forward in the sources, and, indeed, Seleucus acknowledged Eumenes' commission from the kings and regent. The Babylonian satrap proclaimed his desire to be of service to the kings, but refused to obey Eumenes because of that commander's earlier condemnation by the assembled troops in Egypt (Diod. 19. 12. 2). He does not base his decision verbally on Eumenes not being the legitimate royal general in Asia. Moreover, Antigonus' commission as royal general was “to finish the war against Eumenes and Alcetas” (Diod. 18. 39. 7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38), which had been completed in 319. Tom Boiy (2010: 8–11) argues, however, that Antigonus had been the royal general previously and that these royal troops are therefore his. In this reconstruction of events, this conflict took place

after Antigonus' arrival in the city and involved some of Antigonus' troops. The "royal" troops were then those left in Babylon by Antigonus, who for some unspecified reason came into conflict with forces loyal to the satrap Seleucus, in essence a war between the troops of the new allies. Antigonus, however, is not listed as deploying any troops in Babylon, and, in fact, adds the bulk of Seleucus' forces to his own for the upcoming campaign against Eumenes (Diod. 19. 17. 2, 27. 1), who had moved with his troops out of Babylonia prior to the arrival of Antigonus (Diod. 19. 13. 5). It is more likely that the commander of one of the two citadels in Babylon (Diod. 19. 100. 7; Plut *Demetr.* 7. 2; on the two citadels of Babylon, see Reade 2000: 205–7), held under a separate authority, had accepted Eumenes as the true representative of the kings and for a time resisted Antigonus and the Babylonian satrap. Alexander the Great in Babylonia had divided authority between the governor and a separate commander in at least one citadel in the city (Curt. 5. 1. 43; Diod. 17. 64. 5; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 4). Even though this is nowhere clearly stated, this division of authority likely continued. In 311, there was a separate commander in the Babylonian citadel, when Seleucus returned to Babylon after having been forced to flee by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 55). While Babylonia and the city of Babylon welcomed his return, Diphilus, the commander of one of the citadels in the city, resisted and Seleucus had to storm the stronghold (*BCHP* 3, Rev. 6–8; Diod. 19. 91. 3–4). Such divisions of authority during the Successor period are also found in the satrapy of Cilicia where Cyinda was under an independent commander (Diod. 18. 62. 2), and in the satrapy of Susiane with regard to the city of Susa and its treasury (Diod. 19. 17. 3; cf. Curt. 5. 2. 16). Both of these commanders, in, respectively, Cyinda and Susa, obeyed the commands of Eumenes, who clearly for them represented the true royal authority in Asia.

What then likely took place and what *BCHP* 3, Obv. 33–4 is referencing is that the citadel commander declared for the party of the kings and regent, and their "royal general," i. e. Eumenes, but with Seleucus in control of the city he was unable to join forces with the Cardian, and was only able for a time to maintain an independent authority within the city. The letters from the kings had been sufficient to ensure obedience to Eumenes from the commanders in Cyinda and Susa. Both clearly recognized who represented the true royal authority in Asia. It is likely that this was also the case in Babylon.

With the discovery of large numbers of ostraca, currently over 1700, from the area of Idumaea, now part of southeastern Israel and southwestern Jordan, and possibly produced at a royal storehouse in Makkedah (Lemaire 1996: 1, 21; 2006: 414), additional, albeit again controversial, material has been added to the debate. A critical number of these ostraca make reference to Antigonus. With no ostraca so far discovered that are recorded as Antigonus 1 or 2, but a good number dated Antigonus 3, this dating, it is claimed, reflects that of Babylonia where Antigonus' theoretical first year corresponds with 317/316 (Porten and Yardeni 2008: 245–9), but dated contemporary docu-

ments begin only with Antigonos 3. Other dated ostraca appear to correspond with the Babylonian regnal dating of monarchs of the late Achaemenid and early Hellenistic era (Boiy 2007B: 90–1; Porten and Yardeni 2008: 238). If this chronological identification is accepted and it is not assumed that these Antigonid dates relate to a separate Idumaeen chronology (so Lemaire 1996: 42–5; 2002: 199–201; Anson 2005: 265–6), then Antigonos 3 becomes 315/14 (Boiy 2007B: 91). In Babylon, there was confusion over dating items with respect to regnal years in this period which resulted in multiple systems. Years were dated by Philip III for at least a year past his death (Philip 8, or 316/15), corresponding to a first year for Alexander IV, and a theoretical second year of Antigonos (Boiy 2007B: 24–5). The third year reference predates the beginning of his reign, then, to 317/16, corresponding to Philip 7, this monarch's true last year (Boiy 2000: 116–21; 2006: 47–8; 2007B: 24). Antigonos' presumed first year would then correspond with his arrival in Babylon in pursuit of Eumenes. The Babylonian year began during these years in April (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 36). Thus, this first year would reflect Antigonos' arrival in Babylon sometime after April 8, 317, and before April 20, 316 (Parker and Dubberstein 1956: 36). Antigonos was in winter quarters in Mesopotamia when the news that Eumenes had joined with the forces of the upper satrapies reached him. He proceeded to Babylon at a leisurely pace (Diod. 19. 15. 6). The battle at the Coprates river occurred at the time of "the rising of the Dog Star" (Diod. 19. 17. 3), which occurred, perhaps, on July 23 (Bickerman 1968: 144).

With regard to the ostraca, it has been claimed that the appearance of documents dated Antigonos 3 (315/14) in Idumaea reflects both Antigonos' physical presence in the area and also the Idumaeen adoption of Babylonian dating (Boiy 2007A: 204–5). However, the reference to the third year of Antigonos may simply indicate the adoption of this Babylonian dating, and not that commander's physical presence in Idumaea. The calendar throughout the former Persian Empire, with the notable exception of Egypt, had most often been based on the Babylonian calendar (Bickerman 1968: 24). Since documents in Babylonia were being dated by reference to Antigonos' "third year," but not his first or second, if the Idumaeans were following Babylonian chronological practice and not a system of their own, then this dating may have been initiated *pro forma* at a slightly later time than in Babylon (the earliest ostraca date from July of 315), but reflecting the Babylonian year. In both Babylon and Idumaea, the first surviving contemporary references to Antigonos are, as noted, to his third year, 315/14 (Boiy 2007B: 25), the year in the low chronology when Seleucus fled from his satrapy. With the departure of Seleucus, Antigonos became the ruler of Babylonia (App. Syr. 53). If the Idumaeen and Babylonian chronological systems are connected then it was Antigonos' defeat of Eumenes, the acquisition of the upper satrapies, and the occupation of Babylon that influenced the dating in both Babylon and Idumaea, and there is no need to postulate Antigonos' presence in Idumaea in this "third year." Moreover, the Diadochs down to Antigonos' arrival in Upper Syria were not at war, so dating by

the new and former “general in Asia” would not have been seen by the Idumaeans as a hostile act with respect to the current ostensible holder of the region, Ptolemy.

Eumenes then left Babylon in the spring of 316, the battle on the Coprates occurred in July of that year. The battle of Paraetacene took place before the winter solstice (December 21) (Diod. 19. 37. 3), with Antigonus leaving his camp to cross the desert to Gabene then around December 21 (Diod. 19. 37. 3); his march to Gabene took nine days (Diod. 19. 34. 8, 37. 3), Antigonus arrived in Gabene only a few days before the battle (Diod. 19. 39. 2–6), Eumenes was betrayed almost immediately thereafter, with his own death following about ten days later (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 3–19. 1), therefore, in January 315.

There is also disagreement among scholars with regard to the dates of Cassander's invasion of Macedonia and the subsequent murder of Olympias. The *Parian Marble* (*FGrH* 239 B 14) dates Cassander's “return to Macedonia” in 316/15, as does Diodorus (19. 17. 1). With Eumenes' death occurring in January of 315, and Diodorus' narrative correlating the two deaths, Therefore, Olympias died in 315 as well. Diodorus begins the year 316/15 (19. 17. 1), notes Olympias' death (19. 51. 5), and then starts the new year (315/14) at 19. 55. 1. Moreover, Diodorus (19. 50. 8, 52. 4) remarks that when Olympias surrendered, Eumenes' death was not yet known. By the evidence in Diodorus, the death of the mother of Alexander the Great clearly took place in the spring (cf. Diod. 19. 50. 1–5). Diodorus' previous archon year 316/15 starts in the spring of 316, with Antigonus leaving winter quarters and proceeding to Babylon (19. 17. 2), and, since Diodorus has synchronized events in Europe and Asia, then Cassander invaded Macedonia (19. 35. 1) also in the spring. From the time of the death of King Philip, Diodorus has a number of events intervening between that death and Cassander's successful invasion. Cassander only acted after the murder of his brother Nicanor and the desecration of his brother Iollas' tomb became known to him (Diod. 19. 35. 1), events which occurred sometime after King Philip's murder. It is unknown how long after the royal murders these events took place, but the deaths of the royal couple were for a time kept secret. Cassander then had to break off his siege of Tegea (Diod. 19. 35. 1) and march his army to Macedonia. While the siege of Pydna was in its infancy, Aeacides had organized a relief force, but was thwarted by the actions of Cassander's general, Atarrhias (Diod. 19. 36. 2–3). After the failure to invade Macedonia, the Epirotes overthrew Aeacides and made an alliance with Cassander (Diod. 19. 36. 4–5). Pydna surrendered after famine had already killed many of the inhabitants and threatened to overwhelm the survivors (Diod. 19. 49. 2–4). Diodorus 19. 50. 1 dates the end of the siege at the “approach of spring.” With Philip 111's death in October, or in early November 317, or even in December, the interval between the royal murders and the death of Olympias becomes either five, four, or three months, in the High Chronology; or 16, 15, or 14 months in the Low Chronology. If the siege began in the summer of 316 (as *Parian Marble* [*FGrH* 239 B 14]), then, by the low chronology, the siege lasted, perhaps, as long as eight months.

Further evidence is provided by Cassander's refounding of the city of Thebes. This occurred sometime after Olympias' death and in "the twentieth year" since its destruction by Alexander the Great (Diod. 19. 54. 1). The destruction of Thebes occurred in late September of 335 (Bosworth 1980: 92; 1988: 33), or in the archon year 335/4. The *Parian Marble* dates the restoration in the archon year 316/15 (*FGrH* 239 B F-14), as does Diodorus (19. 17. 1; cf. Diod. 19. 55. 1), which corresponds with the restoration being in "the twentieth year." The third-century AD author Eusebius [Porphyry] (*FGrH* 260 F-3.4), in his *Cronica*, records Olympias' death in the first year of the 116th Olympiad, or 316/15. Since the Olympics took place at the height of summer and it is clear that Alexander's mother was murdered in the spring, the year must have been 315 by these separate determinations. The evidence, then, supports the deaths of both Eumenes and Olympias early in 315, and, consequently, supports the Low Chronology.

Greeks and Macedonians

The generally accepted view from antiquity that Eumenes ultimately failed in the struggle to succeed to at least some part of Alexander's legacy in the main because of his "Greekness," while tempered in the works of most recent historians, is still regarded as a significant factor in Eumenes' final defeat and death by many. Nowhere today is August Vezin's claim (1907: 125–6) that ethnicity was completely responsible for Eumenes' downfall echoed, but Peter Green is typical of the more modified view.¹ "Eumenes, as a Greek, had to throw in his lot with the kings, since unlike a blue-blooded Macedonian baron he could not, short of emulating Alexander, usurp the throne himself. . . . He was destroyed . . . by the fundamental greed-cum-xenophobia of Macedonian troops." To assess the validity of the last part of this claim, a number of basic questions must be answered. The first to be resolved is what constituted a "Macedonian," as opposed to a "Greek"? This question revolves around the "ethnicity" of the ancient Macedonians. While arguments have been offered with respect to race, culture, language, and so on, the ultimate basis of ethnicity is perception,² or more technically it is "a socially constructed category" (Fought 2006: 4), which typically owes much to historical circumstance (Smith 1986; Toland 1993: 1–20; Banks 1996). As will be seen, there is no better example of this conclusion than the experience of ancient Greece.

How did the Macedonians see themselves and conversely how were they perceived by the neighboring "Greeks" or "Hellenes" at different times in their respective histories? According to myth, those peoples initially known as Greeks, were later renamed by Hellen, Hellenes (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 3).³ The question of ethnicity is made difficult, because Greek ethnicity developed without the benefit of political unity. Indeed, political unification into one national state was never a goal of the ancient Greeks (Perlman 1976: 3, 5, 30; Anson 2004A: 4–5). While in certain contexts the concept of a Greek ethnicity was accepted, Greeks politically were typically organized in city-states (*poleis*) or tribes (*ethnê*), to which was owed primary allegiance. Even though certain

1 Shared by Badian 1967: 203; 1982: 17; Westlake 1969: 321; Hornblower 1981: 9; Devine 1985B: 96; Borza: 1990: 263n. 31, 280; Axworthy 2010: 29; Romm 2011: 265.

2 Barth 1969: 10–15; Just 1989: 74–5; Eriksen 1993: 20–2, 38; Renfrew 1998: 275–7; Hall 2002: 9; Anson 2010: 12–20.

3 I will use the two terms, Greeks and Hellenes, interchangeably.

Greek states were absorbed by force by other *poleis*,⁴ or tribes, and a number of federations were created in which there was a local citizenship as well as a federal one (in general, see Larsen 1968), unification in which city-states in particular would willingly submerge their independence totally into a greater polity were very rare.⁵ The issue is complicated further by the acceptance of ethnicities that transcended the *poleis* or *ethnê*, but were less than “Greek.” In this category were the classifications of Ionians, Aeolians, or Dorians; Euboeans, Boeotians, Arcadians, and so on. While these might be regarded as super *ethnê*, these groups represented a second tier of affiliation, not primary. These distinctions were based on kinship myths, distinctive dialects, regional locations, or in most cases, all of the above.⁶

While most modern anthropologists see ethnicity as a product of social ascription, and not of any specific genetic qualities or even cultural heritage, the ancient Greeks themselves defined ethnicity by both descent and culture. Herodotus (8. 144. 2; cf. 7. 9b. 2) has the Athenians express to Spartan ambassadors the shared kinship of all Greeks in blood, speech, religious institutions and practices, and pattern of living.⁷ Despite this listing, Herodotus himself makes it clear that Greek ethnicity was far more complicated and less deterministic than this definition supposedly expressed by the Athenians. He believed that the same language could be spoken by people of different ethnicities (Hdts. 1. 171. 6).⁸ He, further, recognized that ethnicity could change over time. He reports that the Athenians were by one tradition originally Pelasgians, the supposed autochthonic inhabitants of the peninsula, who through the adoption of the Greek language and culture became “Hellenes”

4 For example, the Argives increased their population by eliminating the communities of Tiryns, Hysiae, Orneae, Mycenae, Mideia, along with other towns in Argolis and removing the people to Argos (Paus. 8. 27. 1).

5 Such an exception was the creation of Megalopolis. Here forty-one cities were abandoned and their populations incorporated into the new foundation (Paus. 8. 27. 2–4). Pausanias (8. 27. 2) states that this was possible because of the Arcadians’ fear of the Spartans. Even here, however, three repented and were removed to Megalopolis by force; many of the residents of Trapezus left the Peloponnesus entirely and settled in the area of the Black Sea in order to avoid incorporation; many were massacred by other Arcadians (Paus. 8. 27. 5–6).

6 It is not the purpose of this chapter to discover why the Greeks believed as they did, or when they came to their conclusions, but only to examine what they did believe in the 5th and 4th centuries BC.

7 Josiah Ober even presents an argument for the existence of “Greek rules” of warfare (1994: 12–14).

8 In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon describes Apollonides, who spoke in the Boeotian dialect and pretended to be a Greek, but was given away by “his pierced ears” (3. 1 26, 31).

(Hdts. 1. 57. 3; cf. Hdts. 7. 161. 3).⁹ The Arcadians were also believed to be of Pelasgian descent (Hdts. 1. 146. 1; 2. 171. 3; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3. 8. 1; Paus. 8. 4. 1),¹⁰ but they are listed in Homer's catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2. 600), which for later Greeks was a mark of Greek ethnicity (Thuc. 1. 10. 5), and their Greek ethnicity, as that of the Athenians, is never questioned (Hdts. 8. 72. 1; Thuc. 5. 60. 3; 7. 58. 3). According to myth, Pelasgus was an Arcadian (Paus. 8. 4. 1; cf. Paus. 10. 9. 1), and either autochthonous, or the son of Zeus and Niobe (Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 1. 1).¹¹ As with the Athenians, Herodotus describes the origin of the Ionian branch of the Hellenic "*genos*" (1. 143. 2), as derived from the Pelasgians (1. 56. 2). This view of the growth of Hellenic ethnicity through assimilation accords well with the general principle enunciated later by Isocrates, who states, "the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood" (4. 50). Indeed, Herodotus sees the expansion of the Greek nation as a direct result of the absorption of other peoples. "But the Hellenic stock, it seems clear to me, has always had the same language since its beginning; yet being, when separated from the Pelasgians, few in number, they have grown from a small beginning to comprise "a multitude of peoples," chiefly because the Pelasgians and "many other foreign peoples" united themselves with them" (Hdts. 1. 58. 1). This is likewise the view of Thucydides (1. 3. 2–3): "... before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes (*ethnê*), in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not until Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all."¹² Those who had been Greeks could also fall from that status, as apparently had the Gelonians, of whom Herodotus (4. 108. 2) relates that they were in origin Greeks, still practicing some aspects of Greek culture and speaking a mixed language of Greek and Scythian, but whom he associates with the tribal peoples neighboring the Scythians (4. 102. 2, 119. 1,

9 For a full discussion of Herodotus 1. 56–58, and the textual and interpretive issues involved, see McNeal 1985: 11–21; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2011: 117–19.

10 Lemnos and Imbros were reputedly still inhabited by Pelasgians in the 5th century BC (Hdts. 5. 26. 1; 6. 38. 1–4, 136. 2; Paus. 7. 2. 2), until the Lemnians, and, perhaps, the Imbrians, were expelled by the Athenians (Hdts. 6. 140. 1–2; cf. Diod. 10. 19. 6; Paus. 6. 19. 6).

11 Pausanias (9. 1. 1) also declares the Plataeans to be autochthonic. Plataea is listed by Homer among the Boeotians in his catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2. 490). By one tradition the Achaeans were autochthonic as well (Paus. 5. 1. 1), but more commonly they were believed to have been descended from Hellen (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 3; Paus. 7. 1. 2–3).

12 A similar view is expressed by Euripides (frg. 228. 7=Str. 8. 6. 9).

135. 1).¹³ Plutarch (*Lys.* 3. 2), perhaps, reflecting his source, likewise states that Greeks through association with other peoples could be “barbarized.”

While emphasizing the importance of culture, Greeks did, however, have a tendency to create genealogical myths to link these various peoples together.¹⁴ Hence, even though Herodotus could speak of assimilation, he also emphasizes descent. The more narrow genetic view of ethnicity was certainly present. Plato (*Menex.* 245D) has Aspasia call the Athenians the only pure Greeks, having not a drop of “barbarian” blood. Other Greeks, those apparently descended from the “Dorians,” who originally according to tradition lived in the northern Greek peninsula (Paus. 5. 1. 2; Str. 9. 4. 10), or those associated with the legendary heroes Pelops, Cadmus, or Aegyptus,¹⁵ she calls “naturally barbarian and only nominally Greeks.” While this is a decidedly curious work, and may, or may not, represent the views of Plato,¹⁶ it must reflect in some fashion the views of a large group of Athenians. It is interesting that in the *Protagoras* (341C), Pittacus’ Lesbian dialect is referred to as “*phonê barbaros*.” Herodotus (7. 161. 3) has an Athenian envoy respond to Gelon’s demand for Syracusan command of the sea prior to the Persian invasion: “Are we not Athenians—the most ancient of all Greek peoples, the only nation never to have left the soil from which it sprang?” These passages clearly point out the supposed mixed origin of these other “Greeks.” In the myths, both Pelops and Cadmus arrived in the Greek peninsula from Asia; Aegyptus from Egypt by way of Asia.¹⁷ In the literature of the 5th and 4th centuries, in general, Greeks divided the world between themselves and barbarians.¹⁸ This is a very common view in the 4th century. Plato (*Rep.* 470C) proclaims, “barbarians and Greeks are enemies by nature,” and Isocrates speaks of the eternal hatred between Asians and Greeks (4. 157; 12. 163).

The view of Asians as barbarians may have had a long history in the Greek tradition. While generally ignoring cultural and linguistic differences amongst the various forces on both sides participating in the Trojan War, Homer (*Il.* 2. 867) does make reference to the Carians as speaking a “barbaric language

13 While serious doubts have been raised about the Greek origin of the Gelonians (see How and Wells 1975: 340), what is important here is Herodotus’ perception.

14 A point emphasized by Hall (1997: 43, 48) and Patterson (2010: esp. 163).

15 Respectively the namesake of the Peloponnesus, the founder of Thebes, and the *eponymon* of Egypt, whose son later ruled over Argos.

16 For a general discussion, see Kahn 1963: 220–34; Cohen 2000: 100–102.

17 Paus. 5. 1. 6; 7. 21. 13; 9. 12. 2; Isoc. 10. 67–68; Str. 7. 7. 1; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2. 1. 4–5; 2. 2. 1; cf. Thuc. 1. 9. 2.

18 Thuc. 1. 1. 2, 82. 1; 2. 97. 3; 6. 1. 1., 6. 1. 18. 2; Hdts. 1. 1. pref., 1. 3, 9; Isoc. 10. 67; Dem. 19. 312.

speakers." Any existing hostility towards Asians was heightened by the events of the Persian invasion. What had been seen as difference before the war was now often defined as "natural and hereditary hatred" (Isoc. 4. 184). Plato speaks of the Persian defeat as a critical event in Greek history. "If the Persians had conquered Greece, practically all the Greek races (*genê*) would have been confused together by now, and barbarians confused with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians, just as the races under the Persian empire today are either scattered abroad or jumbled together and live in a miserable plight" (*Leg.* 693A). Both Simon Hornblower (1991: 11) and Jonathan Hall (1997: 44, 47) emphasize the importance of the Persian War in defining Greek ethnicity. Hornblower (1991: 11; cf. Cartledge 1993: 11–12), in particular, states that "Persia gave the Greeks their identity." This is by far too strong a statement. Greek genealogical-ancestral myths had been recorded at least by the 6th century BC (West 1985: 127–30, 169–71). The concept of a distinct Greek ethnicity was in particular settings even formally determined, perhaps, as early as the 8th century BC.¹⁹ The great religious festivals, occurring at regular intervals at Isthmia, Delphi, Nemea, and Olympia, were open only to those who could demonstrate their Greek ethnicity to the satisfaction of individuals commissioned by the festivals to make such determinations. While only for the Olympic Games does direct evidence exist for such a body (Hdts. 5. 22. 2), it is very clear that the others were also exclusively for Greeks at least by the 5th century BC, and likely well before (Dem. 18. 91; 9. 32; Aeschin. 3. 253–4; Plut. *Thes.* 25. 4), and the games were viewed as a means of promoting Panhellenism (Paus. 5. 4. 5, 8. 5; Lys. 33. 1–2; Ar. *Lys.* 1128–34). All of the attested Olympic victors in these years came from "Greek" cities or regions (Moretti 1957). The Panhellenic spirit of the games is clearly reflected in Pindar's odes (Morgan 1993: 36). The Olympic Games had expanded well beyond a local Peloponnesian festival long before the Persian War. Already in the 7th century victors are recorded from Megara, Athens, Thebes, Croton, Smyrna, Syracuse; in the 6th, additionally from Miletus, Samos, Sicilian Naxos, Aegina, Corcyra, Chalcis, Thessaly, Delphi, Gela, Taras, and Apollonia (Moretti 1957: 63–79).²⁰

Even Hall's claim (1997: 44, 47) that Greek ethnicity had moved from "aggregative" to "oppositional," that is from identification based on common cultural traits to that based on cultural differences from some third party, as a direct result of the Persian War, is not true (Anson 2009C: 17–18; Gruen 2011: 3–4).

19 For a discussion of the date for the origins of the major Greek festivals, see Colin Renfrew 1988: 22–3.

20 The accuracy of the list preserved by Hippias has been questioned, however. See Lee 1988: 110–18.

While the distinction between Persians and Greeks was clearly heightened, the process of assimilation continued. The definitional process would appear to be very fluid and very much tied to culture. Even those basic definitions long established in myth were expanding.

By the sixth century BC, certain basic criteria for Hellenic status had been established. For example, the Greeks at Naucratis, founded around 570, while coming from Chios, Teos, Phocaea, Clazomenae, Rhodes, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, Phaselis, and Mytilene, created a common religious sanctuary, the *Hellenion*, pointing to their common Hellenic heritage (Hdts. 2. 178). “Greeks” were the descendants of those who had sent ships on the great Trojan expedition and been recorded in Homer’s catalogue of ships in the *Iliad* (2. 494–759),²¹ or as those believed to be descended from Hellen, the supposed forebear of the Hellenes (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 2–3; Pind. *Ol.* 9. 40), or often both.²² It is suggested that the list actually indicates those peoples recognized as Greek at the time of creation of the catalogue (Kullman 2012: 222–3), and the mythic connections to Hellen were continuously expanded. The Greeks engaged in what Erich Gruen (2011: 223–43) calls a form of “identity theft.” Even the Athenians, who, according to Herodotus, on the one hand, saw themselves as originally Pelasgian, claimed connection to Ion, a grandson of Hellen (Hdts. 8. 44. 2; Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 3; Paus. 7. 1. 2). Ion by tradition migrated to Athens and became their war leader against Eleusis (Paus. 2. 14. 2). Of course, this mythology was reflective of the historical expansion of Greek ethnicity as indicated in Herodotus, and was only created later to validate the results (Hall 1997: 48). In short, the general acceptance of this mythic genealogy represents the end of the process of assimilation for the particular group involved. But what must be emphasized is that these connections were not simply of cultural importance. Greeks often cited these myths to make legal and political points. Claims with respect to territory made by Greek communities often hinged on these mythic relationships. The Athenians and the Mytileneans contested the ownership of Sigeum with the Mytileneans claiming it belonged to them because of their

21 Thucydides (1. 3. 4, 10. 5, 12. 2; cf. Hdts. 1. 3. 2) regards the Trojan War as the first “Hellenic enterprise.” Even into the Roman period determinations of ethnicity were made based on Homer’s statements (Paus. 8. 22. 1; Str. 8. 3. 3).

22 This genealogy was both contradictory and seemingly incomplete. The Arcadians, as noted earlier, were believed to be the descendants of Pelasgus, not Hellen. Yet, there is never any question concerning their Hellenic status (Hdts. 8. 72. 1; Thuc. 5. 60. 3; 7. 58. 3). They had sent ships to Troy (*Il.* 2. 600). Apparently, to the various creators of genealogical myths no need was seen to create a tie to Hellen in order to bolster their status as Greeks; that status was so generally recognized.

actions during the Trojan War (Hdts 5. 94. 2), and Athens claimed Salamis since their ships were stationed next to those from Salamis in the *Iliad* (Plut. *Sol.* 10. 1). During their second invasion of Attica in the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans avoided devastating the region of Tetrapolis because the mythic Heraclids, Spartan ancestors, had once dwelt there (Diod. 12. 45. 1).

More practically, and again with respect to situations like those in the Olympic Games, the key item to Greek ethnicity was language (Anson 2009C: 5–30). The role of language in defining origins, in the expression of culture, and as the carrier of phenomenology, is generally recognized (Fishman 1977: 25–6, 41; 1983: 128; Giles, Bourhis, Taylor 1977: 307–8; Haarmann 1986: 40, 83, 261; Romaine 2000: x), and while its link to any particular ethnicity is not inevitable, it is likely, and in the case of the ancient Greeks, clear. While Herodotus has the Athenians speak of kinship as defined by blood, speech, religious institutions and practices, and pattern of living, yet, most often he refers to the Greek language as the defining element of Hellenism.²³ As Corrado Bologna (1978: 305) states, “E’ ancora il linguaggio che separa il Greco ed il Barbaro, prima di qualsiasi altra qualità e categoria.” Likewise, Edith Hall (2004: 5): “No other ancient people privileged language to such an extent in defining its own ethnicity.” Hall (2002: 191–2), however, argues that Herodotus’ use of the phrase “Hellenic tongue” “is not based on any empirically-derived observations . . . [but] is rather an abstract reification that assumes the prior existence of an ‘imagined community’ defined according to other criteria.” Prior to the 19th century the existence of any “national language” was rare, and in the case of Greek, 4th c. BC, *Koine* represented the first approximation of such a truly national Greek language, yet, Alexander wanted his *Epigoni*, his 30000 Asian young men, who were to be trained in the Macedonian fighting style, “taught Greek” (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 3; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 6. 1; Curt. 8. 5. 1; Diod. 17. 108. 2).

Certainly before the general spread of *Koine* every Greek-speaking region and community possessed its own characteristic speech (Palmer 1996: 82, 174). Consequently, our sources refer to “βοιωτιάζων φωνή,” Boeotian speech (Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 26; Arr. *Anab.* 6. 13. 5; Paus. 9. 34. 2), Λακωνίζων φωνή, Laconian speech (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. 11),²⁴ “φωνή Δωρίδος,” Doric language (Thuc. 3. 112. 4; 6. 5. 1), “φωνή Χαλκιδέων,” Chalcidian (Thuc. 6. 5. 1), and “φωνή Ἀττικιστί,” Attic.²⁵

23 Hdt. 2. 30. 1, 56. 3, 59. 2, 112. 1, 144. 2, 153. 1, 154. 2; 3. 26. 1; 4. 23. 2, 52. 3, 78. 1, 106, 108. 2, 109, 110. 1, 117, 155. 3, 192. 3; 6. 98. 3; 7. 9b. 3; 8. 135. 3, 144. 2; 9. 16. 2, 110. 2 (see Hinge 2009).

24 The Messenians apparently spoke the same “φωνή” as their Spartan oppressors (Thuc. 4. 3. 3; cf. 3. 112. 4).

25 Dem. *Ex.* 8. 2; 16. 2; cf. Thuc. 7. 57. 1, 63. 3; Athen. 3. 126E; also, γλώσσα Ἀττική (Hdts. 6. 138. 2; Xen. *Mem.* 3. 14. 7).

Additionally, there are a number of passages in the sources referring in some fashion to Μακεδονίζων φωνή (Plut. *Alex.* 51. 11; *Eum.* 14. 11; *Ant.* 27. 5; Athen. 3. 122A; *PSI* XII 1284; cf. Curt. 6. 9. 35). Strabo (8. 1. 2; 14. 1. 3, 5. 26) speaks of three or four basic dialects, and one modern commentator lists 24 (Coleman 1963: 113).

While φωνή in the references to Boeotian, Attic, etc., is typically translated as dialect, there is considerable debate concerning its meaning. The word, φωνή, most often refers to generic speech or voice,²⁶ which is almost without exception the case with Homer and Hesiod,²⁷ but the word can also refer to song (Pl. *Leg.* 666D, 673A), as well as to language²⁸ and dialect (Hdts. 7. 70. 1; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2. 8; Pl. *Leg.* 642C; *Crat.* 398B, 398D; Thuc. 7. 57. 2, 67. 3). It is even used to describe the sound of musical instruments (Pl. *Rep.* 397A), or of sounds in general.²⁹ While there was in truth no “Greek” language apart from the regional variations, certain of these dialects achieved a Panhellenic status (Palmer 1996: 174), and even though neither Homer nor Hesiod speak of a “Greek language,” Herodotus routinely refers to “Ελληνικός γλῶσσα” (Hellenic speech).³⁰ This author has the Persian Mardonius state that all Greeks speak the same language (Hdts. 7. 9b. 2). Thucydides (2. 68. 5), Xenophon (*Anab.* 7. 3. 25; *Cyn.* 2. 3) and Isocrates (6. 8) also make reference to “Hellenic speech.” Clearly, Greeks recognized that there was a commonality in their dialects. However, the various dialects were also seen as distinctive. Aeschylus in *Seven against Thebes* (l. 170) refers to the Argive army surrounding Thebes as “Ετερόφωνοι” (foreign

26 For example, see Aeschin. 1. 181; 2. 1, 88, 115, 156; 3. 109, 120; Dem. 1. 2; 9. 61; 18. 10, 23, 43, 170, 222, 271, 279, 286–287; 19. 15, 16, 103, 206, 336, 337; 21. 72, 195; 24. 175; 42. 15; 45. 30; 48. 44; 57. 11; Hdts. 1. 85. 4, 159. 3; 2. 2. 2, 55. 2, 71. 1; 4. 129. 1, 3, 141. 1, 155. 3, 4; 5. 58. 1, 93. 2; 8. 65. 1, 4, 6; Isae. 6. 59; 12. 4; Isoc. 5. 26, 27, 81; 8. 3; 12. 10, 142; 15. 20, 22, 189, 296; 19. 28; Lys. 6. 51; Pl. *Leg.* 634E, 653D, 664E, 665A, 672E; *Rep.* 393C, 395D, 568C; *Apol.* 18A, 31D; *Crat.* 383A, 422E, 423B; *Thaet.* 190A, 203B, 206D, 208C, 261E; Plut. *Alc.* 1. 4, 2. 5; *Cim.* 8. 1; *Lys.* 8. 2; *Nic.* 27. 1; *Per.* 7. 1, 8. 3; *Sol.* 14. 1, 28. 2; Xen. *Anab.* 2. 6. 9; 7. 3. 25, 7. 46; *Cyr.* 1. 4. 4; *Hell.* 2. 3. 56; *Mem.* 1. 4. 12; *Cyn.* 6. 20.

27 Hes. *Sh.* ll. 383; *Th.* ll. 39, 584, 685, 830; *WD* 79, 104, 448; Hom. *Il.* 2. ll. 490; 3. 161; 13. ll. 45; 14. ll. 400; 15. ll. 686; 17. ll. 111, 555, 696; 18. ll. 220, 221, 571; 20. ll. 81; 22. ll. 227; 23. ll. 67, 397; *Od.* 4. ll. 279, 705; 10. ll. 239; 12. ll. 86, 396; 19. ll. 381, 472, 521, 545; 24. ll. 530.

28 Aeschin. 3. 16, 172; Hdts. 2. 2. 3, 32. 6, 42. 4, 57. 1; 4. 23. 2, 111. 1, 114. 1, 117. 1; 7. 85. 1; Hom. *Il.* 2. 867; Isoc. 1. 9. 8; Pl. *Leg.* 777C; *Crat.* 409E, 410A, 418B; *Thaet.* 153B; Plut. *Cim.* 18. 3; *Them.* 6. 2; *Thes.* 16. 2; Thuc. 6. 5. 1; Xen. *Anab.* 4. 8. 4; *Cyn.* 2. 3.

29 Pl. *Rep.* 475B, 480A, 617B; *Crat.* 419B, 423D, 423E; *Thaet.* 185A; Plut. *Cim.* 1. 6; Xen. *Ages.* 2.12; *Cyn.* 11. 4.

30 Hdts. 1. 58. 1, 110. 1; 2. 30. 1, 56. 3, 59. 2, 112. 1, 137. 5, 143. 4, 144. 2, 153. 1, 154. 2; 3. 26. 1; 4. 52. 3, 78. 1, 108. 2, 110. 1, 155. 3, 192. 3; 6. 98. 3; 7. 9b. 3; 8. 135. 3, 144. 2; 9. 16. 2, 110. 2.

speakers). Herodotus, despite his comments on “Greek speech,” is, nonetheless, cognizant of the many variations in Greek during the fifth century, for when he speaks of Ionia he refers to four “γλώσσαι” (language, speech, more generically, tongue) (Hdts. 1. 142. 3). The nature of the Greek language is best related by the “Old Oligarch” when he speaks of the Athenians: “The Athenians have mingled with various peoples . . ., hearing every kind of φωνήν, they have taken something from each; the Greeks individually rather tend to use their own dialect, way of life, and type of dress, but the Athenians use a mixture from all the Greeks and non-Greeks” ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2. 8).

Among the Greeks of the Classical Age, however, there was apparently a remarkable ability for most Greek speakers to understand other Greeks from varying parts of the diverse Greek world. Even though Herodotus (1. 142. 3–4) describes the “Greeks” of Ionia as not sharing a common language (“γλώσσα”), but speaking in “four different ways.” The speech of Miletus, Myus, and Priene, he describes as entirely different from the speech of Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, and Phocaea, and, while the Chians and Erythraeans spoke a common “γλώσσα,” but the Samians, “one that is all their own” (Hdts. 1. 142. 4).³¹ However, the differences in language here emphasized by Herodotus did not apparently hinder communication between the various peoples. The Ionians met in common assembly at Panionion, where evidently they encountered no communication problems (cf. Hdts. 1. 170. 1–3; 6. 7. 1, 11. 1–4). During Cyrus’ ill-fated expedition against his brother, the “Greeks” in his army often met in assembly, and despite coming from areas of the Greek world as geographically disparate as Ionia (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 7), Boeotia (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 11; 5. 6. 21), the Chersonese (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 9), Thessaly (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 10; 2. 5. 31), and the Peloponnesus (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 6; 2. 5. 31; 3. 1. 34, 47), there is never a word about translators or of miscommunication despite this diversity in the Greek military body (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 3–7, 9–20, 4. 12). Xenophon is not here being remiss in omitting such individuals, for he often refers to the interpreters used by the Persians or other non-Greeks to communicate with the Greeks.³² The Greeks also had interpreters of their own who were used to communicate with Persian-speakers (Xen. *Anab.* 2. 5. 35; 4. 2. 18, 5. 10, 34), and other non-Greek peoples (Xen. *Anab.* 5. 4. 4; 7. 2. 19, 6. 8). From this evidence, it would

31 Plato (*Prot.* 341C) implies that Lesbian in the time of Pittacus (second half of the seventh and early sixth century) was a “barbarous speech.”

32 Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 17, 8. 12; 2. 3. 17; 4. 4. 5; 7. 6. 8, 43; Cyrus’ chief interpreter was Pigres (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 17, 8. 12), and Glus, the son of Tamos, the Egyptian, may have been another used by Cyrus. The latter is sent to the Greeks with a message (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 4. 16) and on another occasion is associated directly with Pigres (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 5. 7).

appear that most dialects of Greek had enough in common that those from different regions of the Greek-speaking world could readily comprehend one another. Greece's wandering poets, national religious festivals, and extensive commerce aided in the ability of Greeks from such diverse areas to comprehend one another (Anson 2009C: 5–30). However, those from more remote and less urbanized areas often spoke a dialect that was difficult for other Greeks to understand.³³ The Eurytians, the largest Aetolian tribe, spoke a “γλῶσσα” exceedingly difficult for other Greeks to comprehend (Thuc. 3. 94. 5). Yet, Thucydides regards the Aetolians, with the exception of the “majority of the Amphilochians,” as Greeks (Thuc. 1. 5. 3; 2. 68. 5; cf. 3. 112. 7).³⁴

The ascriptive nature of Greek ethnicity is seen in many respects. What is remarkable is how flexible this definition of Hellene could be. Certain ethnic connections did not require mythic explanation. Greek colonies claimed Greek descent based on the ethnicity of their mother cities. These claims were accepted, even though many, if not most, of these colonies were settled only by men from the home city, who subsequently married native women (Hdts. 1. 146. 2–3; Paus. 7. 2. 6). Even in those colonies where women migrated as well (cf. Hdts. 1. 164. 3), many married native women.³⁵ Colonies on occasion had mixed male populations of Greeks and natives (Hdts. 6. 34–36, cf. 41; Diod. 12. 32. 3; Paus. 5. 26. 7; 7. 3. 6, 7). In the case of Amphipolis, it apparently not only had a mixed population, but one in which the settlers from the mother city were in the minority (Thuc. 4. 106. 1; cf. Thuc. 1. 100. 3; 4. 102; Diod. 12. 32. 3).

33 Hammond (1994: 138) notes that Vlach pastoral communities still have “a distinct and strong dialect” of Greek.

34 The Amphilochian colony of Argos had joined with the Ambraciots and subsequently “became Hellenes and learned their present Hellenic speech, but the rest of the Amphilochians remained barbarians” (Thuc. 2. 68. 5).

35 While there is not much evidence regarding the presence or absence of women in the colonizing period, there are certain indications. In the inscription recording the decree for the creation of the Theraean colony of Cyrene (*SEG* 9. 3), it states that “one son be conscripted from each family; that those who sail be in the prime of life, . . .” Miltiades having settled in Cardia married a Thracian princess (Hdts. 6. 39. 2; Plut. *Cim.* 4. 1). These early colonies were typically not military colonies, such as those established by Alexander in his eastern campaigns, where the colonists were almost exclusively soldiers and the women natives (see Fraser 1996: 185–7). Alexander often incorporated natives in his colonies. For example, between Alexandria of the Caucasus and Bactria he founded communities containing 7000 natives, 3000 camp followers, soldiers unfit for duty, and mercenary volunteers (Diod. 17. 83. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 23). This was apparently a usual mix for Alexander. At Arigaeum, he created a colony from neighboring tribesmen, volunteers, and any soldiers no longer fit for combat (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 29. 3).

Certainly in the case of Amphipolis all were considered citizens (Thuc. 4. 106. 1). This was not always the situation. On occasion these non-Greek populations were given a status less than that of full citizenship (Hdts. 4. 159. 4, 161. 3; 7. 155. 2; Str. 12. 3. 4).³⁶ But intermarriage and even mixed populations apparently did not change the character of the colony or the general ethnic perception of the community as a Greek settlement.³⁷ Colonies, despite their customary political independence from their mother cities, maintained close ties, especially with respect to religion (Graham 1964: 159–65, 213).

While the defeat of the Persian invaders had an effect on the “Greek” psyche, it was nuanced. A coalition of but thirty-one out of, perhaps, seven hundred *poleis* had defeated the greatest military power in the Western world. Greek ethnicity had become certainly more valued, and this victory over the empire of Persia became a unifying force for all Greeks, even though most of the Greek world either sat the war out or surrendered to the Persians. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3. 2. 11–13) emphasizes to the “10000,” after the massacre of their generals, that they are all united in the “actions of your forefathers” in defeating the Persians. In the collective that was the army of the 10000, there were many whose ancestors had participated in the war on the side of the Persians, including the Thessalians (1. 1. 10, 2. 6; 2. 1. 5) and Thebans (2. 1. 10), but in this speech all Greeks shared in the victory.

While in actuality assimilation was common, Greeks still accepted the dichotomy of Greeks and the rest of the world’s peoples.³⁸ In addition to classifying the Greeks as a distinct ethnicity, Herodotus also associates Greeks with Europeans and distinguishes both from Asians (7.185.1; cf. 9. 31.1–5). Herodotus describes the Persian War, in part, as the continuation of long-standing

36 Aristotle (*Pol.* 1330A) states that in an “ideal system” slaves or “barbarian *periokoi*” should farm the land.

37 For the remarkable ability of even those rare colonies with mixed populations to maintain the culture of their mother city, see Gwynn 1918: 102–103; Graham 1964: 211–17. In cases where the colony was a joint foundation of two or more Greek *poleis*, each group of immigrants often maintained their own traditions (Graham 1964: 17–22). While founded in 453 BC, under Athenian leadership, Thurii represented a panhellenic settlement, including Arcadians, Achaeans, Boeotians, Euboeans, and Ionians (Diod. 12. 10. 6–11.1–3, 35. 2–3). Here, where many features of the Athenian state were incorporated, including democratic government, the state was very cosmopolitan; the founder of the city was officially Apollo (Diod. 12. 35. 3). Another example of a Greek colony with a mixed population was the Spartan colony of Heracleia at the head of the Malian Gulf, in which 4000 colonists were Spartan and Peloponnesian, but 6000 were “other Greeks” (Diod. 12. 59. 3–5).

38 For example, Thuc. 1. 1. 2, 82. 1; 2. 97. 3; 6. 1. 1., 6. 1. 18. 2; Hdts. 1. 1. pref., 1. 3; 9. 79. 1, 106. 1; Dem. 19. 312.

hostility between Europe and Asia (Hdts. 1. 1–5, 25–28, 86, 141, 163–169). Aristotle (*Pol.* 1327b 23–28) differentiates between Hellenes, Europeans, and Asians. “The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity.”³⁹

Given these perceived divisions, where did the “Greeks” generally place the Macedonians amongst the world’s peoples? While Aristotle (*Pol.* 1324b) lists the Macedonians among the barbarians, it is very clear from the earliest Hellenic sources that most Greeks perceived the Macedonians as being some sort of hybrid, related to the Hellenes, but distinct. This is seen in the ancestor myth presented in *The Catalogue of Women* attributed in antiquity to Hesiod.⁴⁰ “The district Macedonia took its name from Macedon, the son of Zeus and Thyia, Deucalion’s daughter, and she conceived and bore to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt two sons, Magnes and Macedon, rejoicing in horses, who dwell round about Pieria and Olympus . . .” The ancestor of the Macedonians is then the nephew of Hellen, although through the female line. By the end of the 5th century BC, in the eyes of some, this mythological distinction between Macedonians and Hellenes was eliminated. Hellanicus makes Macedon the son of Aeolus and hence in the direct line of Hellen (*FGrH* 4 F-74). Hellanicus was attempting to systematize all of the various genealogical myths and, also, to bring into the Hellenic camp those left out by the more traditional myths. For example, Hellanicus wished to join the Athenians directly to the family of Hellen through an otherwise unknown daughter, Xenopatra (*FGrH* 4 F-125). It is, therefore, likely that Hellanicus was attempting to incorporate those peoples he believed to be culturally Greek, but who were not included as descendants of Hellen by the older myths. He must then have believed that the Macedonians were true Greeks. The Macedonians were also associated certainly by the Classical Age with the Greek Dorians (Hdts.8. 43. 1) through

39 Translation is from the (*Loeb Classical Library* translation, Rackham 1972: 21:565, 567.

40 Fragment 3=Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (3), de Them. 2 p. 48B. Homer makes no reference to the Macedonians, only to the Paeonians inhabiting the valley of the Axios (*Il.* 2. 845, 10. 425, 16. 284, 285, 21. 150, 200, 205).

the belief that the Dorians had stayed some time in this region prior to their descent into southern Greece (Hdts. 1. 56. 3).⁴¹

Despite these post-Hesiodic mythic connections, in the literary evidence from the Classical Age most "Greeks" acknowledged the distinction between themselves and the Macedonians. Thucydides (4. 124. 1) refers to an army made of Macedonians and "Hellenes domiciled in the country." Aeschines (3. 128) notes that "Philip was not in Macedonia at that time, nor in Hellas, but in Scythia . . .," and Isocrates (5. 107–8) compliments the Macedonian King Philip II by saying that this monarch "knew full well that the Hellenes were not accustomed to submit to the rule of one man, while the other races were incapable of ordering their lives without the control of some such power. . . . because he alone among the Hellenes did not claim the right to rule over a people of kindred race." The implication is clear that Macedonians were one of those peoples who needed a king, and hence were not Hellenes. When the Macedonian king Alexander I attempted to participate in the Olympic Games, the Greeks who were to run against him said that the contest was for Greeks and not for foreigners. Alexander, by convincing the *Hellenodicaí*, those in charge of the Games, that he was an Argive by descent, was judged to be a Greek, and competed in the stade race and tied for first place (Hdts. 5. 22; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 101). Alexander's name, however, does not appear on the victor list (Moretti 1957). Due to this omission and other problems with the text, a number of scholars refuse to accept the historicity of Alexander's participation (Badian 1982: 46 n. 19; Borza 1990: 111–12), claiming the tale was simply part of Argead philhellenic propaganda. While there are problems involving Alexander's appearance; his supposed age, his omission from the victor list, etc., these can be resolved. As Gene Borza (1990: 111) notes, "if one regards the tale of the ill-fated Persian embassy as unhistorical, . . . Alexander might well have been no older than twenty at the time of his accession, nearly prime for competition in the stade race of 496 . . ." The account of Alexander having Persian envoys killed in 510, is generally rejected by scholars (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 99, Borza 1990: 102). With respect to Alexander's absence from the victor list, as Borza (1990: 112) also notes as a possibility, he may simply have lost the run-off. It is also possible that he did not do well and the "tie" represents an embellishment. While Herodotus' information owes much to Argead sources (Hdts. 5. 22), he had visited Olympia (cf. Hdts. 7. 170. 4; 8. 34. 1; 9. 81. 1). Moreover, there is no hint later of any opposition to Philip II's participation in the games (Plut. *Alex.* 3. 8, 4. 9), despite Demosthenes' claim (9. 31) that

41 Kalléris (1988: 1:3) believes "les Macédoniens appartenaient à la dernière vague des émigrants grecs."

Philip was neither a “Greek,” nor “related to Greeks.” The Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house was generally recognized in the Classical period,⁴² for as a Macedonian, the evidence suggests that he would have been barred from competition.

While Macedonians were not commonly viewed as Hellenes in the fifth and fourth centuries, a distinction was also seen by most Greeks between Macedonians and “barbarians,”⁴³ including those so-called “barbaric” groups living within the Greek peninsula. Illyrians throughout antiquity were regarded as barbarians, as were Paeonians (Diod. 16. 4. 2), and most Thracians (Thuc. 4. 125. 1; Diod. 12. 30. 3; 15. 13. 3, 14. 1–2; 16. 4. 5). Nowhere is the tripartite distinction between Greeks, Macedonians, and barbarians made clearer than in Isocrates’ *To Philip* (154): “I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes, to reign as king over the Macedonians, and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians.” This distinction between Greeks and Macedonians persisted into the Hellenistic Age. Borza (1996: 122–31) has conveniently collected the ancient references relating to these time frames, and typical is the speech in Arrian purportedly delivered by Alexander the Great prior to the battle of Issus, where the Macedonian king refers to his troops as Macedonians, Greeks, and barbarians (*Anab.* 2. 7. 4–5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 11. 3; 47. 9). Callisthenes, speaking in opposition to the imposition of prostration in Alexander’s court, refers both to the “Greeks” and “Macedonians” collectively, and as separate entities (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 10. 8). Later, in the wars that followed Alexander’s death, the Macedonian government, “the kings,” issued a decree in which Greeks and Macedonians were clearly distinguished, but here there are clear political distinctions being made (Diod. 18. 56. 1–3).

This perception of difference began to change with Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire. Five years before Alexander the Great’s death a non-royal Macedonian named Cliton won the *stadion* at Olympia (Moretti 1957:

42 Herodotus (5. 22; 8. 137–139), Thucydides (2. 99. 3; 5. 80. 2), and Isocrates (5. 32, 107), all accept the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house, probably reflecting general Greek acceptance as well. Moreover, the rulers of the Upper Macedonian district of Lyncestis prided themselves on being descendants of the Corinthian Bacchiads (Str. 7. 7. 8; cf. Thuc. 2. 99. 1). While Borza (1990: 81–4) argues that any connection between Macedonian families and Greek forebears is more likely mythic than factual, the Argive origin is credited as factual by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 3–4).

43 Thucydides does, on occasion, appear to list Macedonians separately from barbarians (4. 125. 1, 127. 2), and Diodorus, perhaps, following Ephorus, likewise refers to Macedonians as distinct from barbarians (16. 4. 2, 5, 71. 2). Demosthenes (19. 327) even seems to see some distinction at least in the terms. He is clear, however, that, for him, Macedonians were barbarians (3. 24; 9. 31–32).

127 [#463]), and after Alexander, "Greeks" from Lycia (Paus. 5. 8. 11),⁴⁴ Tralles, Pergamon, Bargylia, Nibis, and Alexandria are included in the list of Olympic victors.⁴⁵ By the second century BC, at the latest, the Macedonians were regarded as fully Greek (Polyb. 5. 104. 1, 105. 5; 7. 9. 3, 5, 7; 9. 37. 7; 38. 3. 8; cf. Livy 31. 29. 15; Str. 10. 2. 23). Certainly, by the time of the early Roman Empire, Greek was the spoken language of Macedonia, and most likely centuries before. Strabo (7. 7. 1) clearly regarded Macedonians as Greeks, and spoke of the affinity of dialect (διάλεκτος) among the inhabitants of "the Macedonian empire," including most Epirotes, although certain Epirotes even in Strabo's time continued to be regarded as "διγλωσσοι" (7. 7. 8).

However, in the 5th and 4th centuries BC, while the language of the court was apparently Attic Greek,⁴⁶ and the language of the various later Successor kingdoms was as well, it is clear that normal Macedonian speech was not always clearly understood by non-Macedonians, perhaps, suggesting this was a non-Greek language. In Curtius' account of the trial of Philotas, Alexander asks that commander whether he wishes to address the troops in "*patrio sermone*," native speech (Curt. 6. 9. 34), to which the latter replies that he will address the troops in "*eadem lingua*," that same language, used by Alexander so as to be more readily ("*facilius*") understood by the non-Macedonians present (Curt. 6. 9. 35).⁴⁷ "*Eadem lingua*" was likely the speech of the Macedonian court, which, as noted earlier, was Attic Greek. Alexander then used Philotas' choice of language against him, telling the Macedonians that the latter loathed the "*sermo patrius*" (Curt. 6. 9. 36).⁴⁸ Philotas was apparently in the habit of using Attic Greek and on occasion, regarding those who spoke the Macedonian "*lingua*," as "Phrygians and Paphlagonians," and even employing an interpreter to address those Macedonians with difficulties comprehending Attic (Curt. 6. 11. 4). Like "φωνή" amongst the Greek authors, *sermo* is used by Curtius most

44 Moretti (1957: 138 [#558]) rejects this particular victor.

45 Moretti (1957: 133 [#512]), 134 (#519), 135 (#538), 136 (#539), 137 (#555), 139 (#569, #572), 140 (#575), 140 (#581), 141 (#586).

46 It is generally assumed that Attic Greek was adopted by the Macedonian court sometime shortly after the Persian War (Kalléris 1998: 1:53n. 7; Borza 1990: 92).

47 While these statements occur in the midst of speeches and consequently owe something to the flourishes of the author, Curtius most likely elaborated on the material found in his sources, rather than inventing the content (Baynham 1998: 50–5). Elias Kapetanopoulos (1999: 117–28), however, argues that much of the Curtian account of this episode has been invented as well as amplified by the author.

48 Two other speeches are delivered by Amyntas and Coenus respectively (Curt. 6. 9. 28–31), but without any indication of the nature of the speech being used.

often to mean conversation or common speech,⁴⁹ while *lingua* is most frequently an indication of a style of speech (Curt. 4. 6. 6; 6. 9. 20; 7. 2. 37; 8. 1. 45). Indeed, in other early Roman imperial writers the terms exhibit the same ambiguity as φωνή.⁵⁰ Tacitus uses *sermo* to indicate conversation (*Agr.* 40. 4; 41. 4; 45. 3), but also to indicate language (*Ger.* 28. 3) and dialect (*Agr.* 11. 3). In Quintilian, amongst other meanings, *sermo* and *lingua* are both used to refer to dialects (*Inst.* 11. 2. 50; 12. 10. 34). While the words Curtius chooses have ambiguous meanings, his context clearly indicates that he is referring to dialectical differences and not to distinct languages. It is interesting that neither Alexander, nor Philotas, were concerned about the ability of the majority of Macedonians to comprehend “*eadem lingua*.” Alexander had addressed the assembled army in Attic without complaint. Philotas makes it clear that it was the non-Macedonians who were more likely not to understand “*sermo patrius*” than the Macedonians not comprehending “*eadem lingua*.” However, Philotas does not say that he will use “*eadem lingua*” so that he will be understood only by those non Macedonians present, but by the majority of the army, including, apparently, the Macedonians. He will speak in Attic so that these others “*facilius percepturos*” his comments. The implication, then, is that Macedonian speech was not incomprehensible to non-Macedonians, just on occasion difficult to understand (on the preponderance of archaeological evidence for Macedonian speech being Greek, see Hatzopoulos 1999: 225–239; Engels 2010: 94–5).

The most likely explanation for the situation surrounding Philotas’ trial is that Attic Greek was routinely used when officers addressed the army as a whole. With the forces accompanying Xenophon, it is apparent that any number of dialects were readily understood by the assembled Greeks. In the case of the combined force under Alexander’s command, Attic was the common dialect most clearly understood by the variety of Greek speakers in the army. Alexander in his comments on Philotas’ use of Attic has simply taken advantage of that officer’s choice of speech to emphasize his aloofness, his distance from the rank-and-file Macedonian soldiers. Many common soldiers came from the more inland and far less urbanized areas of Upper Macedonia. When Alexander crossed to Asia, of his five Macedonian infantry divisions three were from Orestis, Lyncestis, Elimiotis, and Tymphaea, cantons of Upper Macedonia (Diod. 17. 57. 2). Philotas had commanded the Companion cavalry, and not one

49 Curt. 6. 7. 16, 19, 20, 8. 11, 12, 11. 12; 7. 1. 21; 8. 2. 7, 4. 27, 5, 14, 21; 9. 1. 5.

50 While Curtius’ dates are debated, the consensus is that he wrote in the early Roman imperial period (Syme 1987: 111; Baynham 1998: 201; Atkinson 1980: 19–57; 1994: 26–8; Heckel 1994: 67; Devine 1979: 142–59).

of the infantry divisions.⁵¹ He is one of those specifically listed by Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander* (40), as “having grown luxurious and vulgar in their extravagant living.” Curtius (6. 8. 3, 11. 3–4) also emphasizes his elaborate lifestyle and the arrogance he especially displayed towards the “*rustici homines*.”

That soldiers might be offended, if addressed in anything other than their “rude *patois*,”⁵² may also be responsible for another text often used to argue for a distinct Macedonian language. PSI XII. 1284, a papyrus fragment from Arrian’s *History of the Successors* (see Chapter 1), records that a Macedonian named Xennias, “a man of Macedonian φωνή,” was dispatched by Eumenes to address a group of Macedonians. Eumenes was attempting to subvert the troops recently brought from Macedonia by Craterus after the latter’s defeat and death. The dispatch of Xennias likely represents Eumenes’ concern that his ambassador be as closely identified with these newly arrived troops as possible, i. e. a “*rusticus homo*.” In any case, nothing here would indicate the exact nature of this speech.⁵³ Other passages relating to “Macedonian speech” are even more ambiguous. Alexander summoned his hypaspists in “Macedonian” during the incident that resulted in the death of Cleitus (Plut. *Alex.* 51. 11); Eumenes was greeted by his Macedonians in “Macedonian” (Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5); many kings of the Ptolemaic dynasty had given up their “Macedonian speech” (Plut. *Ant.* 27. 4); Attic speakers had adopted Macedonian idioms (Athen. 3. 122A). Despite the apparent unique features of Macedonian speech, the evidence points to it being a dialect of Greek.⁵⁴

Supporting “Macedonian” as a dialect of Greek and not a separate language is the inscriptional evidence from Macedonia itself. These inscriptions are all in Greek, a number of variations in spellings and the appearance of words of non-Greek origin notwithstanding.⁵⁵ Of the roughly 6300 inscriptions

51 Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 1; 3. 11. 8; Diod. 17. 17. 4, 57. 1; Curt. 4. 13. 26; 6. 9. 26.

52 One possibility for the “Macedonian” language suggested by Borza (1990: 92).

53 See Kapetanopoulos 1993:13–30. This author not only points out that nothing in the phrasing necessarily indicates a Macedonian language, but simply that his speech was in “the Macedonian fashion” (*ibid.* 14, 19), and that “a Macedonian man in speech” could mean simply a “Macedonian” (*ibid.* 16–17, 19). With less conviction, Kapetanopoulos states that the passage may imply that Xennias was not a native Macedonian, but, nonetheless, well versed in the Macedonian dialect (*ibid.* 13–14, 25–26).

54 So, Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 46–7), Kalléris 1988: 1: 288; Kapetanopoulos (1999: 117–28), Brixhe (1999), Anson 2004B: 190–231; 2009C; 2010: 20; O’Neil (2006), Panayotou (2007). Borza (1990: 92–5) and Hinge (2007: 68) do not believe the evidence is such to establish a convincing argument one way or the other.

55 See those collected in Demitsas 1980; Hatzopoulos 1996: vol. 2. Neither of these collections is by any means complete. The former is dated; the latter limited by the author’s

recovered within the confines of ancient Macedonia, approximately 99 per cent are written in Greek (Panayotou 2007: 436), and no Macedonian coin has yet been discovered whose legend, where there is one, is not in Greek. Grave stelai from Vergina, dated by Manolis Andronicus (1984: 83–5) to the second half of the fourth century BC, not only reveal that the majority of the names derive from Greek roots, with only one clearly of Thracian origin, but all are recorded in Greek. Andronicus also notes that the patronymics also reflect Greek roots, therefore, demonstrating that this use of “Greek” names, or simply those derived from Greek roots, was present at least from the first half of the fourth century (*ibid.* 84). While J.N. Kalléris (1988: 1:66–277) lists 153 words as peculiarly Macedonian, he emphasizes that they are in the vast majority etymologically Greek.⁵⁶ Given that Macedonia was regularly invaded and continuously surrounded by various tribal, non-Greek, speaking peoples, it is likely that the Greek of Macedonia would be replete with words and expressions of non-Greek origin. What is then surprising is that so few collected by the lexicographers are not of Greek origin (Kalléris 1988: 1:281). As with so much of the culture of Macedonia, the evidence would suggest a multifaceted society of a great many variations, but with the major influence, both culturally and linguistically, being Greek.

The exact nature of this Macedonian dialect can only be guessed. Nicholas Hammond’s suggestion (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 2:48–9) that it may have been a form of Aeolic, while certainly not incontestable,⁵⁷ is a definite possibility.⁵⁸ Hellanicus (*FGrH* 4 F-74), citing the priestesses of Hera in Argos, declared the Macedonians to be the descendants of Aeolus. Claiming such descent for the Macedonians would apparently serve no particular Argive interest. The Argives were according to Greek tradition Dorians (Paus. 2. 37. 3; 4. 5. 1–2; 7. 1. 5, 7),⁵⁹ and, as noted, there was a tradition that the Dorians had spent

intent to present public documents. It is also the case that all inscriptions from Epirus are also in Greek (Meyer 2013: 136–65).

56 “Sur les 153 mots étudiés, il n’y en a que deux ou trois dont la racine puisse être considérée comme non grecque de façon plus ou moins certaine” (Kalléris 1988: 1: 278). Of the 153, 31 are military terms and twelve are Macedonian months.

57 Borza (1990: 92) finds his argument unconvincing. Dubois (1995: 190–7) regards “Macedonian” as a northwestern Greek dialect.

58 Hammond (1994: 135–6) postulates that Lower Macedonia and Upper Macedonia actually spoke two different dialects of Greek. It is credible that the more urbanized areas of Lower Macedonia spoke a Greek more clearly understood by their southern neighbors, but it is unlikely that the two dialects were as diverse as Hammond postulates (see Bosworth 1996: 25–6, for a critical examination of Hammond’s evidence).

59 The Argives also spoke a form of Doric (Palmer 1996: 76–7).

time in Macedonia (Hdts. 1. 56. 3). The association of the Macedonians and Aeolus may have been based on what the priestesses knew of the Macedonian dialect (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 48). Certain of the words deemed to be “Macedonian” do show Aeolic qualities (Hoffmann 1974; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 48–9).

That dialectical differences within a common language may lead to practical incomprehensibility among speakers of what in essence is the same language, is not surprising. A roughly analogous situation exists in present day China, one basic written language, but regional dialectical differences distinct to the point of interregional incomprehensibility. Even Mandarin, the dialect spoken by the vast majority of Chinese, has four widely recognized variations. In a different context, Morpurgo Davies (1987): 21 n.4) relates how, while a native speaker of Italian, she “cannot read Sicilian or Milanese, two Italian dialects, without the help of a translation.”

While Greeks and Macedonians living in the 5th and into the 4th centuries thought themselves distinct peoples, the many cultural similarities are striking. Macedonians practiced the same basic Hellenic religion (Edson 1970: 39; Borza 1990: 95; Christesen and Murray 2010: 428–9, 443), and, as noted, the Macedonian kings were regarded as the descendants of an Argive royal exile. What truly separated the Macedonians from most of the Greek world was their politics. Macedonia was a monarchy, not a city-state, and before Philip II, not a very urbanized land either. In the *poleis*, citizens were sovereign. They made the laws. For Greeks, one of the keys to their culture was *eleutheria* (freedom). The *polis* and *eleutheria* were seen as interconnected. In the words of Jean Jacques Rousseau: “Self-imposed law is liberty” (Watkins 1986: 20). The Greeks would also have agreed (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1253A) with the French philosopher that “the larger the state, the less the liberty” (Watkins 1986: 62). Macedonia under Philip II and Alexander III would fail on both accounts. The people did not make the laws and the states were extensive. Put another way, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3. 2. 13) emphasizes that Greeks bow only to the gods. For Xenophon (*Anab.* 1. 9. 29; 2. 5. 38), even Cyrus, the brother of the Persian king and the pretender to the throne, was unless victorious, but a slave. With Philip’s urbanization efforts coupled with Macedonia’s political prominence, the distinction between cities in Macedonia under the overall authority of kings, but mostly autonomous in their daily affairs, and Greek cities, ostensibly autonomous, but often also in the age of Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochs, under the real authority of kings, became blurred.

The many cultural affinities between the Macedonians and the “Greeks” would certainly help explain the confusion over the “ethnicity” of the Macedonians exhibited in our sources, and hence, their tangential attachment

to the Hellenic genealogy. The character of the Macedonian government (cf. Isoc. 5. 107–108) and the rural/tribal nature of much of this region would suggest to many Greeks that the Macedonians could not be true Hellenes, despite their many cultural affinities. Certainly in the fourth century many “Greek” politicians found it useful in their attempts to rally support against growing Macedonian power to proclaim all Macedonians as barbarians.

The Molossians, apparently also because of their rural, tribal, monarchical society, were not seen as Greeks, even though they were by myth associated with Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles and the slayer of Priam,⁶⁰ who came to rule the Molossians after the Trojan War (Paus. 1. 11. 1; 2. 23. 6). Thucydides (2. 80. 5) includes them amongst the barbarians, along with the other two major Epirote tribal groups, the Chaonians and the Thesprotians.⁶¹ Yet, the evidence points to the Molossians, at least, as speaking a form of Greek (Hammond 1967: 423, 525–6; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 45; Borza 1990: 78). Here again the inscriptions are in Greek (Meyer 2013: 136–65).

Another people in many ways like the Macedonians and the Molossians, but whose “Greekness” was only occasionally questioned, were the Aetolians. By one tradition, the Aetolians were not the descendants of Hellen, but descended from Endymion, the grandson of Zeus and Protogeneia, a daughter of Deucalion (Paus. 5. 1. 4). Pausanias (5. 1. 4) relates, however, that “others with greater probability” traced Aetolian descent from Hellen through the female line. The link is made through Asterodia, the great granddaughter of Hellen (Apollod. 1. 7. 3; Paus. 5. 1. 4), whose marriage to Endymion produced Aetolus ([Hes.] *Catalogue of Women* Fr. 10[a]. 58–63) and Epeius, the ancestor of the Eleans (Paus. 5. 1. 4). The Aetolians are recorded as having sent ships to Troy (Hom. *Il.* 2. 638), and are according to myth closely related to the Eleans, a people whose “Greekness” was never questioned (Hdts. 8. 73. 2; Paus. 5. 1. 3–4, 18. 6; 8. 49. 7). But, Euripides (*Phoen.* 138) implies that the Aetolians were “half-barbarians,” and Thucydides (2. 68. 5) states that most of the Aetolian tribe of the Amphilochians, at least, were barbarians. As late as the second century BC, Polybius (18. 5. 8), ostensibly quoting Philip V, states that most of the Aetolians were not Greeks. Specifically he mentions the Agraeans, the Apodotians, and the Amphilochians as barbarians. While certainly not the most reliable of sources, given that this information is delivered in the form of a speech, Polybius is likely having Philip repeat a prejudice shared by many others. In

60 Paus. 4. 17. 4; 10. 26. 4, 27. 2; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3. 13. 8; E. 5. 10; Str. 7. 7. 8.

61 Their status along with that of the Thesprotians, Cassopaeians, Amphilochians, and the Athamanes, as barbarians did not change even by the early Roman imperial period (Str. 7. 7. 1).

part, any confusion regarding the ethnicity of the Aetolians is explained by the expansion of Aetolia over the centuries (Woodhouse 1973: 55–87). Those peoples, added to the Aetolian *“ethnos”* over time, on the whole benefitted from the Homeric tradition respecting the Aetolians. Homer only mentions five Aetolian cities, and all of these are near the coast, bounded on the east by Acarnania and on the west by Western Locris.⁶² In the 5th century, neither the Amphilochians, nor the Agraeans, were associated with the Aetolians, and, as noted earlier, Thucydides did not regard the majority of the Amphilochians as Greeks. While certain peoples inhabiting the region of 5th and 4th century Aetolia might not have been regarded as “Greeks,” it is clear that throughout their history the Aetolians, in general, were so counted (Thuc. 1. 5. 3). Later, in the period after Alexander III’s death, the Aetolians were a major “Greek” force in the Lamian War against Macedonian authority.⁶³ It is interesting to note, however, that the first attested Aetolian Olympic victor appears only in 240 BC (Moretti 1957: 139 [#568]).

Part of the reluctance of some to accept the Aetolians as fully Greek relates to their political organization. The Aetolians have been described as “the best example known of a Greek tribal state” (Larsen 1968: 78). It is difficult to know the exact nature of Aetolian unity in the 5th century or earlier, but their level of cooperation surprised the Athenian Demosthenes and led to the failure of his expedition into Aetolia in 426 BC (Thuc. 3. 94–8). Thucydides (3. 96. 3) points out that all the Aetolians united to resist this invasion, “even the most remote Ophionians, Bomiensians, and Calliensians.” Earlier the Aetolians collectively had sent three ambassadors to Corinth and Sparta. These three representatives are identified as coming from the three main Aetolian tribes, the Ophionians, the Eurytians, and the Apodotians (Thuc. 3. 100. 1). While the importance of the tribal divisions was in some sense maintained,⁶⁴ by the mid-fourth century at the latest the Aetolians had created a sympolity, a league.⁶⁵ Aetolia, like Macedonia, was not an area of city-states in the 5th and early 4th centuries, but rather a land of “unwalled villages” (Thuc. 3. 94. 4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 14).

62 For the location of these cities, see Woodhouse 1973: 115–41, with map on p. 53.

63 The war had begun soon after the news of Alexander’s death reached Greece (Diod. 18. 8. 17; 9. 1), and the Aetolians had been the first to join the alliance against Macedon sponsored by the Athenians (Diod. 18. 11. 1, 13. 3).

64 After the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, the Aetolians had sent ambassadors, “according to tribe (ἔθνη),” to Alexander to ask to be forgiven for revolting from his authority (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 10. 2).

65 This was in existence at least by 367, when an Athenian decree mentions the “κοινόν” of the Aetolians (GHI 2:110 [#137, ll. 9, 19]).

What is clear from the evidence is that this ambiguous ethnic relationship between the Macedonians and their southern neighbors was evolving over time.⁶⁶ By the second century BC, Macedonians and “Greeks” saw themselves and each other as Greeks (Adams 1996: 220–2). Polybius, in particular, no friend of Macedonia, associates Macedonians and Greeks.⁶⁷ This is also the evidence of the Olympic Games. Following Alexander I, the only Macedonian participants down to the reign of Alexander the Great were royal.⁶⁸ Philip II is the recorded winner of three Olympic competitions, the horse race in 356 (Moretti 1957: 123 [#434]), the *tethrippon* in 352 (Moretti 1957: 124 [#439]), and the *synoris* in 348 (Moretti 1957: 124 [#445]). But in 328, Kliton, the winner of the *stadion*, is listed as from Macedonia, as is Lampos, the winner of the *tethrippon* in 304, and five other non-royal Macedonians are recorded as victors in the third century BC.⁶⁹ While it might appear obvious that what led to this change was the campaign of Alexander the Great and the subsequent creation of many new “Hellenic” colonies in the East, the actions of Alexander’s father may have been equally responsible for this transformation.

Prior to Philip, the term Macedonian had not achieved a national status (Anson 2013A: 14–15). It is even questionable when the appellation Macedonia came to be generally applied to the great plain formed by the Axios and the Haliacmon Rivers and its surrounding plateau (Borza 1990: 99). Certainly by the 5th century Herodotus and Thucydides both speak of the plain as Lower, and the plateau, as Upper Macedonia.⁷⁰ In any case, the region of Upper Macedonia was only permanently joined to Lower Macedonia during the reign of Philip II (Dell 1963: 62–99; 1970: 115–26; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 14–31, 650–6). Prior to this time the Orestians, Lyncestians, Tymphaeans, and Elimeians had their own separate governments (Thuc. 2. 99. 2). During these

66 A point strongly emphasized by Lindsay Adams (1996: 205–22).

67 Polyb. 5. 104. 1; 7. 9. 3, 5, 7; 9. 37. 7; 38. 3. 8 cf. Livy 31. 29. 15; Str. 10. 2. 23. Even certain Thracian tribes became disassociated from the category of “barbarian.” Polybius refers on a number of occasions to the “Thracians and the barbarians” (23. 8. 3–4; 10. 4). However, the Odrysians, the Bessi, and the Dentheleti, retained their status as “barbarians” (Polyb. 23. 8. 4; cf. Str. 7. 7. 1), as did most of Macedonia’s northern and western neighbors (Polyb. 7. 11. 5; cf. Str. 7. 7. 1). Asians were still regarded as barbarians (Polyb. 10. 30. 2, 31. 2, 48. 8), as were Gauls (Polyb. 9. 30. 3, 35. 1, 2), and Romans (Polyb. 11. 5. 7; 18. 22. 8; cf. Livy 31. 29. 15).

68 Solinus (9. 16) records that Archelaus competed at Olympia and also at Delphi. He is listed as the winner of the *tethrippon* in 408 BC (see Moretti 1957: 110–11 [#349]), however, his participation is rejected by both Badian (1982: 35, 46 n. 16) and Borza (1990: 174), but accepted by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 150).

69 Moretti 1957: 127 (#463), 132 (#498), 134 (#527), 135, (#533), 136 (#543, #549), 137 (#552).

70 Hdts. 7.173. 1; 8. 137. 1; Thuc. 2. 99. 1–3; cf. Str. 7. frg. 12, 7. 8; 9. 5. 3, 17; Paus. 1. 13. 2.

centuries preceding unification, the leaders of the various upland Macedonians were often at odds with their lowland cousins. In the late 420s, Arrhabaeus, the king of Lyncestis, was openly hostile to the "Macedonian" kings (Borza 1990: 150–1, 163–4), and earlier in 432, Derdas I, king of Elimeia, had allied himself with the Athenians and a pretender to the Macedonian throne (Thuc. 1. 57. 3). Derdas II ruled an independent Elimeia, allied with the Spartans, in 382 (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 38).

By one tradition the original Macedonians were a group of related tribes, part of whom moved from the western mountains down into the central plain during the period from ca. 650 to 550.⁷¹ However, it was also claimed that the tribes that came to inhabit Upper Macedonia were not Macedonian at all, but Epirote.⁷² When the "Macedonian" tribes moved into the coastal plain most of those encountered were expelled from their lands and replaced by Macedonian settlers.⁷³ These included the Pierians, Bottiaeans, Edonians, Almopians, Crestonians, and Bisaltians (Thuc. 2. 99. 2–5).⁷⁴ But over the years many others migrated to Macedonia, coming from southern Greece, Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace, and elsewhere. From at least the time of Alexander I, migration of Greeks from the south to Macedonia had been encouraged. Even though many of these refugees came as communities, they are not found subsequently as distinct entities in Macedonia.⁷⁵ When Mycenae was destroyed

71 Thuc. 2. 99. 1–3; cf. Thuc. 4. 83. 1; see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 56–64; Borza 1990: 87.

72 Strabo (7. 7. 8–9; 9. 5. 11) is the source for this tradition of the Epirote ethnicity of the tribes of Upper Macedonia, but Hammond believes that this material ultimately derives from Hecataeus (Hammond and Griffith 1972: 439; 1979: 63). For Hammond, these tribes became Macedonians "in the political sense" by the time of the Peloponnesian War. However, Thucydides (2. 99. 1–3) clearly saw these groups as Macedonians in an ethnic sense. For Thucydides is making a contrast between these groups as being "Macedonians," yet often having separate rulers.

73 Early to mid 7th century BC (Borza 1990: 84; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 4).

74 With respect to the Bisaltians, and most likely the Crestonians as well, the nature of this conquest is ambiguous. They may have already migrated from Bisaltia and Crestonia into the northern mountains to escape Xerxes' advance into Greece (Hdts. 8. 116. 1). Alexander I then would have moved into evacuated territory. Even though according to Herodotus the Bisaltians fled north, where they maintained their independence into the reign of Perseus (Livy 44. 45. 8; 45. 29. 7, 30. 3), many Bisaltians and Crestonians are later found living in Chalcidice (Thuc. 4. 109. 4), suggesting that the evacuations and expulsions related to the Persians and to the campaign of Alexander I were not as complete as indicated by the sources with many of these peoples, perhaps, remaining in their original homelands.

75 Hammond (1995: 126 n. 20) argues on the basis of Thuc. 4. 124. 1, "Perdiccas meanwhile marched...to Lyncus...[leading] a force of Macedonians,...and a body of Hellenic hoplites domiciled in that country," that these Greeks migrants maintained their identity.

by Argos, over half the population came to Macedonia on Alexander I's invitation (Paus. 7. 25. 6).⁷⁶ Similarly in 446, when Pericles captured Histiaea on Euboea, the inhabitants took refuge in Macedonia (*FGrH* 115 F-387). As people coming from *poleis*, it is likely that they were associated with Macedonian urban populations.

Additionally, many Greek cities along the coast became part of the kingdom during Philip II's reign (Diod. 16. 8. 2–3).⁷⁷ While Methone was razed to the ground and its land distributed viritane to "Macedonian" settlers (Diod. 16. 34. 5; Just. 7. 6. 14–16; cf. Dem. 4. 35),⁷⁸ much of the population of Amphipolis remained and was incorporated into the new "Macedonian" community (Diod. 16. 8. 2). This was apparently also the case with Pydna.⁷⁹ With Philip, conquered cities frequently would be refounded with the incorporation of Macedonians, or with settlers from surrounding areas, into the existing population (Dem. 18. 182). Justin notes that Philip II even augmented city populations with prisoners of war (Just. 6. 8. 1). The clearest documented example of a refounded city is that of the Thasian colony of Crenides (Diod. 16. 3. 7). Philip captured the city in 356, and refounded it as Philippi (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 358; Anson 2013A: 63, 65). Its acquisition is mentioned without a hint of a siege or the expulsion of any of its citizens, but it is noted that Philip increased its population (Diod. 16. 8. 6). Philip is also recorded as dramatically augmenting the population of his capital city, Pella (Str. 7. frg. 20). Philip II's urbanization policies transformed a part of Macedonia at least from its overwhelmingly rural nature (Anson 2008A: 17–30; 2013A: 62–71). This point is emphasized in a speech attributed to his son Alexander by Arrian (*Anab.* 7. 9. 2), in which that commander states, "Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing sheepskins and grazing a few sheep . . . he made you dwellers in cities." While the speech may be questioned from a number a perspectives, evidence does support a less dramatic view of the effect of Philip's actions.

Gomme (1969: 612), however, rightly sees these "Hellenic hoplites," referred to by Thucydides, as coming from the then independent Greek coastal cities, such as Pydna.

76 Others went to Cleonae and Ceryneia (Paus. 7. 25. 6–7).

77 The relationship between the coastal cities and the Macedonian kings was complicated. Pydna, at least, had been part of the Macedonian king's domains during the first half of the 5th century (Thuc. 1. 137. 1; Plut. *Them.* 25–26).

78 See Griffiths 1965: 135, and Papazoglou 1988: 105–106.

79 See the evidence collected by Griffith (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 356–7). Pydna is described during the reign of Perseus as a city of numerous nationalities (Livy 44. 45. 6). Pydna had been taken by king Archelaus and refounded two and half miles inland (Diod. 13. 49. 1–2).

The question becomes what was the status of all these different peoples settled in traditional Macedonia? It appears clear that those transported from their homelands and settled with “Macedonians” in Macedonia, became Macedonians. Inscriptional evidence provides no evidence of differentiation. Individuals are most often listed simply by their name, or by their name and patronymic; sometimes by their name, patronymic, and by their city, occasionally by name, patronymic, and by the ethnic “Macedonian”; and less often by name and Macedonian ethnic only (Gabbert 1988: 10–11; Hatzopoulos 1996: 2: *passim*). As concluded by J. Gabbert with respect to Antigonid Macedonia (1988: 11), “[there is] no way to explain it as indicative of different classes of citizenship. The various usages may have no significance. All individuals may equally be Macedonian subjects and the variety of the language employed an example of human diversity.” Koen Goudriaan (1988: 14, 119) in his analysis of ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt concludes that the presence of ethnic categorizations in surviving inscriptions was most often simply the result of an attempt to identify clearly individuals and implied no special citizenship or status. This is apparently the case in the Macedonia of Philip and Alexander as well. The evidence strongly suggests that the common citizenry in Philip II’s urban foundations enjoyed complete equality, with no distinction being drawn between the new and old citizens (Hatzopoulos 1996: 1:182). Even though Upper Macedonia was only fully unified with Lower Macedonia by Philip II, these areas remained united down to the dismemberment of Macedonia by the Romans in 167 BC. In this entire period there is only one claimed revolt of a former Upper Macedonian kingdom (Polb. 18. 47. 6) and that contested revolt came in 197 BC, one-and-a-half centuries after its annexation by Philip (Anson 2013A: 68). Hatzopoulos (1996: 1: 103) calls the revolt “a pious fiction invented by the Romans.”

The distinction that did exist in the ranks of non aristocratic Macedonians was not one of ethnicity of origin, but rather of economic and social status. While many Macedonians received land from the king, many more retained the serf-like status that had typified Macedonia before the reign of Philip II (Ellis 1976: 58–9; Billows 1995: 9–11; Anson 2008A: 17–30). Through a combination of land distribution and urbanization, Philip broke these ties. Alexander claimed that Philip had brought the Macedonians “down from the hills to the plains” (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 5. 2), and the evidence, sparse though it may be, is suggestive that Philip, for many, did exactly that. Those receiving king’s land became independent of their dependency on neighboring landlords and given their obligation to serve the king militarily, their status became that of *pezhetairoi*, infantry companions of the king (Chapters 2 and 8; Anson 2013A: 66–71). After the battle on the Granicus, and probably as a general practice with regard to

war casualties,⁸⁰ Alexander remitted for the families of the Macedonian dead all property taxes and personal liabilities (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 5; cf. Diod. 17. 21. 6). Helmut Berve (1973: 1:307) and Miltiades Hatzopoulos (1996: 1: 437) have pointed out that the remission of tax indicated that the dead and their families held royal land. The practice of granting land in return for military service was certainly a common practice in the Hellenistic period (Billows 1995: 146–69), and it was obviously common practice in Philip's and Alexander's Macedonia as well (Anson 2008A: 17–30; 2013A: 67–71).

While the rank-and-file infantry as king's companions did not typically eat, drink, hunt, etc. with the king, like their aristocratic counterparts, the expansion of the concept was designed to cement these soldiers personally to their monarch. It was through these policies of land distribution and companionship that Philip created a Macedonian nation. Those who received land and were considered so attached to the king now had a stake in the kingdom and in the perpetuation of the monarchy as the guarantor of their new status (Anson 2008A: 23–5; 2013A: 67–71).

As with the *pezhetairoi*, so with the king's *hetairoi*, Philip and Alexander pursued a similar policy of equality without regard to ethnic origin (Badian 1982: 39). In the reign of Alexander the Great, roughly ten per cent of his *hetairoi* were originally from Greek poleis.⁸¹ Foreign *hetairoi* would be given large tracts of land by the king (cf. Athen. 6. 261A), as were numbers of their Macedonian counterparts (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3–6; cf. Diod. 16. 34. 5; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 9. 2). For example, Leonnatus, son of Anteas, is described in Nearchus' list of the trierarchs for the Indian fleet as a Macedonian from Pella (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3), but he was a member of the Lyncestian royal house (Heckel 2006: 147 [#2]). Philip granted all of the land north of Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7. 39; cf. 7. 44; Dem. 8. 64). Nearchus, Alexander's fleet commander from Crete, and Laomedon, the Mytilenian, are listed as Macedonians from Amphipolis (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4). Eumenes, the royal secretary, was, however, listed as a Cardian Greek, despite his long service with the Macedonian court, his *hetairos* status, and his likely acquisition of a large estate in Macedonia. Clearly in the case of the former Nearchus and Laomedon, they were more closely identified either by their contemporaries or by subsequent historians with their new homes than with their homelands. Eumenes himself emphasized his Cardian birth and it was clearly picked up by historians, and in particular by Hieronymus, a Cardian himself. There is nothing to suggest that these "Greeks" enjoyed different offi-

80 At Opis, Alexander, referring to those who had died on the long campaign, states that "their parents have been freed from all services and taxes" (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 10. 4).

81 Twenty-seven have no listed residence; see Stagakis 1962: 79–87.

cial statuses within Macedonia. What existed socially as noted, could be very different, with a prejudice against those not from Macedonia originally by those from long-standing Macedonian aristocratic families.

Certain peoples were conquered by the Macedonian kings, but never listed as Macedonians. The Paeonians were made subject to Philip II and to his son Alexander,⁸² but were brigaded separately as foreign (“βαρβαροι”) troops in Alexander’s army (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 7. 5; cf. 1. 14. 1).⁸³ Of course, this begs the question, what does it mean to be a “Macedonian” as opposed to a Paeonian? Royal control differed little whether the locality considered itself “Macedonian” or otherwise. Polybius (4. 76. 2) remarks with respect to Thessaly, “although the Thessalians were supposedly governed constitutionally and dealt with more favorably, they were actually treated the same way as the Macedonians, obeying all of the orders from the kings’ agents.” Philip II imposed a tithe on conquered Thracians (Diod. 16. 71. 2), and Philip V had his possessions in Thrace supervised by a governor (Polyb. 22. 13. 3). Demosthenes referring to Philip II’s acquisition of various Greek cities, states that “in the cities he overthrows the constitution, putting a garrison in them, others he razes it to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery, others he colonizes with barbarians instead of Greeks” (Dem. 18. 182). Given the evidence of Amphipolis, this is an exaggeration, but non Greeks were clearly added to many of these populations, and kings readily settled members of their *hetairoi* in or near these cities.⁸⁴ However, in the case of Paeonia, the region retained its kingship and issued a separate coinage, its king a dependent ally of Philip’s and Alexander’s.⁸⁵ Clearly, the peoples of the traditional lands of Upper and Lower Macedonia perceived of themselves as ethnically Macedonians and were incorporated into the newly formed state as “Macedonians,” along with those coming from outside traditional Macedonia but settled within the generally recognized borders of Macedonia. The regions of Paeonia, Illyria, Thrace, and others, conquered by the Macedonian monarchs and their armies were seen as ethnically distinct both by themselves and by their conquerors. However, as shown, the power of the monarchy was as all inclusive in Paeonia as it was anywhere in Macedonia.

82 Diod. 16. 1. 5, 4. 2, 22. 3; 17. 8. 1; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 5. 1.

83 The Paeonians had by tradition sent aid to Troy (Hom. *Il.* 2. 845); Pliny 4. 17. 2 lists the Eordians as Paeonians.

84 Philip V likewise gave tracts of land associated with his cities to his *hetairoi* (Polyb. 22. 13. 5).

85 See Merker 1965: 44. Later, during the reign of the Antigonid dynasty, a “praetor” is mentioned in Paeonia (Liv. 40. 21. 9, 23. 2).

During Philip's and Alexander's reigns large numbers of people were their *hetairoi* and their *pezhetairoi*. These individuals enjoyed a status quite different from that of those who remained as serfs, bound to their local aristocrat. These holders of king's land became Macedonia's "citizen soldiers" (Diod. 18. 12. 2). While ethnic ascription continued both to describe geographic residence or origin, status in Macedonia was conferred by the king and cemented with land.

“A Greek among Macedonians”

If Philip and Alexander's kingdom was ultimately composed of royal landholders and locally self-governing communities, in which lived mixed populations, and where regionalism was virtually non-existent, and nationalism prior to Philip not discernible; where status was ultimately bestowed by the king, and the basic culture and language were Greek, then, in what sense could Eumenes be an object of discrimination? Further, Eumenes enjoyed a position of prominence as head of the imperial chancellery, the nerve center of the growing domains under the control of the Macedonian monarchs. Eumenes was also one of both Philip's and Alexander's *hetairoi* (Chapter 2, Stagakis 1970: 98 n. 40). After Alexander's death, Eumenes became a satrap, a confidant of the regent Perdiccas, and ultimately royal general in Asia. He commanded sizable numbers of Macedonian troops beginning with his appointment as general in Asia Minor by Perdiccas in 320. Yet, Eumenes is recorded as personally referring to his handicap as a “Greek” (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1; cf. Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3–4; Nepos. *Eum.* 7. 1–2). and modern scholars often refer to the long-standing hostility of Macedonians and Greeks towards one another (Badian 1982: 36–43; Borza 1990: 96, 280). As direct evidence for Macedonian hostility towards Greeks during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, few passages, however, can be cited.

Curtius (8. 1. 24) mentions a “*seditio*” arising among the “Macedonian soldiers” and the “Greek mercenaries” in which Philip was injured, and was only saved by Alexander's direct intervention. But the cause of the conflict is nowhere stated, and no other source even confirms this incident.¹ Certainly between native troops and mercenaries any number of reasons for disagreement

1 Curtius' account occurs during his telling of the Cleitus episode, in which he presents numerous differences from what is found in Arrian and Plutarch. Indeed, the related events leading to the death of Cleitus are nowhere the same. Curtius (8. 1. 22–52) states that the quarrel began at a “*convivio*,” where Alexander belittled the achievements of his father and Parmenio, and Cleitus reproached Alexander for among other things the death of Attalus. In Arrian (*Anab.* 4. 8. 2–6), the incident is connected to a sacrifice to the Dioscuri during which various of Alexander's courtiers express the opinion that Alexander was greater than Castor, Pollux, or even Heracles. Here, it is Cleitus who brings up Philip, declaring that Alexander owed a lot to his father. To this the courtiers respond, but not Alexander. Plutarch (*Alex.* 50) reports the sacrifice to the Dioscuri, but also relates an interrupted sacrifice being performed by Cleitus. Here the cause of initial complaint was a song composed to ridicule the generals who had recently been defeated in Sogdiana (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 4. 5. 2–9; 6. 1–2; Curt. 8. 1. 35).

might have arisen, not to exclude ethnic differences. Arrian (*Anab.* 2. 10. 7) in his description of the battle of Issus relates how between the Greek mercenaries serving Persia and the Macedonians there developed a Greek-Macedonian rivalry.² However, the first explanation for the severity of the fighting offered by Arrian is that the Greeks were attempting to salvage a victory and the Macedonians did not want their reputation for invincibility tarnished (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 10. 5–6). In the case of the latter, it would appear that the “Macedonian” troops were far more concerned with their military reputation than with any ethnic hostility. Besides, certain Greeks participated fully in the Macedonian victory. The Thessalian and Peloponnesian cavalries, in particular, fought well holding back the Persian left wing (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 8. 1, 11. 2; Curt. 3. 11. 14; Diod. 17. 33. 6).³ While they nowhere appear in any author’s account of the fighting in any of Alexander’s three great battles against the Persians, there were 7000 allied Greek hoplites included in the force that crossed to Asia with Alexander (Diod. 17. 17. 3). Alexander may not have wanted to test their loyalty, but it is more likely that they simply have been omitted from our surviving accounts.⁴ Prior to the battle of Issus, Alexander had not only singled out Macedonian commanders for encouragement, but also “mercenaries who were conspicuous for their rank or some excellence” (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 10. 2; Curt. 3. 10. 8).

Given that a sizable number of the Greek mercenaries in Persian employ had probably been exiled from their cities as a direct result of Philip’s and Alexander’s campaigns, there was probably considerable hostility between these Greeks and Alexander’s forces. On the Granicus, Thessalians, Athenians, and Thebans were among those captured.⁵ For Philip’s former troops these

2 Diodorus (17. 33. 2–34.9) makes no mention of this rivalry or of the role of the Greek mercenaries in the battle.

3 These cavalry units had also acquitted themselves well on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 3, 16. 1–2; Diod. 17. 19. 6, 21. 4, cf. 17. 33. 2), and at Gaugamela (Diod. 17. 57. 3–4; Curt. 4. 13. 29, 16. 1–7; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 11. 10).

4 Neither Arrian, nor any other source provides an exhaustive review of troop dispositions for any of the battles. The only two references to specific “Greek” infantry units, albeit mercenary, with Alexander’s forces occur in the description of the battle at Gaugamela. “Those called the old mercenaries” are found on the right wing (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 12. 2; these are, perhaps, veterans of service with Philip, see Parke 1933: 188), and on the left the “Achaean mercenaries” (Diod. 17. 57. 4; cf. Parke 1933: 190).

5 Alexander apparently freed immediately the Thebans he captured, but sent to Macedonia to perform hard labor the surrendered Thessalians and Athenians (Plut. *Mor.* 181B; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 29. 5; 3. 6. 2). After Issus, Alexander discovered prominent Athenians and Spartans in the Persian camp (Curt. 3. 13. 15).

battles against Greek mercenaries in Asia may have been seen as continuations of Chaeronea,⁶ or, following their king's own propaganda, they may have perceived the Persian campaign as a war of Greeks against barbarians, and any Greek fighting on the Persian side as a traitor to all Greeks (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 6–7, 27. 5–6). With respect to the crusade against Persia, Macedonians are on occasion included as Greeks. After his victory on the Granicus, Alexander, along with the offering to Athena that he sent to Athens, included the inscription, "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, these spoils from the barbarians of Asia" (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 7).

One of the most often cited examples of hostility between Greeks and Macedonians comes from the accounts of the combat between the Athenian Dioxippus and the Macedonian Corragus in 326/5 (Diod. 17. 100. 2–101. 2; Curt. 9. 7. 16–23). Corragus, emboldened by drink, during one of Alexander's famous "banquets," had challenged the professional Olympic pancratist, Dioxippus, to single combat.⁷ A time was fixed and the contest was held before the entire army. While Diodorus reports that the Macedonians supported Corragus, and the Greeks, Dioxippus (17. 100. 4), Curtius states that the "majority of the soldiers, including the Greeks," supported the Athenian (9. 7. 19). It should be noted that most of these Greeks were again mercenaries; the Greek allies having been sent home or enlisted as mercenaries in 330 (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6). The Athenian's victory dismayed the Macedonians and was hailed by the Greeks (Diod. 17. 101. 2; Curt. 9. 7. 23). There is disagreement over whether the text refers to Dioxippus' supporters in an emendation as ὁμόφωνοι, common speakers, as opposed to ὁμόφυνοι, the same kind or race (Bosworth 2006: 420). If the former, then a distinction is being made based on speech, which certainly would suggest that the dialect was distinctive. Yet, as noted in the previous chapter Macedonians readily understood "Greek," and while Alexander wanted his *Epigoni* educated in Macedonian battle tactics, he wanted them to learn "Greek" as well (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 3). In either case the clear distinction being made is between the Macedonian regulars and the Greek mercenaries. On closer examination, it is apparent that Dioxippus by his victory especially incurred the wrath of Alexander's "friends" and "all the Macedonians associated with the court," who were jealous of Dioxippus' accomplishment and plotted to destroy him (Diod. 17. 101. 3–4). Alexander, in particular, was upset that the Persians had witnessed this defeat of a vaunted Macedonian (Curt.

6 Alexander before the battle at Issus encouraged his Macedonian troops by reminding them of their victory over the Athenians and Boeotians, of their destruction of Thebes, and of their triumph on the Granicus (Curt. 3. 10. 7).

7 Dioxippus won the *pancratation* in 336 (Moretti 1957: 125–6 [#458]).

9. 7. 23). That the “Greeks” would rejoice at the victory is not surprising. As noted, many had been defeated by the Macedonian king, and while they now served him, they still felt the stings of the defeats at his hands of their cities, or in certain cases of themselves personally. There was also the distinction of being mercenaries. However, Dioxippus’ victory apparently had no lasting effect on the Macedonian soldiers who witnessed the contest. While Curtius states that the Macedonians were saddened by the defeat of their compatriot (9. 7. 23), Diodorus notes the crowd’s (πλήθος) general enthusiasm over the skill and speed of the Athenian’s victory (17. 101. 1). Clearly most of the rank-and-file, whether “Greek” or “Macedonian” appreciated the victor’s skill.

Other incidents offered to demonstrate the racial antagonism between the Greeks and Macedonians likewise offer but poor evidence. Even in the struggle that resulted in Philip’s victory at Chaeronea, only the Athenians, Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Phocians actively joined the “Greek” side (Dem. 18. 237; Paus. 10. 3. 3; *GHI* 2:231–2 [#178]), the Thessalians, Messenians, and Eleans allied themselves with Philip (Paus. 4. 28. 2; 5. 4. 9), while the Arcadians, Argives, and Spartans, among others, remained neutral (Dem 18. 64; 19. 261; Paus. 8. 6. 2). A similar situation arose in the Lamian War. While the coalition here was larger than that which had fought against Philip at Chaeronea, there were still notable exceptions (Diod. 18. 9. 4–11. 3; Hyp. 6. 13; Paus. 1. 25. 4). The Arcadians and Spartans again remained neutral (Paus. 8. 6. 2), and the Euboeans and Boeotians actively joined the Macedonians (Hyp. 6. 11; Paus. 1. 25. 4). The actions of the latter are especially instructive with respect to the full implications of Greek ethnicity. The Boeotians sided with the Macedonians, because they feared the Athenians would found a colony on the former site of Thebes (Paus. 1. 25. 4). They preferred Macedonian suzerainty to the mere possibility of Athenian domination. Moreover, the war, it was claimed, was fought not out of hatred for the Macedonians, but rather for “freedom” (Hyp. 6. 10, 11, 13, 16). Even Demosthenes rarely attacked the Macedonians as a people, but rather turned his hostility against their king.⁸ The Macedonians are only denigrated by Demosthenes on three occasions (17. 20, 22, 26).

Other claims of Greek-Macedonian hostility come from incidents involving Alexander’s Greek colonists in Asia. As noted in Chapter 3, on two occasions “Greeks” from the upper satrapies chose to leave their new homes and attempt

8 Dem. 1. 7, 12; 2. 5, 9; 3. 1–2, 14, 16, 20; 4. 4–5; 6. 1, 6; 7. 10; 8. 31, 43, 46, 55, 56; 9. 1, 6, 65, 71, 72; 10. 2, 10, 15, 19, 49, 57, 58, 62, 68; 11. 5, 10; 15. 24; 18. 31, 48, 63, 66, 68, 90, 93, 144, 158, 163, 164, 181, 200, 231, 235, 300; 19. 9, 10, 30, 50, 53, 56, 62, 77, 79, 92, 156, 300, 302, 338; 23. 116, 121; cf. Aes. 1. 67; 2. 14, 58, 79; 3. 54, 66, 73.

to return to Greece. In 326/5, while Alexander was recovering from a wound, 3000 "Greeks," who had been settled in Bactria and Sogdiana, "revolted from the Macedonians" and began to march home (Diod. 17. 99. 5; Curt. 9. 7. 1–11).⁹ Ethnic hostility is nowhere mentioned as the cause for the rebellion, only the desire to return to Greece is offered. Curtius (9. 7. 1) even states that the revolt did not arise because of hostility toward Alexander. While Diodorus describes the action as a revolt against the Macedonians, he further emphasizes that their discontent was with their new homes amongst "barbarians," i. e. Bactrians and Sogdians (Diod. 17. 99. 5). Curtius presents the insurrection as a complicated affair. In his account, the revolt begins as a disagreement among the colonists themselves over returning to Greece, in which there were many Greek casualties (9. 7. 1–9). Greeks even from the same city-state were at odds with one another (Curt. 9. 7. 3–4).¹⁰ Moreover, many of these colonists had been separated from the army by Alexander because of their insubordination (Just. 12. 5. 13). While little is known of the origins of these "Greek" mercenaries, it is probable that they were troops acquired from the defeat of the Persians, and, perhaps, even from the defeated forces of Agis and Sparta as well, and incorporated into Alexander's army (Holt 1988: 78–9). For the upcoming campaigns, Alexander would want to keep with him troops who had proven their loyalty. Justin's reference to malcontents and the strong possibility that Alexander was settling many of his former Greek adversaries in this region would certainly help explain the revolt. This was also a difficult region to pacify, as shown by the rebellion that occurred in 329, which saw the massacre of many of the Graeco-Macedonian settlers (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 1. 4–5; Curt. 7. 6. 13–15).

The other cited incident involving a revolt of "Greeks" left in Alexander's eastern Asian foundations occurs after Alexander's death in 323 (Diod. 18. 7). Once again the location is the upper satrapies and the cause of the insurrection is the longing to return to Greece. The desire of the Greeks is again understandable; stuck in the middle of nowhere, they missed "their old manner of life" (Diod. 18. 7. 1), and Alexander was dead and the future of his empire in doubt. As in the earlier uprising, there is no indication of pent up antagonism towards the Macedonians. Indeed, these settlements probably contained small

9 Schober 1981: 27–32; Holt 1988: 84–5.

10 According to Diodorus (17. 99. 6) these Greeks were massacred after Alexander's death, but it is clear that Diodorus is associating this insurrection with the revolt in 323 (Diod. 18. 4. 7; 7. 1–2), for Curtius (9. 7. 11) records that they did eventually return to Greece (accepted by Hammond [Hammond and Walbank 1988: 84]). However, Holt (1988: 85 and n. 143) accepts Diodorus' testimony and sees a linkage between this massacre and the later rebellion.

numbers of Macedonians.¹¹ What is remarkable is the large number of those who joined this revolt, given that at least 3000 settlers from this general area had already withdrawn in the earlier uprising. Diodorus (18. 7. 2) reports that this rebel force amounted to 20000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. While Diodorus emphasizes the military nature of these individuals, many may have been former camp followers who had been part of the original settlements and were equally discontented with their situation (Diod. 17. 83. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 23; Arr. *Anab.* 3.28. 4). In this second revolt, Perdiccas, the new regent, decided to stop their march and make an example of the participants (Diod. 18. 7. 3–4). The rebels were defeated by a mixed force of 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry from the ranks of Perdiccas' Macedonians, and 10000 infantry and 8000 horsemen supplied by the satraps of the upper satrapies, all under the command of the regent's lieutenant, Pithon (Diod. 18. 7. 3). The troops from the upper satrapies were likely a mix of Asiatics and Greeks, with the vast majority being Asiatic.¹² While Diodorus (18. 7. 8–9) states that all the Greek rebels were executed after their surrender by the Macedonians, this was not done as the result of ethnic animosity.¹³ Even though, according to Diodorus, Perdiccas had given

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- 11 Justin does not identify the ethnicity of the malcontents, and the repeated references to soldiers “unfit for service” (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 22. 5; 7. 24. 7), suggests that others than Greeks were included. That the revolts are called “Greek” would not be evidence for the absence of other groups, since the majority of those left in these colonies were former Greek mercenaries.
- 12 No source gives the ethnic or regional breakdown of these troops. One indication of the nature of the forces under the command of the satraps of the upper provinces, comes from a listing of the forces brought by Peucestas when he joined Eumenes' forces in 316. Peucestas brought 3000 infantry “of every nationality,” 600 Greek and Thracian cavalry, and more than 400 Persian horsemen (Diod. 19. 14. 5). Included in his infantry force was probably a contingent of Greek mercenaries, but how many can only be guessed. In 316, Eumenes joined with the satraps of the upper provinces, and, after the amalgamation of their respective forces, had a total force of 35000 infantry. Of these, 6000 were Greek mercenaries with, perhaps, others contained in 5000 troops with Macedonian equipment “of all races (*ethnê*)” (Diod. 19. 27. 6). Little more than 3000 were Macedonians, the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 28. 1). Most of these Greek mercenaries were those Eumenes had recruited prior to his march to the upper satrapies. Eumenes had enlisted 10000 Greek mercenaries in Cilicia (Diod. 18. 61. 5).
- 13 Schober (1981: 35–6, and n. 2) and Holt (1988: 88–90) believe that the number of the slain in the massacre is an exaggeration. They argue that there was likely a round up of leaders for execution, but not a wholesale slaughter. While undoubtedly numbers of rebels fled the battle without bothering to surrender, and others died fighting and in the subsequent flight, those who did surrender were executed. The text is very clear. Additionally, the so-called prologue to Trogus' Book Thirteen, states that all the rebels were killed by Pithon.

the order because he did not trust Pithon, the more likely explanation is that he wanted to prevent any further risings against the authority of the central government.¹⁴ Perdiccas was noted for violent reprisals for what he saw as insubordination. After the brief conflict between the cavalry and infantry in Babylon, he had executed the ringleaders (Curt. 10. 9. 18; Diod. 18. 4. 7–8). As noted in Chapter 1, Perdiccas is described in the sources as "murderous" (Diod. 18. 33. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 2. 3; Just. 13. 8. 2). The Macedonians carried out the order, over Pithon's supposed objections, in order to gain the Greeks' possessions (Diod. 18. 7. 9). Perdiccas had promised them the right to the rebels' belongings (Diod. 18. 7. 5). Whether killed in battle, in flight, or in the massacre, there apparently was not a great number of Greek mercenaries left in the eastern satrapies afterwards. This may have been an additional motive for the massacre. With his control of the royal army Perdiccas did not need additional troops, and was probably reluctant to leave so many discontented mercenaries available for employment by others.

Modern historians are divided in their estimations of the loyalty of the Greek mercenaries in Macedonian employ. These troops are on the one hand described as trustworthy (Griffith 1975: 15–16, 26), but on the other as troublesome and disloyal (Holt 1981: 78). There may, indeed, be no contradiction in these seemingly conflicting opinions. Many of these mercenaries had come

The actual number killed was likely thousands more than the 3000 suggested by both Schober and Holt.

- 14 Diodorus' claim that the order to kill the rebels was the result of the regent's distrust of the commander to whom he had given the assignment to crush this rebellion is doubtful. Why would Perdiccas assign to an officer that he did not trust such a sizable force and such an important command? Schober (1981: 33 n. 2), and Hammond and Griffith (1988:117) suggest that Pithon was chosen for the command by an army "assembly" and not by the regent. Diodorus' unemended text makes this a possibility, but the entire context has the regent making the decisions. It is Perdiccas who determines to stop the movement of the Greeks west; it is Perdiccas who chooses the method of selection of the troops for this campaign; it is Perdiccas who decides to execute the rebels. It would be peculiar to leave all decisions to Perdiccas except the selection of the commander. It makes greater sense to emend the passage to bring it into correspondence with the general thrust of the citation. The most likely explanation for Pithon's selection is that at the time Perdiccas was unaware of his ambitions. This claimed desire on his part to become "ruler of the upper satrapies" (Diod. 18. 7. 4) appears to foreshadow his actual attempt to realize this goal in 317 (Diod. 19. 14. 1–2). Pithon from 320 on was Eumenes' enemy. Hieronymus may here be attempting to blacken Pithon's memory still further, by showing that his infidelity was a character trait (see Holt 1988: 90 n. 12). It is also possible that Hieronymus heard later rumors about Pithon's early ambitions. In any case, it is clear that the origin of this charge is Hieronymus.

to Asia with Alexander and had proven their loyalty (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6; cf. 6. 13. 5). Arrian (*Anab.* 5. 27. 4–5, 8) has Coenus on the Hyphasis speak of the shared sufferings of the Greeks and Macedonians. While this speech undoubtedly owes much to the rhetorical embellishments of Arrian himself, it probably reflects a contemporary and eyewitness source, Ptolemy, son of Lagus (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 28. 4).¹⁵ In the conflict between the infantry and the cavalry after Alexander's death, Pasas, the Thessalian; Damis,¹⁶ the Megalopolitan; and Perilaus, of unknown origin, but likely also Greek (Heckel 2006: 203 [#1]; contra: Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 199), served as the negotiators for the infantry in the discussions with the cavalry (Curt. 10. 8. 15). Damis was a veteran of Alexander's campaigns and later conducted the defense of Megalopolis during Polyperchon's siege in 318 (Diod. 18. 71. 2). All three negotiators were likely commanders of mercenaries (see Chapter 3). The presence of these negotiators indicates that many Greek mercenaries had joined their Macedonian counterparts and been involved in the initial rioting that followed Alexander's death. Mercenaries coming to the expedition under different circumstances would be understandably less loyal. Ethnicity was a factor, but not in the sense of Greeks versus Macedonians. Those mercenaries, who had resisted Philip and later Alexander, either in Greece or in Asia, would view the Macedonians as paymasters, for they had no other, but would nurture no love for them. During the period of the Successors even the distinction between Macedonians and mercenaries had become blurred. In 320, Craterus had 20000 infantry, "mostly Macedonian" (Diod. 18. 30. 5), and Eumenes' phalanx was composed of "men of many races" (Diod. 18. 30. 4). Prior to the battle of Paraetacene, Antigonos' army included 8000 Macedonians and 8000 mixed troops in Macedonian equipment (Diod. 19. 29. 3), and at Gabene, Eumenes had in his phalanx "5000 men of many races (*ethnê*) armed with Macedonian equipment" (Diod. 19. 27. 6).¹⁷ All troops, whether officially mercenaries or Macedonians, as shown previously were concerned with their pay.

15 Arrian in the preface to his *Anabasis* (pref. 1; cf. 6. 2. 4) states that his history is primarily based on the works of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and wherever he is using a different source, he so indicates as "λεγόμενα" (pref. 3). No such indication appears for Coenus' speech.

16 The text reads Amissus, but see Heckel 1992: 148 n. 454; 2006: 102 [#1].

17 R.A. Lock (1974) 134–7) argues that Philip and Alexander routinely added "Greeks" to their infantry units; Philip from the populations of newly acquired territories, Alexander from his mercenaries, and that there was little evidence of hostility amongst these troops. While the integration of Greek and Macedonian infantry is apparent in the immediate period following Alexander's death, unfortunately, there is little evidence that such

What is surprising is how few incidents can even be suggested as showing ethnic hostility between Greeks and Macedonians. More incidents can be produced for the hostility of the Arcadians and the Achaeans towards the other Greek participants in the aftermath of Cyrus's expedition of 401 (Xen. *Anab.* 6. 2. 4–12, 16; 7. 6. 8–10). *Poleis* on the Greek mainland, formerly free, but now having to follow Macedonian foreign policy would continue to trouble the Macedonians, but Greek cities on the islands and in Asia most often readily joined Alexander. Given the scarcity of evidence for animosity between the Macedonians and the Greeks, it is interesting to note the abundance of testimony for Macedonian hostility towards Asians. At Opis in 324, in response to Alexander's announcement to the assembled army that he was discharging most of his Macedonian veterans, many soldiers voiced their pent up frustrations with Alexander's policies respecting his new Persian subjects. The troops were indignant over Alexander's adoption of Persian dress, the outfitting of a Persian unit in Macedonian equipment, and the incorporation of Persians in the elite companion cavalry. They also believed that they were to be replaced by Asians and the permanent seat of the empire was to be established in Asia.¹⁸ In the conclave that followed Alexander's death, the Macedonian soldiers had shown hostility towards all nominees for the succession put forward who were of partial Asian ancestry (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 13–14). The candidacy of Alexander's three or four-year old son, Heracles had been rejected by the soldiers with a clashing of spears on shields (Curt. 10. 6. 10–12), and the proposal that a final decision await the birth of Alexander's child by his Sogdian wife Roxane was likewise rejected (Curt. 10. 6. 9; Just. 13. 2. 5).¹⁹ In the civil strife that followed this meeting, it was not only the cavalry who opposed the infantry, but the Asian troops, who numbered over 50000, were also arrayed against them.²⁰ While the sources only speak of Macedonian anger at the increasing

amalgamation took place during Alexander's lifetime. It is, however, likely, given how rapidly such integration occurred after his death.

18 Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1–2; Plut. *Alex.* 71; Curt. 10. 2. 8–12; in Babylon, Asiatic troops were incorporated into Macedonian units (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 1).

19 Subsequently, Roxane did give birth to a son who became Alexander IV and ruled in a joint monarchy with his father's half-brother, Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 6. 9; Just. 13. 2. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8; see Chapter 3).

20 In 330, 2600 Lydian infantry had joined Alexander's forces (Curt. 6. 6. 35). At Susa in 324, 30000 Iranians were added (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 6. 1; Diod. 17. 108. 1; Plut. *Alex.* 71), and an additional Persian force of 20000, plus large numbers of Cossaeans and Tapurians were brought to Babylon in 323 by Peucestas (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 1–4; Diod. 17. 110. 2). While it is not definitely stated that these troops joined the cavalry and withdrew from Babylon, all indications suggest that they must have done so. The 20000 Persians were under the

Persianization of Alexander's court and the incorporation of Asian forces in Alexander's army (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 2–3, 11. 1, 3), the Greek mercenaries certainly shared their views. While many Greeks had long served in Persian armies, they had always done so in exclusively Greek units, and while on occasion formally under a Persian commander, their actual captains were Greek officers, usually their recruiters. At the siege of Perinthus, the Persian mercenary contingent was commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian (Paus. 1. 29. 10); Memnon of Rhodes commanded the mercenaries against Philip's advance force in Asia in 336 (Polyaen. 5. 44. 4; Diod. 17. 9. 10); at Issus, the Greek mercenaries in Persian employ were under the command of Thymondas of Rhodes (Curt. 3. 9. 2); at Gaugamela, the Greeks were led by Paron of Phocis and Glaucus of Aetolia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 2; cf. 3. 11. 7). The apparent exception to the rule was the Persian Omars' command of the Greek mercenaries on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 3; Diod. 17. 19. 6), instead of their previous commander Memnon. In any case, Omars was only in overall command, the individual units were in all probability under Greek officers, as was the case with the 10000 (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 7. 1; 2. 2. 3–5).²¹ Unfortunately, there is little material treating the attitudes of the common Greek mercenary in Persian employ other than Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Yet, here the general feeling of ethnic superiority is clear (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 5, 7. 3; 2. 6. 26–31), echoing the words of Euripides, "Hellenes should rule barbarians, but not barbarians Hellenes, those being slaves, while these are free" (*IA*, 1400). Certain fourth-century Greeks speak of the "natural and hereditary hatred" between Greeks and barbarians (Isoc. 4. 157, 184; 12. 163; Pl. *Rep.* 470C; Dem. 19. 312).

Alexander's limited use of Greeks in the administration of his empire is also seen as reflective of a general hostility towards Greeks by Macedonians (Badian 1982: 39). This bias then assured that after Alexander's death only native Macedonians would succeed to his legacy. In truth, neither group was as monolithic as the dichotomy implies and the relationship between those native to Macedonia and those from the Greek *poleis* was strongly influenced by internal class and political divisions. It is generally taken as a given that Philip did not use Greek officers to command troops; only six individuals, all Macedonians, are directly identified as leading the king's forces during his reign. While this is hardly conclusive evidence for the exclusive use of Macedonians

command of the noble Peucestas and had only recently arrived. Further, the hostility demonstrated by the Macedonians at Opis towards Asian troops (Curt. 10. 2. 12–4. 3; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1–11. 9; Diod. 17. 109. 1–3; Just. 12. 11. 1–12. 12; Plut. *Alex.* 71) would tell against their active cooperation with the Asians during this crisis.

21 In general, see Parke 1933: 23–43, 105–13, 165–70, 177–85.

as battalion commanders, the army that Alexander led to Asia, still very much the army of his father, likewise had a dearth of non-Macedonian commanders.

Later in his expedition Alexander did employ Greeks as military leaders. Erigyius, a Mytilenian (Diod. 17. 57. 3), commanded the allied cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6, 11. 10; cf. Diod. 17. 17. 4), and occasionally, infantry allies and mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 3; 3. 6. 6, 28. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 2–3);²² Nearchus, a native of the island of Crete (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 10; Diod. 19. 69. 1; Polyæn. 5. 35), commanded light infantry (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 30. 5–6) and the fleet (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 2. 3; *Ind.* 18. 10); Eumenes was a commander of the Companions, the aristocratic cavalry of Macedonia (see Chapter 2). While Erigyius had commanded allied cavalry and non-Macedonian infantry, and Nearchus had led light-armed troops in India, the commands of Macedonian infantry were all held during Alexander's reign by native Macedonian aristocrats. Of the fifty-two persons listed as satraps in Alexander's reign, only three were indisputably Greeks, and none of these was a mainland Greek. Nearchus was governor of Lycia and Pamphylia (Arr. 3. 6. 6; Just. 13. 4. 15), Stasanor, governor of Aria and Drangiana (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 29. 5), and Cleomenes, governor of Arabia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 4), and probably Egypt (see Seibert 1969: 43–4, 50). Greek *hetairoi* were apparently limited to responsibilities at the royal court, or, in the military sphere, mostly to the command of non-Macedonian units. The great exception was, of course, Eumenes. The policy of regional recruitment and command changed dramatically during Alexander's long campaign in Asia, when commanders were often reassigned without regard to regional origin. The further Alexander moved both actually and conceptually from Macedonia the less he relied on the old-line Macedonian aristocracy. Few Greeks, however, benefitted from the changes brought with Alexander's conquests. This was the result of a combination of factors. Alexander's army was until the victory at Gaugamela still primarily the traditional Macedonian levy with Macedonian aristocratic officers. Alexander's army of invasion included relatively few Greek military commanders, and in 330, when the allied contingents of the League of Corinth were dismissed, most of these returned to Greece (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6). Few accompanying Greek *hetairoi* had military expertise, nor was this their traditional role in Macedonia. Of the 834 persons listed in Helmut Berve's *Das Alexanderreich* (1973: vol. 2), only 149 Greeks are associated with Alexander's train. Of these, 69 are court figures not associated with administration in any capacity. They include philosophers, actors, athletes, etc. Only 53 are directly associated with the military, 22 of whom are connected with the forces of the Greek allies

22 Curtius (8. 2. 40) refers to Erigyius as "inter claros duces" at his death in 328/7.

dismissed in 330, 14 others held naval appointments.²³ Eumenes of Cardia is the single Greek who commanded a Macedonian unit during Alexander's reign. Traditionally in Macedonia the aristocratic Macedonians served in this military capacity, which only really began to change with Alexander.

The limited use of Greeks was then not the result of prejudice on the part of the Macedonian monarchs. While Alexander only employed Greeks in a limited manner in his administration, he was restricted in their use by his need to assuage the native nobility.²⁴ As noted, the military structure of the army that Alexander inherited from his father was the traditional one of Macedonia, i.e. with the exception of the hypaspists, the king's personal guard, and while the regular infantry, the *pezhetairoi*, were the king's "companions," these infantry units were recruited territorially and most often placed under the command of local, albeit loyal, aristocrats (Milns 1976: 101, 103–4). This was a situation not unlike that seen in the recruiting of mercenary forces. In 401 BC, the Persian Cyrus's "Greek" forces were made up of units under the command of their Greek recruiters (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 9–2. 1). Alexander was bent on conquest, he had no intention of Hellenizing the East. He would use the resources available for his purpose without taking any risk for the sake of broader aims. As so many scholars have now demonstrated, Alexander pursued no sweeping ideals (Badian 1958): 425–44; Bosworth 1980: 1–21; Borza 1991: 21–5; Anson 2013A: 121–2, 188).

What is most curious concerning the entire argument for Macedonian prejudice against Greeks is that the career of Eumenes of Cardia is its centerpiece. I would turn this argument around and say that Eumenes is the proof that such an all-encompassing prejudice did not exist. In Alexander's lifetime, Eumenes was appointed as commander of Perdiccas' former hipparchy of the elite Companion Cavalry, when that officer was promoted Chiliarch (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). In 323, he was assigned the satrapy of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia;²⁵ in 320, this satrapy was extended to include general supervision of all of Asia Minor.²⁶ In 320, having defeated the forces of the Macedonian aristocrat, Neoptolemus, that commander's Macedonians readily enrolled for service with Eumenes (Diod. 18. 29. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 27). While the Macedonians in Egypt after the regent Perdiccas' assass-

23 These data were collected by Gene Borza (1991: 21–5).

24 As Borza (1990: 238–9) points out, while the king's power was unrestrained by constitutional restrictions, he was limited by the presence of potential rivals within his family and especially by the power of the nobility.

25 Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3; Just. 13. 4. 16; see Chapter 3.

26 Diod. 18. 29. 1–3; Just. 13. 6. 14–15; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2; see Chapter 4.

sination sentenced Eumenes to death, they also condemned other prominent and very Macedonian supporters of the former leader. Moreover, Eumenes' own Macedonian troops in Asia Minor were incensed by the actions of the forces in Egypt and voted him a personal bodyguard (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9–10). These same troops also ignored the offers from prominent Macedonian commanders of a substantial reward for Eumenes' murder (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11). Eumenes was later offered a share in the Macedonian regency for Alexander's heirs (Diod. 18. 57. 3), and he did become "royal general" in Asia (Diod. 18. 58. 1; Chapter 5). Eumenes was certainly different from the majority of Alexander's commanders in his success. Very few native Macedonian aristocrats acquired the positions and powers that Eumenes achieved. In the final analysis, this Greek came very close to dominating all of Alexander's Asian conquests.

In one respect, however, Eumenes was very different from his native Macedonian noble colleagues and opponents. His position in Macedonia had been dictated entirely by his relationship to the king. He was one of the king's *hetairoi*. While Eumenes was certainly one of Philip's *hetairoi* (See Chapter 2, Stagakis 1970: 98 n. 40), his administrative position at court, as opposed to a military or a purely advisory one, limited his prestige among the other companions. These aristocrats preferred their relationship with the king to be entirely personal, akin to familial relations, and their services to him to be primarily military and only secondarily administrative. Eumenes did not possess hereditary lands and the family powers which went with such possession (Müller 2003: 17–50; cf. Lacey 1968: 25–32, 47–8, 53–68). He had come to Macedonia as an exile from his home city (see Chapter 2). The residual power of the family in Macedonian society was strong; the blood-feud was still in evidence in the late fourth century (Curt. 6. 11. 20; cf. Diod. 19. 51). Antigonus Monophthalmus made extensive use of his extended family (Wheatley 1999: 4; Anson 2014A: 143–4, *passim*). Even though many of these Upper Macedonian nobles were given land in Lower Macedonia by Philip (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4), these men still retained strong ties to their previous domains,²⁷ and while Philip had given land to many common Macedonians living in these Macedonian cantons assuring their loyalty to the monarchy (see Anson 2008A: 17–30; 2013A: 66–71), still many would have retained their traditional ties to the local aristocracy. Eumenes had been given land in Lower Macedonia by Philip, but that monarch could not manufacture blood ties for him. Moreover, many of these native-born nobles were related to each other and to the royal family (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 14–22; Ellis 1976: 59–60). Marriage alliances

27 Perdiccas was from Orestis (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 5) and descended from the former kings of Orestis (Curt. 10. 7. 8).

between the royal family and the noble houses of Macedonia were frequent; at least, dating from the reign of Alexander I (Schol. Thuc. 1. 57. 3). These nobles were *hetairoi* because of their position and power; Greeks living in Macedonia became powerful in Macedonia because of their being made *hetairoi*. Consequently, even though Eumenes' position was one of great responsibility, it was not highly regarded by the Macedonian nobility (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; *Com. Ser. et Eum.* 1. 6). As noted, this prejudice against the position of secretary is echoed in the comments attributed to Neoptolemus, the one-time commander of the hypaspists, concerning Eumenes: "He (Neoptolemus) had followed the King with shield and spear, but Eumenes with pen and paper . . ." (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6).

Among the native Macedonian nobility there was clearly a sense of superiority over all others whatever their origin or position. In 320, the aristocratic Macedonian officers Neoptolemus and Alcetas, although ordered by Perdiccas to obey Eumenes, ignored the latter's commands (Diod. 18. 29. 2–4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2–4). Even though Neoptolemus is said to have been jealous of Eumenes, and Alcetas afraid that his Macedonians would not fight against Antipater, undoubtedly part of their reluctance was that Eumenes was not truly one of them. After Perdiccas' murder in Egypt, most of the Macedonian aristocratic followers of that commander fled to Alcetas, not to Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). In 319, Eumenes was unable to forge a coalition out of the very considerable forces still in Asia Minor loyal to the party of the former regent Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8–9). Subsequently, despite being the "royal general in Asia" he still suffered from the jealousy and rivalry of a new set of Macedonian aristocratic allies (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4–8; cf. Diod. 18. 60. 1–61. 3; 19. 15. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 2). Antigenes in 317 (Diod. 18. 62. 7), and Seleucus in 316, called Eumenes a foreigner (Diod. 19. 13. 1). Nor was it foreign-born *hetairoi* alone who were viewed as inferior by Macedonian aristocrats. Philotas, the son of Parmenio, had demonstrated his contempt for backward native-born Macedonians (Curt. 6. 11. 4).

In Macedonia, there was a clear class separation between the cavalry and the infantry. The cavalry was composed of those from upper class families and a few foreign *hetairoi* (FGrH 72 F-4; Curt. 10. 7. 20). To fight on foot, except in the most extreme of circumstances, was considered beneath these aristocrats. For killing a boar in the hunt before the king could take his opportunity, Alexander the Great punished the page Hermolaus by having the young man whipped in the presence of the other pages and additionally by having "his horse taken away" (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 2). In Amyntas' (son of Andromenes) defense of his involvement in a plot against the life of Alexander, he claimed that he retained his horses when ordered to give them up, because, if he had not, he would "have had to fight on foot" (Curt. 7. 1. 34).

While Eumenes' association with Alexander grew close during the years of campaigning, it had initially begun as a professional relationship. Many of Eumenes' younger contemporaries had entered the royal household as "pages." These young men attended the king, guarded him while he slept (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 1–2), and grew up with the royal prince (Heckel 1992: 238–44; Hammond 1980: 16; Anson 2013A: 58–61). In most cases, pages were the sons of the leading nobles of Macedonia, men such as the future army commanders Craterus, Perdikkas, Seleucus and Hephaestion (Heckel 1992: 237–84). However, pages could also be the sons of non-Macedonians. Philotas, the son of the Thracian Carsis, was one of Alexander's pages (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 4; Heckel 2006: 219 [#5]).²⁸ While pages could come from the ranks of prominent non-Macedonians, it is certain that Eumenes was not a page. First, he was "in his twentieth year" when he entered Philip's service (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 1; Chapter 2), older than the typical page, who was an adolescent (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 1). Second, the implication in the sources is that Eumenes left Cardia to become Philip's secretary (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4). Eumenes, therefore, entered the court as an adult and in the capacity of secretary. He did not share the same experiences or camaraderie as these pages, who later dominated the inner circle of Alexander's court. Eumenes was in a position similar to that of many native Macedonian nobles who were older and had not grown up with Alexander. Antigonos, for instance, the future satrap of Greater Phrygia, enjoyed a close relationship with Philip, but not with Alexander or that monarch's closest companions. Pierre Briant (1973: 25, 130–1) believes that Antigonos' lack of a close connection to Alexander was for him an almost insurmountable obstacle. Later, when Antigonos had reversed his earlier weakness, he removed from command those who had been close to Alexander (Diod. 19. 46. 2; 48. 5; 56. 1).

It should be noted, however, that much of the difficulty Eumenes faced was of his own creation. As Plutarch (*Ser. et Eum.* 2. 4) noted so many centuries ago, "if Eumenes had not contended for the primacy and been contented with a secondary position . . .," he would have survived. Part of the reason a united command of the surviving Perdikkans was not created during the winter of 320/319 was that Eumenes was not willing to relinquish the chief command to another (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8; see Chapter 5). While various Macedonian aristocrats may have resented serving the Cardian Greek, Eumenes apparently was unwilling to accept a position less than what he had held under Perdikkas. After Antigonos trapped him in Nora in the spring of 319, that commander, as seen, offered to release Eumenes as his subordinate, but Eumenes initially

28 Not to be confused with Philotas, the son of Parmenio (see Heckel 1992: 23–33, 295; 2006: 216–19 [#4]).

refused (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 2–11. 3). It was only when the siege grew prolonged, did he offer to serve the regent Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1), and finally in 318, he did agree to Antigonus' terms (Diod. 18. 50. 4; Chapter 5). This commander became less objectionable and service as a subordinate less humiliating when the circumstances absolutely demanded compromise. But, at the first opportunity to regain his independence, Eumenes deserted Antigonus in spite of his oath to serve him (Diod. 18. 53. 5).

Perhaps, the most surprising aspect of Eumenes' supposed ethnic handicap is that it may have been first mentioned by Eumenes himself. In the disturbance that broke out between the infantry and the cavalry after Alexander's death, Eumenes, unlike the other cavalry officers, stayed in Babylon and pretended to be neutral in the dispute, but in truth used his influence to undermine the infantry's support for Meleager (see Chapter 3). Eumenes verbally based his proclaimed neutrality on his Cardian birth: "It was not his business, since he was a foreigner, to meddle in disputes of Macedonians" (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1). Many other Greeks had no qualms about involving themselves in the quarrel over the succession. Nearchus had proposed to the assembled army that Heracles be recognized as Alexander's successor (Curt. 10. 6. 11). Moreover, after the conclusion of the conflict, other Greeks were awarded satrapies. Laomedon of Mytilene received Syria,²⁹ and Stasanor of Soli, Aria and Drangiana.³⁰ Eumenes' statement was an argument that was just plausible enough to permit him to maintain his supposed and very precarious neutrality. After all the leaders of the two opposing camps, Perdiccas and Meleager (Heckel 2006: 159 [#1]), were members of the native Macedonian aristocracy.

Eumenes' claim of inferiority was generally accepted by the native Macedonian nobility on the grounds that he did not share their birth. This point is made by Nepos, "neque aliud huic defuit quam generosa stirps" (*Eum.* 1. 2). The regular infantrymen were unconcerned with Eumenes' non Macedonian, aristocratic, bloodlines. He had been a close associate of both Philip and Alexander. The power of the Argead mystique for the Macedonian soldiers also accounts for Arrhidaeus' kingship, and for the attempts by many of the contenders for power after Alexander's death to marry his sister, Cleopatra.³¹

29 Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5, 1b. 2; *FGrH* 100 F-8.2; Diod. 18. 13. 10; Curt. 10. 10. 2.

30 Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 6; *FGrH* 100 F-8.6; Diod. 18. 13. 1; cf. Curt. 8. 3. 17.

31 Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5), Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1–3, 25. 3; Just. 13. 6. 4–7), Cassander, Lysimachus, Antigonus and Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 4), all sought her hand in marriage. Eumenes himself had appealed for her assistance in the immediate aftermath of Perdiccas' failed expedition to Egypt in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6; Just. 14. 1. 7–8).

Antigonus eventually had her murdered to prevent her union with his rival Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 5–6). Eumenes quickly realized the importance of tying himself to the former kings, Philip and Alexander, and to their family.

Eumenes, in fact, throughout his career was well-liked by his Macedonian troops.³² Indeed, as seen, prior to the battle of Gabene many of Eumenes' officers had decided that after defeating the enemy they would kill Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–3, 6; Anson 2014B: 99–109; Chapter 6), because of his popularity with the infantry (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1). They believed that after the battle a victorious Eumenes might no longer need them. On those occasions where Eumenes encountered hostility from his Macedonian forces, his Cardian birth was not the issue. Many Macedonians in 320 held him responsible for the death of the popular Craterus (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 7–8). At the time of his death, those Macedonians serving Antigonus saw him as the cause for their own misfortunes suffered at his hands in combat (Nepos *Eum.* 12. 2; Diod. 19. 44. 2). However, only once in Eumenes' entire career was his Cardian origin held up to ridicule by common soldiers, and then the circumstances minimize the significance of the taunt. It was the capture of Eumenes' baggage train during the battle of Gabene, that precipitated his surrender by the argyraspids to Antigonus (Diod. 19. 43. 8–9; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 11, 4. 1, 18; Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1). As Eumenes was being led away against the wishes of the majority of his forces, the argyraspids referred to him as "a pest from the Chersonese" (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1–2). For these troops the seizure of their "baggage," which included their families and the loot of a decade's service in Asia (Diod. 19. 43. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 6; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6–7, 10), resulted in Eumenes' surrender, not any ethnic animosity. The sources are very clear that the argyraspids' only concern was to reprieve their possessions and families (Diod. 19. 43. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 2; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13). With the armies long serving in Asia, their camp had become their home, and it was always an important component of every campaign, both to protect the camp (Diod. 19. 13. 4, 23. 4, 32. 1; Polyæn. 4. 6. 10), and as an incentive to encourage one's own troops with the hopes of capturing the enemy's possessions (Diod. 18. 7. 5, 9, 30. 2).

The importance of baggage is one of the many attributes of mercenaries. Even during Alexander's lifetime many of his Macedonians had shown certain mercenary characteristics. That monarch often in the latter stages of his campaign had to resort to promises of riches and booty and more personal appeals to keep his troops' loyalty (Curt. 9. 2. 27; Arr. *Anab.* 5. 26. 8; Diod. 17. 94. 1–3; cf. 104. 5–7). Earlier in his expedition Alexander had encouraged his troops in national terms: territories were not secure and further campaigns were neces-

32 Diod. 18. 59. 4, 63. 5; 19. 24. 3–5; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3, 4. 1, 4–5, 6. 1; Just. 14. 8. 5.

sary to complete the conquest (Curt. 3. 3; Plut. *Alex.* 47. 1–4; Just. 12. 3. 4). Even though no commander in this period was so harmed by the loss of baggage as was Eumenes, he was not the only leader to suffer difficulties because of it. In 306, Demetrius defeated the Ptolemaic general Menelaus and captured 3000 of his troops. As was customary, Demetrius enrolled the defeated into his own army, but these deserted back to their former commander, “because their baggage had been left behind in Egypt with Ptolemy” (Diod. 20. 47. 4).³³ After this same Demetrius had captured the belongings of 5000 Illyrian mercenaries, these troops’ commander Lysimachus had them executed for fear that they would mutiny to regain their possessions (Polyaen. 4. 12. 1). While a number of historians suggest that Eumenes was not sufficiently concerned with “baggage” and his camp (Schäfer 2002: 114–15; Roisman 2012: 167–8), it needs to be noted that this action came from the argyraspids, the other troops serving Eumenes did not support these callused veterans’ actions. Moreover, the camp was guarded (Diod. 19. 42. 4) and the dust obscured the operation (Diod. 19. 42. 2). Diodorus (19. 42. 2) states that Antigonus inaugurated this operation to achieve victory “without effort,” yet, Antigonus came very close to losing this battle.

Moreover, Eumenes’ problems with the argyraspids were not unique. These troops had a long history of insubordination and independent action. Justin (14. 2. 7) states that after Alexander they had little respect for any other leader. Their commander had participated in the murder of Perdiccas in Egypt and they themselves had been involved in the sedition at Triparadeisus in which the new regent Antipater was himself almost killed (Just. 14. 4. 11; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 35, 38). One mark of their unruliness is that after Triparadeisus they were separated from the rest of the royal army given to Antigonus and sent with Antigones to bring part of the royal treasure from Susa to Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38; Chapter 3). This was the case, even though Antigonus was to face considerable armies in Asia Minor still loyal to the Perdiccan cause. Despite their obvious military abilities they were seen as too dangerous to be incorporated into the royal army. Indeed, after their surrender of Eumenes, while absorbing most of that commander’s forces into his own army, Antigonus had no wish to invite the same difficulties the argyraspids had visited upon so many others. One of the commanders, Antigones, was put into a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19. 44. 1), 1000 of the most troublesome argyraspids were given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Anachrosia, who was commanded to see to their destruction, and the rest were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyaen. 4. 6. 15;

33 In 312 BC, Demetrius lost the city of Gaza because of his soldiers desire to save their possessions (Diod. 19. 84. 7–8)..

Diod. 19. 48. 3; see Chapter 6). Antigonus thereby dismantled the best fighting unit in the Western world, but also its most dangerous.

While Eumenes' enemies often attempted to subvert his troops, they seldom made reference to his foreign birth. Seleucus, in 316, did call on Eumenes' soldiers to cease preferring "a foreigner" (Diod. 19. 13. 1), but his request was ignored. Most often the troops were reminded that Eumenes and the other supporters of the former regent Perdiccas had been condemned by the troops in Egypt;³⁴ previous commanders of units within Eumenes' forces recalled for these soldiers their former loyalty;³⁵ threats were issued (Diod. 18. 63. 3), and bribes were frequently offered.³⁶ Of the various inducements to treachery, only the last enjoyed a measure of success. In the spring of 319, Eumenes' commander, Perdiccas, deserted with 3000 infantry and 500 cavalry (Diod. 18. 40. 2), and later during the course of the battle near Ornycia, Apollonides and his cavalry contingent deserted Eumenes (Diod. 18. 40. 5–8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3). While the cause of Perdiccas' treachery is unknown, in the case of Apollonides the desertion was the result of "great promises" (Diod. 18. 40. 5). Of course, the argyraspsids surrendered Eumenes to gain the return of their families and property, the ultimate bribe.

Besides the argyraspsids, difficulties controlling Macedonia's, long-standing, veteran soldiers were not unknown to other commanders. As seen, the army mutinied at Triparadeisus in 320, and later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 44–45). The overriding issue in both of these incidents, the unifying theme, was money (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 32; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). Moreover, in the winter of 320/319, 3000 Macedonians deserted Antigonus, and began to pillage the countryside of Lycaonia and Phrygia (Polyæn. 4. 6. 6). While they were later returned to Macedonia, this does not appear to have been their initial intention.

In these incidents, in addition to the concern for pay, it is interesting to note the influence of unit commanders over the troops under their authority. The Macedonian soldiers who deserted Antigonus, the "royal general in Asia," in the winter of 320/319, were more loyal to their immediate commander, Holcias, than to the royal general (cf. Polyæn. 4. 6. 6). The 3500 troops who deserted Eumenes readily followed Perdiccas, "one of Eumenes' distinguished commanders" (Diod. 18. 40. 2). When Eumenes recaptured the deserters, he put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18. 40. 4). This quality of giving greater loyalty to

34 Diod. 18. 62. 1, 4; 19. 12. 2, 5–13. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11, 10. 7–8; Just. 14. 1. 9–10.

35 Diod. 19. 12. 3; 13. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 27. 5; 4. 24. 3, 8–10, 29. 1–2; 5. 23. 7.

36 Diod. 18. 62. 3–4; 19. 25. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9–10.

a subordinate commander than to the overall leader is, like concern for remuneration, a basic characteristic of a mercenary army.³⁷ Prior to Triparadeisus, Alexander's former army was united and often acted with great uniformity; it was only with the break-up of this force that this particular mercenary quality appeared in full force. In Babylon, after the death of Alexander, in Asia Minor after the murder of Cynnane, and in Egypt during and after the Perdiccan invasion, the troops acted as a corporate entity, using individuals when it suited the army's interest and discarding them when those interests were no longer served. After Triparadeisus, the Macedonian core was divided amongst different commanders. While the bulk of the Macedonians were initially assigned to Antigonus for his campaign against the surviving Perdiccans, they were later in the main returned to Macedonia, the 3000 argyraspids were assigned to Antigenes (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 38), 1000 Macedonians went off with Arrhidaeus the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and there were probably other deletions as well (Anson 1991: 245–6 and n. 60). With this division the remaining units became increasingly more mercenary in their characteristics. Soldiers showed a predilection after defeat to enroll with the commander of the victorious army and to shun poor pay masters. The majority of Neoptolemus' defeated forces laid down their weapons and swore an oath to serve Eumenes and did (Diod. 18. 29. 5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6). Antigonus had acquired many of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18. 41. 4), and others from subsequent desertions (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Just. 14. 2. 3); he obtained the surrender of almost the entire army formerly led by Alcetas through negotiation and enrolled these units in his forces (Diod. 18. 45. 4).

The evidence then supports the existence of prejudice, but only as exhibited by the native Macedonian aristocracy. Moreover, this was not ethnic prejudice, but one of class. The lower classes of Macedonia apparently were not greatly motivated by ethnic or class considerations with respect to Greeks. The army, especially during Alexander's reign, proved itself loyal to the monarchy, and to those directly connected to the king. The common Macedonians supported Eumenes because of the confidence Alexander had shown in him, because of his perceived loyalty to Alexander's family, and because of his command abilities and his skill as a paymaster. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus the One-eyed, in 288, believed that his Macedonian troops, fighting on their home soil, would readily resist Epirote Pyrrhus, because he was both a "foreigner" and not directly connected to the great Alexander (Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 8). He was proven wrong. His troops deserted readily to Pyrrhus (Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 10). To

37 Parke 1933: 25–7; Briant 1973B: 54. For the increasing mercenary quality of Alexander's and his Successors' armies, see Anson 1991: 230–47.

put Eumenes' career into proper perspective, that is into a Greek context, it needs to be recalled that even after Xenophon's success in helping to organize the successful retreat from the heart of the Persian Empire, the Arcadians and the Achaeans refused to follow him further, because he was an Athenian (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 2. 10). Eumenes' Macedonian soldiers exhibited far less ethnic consciousness than that exhibited by the average Greek.

Eumenes' difficulties were not then ethnic in origin. Nationality, if anything, through Eumenes' consummate diplomatic skill, was turned to his advantage. Eumenes repeatedly claimed that his non-Macedonian birth denied him either the temptation, or the power to emulate Perdiccas' and Antigonus' ambitions. Seleucus, another possessed of acute political acumen, attempted to use Eumenes' own ploy against him, but Eumenes' commanders accepted it as limiting Eumenes and in no way demeaning themselves. Nationality had little to do with Eumenes' failure. Divided command and the skill of his principal opponent Antigonus were responsible for Eumenes' ultimate defeat. Judging from the prominence of the failure due to ethnicity theme in the surviving sources, its origin must have been Hieronymus. Eumenes' fellow countryman may have over time come to believe that Eumenes was doomed to failure from the beginning. Certainly, in the years following that commander's death, there had been a dearth of politically prominent Greeks. Hieronymus himself never achieved any high office. Those who did succeed were invariably Macedonian aristocrats. Hieronymus came to emphasize Eumenes' handicap as a Greek over Eumenes' skillful use of this theme. He also came to regard Eumenes' final stand with the forces of the kings as overshadowing any earlier dealings he may have had opposed to their best interests. These emphases presented a romantic picture that proved very attractive to later historians and biographers. Eumenes, however, was in the final analysis just another ambitious contender for power on the stage created by Alexander's death, and like Meleager, Craterus, Neoptolemus, Perdiccas, Alcetas, Attalus, Antigenes, and many others, he left the stage early; his failure due to ill luck, bad alliances, and one very capable opponent.

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Index

- Abydos 4, 84, 136, 259
 Acarnania (Acarnanians) 233, 234
 Achaea (Achaean) 24, 215, 223, 242, 244,
 249, 261
 Achaemenid 188, 210
 Achilles 48, 206, 232
 Acitus 5
 Adana 168
 Adea 4, 14, 100, 101
 Adea/Eurydice 101, 123
 Adriatic 23
 Aeacides xvi, 186, 211
 Aegae 100, 101, 102, 104
 Aegina 217
 Aemilius Paullus 24, 25
 Aeneas 48
 Aeolic (dialect) 230, 231
 Aeolis (Aeolians) 133, 214, 224, 230, 231
 Aeropus 59
 Aeschines 225
 Aeschylus 220
 Aetolia (Aetolians) xiv, xv, 95, 96, 97, 102,
 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 222, 232, 233, 250
 Aetolus 232
 Agatharchides 12, 26, 27
 Agathocles 9, 41, 44
 Agathon 87
Agema 117, 120, 192
 Agis 245
 Agora 45, 49, 238
 Agraeans 232, 233
 Alcetas xv, 5, 34, 59, 76, 78, 91, 93, 96, 97,
 98, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 111, 113, 115, 117,
 125, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 147,
 148, 149, 150, 165, 169, 175, 192, 254, 260,
 261
 Alexander, son of Polyperchon xvi
 Alexander I 45, 59, 225, 234, 235, 236, 254
 Alexander II 59
 Alexander III (Great) viii, 19, 22, 30, 47,
 50–51, 58, 75, 76, 78, 79, 85, 89
 Administration 45, 46, 74, 86–87, 88, 91,
 94, 99, 134, 143, 167, 209
 Colonies 70, 80, 174–175, 222, 244–245
 Death xiv, 39, 57, 58, 79, 101, 189
 Funeral carriage 104–105, 129, 130
 “King of Asia” 53, 58, 59, 64
 Opis 63
 Persianization 54–55, 63, 64, 68, 70, 71,
 219, 226, 250
 Succession crisis 58–73
 Alexander IV ix, 73, 74, 96, 103, 125, 159, 186,
 249
 Alexander of Epirus 111
 Alexander Tent xvi, 142, 165–166, 167–168, 179
 Alexandria (Caucasus) 222
 Alexandria (Egypt) xviii, 3, 27, 105, 227
 Alexandria Eschate xviii
 Alexandria (Kandahar) xviii, 87
 Almopians 235
 Alopece (deme) 19
 Amazons 19
 Ambracia (Ambraciots) xvii, 222
 Amisus xviii
 Amisus of Megalopolis
 (see Damis of Megalopolis) 68, 248
 Amorgos xiv
 Amphilocheians 222, 232, 233
 Amphimachus 173, 179, 205
 Amphipolis xvii, 49, 222, 223, 236, 238, 239
 Amyntas (satrap of Bactria) 87
 Amyntas I, King of Macedonia 59
 Amyntas II, King of Macedonia 48, 59
 Amyntas III, King of Macedonia 18, 39, 59
 Amyntas, son of Andromenes 227, 254
 Amyntas Perdicca 60, 61, 100
 Anachrosia 203, 258
 Androbazus 179
 Andromenes 254
 Antea 238
 Antigene 5, 89, 98, 107, 117, 123, 127, 160, 161,
 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 174, 179, 181, 163,
 189, 192, 198
 Antigonus Gonatas 12, 14, 33, 34, 155
 Antigonus Monophthalmus xiv, xv, 5, 7, 12,
 17, 31, 35, 37–38, 41, 55, 69, 76, 78, 79,
 81–82, 87, 92, 93, 94, 96–97, 102,
 103–104, 106, 110, 111–112, 113, 116–117,
 126–127, 129, 147–149, 150, 151–152,
 154–156, 157, 255, 256–257, 258

- Ambitions 137, 150–151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 261
 First Confrontation with Eumenes xv, xvi, 5, 6, 8, 12, 35, 132, 135–146
 Proclamation of kingship 8
 Royal General in Asia xv, xvi, 56, 127–128, 135–146, 152, 208–209, 259
 Second Confrontation with Eumenes 153, 162, 163–204
 Antiochus 68
 Antipater, general and regent xiv, 22, 30, 45, 47, 52, 53, 55, 62, 92, 94–95, 100
 Babylonian Settlement 65, 70, 71, 74–75, 95–96, 101
 Death 150, 151
 First Diadoch War xv, 97–98, 99, 102–105, 106, 108–109, 111, 112–119, 121, 126–128, 134–137, 139, 141, 142, 144, 147, 160, 176, 258
 Lamian War xiv, 77, 82–83, 85–86, 93, 108, 109, 125, 157, 158
 Aornus 56
 Apodotians 232, 233
 Apollo 223
 Apollodorus 87, 250
 Apollonia 217
 Apollonides of Cardia 45, 49, 238
 Apollonides, mercenary cavalry commander 143, 144, 145, 259
 Apollonides, Asian mercenary 214
 Apollonides, mercenary cavalry commander
 Arachosia 178, 188, 206
 Arbelitis 173
 Arcadia (Arcadians) 214, 215, 218, 223, 244, 249, 261
 Archelaus, King of Macedonia 46, 59, 234, 236
 Archelaus, son of Theodorus 160
 Archon 106, 113, 140
 Argaeus 36, 59
 Argeads (Argead; *see also* Temenid) viii, 1, 58, 60–61, 64, 69, 70, 98, 99, 101, 105, 107, 132, 162, 171, 204, 225, 256
 Argos (Argives) 58, 214, 216, 220, 222, 225, 226, 230, 231, 236, 244
 Argolis 214
 Argyraspids (*see also* Hypaspists) xvi, 6, 88, 89, 107, 115, 117, 127, 160, 161, 164, 169, 172, 174, 177, 179, 183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 194, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 264, 265
 Alexander's former infantry guard 89, 107, 117
 Ariarathes xiv, 11, 39, 76, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 88, 89, 91, 116
 Aristobulus 38, 248
 Aristonous 61, 64, 67, 68, 76, 98, 107, 111, 113, 171
 Aristotle 24, 223, 224
 Armenia (Armenians) xiv, 57, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 98, 106, 107, 113, 114, 119, 143, 145, 146, 186, 196
 Army Assemblies ix, 47, 61, 67, 124–125, 133–134, 147, 163, 227–228
 Arrhabaeus 235
 Arrhidaeus (King Philip III) ix, xvi, 39, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 98, 101, 166, 249, 256
 Arrhidaeus (Macedonian commander, regent, satrap) xv, 81, 101–102, 105–106, 112, 125, 126, 127, 150, 151, 155–156, 169, 176, 260
 Arrian 4, 6, 7, 11, 14, 37, 38, 40, 54, 56, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73, 79, 93, 103, 112, 113, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 128, 135, 137, 138, 161, 164, 175, 180, 226, 229, 236, 241, 242, 248
 Artabazus 60, 119, 120
 Artaxerxes 90
 Artosis 120
 Asander, satrap of Caria xv, 77, 102, 111, 112, 117, 136, 139, 169
 Asander, satrap of Lydia 86
 Asclepiodorus 87
 Asebeia 21
 Asiatic troops 246–248, 249
 Aspasia 216
 Asterodia 232
 Atalante 125, 126
 Atarrhias 211
 Athamanes 232
 Athena 243
 Athens (Athenians) 14, 15, 16, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 35, 42, 43, 45, 66, 84, 86, 95, 102, 108, 111, 128, 129, 151, 156, 157, 158, 159, 187, 207, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224, 233, 235, 242, 243, 244, 250, 261
 Atropates 76, 78
 Attalus 44, 50, 51, 65, 66, 105, 107, 110, 112, 122, 125, 126, 140, 141, 142, 149, 150, 241

- Attica 219
 Audata 50, 100
 Axios 224, 234
- Babylon, Babylonia (Babylonians) xiv, xvi, xviii, 7, 33, 39, 52, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 95, 100, 101–102, 104, 105, 106, 113, 130, 131, 140, 164, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189, 207–208, 209, 210, 211, 248, 249, 260
Babylonian Astronomical Diaries 206
Babylonian Chronicle 130, 208
 Babylonian citadel(s) xvi, 87, 174, 177, 208–209
 Babylonian crisis 58–76, 86, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 113, 116, 124–125, 132, 167, 204, 247, 256
- Bacchiads 51, 226
 Bactria (Bactrians) xviii, 60, 87, 133, 299, 203, 222, 243, 245
 Badace 183, 184
 “Baggage” 145, 146, 172, 178, 185, 188, 181, 194, 195, 197, 202, 257, 258
 Baghdad 63
 Balacrus 76, 78, 92, 93
 “Barbarians” 216, 217, 222, 224, 226, 232, 234, 239, 243, 250
 Bargylia 227
 Barsine 60, 64
 Besaltia (Bisaltians) 47, 235
 Bitumen 12
 “Blood-feud” 253
 Boeotia (Boeotians) 214, 215, 219, 220, 221, 223, 243, 244
 Bomiensians 233
 Bottiaeans 235
 Byzantine, Byzantium 25, 26, 37, 58, 77, 129, 171
- Cadmus 216
 Calliensians 233
 Callisthenes 226
 Cappadocia (Cappadocians) xiv, xvi, xviii, 35, 39, 57, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 107, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119, 127, 128, 135, 136, 141, 143, 146, 152, 156, 160, 162, 163, 165, 170, 185, 204, 252
 Cappadocian cavalry 91–92, 107, 109, 112, 119, 141, 143, 146, 168
 Caranus 60
 Cardia (early history) xvii, 29–30, 41, 42–43
 Caria (Carians) xvii, 51, 52, 76, 87, 102, 111, 136, 139, 169, 216
 Carian villages xvii, 173, 174
 Carmania xviii, 178, 203
 Cassander xv, xvi, 16, 137, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 169, 171, 186, 187, 188, 206, 207, 211
 Cassopaeians 232
 Castor 241
 Casualties 13, 119, 144, 148, 184, 185, 186, 192, 194, 204, 210, 238
 Celaenae xvii, 94, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 149, 153, 155, 158
 Celbanus 205
 Cersobleptes 42–43
 Chaeronea, battle of 44, 59, 202, 235, 243, 244
 Chalcidice (Chalcidians) 219, 235
 Chancellery 46, 53, 76, 241
 Chaonians 232
 Chiliarch xv, 56, 71, 98, 116, 137, 155, 157, 159, 252
 Chios (Chians) xvii, 120, 218, 221
 Cicero 18
 Cilicia (Cilicians) xiv, xvi, xviii, 35, 62, 71, 75, 76, 78, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 127, 132, 135, 138, 139, 146, 154, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 170, 179, 209, 246, 258
 Clazomenae 42, 218, 221
 Cleitus, Companion of Alexander the Great 241
 Cleitus, fleet commander, satrap xv, xvi, 85, 107–108, 109, 111, 112–113, 114, 117, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162, 171–172, 192, 207, 208, 229
 Cleomenes 76, 79, 87, 99, 103, 251
 Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great xiv, 69, 83, 84, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 111, 112, 135, 136, 139, 159, 204, 256
 Cleopatra, wife of Philip II 50–51
 Clitarchus 10
 Cliton 3, 226
 Cnidus xvii, 218

- Coele-Syria xviii, 173
 Coenus 227, 248
 Colonies (colonists) 80, 222, 223, 234, 244, 245, 248, 256, 259
 Colophon xvii, 221
 Coprates River, battle on xvi, 180–184, 192, 207, 210, 211
 Corcyra (Corcyraeans) xvii, 217, 244
 Corinth (Corinthians) xvii, xviii, 51, 74, 226, 233, 244
 Cornelius Nepos (*see* Nepos)
 Corragus 243
 Cortege (Alexander's funeral) 101, 102, 105, 130
 Cossaeans 70, 184, 249
 Cotys 42
 Crannon, battle of xiv, xvii, 84, 85, 86
 Craterus xiv, 54–55, 62, 65, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 83, 89, 92, 94, 95, 138, 159, 229, 257, 261
 Ambitions 77, 85–86, 94, 95, 96, 99
 Death xv, 77, 120–121, 123, 124, 125–126
 Invasion of Asia xv, 8, 57, 84, 85–86, 99, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109–110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116–120, 143
 Crateuas 68, 180, 197
 Cratylus 47, 236
 Crenides (*see* Philippi) xvii, 14, 17, 37, 47, 236
 Crestonia (Crestonians) 235
 Crete xvii, xviii, 49, 238, 251
 Cretopolis 148, 151
 Croton 217
 Ctesias 19
 Cyinda 75, 89, 97, 142, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 179, 184, 209
 Cynnane xiv, 100, 101, 103, 107, 116, 122, 260
 Cyprus (Cypriots) xv, xviii, 8, 99, 110, 111, 113, 127, 165, 171, 197
 Cyrene xiv, xviii, 99, 103, 222
 Cyrus 53, 79, 133, 135, 231, 249, 252
 Cyzicus xvii, 112, 155, 156, 169

 Damascus xviii, 60
 Damis of Megalopolis 68, 248
 Darius I (King of Persia) 90
 Darius III (King of Persia) 53, 60, 79, 85, 89, 91, 100, 122, 133, 134
 Dasht-I Kavir xviii, 190, 196
 Deidameia 186
 Delphi xvii, 22, 217, 234
 Demades 30, 95, 97, 102, 103, 151
 Demarchus 76
 Deme 19
 Demetrius, son of Antigonus Monophthalmus 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 155, 192, 200, 201, 203, 204, 258, 260
 Demetrius, of Phalerum xvi, 156–157, 187, 207
 Demochares 14, 15–16
 Demosthenes, Athenian orator 14, 30, 44, 46, 226, 239, 244
 Demosthenes, Athenian general 233
 Derdas I, king of Elimeia 235
 Derdas II, king of Elimeia 235
 Diadoch Wars
 First xv, 103–149
 Second 154–206
Diadochi (Successors) 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 26, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 47, 67, 86, 91, 129, 134, 166, 192, 248, 260
 Diodorus of Sicily 4, 6, 8–9, 14, 16, 20–34, 35, 37–38, 39–40
 Diogenes 19
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 10, 11, 13, 121
 Dioscuri 241
 Dioxippus 243, 244
 Diphilus 209
 Diyllus 14, 16–17
 Dizful 180
 Docimus 140, 141, 149
 Dorians 214, 224, 225, 230
 Drangiane 179, 256
 Drypetis 100
 Duris of Samos 9, 14, 18–20, 24, 29, 31, 41, 42, 84, 121, 144, 147, 154

 Ecbatana xviii, 97, 134, 178, 184, 185, 188, 190, 204
 Edonians 235
 Egypt, Perdiccas' invasion of 7, 31, 105–107, 110–111, 113, 121–124
 Eleans 232, 244
 Elephants 26, 85, 110, 126, 139, 143, 144, 147, 148, 175, 178, 180, 181, 185, 187, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202
 Eleusis 218
Eleutheria 231
 Elimeia (Elimeians) 234, 235
 Elimiotis 50, 228
 Emathia 47

- Endymion 232
 Eordians 239
 Epeius 232
 Ephemerides 53, 54
 Ephesus (Ephesian) xvii, xviii, 108, 111, 112, 156, 221
 Ephorus 19, 24, 25, 226
Epieikeia 21
Epigoni 10, 36
Epimeletes 186
 Epirus (Epirotes) xvii, xviii, 50, 51, 159, 186, 211, 227, 230, 232, 235, 260
 Erigyius 69, 251
 Erythrae (Erythraeans) xvii, 221
Esebeia 21
 Ethnicity 2, 51, 213–240, 246, 248, 261
 Euboea (Euboeans) xvii, 214, 223, 236, 244
 Eudamus, brother of Pithon 175, 180
 Eudamus, satrap of India 6, 179, 180, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199, 203, 205
Euergesia 21
 Eumenes
 Alexander tent xvi, 165–168, 179
 Ambition 1, 26, 204–205, 206
 Antigonid ally xv, 152–154, 159–162, 163, 203
 Crisis in Babylon 57, 68–76
 Death xvi, 204
 Diplomatic skill 51–54
 Early life xiv, 11, 19, 35, 41–46, 47, 49–53
 First Diadoch War xv, 1, 111–121, 134–146
 “Friendships” 54–56, 84
 Hetairos of Philip II, Alexander III 49
 Loyalty 1–2, 5, 51, 53, 54, 78, 84, 132, 166
 Military skill 1, 4–5, 57, 81, 106–107, 117–118, 119–121
 Nora xv, 146–147, 149–154
 Operations in Armenia xiv, 89–92
 Prejudice against 2, 6, 114–115, 164–165, 205
 Royal General in Asia xvi, 162, 163–203
 Royal secretary 45–46
 Satrap xiv, 76, 78–79, 86, 87, 91
 Service with Alexander 53–57, 107
 Euphantus 14, 31
 Euripides 215, 232, 250
 Eurydice, mother of Philip II 50, 51
 Eurydice (Adea), wife of Philip III xiv, xvi, 100–101, 123, 126, 136, 137, 159, 162, 186, 187, 188, 206, 207
 Eurydice, daughter of Antipater xiv, 94–95
 Eurytians 222, 233
 Eusebius 48, 212
 Ezra 53

Fasti 25
 “Friendship” 43, 49, 54–56, 104, 154

 Gabene, battle of xviii, 5, 8, 57, 81, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196–203
 Gadamala 195
 Gamarga xviii, 195, 196
 Gandaridae 134
 Gaugamela, battle of 56, 88, 90, 122, 134, 242, 250, 251
 Gauls 234
 Gaza xviii, 7, 31, 258
 Gela 217
 Gelonians 215, 216
 Gelon 216
 Getae 50
 Glaucus of Aetolia 250
 Glus, son of Tamos 221
 Granicus, battle of 134, 237, 242, 243, 250

 Haliacmon, river 234
 Halicarnassus xvii, 87, 218
 Halys River 76, 79
 Hamadan 184
 Hecataeus, Cardian tyrant 43, 44, 53, 82, 84
 Hecataeus, historian and ethnographer 235
 Hecataeus, Macedonian name 45
 Hellen 213, 215, 218, 222, 224, 232
 Hellanicus 224, 230
 Hellenion 218
Hellenodicaï 225
 Hellespontine Phrygia xvii, 76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 92, 100, 112, 135, 136, 139, 151, 155, 176, 260
 Hephaestion 54–55, 56, 255
 Hera 230
 Heracleia xvii, 6, 13, 17, 18, 39, 223
 Heracles, hero 241
 Heracles, son of Alexander III 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 241, 256
 Hermolaus 254

- Herodotus 15, 59, 183, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 226, 234, 235
- Hesiod 6, 220, 224
- Hetairos* 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62, 69, 81, 98, 120, 238, 239, 240, 241, 251, 253, 254
- Hieronimus, father of Eumenes 41, 42, 43
- Hieronimus of Cardia, historian 1, 9–14, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29–30, 32–33, 34–36, 37, 38, 39–40, 73, 78–79, 98, 106, 116, 121, 128, 129, 144, 145, 147, 149–152, 154, 159, 160, 173, 181, 184–185, 196, 199, 201, 203, 238, 247, 261
- Himera 9
- Hippias 217
- Hirakla 146
- Histiaea 236
- Holcias 64, 138, 139, 259
- Homer 6, 215, 216, 218, 220, 224, 233
- Hoplite 202, 235, 236, 242
- Hubris* 21
- Hydarnids 89
- Hypaspists (*see also* Argyraspids) 88, 89, 92, 107, 115, 117, 138, 160, 161, 169, 192, 201, 229, 252, 254
- Hypaspists (of the Diadochs) 117, 192
- Hyperides 44
- Hyphasis River 63, 134, 248
- Hysiae 214
- Idumaea (Idumaeans) 208, 209, 210, 211
- Ignotus* 67
- Illyria (Illyians) xvii, 50, 51, 74, 101, 226, 235, 239, 258
- Iolaos 94
- Iollas 211
- Ion 76, 218
- Ionia (Ionians) 111, 214, 215, 221, 223
- Iphigenia 6
- Ipsus, battle of xvii, 4, 7, 12, 16, 20, 29, 128, 205
- Iran (Iranians) 182, 196, 249
- Iraq 63, 79, 130
- Isaeus 6
- Isaurians 76, 78, 92, 93
- Isfahan 190
- Isocrates 24, 46, 215, 216, 220, 225, 226
- Issus, battle of 53, 76, 79, 85, 93, 94, 226, 242, 243, 250
- Isthmia 217
- Josephus 10
- Josiah 214
- Justin 6, 31, 38–39, 41, 47, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 73, 75, 76, 96, 100, 106, 107, 108, 114, 118, 119, 128, 132, 150, 164, 202, 203, 236, 245, 246, 258
- Koine* 219
- Lacedaemonians 242
- Lagus 38, 58, 248
- Lamian War (Hellenic War) 77, 82–83, 85–86, 93
- Lampus 234
- Laomedon 49, 76, 77, 139, 169, 238, 256
- Larandians 76, 78, 92, 93, 116
- League of Corinth, Peace of Corinth 44, 157–158, 251
- Lebedos 221
- Lemnos (Lemnians) xvii, 215
- Leonnatus xiv, 37, 38, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 95, 112, 117, 159, 176, 192, 238, 256
- Leosthenes 23
- Leucadians 244
- Livy 3, 227, 234
- Locris xvii, 109, 233
- Lower Macedonia 53, 230, 234, 237, 239, 253
- Lycaonia xviii, 76, 79, 138, 146
- Lycia (Lycians) xvii, 76, 78, 79, 106, 138, 165, 227, 251
- Lydia (Lydians) xvii, 86, 88, 102, 106, 111, 112, 117, 128, 135, 136, 137, 139, 151, 156, 249
- Lyncestis (Lyncestians) 47, 51, 226, 228, 234, 235, 238
- Lyncos xvii, 235
- Lysimachus 7, 18, 37, 38, 41, 61, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 81, 82, 83, 99, 127, 186, 256, 258
- Macedon, son of Aeolus 224
- Macedonia
- Army 133–134, 137–138, 154
 - Army in Asia 62–63, 133–134, 166, 248
 - Ethnicity 213–240, 243–244
 - Local government 231, 237, 240, 241

- Monarchy 46–49, 58, 59–63, 100, 101–102, 238–239
 Polygamy 50–51
 Royal Succession 58–61, 74, 79, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 106, 126, 132, 134, 137, 138, 140, 142–143, 147
 Maedians 47
 Mardonius 220
 Marsyas of Pella 17
 Marsyas of Philippi 14, 17
 Mazaeus 87
 Mazurus 160
 Meda 50
 Media xviii, 76, 97, 134, 152, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 185, 186, 189, 191, 195
 Megalopolis (Megalopolitans) xvii, 68, 188, 314, 248
 Megara (Megarians) xvii, 217, 244
Megistoi 59
 Meleager 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 97, 98, 116, 256, 261
 Memnon 6, 18, 60, 120, 250
 Memphis xviii, 105, 110, 123, 129
 Menander xvi, 102, 104, 106, 111, 112, 117, 128, 145, 163, 170
 Menelaus 258
 Menyllus 157
 Mercenaries 2, 63, 66, 70, 80–81, 82, 85, 86, 99, 109, 115, 119, 121, 122, 123, 133, 134, 143, 156, 162, 164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 176, 186, 189, 205, 222, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252, 257–258, 260
 Mesopotamia xviii, 33, 102, 173, 178, 179, 180, 210
 Messene xvii, 44
 Methone 236
 Mideia 214
 Miletus xvii, 42, 217, 221
 Miltiades 42, 46, 222, 238
 Milyas 148
Mimesis 19
 Mithrenes 88
 Molossia (Molossians) 107, 232
 Mules 64, 101, 129, 130
 Munychia xv, 157
 Mutiny 63, 66, 83, 121, 122, 126, 136, 164, 258, 259
 Mycenae 214, 235
 Myllinas 56
 Myrmidons 48
 Mytilene (Mytileneans) xvii, 48, 69, 218, 238, 251, 256
 Myus 221
 Nabataea 10
 Naucratis xviii, 218
 Naxos xvii, 217
 Nearchus 48, 64, 68, 69, 76, 78, 152, 238, 251, 256
 Nemea 217
 Neoptolemus, satrap and general xiv, xv, 5, 34, 57, 69, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 106, 107, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118–119, 120, 121, 125, 143, 146, 252, 254, 260, 261, 266
 Neoptoleums, son of Achilles 232
 Nepos (Cornelius Nepos) 1, 4, 6, 8, 14, 19, 20, 31, 34–35, 39, 41, 42, 49, 84, 111, 114, 118, 128, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 165, 191, 193, 204, 256
 Neroassus 146
 Nibis 227
 Nicaea xiv, 38, 94, 95, 96, 100, 103, 104
 Nicias 86
 Nicanor, brother of Cassander xvi, 211
 Nicanor, garrison commander
 and Cassander's fleet commander xv, xvi, 157, 171, 192, 207, 208
 Nicanor, commander Alexandria-in-Caucasus 87
 Nicanor, satrap 127, 152
 Nicesipolis 50
 Nicias 5, 86
 Nicomedia 37
 Nile 109, 110, 123
 Niobe 215
 Nora xv, 34, 35, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 160, 161, 170, 204, 206, 255
 Nymphis 14, 17, 18
 Odrysian 42, 234
 Odysseus 206
 Odyssey 6, 31
 Olympia xvii, 217, 225, 226, 234
 Olympiad 25, 128, 212
 Olympians 23
 Olympias ix, xvi, 6, 34, 50–51, 52, 74, 96, 152, 159, 161, 162, 163, 169, 186–187, 211, 212
 Olympic Games 212,
 Olynthus (Olynthians) 13, 23
 Omares 250

- Ophionians 233
 Opis, mutiny 63, 70, 73, 249, 250
 Oracles 9, 23
 Orcynia, battle of 6, 143–144, 146
 Orestes 68, 88, 90, 126, 145, 186, 188
 Orestis (Orestians) 228, 234, 253
 Orontes River xviii, 68, 88, 89, 90, 126, 145, 186, 188
 Ostraca 208, 209, 210
 Oxyartes 78
- Paenonia (Paeonians) 224, 226, 235, 239
 Pages 37, 117, 192, 254, 255
 Palimpsest (Vatican) 4, 6, 37, 135, 139, 140, 146
 Pamphylia (Pamphylians) xviii, 76, 78, 81, 106, 251
 Pancration 243
 Panhellenism 217, 220, 223
 Panion 54, 56
 Panionion 221
 Paphlagonia (Paphlagonians) xviii, 78, 79, 83, 88, 106, 116, 120, 165, 227, 252
 Paraetacene, battle of xviii, 6, 57, 117, 161, 189–194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 211, 248
 Parian Marble 99, 119, 139, 151, 154, 169, 207, 208, 211, 212
 Paron of Phocis 250
 Parmenio 60, 112, 241, 254, 255
 Paroponisdade 179
 Paros 129
 Parthia (Parthians) xviii, 175, 177, 178, 196
 Pasargadae xviii, 97, 190
 Pasas of Thessaly 68, 248
 Pasitigris River 181, 182, 183
 Pausanias, garrison commander 86
 Pausanias, geographer 41, 87, 123, 214, 215, 232
 Pausanias, Macedonian king 48, 59
 Peace of Philocrates 43, 44
 Pelagonia 47
 Pelasgians 214, 215, 216
 Pelasgus 215, 218
 Pella xvii, 17, 47, 55, 158, 236, 238
 Pelusium xviii, 109, 110
 Pelops 216
 Pentacontaetia 24
 Perdiccas, Eumenid cavalry commander 142
 Perdiccas, I, Macedonian king 59
 Perdiccas, II, Macedonian king 59
 Perdiccas, III, Macedonian king 59, 60, 61
 Perdiccas, regent xiv, xv, 1, 4, 5, 7, 31, 37, 38, 39, 42, 56, 59, 60, 61–65, 66, 67, 68, 69–70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84–85, 87, 88–124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 149, 152, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 173, 174, 176, 185, 187, 204, 205, 206, 236, 241, 246, 247, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 261
 Pergamon xvii, 227
 Pericles 18, 236
 Perilaus 69, 248
 Perinthus, siege of 250
 “*Periokoi*” 223
 Persepolis xviii, 87, 88, 97, 133, 134, 167, 179, 182, 185, 188, 190, 192
 Perseus 36, 235, 236
 Persian War 24, 217, 223, 227
 Persis (Persia, Persians) xvii, 35, 42, 44, 53, 64, 70, 78, 87, 89, 90, 111, 165, 173, 175, 178, 181, 182, 185, 188, 194, 199, 200, 203, 206, 217, 218, 221, 223, 235, 242, 243, 245, 249
 Peucestas 5, 34, 35, 55, 61, 67, 117, 161, 165, 166, 167, 175, 178, 179, 181, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192, 194, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 206, 246, 249, 250
Pezhetairoi 49, 59, 237, 238, 240, 252
 Phaedisimus 6, 198, 199
 Phaenarete 19
 Phalanx (Phalangites) 90, 117, 118, 120, 121, 144, 148, 183, 192, 193, 200, 201, 202, 248
 Phalerum xvi, 156, 187, 207
 Pharnabazus 119, 120
 Phaselis xvii, 218
 Phila, daughter of Antipater 94, 95, 155
 Phila, wife of Philip II 50
 Philinna 50
 Philip I, King of Macedonia 59
 Philip II, King of Macedonia 2, 3, 19, 22–23, 28, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42–47, 48, 49, 50–53, 57, 59–61, 69, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 112, 117, 157–158, 167, 185, 201, 225–226, 231, 234, 236, 237, 238–239, 240, 241, 242–243, 244, 248, 250, 253, 255, 256, 257
 Philip III (Arrhidaeus), King of Macedonia ix, xiv, xvi, 39, 67, 71, 73–74, 82, 96–97, 100, 101, 122–123, 126, 130–131, 142, 152, 157–159, 164, 166, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 186–187, 190, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211

- Philip iv, King of Macedonia 16
 Philip v, King of Macedonia 232–233, 239
 Philip, satrap of Bactria 200
 Philip, satrap of Parthia 175
 Philippi (*see* Crenides) xvii, 14, 17, 47, 236
 Philo 14
 Philocrates 43, 44
Philos (Philo) 21, 49, 55, 150, 186
 Philotas 55, 113, 169, 170, 175, 227, 228, 254, 255
 Philoxenus 113, 164
 Phocaea 218, 221
 Phocis (Phocians) xvii, 19, 22, 244, 250
 Phocion xvi, 30, 31, 157
 Phoenicia (Phoenicians) xvi, 113, 139, 140, 165, 169, 171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 206, 207, 208
 Phoenix 120
 Photius 4, 26, 37, 73, 85, 103, 112, 113, 114, 116, 122, 123, 124, 128, 138, 175
 Phrataphernes 78
 Phrygia xviii, 81, 83, 87, 93, 94, 97, 104, 106, 117, 118, 119, 135, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148, 165, 255, 259
 Phthiotis 215
 Phylarchus 13
 Piera (Pierians) 224, 235
 Pigres, cavalry commander 119
 Pigres, interpreter 221
 Piraeus xvii, 156, 157
 Pisaeus 68
 Pisidia (Pisidians) xvii, 39, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115, 117, 136, 138, 139–140, 141, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 165
 Pisidic *aulon* 117, 148, 192
 Pithon xv, 61, 67, 68, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 98, 107, 123, 124, 125, 126, 140, 173, 174–177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 191, 192, 193–194, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 246, 247
 Pittacus 216, 221
 Pixodarus 51, 60
 Plataea (Plataeans) 215
 Plato 216, 217, 221
Pleonexia 51, 60
 Plutarch 1, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 30, 34–36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 52, 54, 66, 68, 82, 84, 90, 91, 114, 116, 118, 120, 121, 132, 136, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 162, 164, 166, 167, 179, 182, 183, 188, 189, 193, 195, 198, 201, 203, 204, 205, 216, 229, 241, 255
 Polemon 105, 140, 141, 149
 Polyaeus 4, 5, 6, 7, 31, 36–37, 136, 138, 144, 145, 148, 166, 193, 194, 195
 Polybius 10, 13, 15, 22, 23, 24, 26, 32, 33, 232, 234, 239
 Polycles 109
 Polyperchon xv, xiv, 6, 56, 68, 74, 77, 109, 119, 127, 155, 159, 168, 171, 172, 186, 187–188, 248
 Freedom decree xv, 157–159
 Alliance with Eumenes xvi, 142, 151, 152, 153–154, 160–162, 163, 169, 171, 185
 Pompeius Trogus 4, 38, 66, 128, 153
 Porphyrogenitus 24, 224
 Priene 221
Principes 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 94, 97, 101, 113, 117, 124, 125, 126, 127
Prostates (Prostasia) 71, 72, 74, 77, 186
 Prostration 226
 Protagoras 216
 Protogeneia 232
Proxenos 42
 Ptolemaeus, garrison commander 87
 Ptolemais 26
 Ptolemy, III, King of Egypt 14, 17, 27
 Ptolemy of Alorus 61
 Ptolemy, general and satrap xiv, xvi, 7, 8, 31, 32–34, 38, 41, 56, 61, 64, 67, 69, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 87, 92, 94–95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 105–106, 107, 109, 110–111, 113, 122–124, 125–126, 127, 129, 130, 139, 155, 157, 160, 161, 166, 167, 168–169, 170, 171, 172, 211, 248, 256, 257, 258
 Ptolemy, nephew of Antigonus 55
 Pydna xvii, 187, 211, 236
 Pyrrhus, King of Epirus 11, 33, 41, 260
 Quintilian 228
 Regalia (royal) 166
 Regency 59–61, 62, 63, 64, 74, 75, 83, 105, 124, 125, 127, 129, 131, 155, 157, 160, 162, 186, 187
 Rhodes (Rhodians) xvii, xviii, 60, 111, 140, 158, 171, 218, 250

- Roxane 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 73, 83, 96, 100, 103, 249
 Royal General in Asia (*Strategos Autocrator*)
 114, 142–143, 160–161
- Sabictas 76
 Salamis 8, 31, 219
 Samos (Samians) xvii, xviii, 9, 14, 18, 22, 41, 95, 158, 217, 221
 Sangala 56
 Sardanapalus 19
 Sardis xvii, 86, 88, 100, 102, 103, 104, 111, 112, 135, 137, 139, 159
 Scythia (Scythians) 215, 225
 Seleucus 7, 31, 32, 56, 68, 98, 107, 123, 126–127, 130, 140, 173–174, 175–178, 181, 183, 194, 205, 206, 207–210, 254, 255, 259, 261
 Sertorius 1, 43
 Seuthes 74, 76, 82
 Shushtar 182
 Sibyrtius 178, 188, 203, 206, 258
 Siwah xviii, 101, 105
 Smyrna xviii, 217
 Socrates 19, 40
 Sogdiana (Sogdians) 60, 133, 241, 245, 249
Somaphylax, Somaphylaces 61, 62, 67, 83, 179
 Sophroniscus 19
 Sosigenes 172
 Sparta (Spartans) xvii, 33, 214, 219, 233, 235, 242, 244, 245
Stadion 226, 234
 Stasander 179, 203, 205
 Stasanor 203, 251, 256
 Stateira 100, 103
 Stirrups 201, 202
 Strabo 79, 123, 146, 153, 183, 220, 227, 235
 Stratonice 141
 Susa xvi, xviii, 54, 70, 87, 88, 97, 127, 142, 160, 161, 164, 169, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 188, 209, 249, 258
 Susiane 35, 160–161, 165–166, 173, 175, 178, 179, 181, 184, 188, 192, 207, 209
 Sympolity 233
 Synoris 234
 Syracuse (Syracusans) 9, 216, 217
- Tabae (Tabenians) 17
 Tacitus 228
 Tammuz 105
 Tamos 221
 Tapurians 70, 249
 Taras 217
 Tarentine 200
 Tarsus xviii, 79
 Tauromenium 9
 Taurus Mountains 163
 Tegea, siege of xvii, 211
 Temenid (*see* Argead) 58
 Temenus 58
 Tenedos 120
 Teos 218, 221
 Termessus 117, 148, 149, 192
Tethrippon 234
 Tetrapolis 219
 Teutamus 5, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 170, 192, 198, 202
 Thaetetus 5
 Thapsacus 130
 Theander 34
 Theano 19
 Thebes (Thebans) xvii, 13, 19, 30, 212, 216, 217, 220, 223, 233, 243, 244
 Theodorus 160
 Theopompus 19, 41
 Thesprotians 232
 Thessalonike 39
 Thessaly (Thessalians) 41, 50, 65, 82, 108, 109, 217, 221, 223, 239, 242, 244, 248
 Thrace (Thracians) xvii, 23, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 47, 53, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 99, 108, 127, 172, 178, 222, 230, 234, 235, 239, 246, 255
 Thucydides 11, 13, 15, 215, 218, 220, 222, 225, 226, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236
 Thurii 223
 Thymondas 250
 Tigris River xviii, 80, 173, 177, 178, 181, 183
 Timaeus 9, 28
 Tlepolemus 178
 Tragic History 15–16, 18–19
 Trapezus 214
 Triparadeisus xv, 74, 99, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 136, 138, 139, 140, 142, 152, 155, 160, 161, 164, 174, 175, 176, 206, 207, 258, 259, 260

Troy 218, 232, 239

Tyana 135

Tymphaea (Tymphaeans) 228, 234

Tyre xviii, 111, 125, 126, 140, 142

Uxians 182

Xandicus 158

Xennias 121, 229

Xenopatra 224

Xenophilus 87, 160, 161, 181, 182

Xenophon 15, 16, 79, 133, 214, 220, 221, 223,
228, 231, 250

Xerxes 133, 235

Zephyrion 168

Zeus 215, 224, 232